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The health of oceanic fish stocks is a cause for concern. In UK waters, just under half of monitored 
stocks are being harvested at or beyond sustainable levels. This thesis seeks to identify the potential 
role for the legal doctrine of the public right to fish in targeting sustainable fishing. This right exists in 
English tidal waters, yet is relatively poorly understood even in legal scholarship, with technical 
issues such as the ownership of the right remaining unclear. Nonetheless, government has often 
stressed the importance of the public interest in fisheries management. It is therefore important to 
understand more deeply the exact legal nature of this interest, especially with respect to the 
implications for the powers and duties appertaining to those managing the interest.  
This thesis uses a legal geography methodology to identify both how the public fishery is owned and 
what duties (if any) are attendant upon such ownership. Part of this challenge is squarely within the 
remit of black letter legal analysis, though this by itself is insufficient to address the research 
question.  Empirically this research explores how the public fishery is understood and experienced in 
practice by key institutions and actors within the Devon & Severn Inshore Fisheries and Conservation 
Authority.  Through a novel synthesis of the legal and social dimensions of the IFCA, a critical legal 
geography of the public fishery and its potential links to sustainably fishing emerges. 
This thesis demonstrates that there is a clear and coherent legal argument underpinning a legal view 
of the fishery as managed as a public trust. The public trust imposes duties on those responsible for 
managing the fishery to ensure that management decisions taken are for the wider public benefit 
(including future generations). In addition, the case study shows that those involved in the practice 
of fishing already identify this public interest in the fishery and the notion of balance in the use of 
fishery resources that it prompts. Furthermore, the legal geography of the public fishery identified 
the potential for a public trust interpretation of the fishery to continue the task of redistributing 
power within the fishery such that it takes account of the wider public interest including the interest 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1    Chapter Introduction 
This chapter presents the context and rationale of the research, together with its theoretical 
framework. It sets out the aims and objectives for the research and introduces the methodological 
approach taken for the research, highlighting the contribution to knowledge claimed by the 
research. The chapter also contains a brief introduction to the subject of property rights as they 
relate to fishing, including a summary of the key term ‘fishery’ and its attendant legal meanings and 
consequences. The chapter finishes with a road map of the thesis, setting out how the research will 
be presented within this document.   
1.2    Context and Rationale 
Declining fish stocks around the world are a cause for concern. The Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (“FAO”) reports that as at 2017, 34.2% of the world’s fish stocks 
that it monitors are overfished (i.e.: fished at a biologically unsustainable level)1 and 59.6% of the 
monitored fish stocks are fully fished (i.e.: fished at maximum sustainable yield level and therefore 
with no room for any further expansion in catch).2 Therefore only 6.2% of the world’s fish stocks that 
are monitored by the FAO have any room for further growth in fishing activities3 that the increasing 
global population and the increasing demands of that population for fish as a source of high quality 
protein will require.4 This figure shows an overall downward trend over the last decade of FAO 
reports, from a ‘high’ of 15% in the 2010 report. 5  
At the European Union scale, the European Environment Agency reported in 20196 that around 45% 
of the fish and shellfish stocks that are monitored in European Waters are not in ‘good 
 
1 Food and Agriculture Committee of the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: 
Sustainability in Action (Rome, 2020), 47 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Luc van Hoof, Gianna Fabi, Vergar Johansen, Josien Steenbergen, Xabier Irigoien, Sarah Smith, Dennis Lisbjerg 
and Gerd Kraus, ‘Food from the ocean; towards a research agenda for sustainable use of our oceans’ natural 
resources’ (2019) 105 Marine Policy 44 
5 Food and Agriculture Committee of the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: 
Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (Rome, 2018), 40; Food and Agriculture Committee of the United 
Nations, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Contributing to Food Security and Nutrition for All 
(Rome, 2016), 38; Food and Agriculture Committee of the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture: Opportunities and Challenges (Rome, 2014), 37; Food and Agriculture Committee of the United 
Nations, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (Rome, 2012), 53; Food and Agriculture Committee of 
the United Nations, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (Rome, 2010), 35 
6 European Environment Agency, Status of Marine Fish and Shellfish Stocks in European Seas (10 October 2019) 
<https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/status-of-marine-fish-stocks-4/assessment> accessed 
6 December 2019 
10 
 
environmental status’ as required by the Marine Strategy Framework Directive.7 This is a big 
improvement on the figure of 74% for the previous year,8 but it is worth noting that a significant 
amount of the stocks classed as in ‘good environmental status’ only achieved that status by meeting 
one of the two measures (fishing mortality and reproductive capacity).9 In the UK the figures are 
similar, with just under half of the monitored fish stocks being assessed by the Marine Management 
Organisation as being either unsustainably harvested or at risk of being harvested unsustainably in 
2018.10 In addition, the Marine Conservation Society reports that progress in the improvement of 
the health of UK fish stocks has stalled,11 with several shellfish fisheries and smaller fisheries still 
either red or orange rated in the Society’s Good Fish Guide.12 
The traditional approach to fisheries management has been to regulate fishing activities on a species 
specific basis.13 Indeed, Mora et al report in their global study of marine fisheries that only 7% of the 
world’s exclusive economic zones “use holistic models as a basis of management 
recommendations.”14 The situation of the bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) provides an illustration from 
the European context of such single species-focused regulation in action. The bass was an 
unregulated species in Europe for many years meaning that fishers (mostly from the UK, France and 
the Netherlands) were free to catch as many as they could. However, in 2016 the state of the bass 
stocks in the fishery was such that the EU imposed emergency restrictions on the catch of wild 
bass.15 Since then the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (“ICES”) has warned that 
 
7 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a 
framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive) OJ L164/19 
8 European Environment Agency, Status of Marine Fish and Shellfish Stocks in European Seas (3 April 2018) 
<https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/status-of-marine-fish-stocks-3/assessment> accessed 
19 December 2018 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider these figures in detail, but the large increase in stocks being 
classed as of ‘good environmental status’ is somewhat surprising and may indicate a change in measurement is 
behind some of the improvement.  
9 European Environment Agency (n6) 
10 Marine Management Organisation, UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2018 (October 2019), 91-108 
11 Clare Fischer, ‘No UK fisheries go ‘green’ in latest Good Fish Guide ratings’ Marine Conservation Society (14 
March 2019) <https://www.mcsuk.org/news/march_fisheries_latest> accessed 8 April 2019 
12 <https://www.mcsuk.org/goodfishguide/search> accessed 8 April 2019 
13 Emma Cardwell and Thomas Thornton, ‘The fisherly imagination: The promise of geographical approaches to 
marine management’ (2015) 64 Geoforum 157, 158; see also John Trochta, Maite Ons, Merrill Rudd, Melissa 
Krigbaum, Alexander Tanz and Ray Hilborn, ‘Ecosystem-based fisheries management: Perception on 
definitions, implementation, and aspirations’ (2018) Plos One 13(1), 2 
14 Camillo Mora, Ransom Myers, Marta Coll, Simone Libralato, Tony Pitcher, Rashid Sumaila, Dirk Zeller, Reg 
Watson, Kevin Gaston and Boris Worm, ‘Management Effectiveness of the World’s Marine Fisheries’ (2009) 
7(6) PLoS Biology e1000131, 2 
15 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/127 of 20 January 2017 fixing for 2017 the fishing opportunities for certain fish 
stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Union waters and, for Union fishing vessels, in certain non-Union 
waters [2017] OJ L24/1, Article 9 
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those restrictions have not been enough to rescue bass stocks.16 There is suggestion by some 
fishermen that the collapse of the northern European bass stocks is a result of the displacement of 
fishing activity onto that stock following the regulation of other stocks, with the French association 
PPPAF (Platform for Small Scale Artisanal Fisheries) arguing that “[t]he crisis is caused by the 
complete dysfunctionality of the entire sector. It has been brought about by the previous over 
exploitation of the hake, followed by the anchovy, and now by the sole, leading to displacement of 
effort onto the bass”.17  
The above illustration shows some of the problems inherent in single species, let alone multiple 
species or holistic, management; it does not take into account species interactions, changes in 
ecosystem structure, changes in fisher behaviour or any other ecosystem-level considerations.18 In 
this context, it is suggested that fisheries managers must “move beyond” single-species management 
of fisheries.19 Indeed, although reporting on individual species levels, overseers and managers like 
the European Environment Agency acknowledge that “ensuring healthy fish and shellfish populations 
does not depend solely on fishing at environmentally sustainable levels, [but that h]ealthy fish 
populations depend on healthy marine ecosystems.”20 In response to the calls to move away from 
the traditional single-species approach to fisheries management, the generally suggested alternative 
is a move towards an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management (“EBFM”).21 Through this 
approach, the focus is moved away from the fish themselves and towards the ecosystems they 
inhabit, managing the fish as components of those interconnected ecosystems. As discussed in 
section 1.3 below, implementing EBFM is not simple, but in this thesis I will argue that the legal 
doctrine of the public trust could be used to facilitate the move towards EBFM in English fisheries 
through its requirement for fisheries to be managed sustainably. Both EBFM and the public trust 
concept will be considered further in section 1.3 below.  
 
16 ICES, Advice on fishing opportunities, catch and effort: Celtic Seas and Greater North Sea ecoregions, 5.3.57 
<http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2016/2016/bss-47.pdf> accessed 15/02/2017  
17 Brian O’Riordan, ‘Survival of Sea Bass and Small Scale Handliners in the Balance’ Low Impact Fishers of 
Europe (LIFE) Platform (Brussels, 11 July 2016) <http://lifeplatform.eu/5708/> accessed 9 September 2020; see 
also Chris Williams, Griffin Carpenter, Robert Clark and Bethan O’Leary, ‘Who gets to fish for sea bass? Using 
social, economic, and environmental criteria to determine access to the English sea bass fishery’ (2018) 95 
Marine Policy 199, 200-201 
18 Trochta et al (n13), 2 
19 Ray Hilborn, ‘Future directions in ecosystem based fisheries management: A personal perspective’ (2011) 
108 Fisheries Research 235, 235 
20 European Environment Agency (n6) 
21 See, for example, Ray Hilborn, ‘Ecosystem-based fisheries management: the carrot or the stick?’ (2004) 274 
Marine Ecology Progress Series 275 and Jon Brodziak and Jason Link, ‘Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management: 
What is it and how can we do it?’ (2002) 70(2) Bulletin of Marine Science 589 
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1.3    Theoretical Context 
In common with other ecosystem related approaches to resource management employed in the 
marine environment,22 defining EBFM is difficult.23 Indeed, it has been described as “much like the 
proverbial elephant encountered by three blind men, different people see EBFM very differently,”24 
while Longhurst notes that “succinct, attractive titles like EBFM can mean almost anything.”25 The 
term is generally used to label approaches that move away from single-species management of 
fisheries and towards more holistic management of fisheries resources.26 However, within the 
concept, Hornborg et al suggest that there is growing consensus for the core principles of EBFM, 
including “that management should be science-based; use relevant ecosystem connections and 
scales; handle uncertainty (precautionary and adaptive management); consider long-term socio-
ecological wellbeing; have a collaborative and interdisciplinary decision-making process; and be 
effective in achieving objectives.”27 Both Hilborn and Link use the concept of a ‘gradient’ to 
characterise national approaches to fisheries management, with single species management at one 
end and whole system management at the other end.28 In this context, EBFM can be viewed as a 
cluster of varying approaches that seek (in varying degrees) to move fisheries management along 
the spectrum towards whole system management. Pikitch et al suggest that such whole system 
management can be achieved by “reversing the order of management priorities to start with the 
ecosystem rather than [a particular] target species”.29 This would imply that the key management 
priority should not be achievement of a given productive yield, but rather maintenance of threshold 
levels of ecosystem health.  
As well as the lack of consensus over what EBFM involves, there is also a lack of consensus as to how 
to implement and achieve EBFM.30 In part this is a result of the focus on the content of EBFM, 
leaving the implementation of EBFM as a secondary concern.31 However, it is also a result of the 
 
22 Trine Skovgaard Kirfeldt, ‘An ocean of concepts: Why choosing between ecosystem-based management, 
ecosystem-based approaches and ecosystem approach makes a difference’ (2019) 106 Marine Policy 103541 
23 Trochta et al (n13) and Susanna Lidström and Andrew Johnson, ‘Ecosystem-based fisheries management: A 
perspective on the critique and development of the concept’ (2020) 21 Fish and Fisheries 216 
24 Hilborn (n19), 235 
25 Alan Longhurst, ‘The sustainability myth’ (2006) 81 Fisheries Research 107, 108 
26 Jason S Link, ‘What Does Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management Mean? (2002) 27(4) Fisheries 18 
27 Sara Hornborg, Ingrid van Putten, Camilla Novaglio, Elizabeth Fulton, Julia Blanchard, Éva Plagányi, Cathy 
Bulman and Keith Sainsbury, ‘Ecosystem-based fisheries management requires broader performance 
indicators for the human dimension’ (2019) 108 Marine Policy 103639, 1 
28 Hilborn (n19), 235; Link (n26), 19 
29 E.K. Pikitch, C. Santora, E. A. Babcock, A. Bakun, R. Bonfil, D.O. Conover, P. Dayton, P. Doukakis, D. Fluharty, 
B. Heneman, E.D. Houde, J. Link, P.A. Livingston, M. Mangel, M.K. McAllister, J. Pope and K. J. Sainsbury, 
‘Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management’ (2004) 305 Science 346 
30 Lidström & Johnson (n23), 217 
31 Phillip Levin and Christian Möllmann, ‘Marine ecosystem regime shifts: challenges and opportunities for 
ecosystem-based management’ (2015) 370 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 20130275, 2 
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nature of the concept; EBFM provides a focus for, and seeks to influence, both those making policy 
and those implementing policy.32 In order to do so, it provides a set of criteria as to the scale at 
which fisheries and the marine environment should be managed – an ‘end-point’ to target – but 
what it does not do is provide guidance as to how to apply that set of criteria.33 For example, Neilsen 
et al applied a foodweb ecosystem model to demersal fisheries off the west coast of Scotland to 
identify the eco-system impacts of various scenarios relating to the management of the cod and 
whiting populations. While the use of this model enabled fisheries managers to grasp some of the 
nature of the ecosystem within which those populations are found, the authors acknowledged that 
“[t]he approach does not provide actionable management advice but stimulates learning and creates 
an opportunity for stakeholders to search for strategic and policy relevant solutions and to position 
themselves in an EBFM context.”34 Dawson and Levin’s analysis of Fishery Ecosystem Plans arrives at 
a similar conclusion in relation to the use of such plans to implement EBFM in the USA.35 Indeed, 
EBFM as a concept cannot provide the necessary guidance to each and every fishery as “no two 
fisheries or ecosystems are exactly alike” and as such EBFM implementation needs to be context and 
case specific.36  
Nonetheless, recognising that EBFM “does not translate easily into a straightforward… change in 
management,37 does not mean that EBFM is a target not possible to reach or that current efforts are 
worthless. Indeed, those involved with the Fishery Ecosystem Plan studied by Dawson and Levin 
suggested that the key success of the Plan was in bringing diverse parties together and making them 
aware of ecosystem scale processes.38 It is therefore clear that EBFM has a real ability to widen the 
management focus of the parties seeking to implement it. However, it does not try to unpick the 
relationship between individuals and the wider community in the context of fishing and so, of itself, 
it cannot tell such parties how to manage fisheries for the better. It is still for those involved in 
fisheries management or State governance to develop specific policies and laws that implement 
EBFM principles.  
 
32 Jason Lowther and Lynda D Rodwell, ‘IFCAs: Stakeholder Perceptions of Roles, and Legal Impacts’ (2013) 15 
Environmental Law Review 11, 13 
33 Kåre Neilsen, Alan Baudron, Niall Fallon, Paul Fernandes, Mika Rahikainen and Michaela Aschan, 
‘Participatory planning and decision support for ecosystem based fisheries management of the west coast of 
Scotland’ (2019) 211 Fisheries Research 59, 67. See also Lidström & Johnson (n23), 220 
34 Ibid., 67 
35 Claire Dawson and Phillip S Levin, ‘Moving the ecosystem-based fisheries management mountain begins by 
shifting small stones: A critical analysis of EBFM on the U.S. West Coast’ (2019) 100 Marine Policy 58 
36 Trochta et al (n13), 7 
37 Lidström & Johnson (n23), 217 and 219 
38 Dawson & Levin (n35), 62 
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In the UK context, the Government’s 25 Year Environment Plan envisages the adoption of “an 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management.”39 Similarly, the Fisheries White Paper talks of 
“pursuing an ecosystem approach to fisheries management.”40 However, the specific measures to be 
taken to achieve this approach were not laid out in any detail. In the subsequent Fisheries Bill, clause 
1 sets out the objectives that fisheries management must seek to achieve, including “the ecosystem 
objective,” being that “fish and aquaculture activities are managed using an ecosystem-based 
approach.” 41 However, the pursuance of this (and the other objectives set for fisheries 
management) is left to fisheries policy authorities42 to determine in a Joint Fisheries Statement; a 
document that must explain “how the fisheries objectives have been interpreted and 
proportionately applied”43 in formulating fisheries policies, which suggests that the ecosystem 
objective could be disregarded in certain circumstances, including for socio-economic reasons. As 
Trochta et al note, “a rigorous management plan that includes ecosystem considerations does not 
necessarily mean that EBFM is implemented and enforced.”44 Indeed, in a study of world fisheries, 
Mora et al found that the sustainability of a fishery was only loosely connected to the scientific basis 
adopted for such management, suggesting that policy makers are too often overruling scientific 
advice “due to socioeconomic costs and political or corruption pressures.”45 Thus a stated adherence 
to EBFM does not appear to always equal the practice of EBFM.  
Starting from the acceptance of the literature that EBFM is the route to more sustainable fisheries,46 
the suggestion of this thesis is that, in the English context, EBFM can be strengthened by recognising 
that it is one part of a broader, more overarching approach to fisheries management, based on the 
underlying public ownership of the English fishery. This thesis therefore aims to elaborate on the 
public ownership, using the theory of public trust, in order to understand its nature and application 
and how it can guide fisheries management. The legal concept of the public trust is based on the 
 
39 HM Government, A Green Future: Our 25 Year Plan to Improve the Environment (HM Government, 2018), 
106-107 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/693158
/25-year-environment-plan.pdf> accessed 11 May 2020 
40 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Sustainable fisheries for future generations (HM 
Government, 2018), 10 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722074
/fisheries-wp-consult-document.pdf> accessed 26 July 2020 
41 Fisheries HL Bill (2019-21) 71, cls 1(4) and 2 
42 Defined in the Bill as the Secretary of State (for England), the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the 
Northern Ireland Department (Fisheries HL Bill (2019-21) 71, cl 48) 
43 Fisheries HL Bill (2019-21) 71, cl 2(1)(c) 
44 Trochta et al  (n13), 5 
45 Mora et al (n14), 7  
46 See Hilborn (n19) for a summary of the basis of the calls for a transition to EBFM and why single-species 
management alone will never be enough to ensure sustainability in fisheries management 
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understanding that there are certain natural resources (generally the foreshore, tidal waters and 
navigable waters) that are “uniquely public resources”47 and as such should be subject to the control 
of the state on behalf of the public, as opposed to the control of private interests. This 
understanding is drawn from the notion of common-pool resources and their tendency to suffer 
from degradation resulting from overuse in situations where it is difficult to exclude others from 
them.48 On this basis, Sagarin and Turnipseed suggest that the “core” of the public trust is the 
acceptance that such common-pool resources “cannot be fairly managed by private owners ... [and 
should instead] be held in trust by government, which must manage their consumptive use and 
protection on behalf of present and future citizens.”49 
In the UK in particular, the notion of fish and fishing rights as a public resource has seen growing 
recognition. In the United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations case, Cranston J 
recognised that “statements about fishing quota... have always to be understood against the 
background that fish are a public resource.”50 While this is not quite semantically correct,51 the 
meaning behind Cranston J’s statement is clear: that the ability to fish in British waters belongs to 
the public in some regard. Furthermore, the Report by the Public Policy Institute for Wales on the 
impacts on fishing of the UK’s exit from the European Union suggests that “Brexit has raised the 
issue of ensuring that fisheries as a public resource are delivering a public benefit.”52 Indeed, in the 
subsequent White Paper on the Fisheries Bill, published in 2018, the government stated that “[t]he 
fish in our seas, like our wider marine assets, are a public resource and therefore the rights to catch 
them are a public asset.”53 It also confirmed that its aim is “… to manage these fisheries – and the 
wider marine environment – as a shared resource, a public asset held in stewardship for the benefit 
of all.”54  
This growing acknowledgement of a public interest in certain resources is reflected in the wider 
public discourse on both the natural environment and the interests of future generations. The 
Government’s 25 Year Environment Plan, again published in late 2018, states in its foreword that 
 
47 Ellen Sullivan Casey, ‘Water Law - Public Trust Doctrine’ (1984) 24 Natural Resources Journal 809, 812  
48 Raphael Sagarin and Mary Turnipseed, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine: Where Ecology Meets Natural Resources 
Management’ (2012) 37 Annual Review of Environment and Resources 473, 474; see also Fikret Berkes, 
‘Fishermen and ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1985) 12(3) Environmental Conservation 199, 199 
49 Sagarin & Turnipseed (n48), 473 
50 The United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of State for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs [2013] EHWC 1959 (Admin), [paragraph 100]  
51 As fish themselves are ferae naturae and therefore incapable of ownership in their wild state, see section 
1.6.3 below for further details  
52 Public Policy Institute for Wales, Implications of Brexit for Fishing Opportunities in Wales (February 2018), 53 
53 DEFRA (n40), 26 
54 Ibid., 15 
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“[w]e hold our natural environment in trust for the next generation.” Yet nine in ten adults remain 
concerned about damage to the natural environment.55 Greener UK, a coalition of thirteen 
environmental organisations formed to lobby for the adequate protection of the environment as the 
UK leaves the European Union (and beyond), describe the environment as “our shared inheritance” 
and “fundamental to the well-being and prosperity of our own and future generations.”56 At the time 
of writing, a Future Generations Bill is currently making its way through the parliamentary process,57 
introduced in the House of Lords, which, “if properly implemented and followed through, … would 
embed in the mundane processes of government, and to some extent of business, the central 
principles of sustainability and concern for the well-being of our grandchildren and the generations 
beyond.”58 
The public trust doctrine, as a concept that recognises the public interest in fisheries, including both 
the interest in the use of the resource and the interest in healthy, sustainable ecosystems for the 
long term, is a concept that has many similarities with EBFM. Indeed, its human focussed approach 
could provide a route to further progress in the least developed area of EBFM: the social context.59 
The consensus around the content of EBFM suggested by Hornborg et al and set out above, includes 
recognition of the need for “long term socio-ecological wellbeing,”60 yet Alexander and Haward note 
that the “human component” accounts for many of the difficulties in operationalising ecosystem 
based approaches to natural resource management.61 Hornborg et al report that the majority of 
research papers in their study failed to explicitly mention human indicators for EBFM, and of those 
that did, the majority focused on economic objectives in relation to fishing.62 Biedron and Knuth’s 
study of perceptions of EBFM in the American context bears this out, concluding that “one of the 
greatest perceived needs [by decision makers and stakeholders to facilitate implementation of 
EBFM]… is more information about human dimensions.”63 
 
55 Natural England, Monitor of Engagement with the Natural Environment – The national survey on people and 
the natural environment (September 2019), 7 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/828552
/Monitor_Engagement_Natural_Environment_2018_2019_v2.pdf> accessed 13 May 2020 
56 Greener UK, A Manifesto for a Greener UK <https://greeneruk.org/sites/default/files/download/2018-
07/Greener_UK_Manifesto.pdf> accessed 13 May 2020 
57 Wellbeing of Future Generations HL Bill (2019-21) 8 
58 Lord Whitty, HL Deb 13 March 2020, Vol 802, column 1253 
59 K A Alexander and M Haward, ‘The human side of marine ecosystem-based management (EBM): ‘Sectoral 
interplay’ as a challenge to implementing EBM’ (2019) 101 Marine Policy 33, 33 
60 Hornborg et al (n27), 1 
61 Alexander & Haward (n59), 33 
62 Hornborg et al  (n27), 5 
63 Ingrid Biedron and Barbara Knuth, ‘Toward shared understandings of ecosystem-based fisheries 
management among fishery management councils and stakeholders in the U.S. Mid-Atlantic and New England 
regions’ (2016) 70 Marine Policy 40, 47 
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In the English context, the public trust is the concept that should be driving the adoption of EBFM 
and that can provide guidance as to how implement EBFM and how to determine “the trade-offs 
[required] between ecological and socio-economic management objectives.”64 Indeed Sagarin and 
Turnipseed advocate that the public trust doctrine “provides a framework for structuring the 
relationship among citizens, both current and future, the governments they elect, and natural 
resources and the services they provide.”65 It is arguable that the protection of the fishery resource 
and the ecosystems in which that ‘resource’ lives is “fundamental to the enjoyment of all other 
public trust uses.”66 Thus managing fisheries to ensure the health of the entire ecosystem is central 
to the public trust. As such, Turnipseed et al (in the context of ocean management) contend that a 
clear public trust would bring three benefits: it would give powerful authority in favour of 
conservation to those responsible for policy and management, it would enable greater coordination 
between governmental bodies involved in management, and it would enable the participation of the 
public in decisions regarding the use of their resource.67 Each of these three elements can be seen in 
the features of EBFM discussed by commentators. For example, Arif notes that EBFM requires 
“cooperation and coordination among the agencies and stakeholders involved,”68 thus a public trust 
that enables and requires greater coordination between those bodies managing fisheries and other 
elements of the ecosystem would be a powerful driver for this feature of EBFM. Similarly, 
stakeholder and wider public participation is also identified as a key feature of ecosystem-based 
management approaches,69 tying in with the need (identified above) to recognise the human 
element in sustainability. Finally, conservation of ecosystems as functioning communities of nature 
is key to EBFM and all other ecosystem-based management approaches.70  
1.4    Research Design 
1.4.1 Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this research is to establish whether the public fishery in England has the potential 
to provide an overarching approach to fisheries management and regulation that would draw 
 
64 Hornborg et al (n27), 2 
65 Sagarin & Turnipseed (n48), 474 
66 Donna Christie, ‘Marine Reserves, The Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational Equity’ (2004) 19(2) 
Florida State University Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 427, 432 
67 Mary Turnipseed, Stephen E Roady, Raphael Sagarin and Larry B Crowder, ‘The silver anniversary of the 
United States’ exclusive economic zone: twenty-five years of ocean use and abuse, and the possibility of a blue 
water public trust doctrine’ (2009) 36 Ecology Law Quarterly 1 
68 Abdullah Al Arif, ‘Exploring the legal status and key features of ecosystem-based fisheries management in 
international fisheries law’ (2018) 27 RECEIL 320, 324 
69 Rachel D Long, Anthony Charles and Robert L Stephenson, ‘Key principles of marine ecosystem-based 
management’ (2015) 57 Marine Policy 53 
70 U.S. National Research Council, A Report of the Committee on Ecosystem Management for Sustainable 
Fisheries (1998) in Trochta et al (n13), 2 
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together the current diverse range of single species regulation under an umbrella of broader 
management aiming to recognise and protect the public interest in fish and the marine 
environment.   
In order to achieve this aim it is necessary to understand the nature of the public interest in the 
public fishery by determining where the ownership of the public fishery could lie and what the legal 
consequences of such ownership would be. As well as the legal position of the public interest in the 
public fishery, it is also necessary to understand how the public fishery is understood and 
experienced by those involved at all levels in fisheries activities and how the public nature of the 
fishery currently impacts upon fisheries activities and management. Once the legal character and 
social understanding and practice of the public fishery are understood, it is possible to collate and 
compare these two elements to identify how they work together to produce the public fishery in its 
present form and consider whether they could support the reframing of the public fishery as a tool 
to enable EBFM.  
The aim of the research will be pursued through three objectives:  
Objective 1: Ownership of the Public Fishery 
O1 To establish who, if anyone, owns the public fishery and what rights, responsibilities and 
duties are attendant on any such ownership.  
Objective 2: Operation of the Public Fishery 
O2 To establish, through a case study, the challenges, issues and pressures experienced by those 
involved in fisheries in the Devon and Severn Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority district 
and to understand how the public right to fish is understood and experienced in the context of such 
challenges, issues and pressures and of fisheries management as a whole in the district.  
Objective 3: Legal Geography of the Public Fishery & its Future 
O3a To compare the doctrine of O1 with the perceptions and experiences of O2 and consider how 
these two elements work together to co-constitute the public fishery and the spaces in which it 
operates.  
03b To establish whether and how the ownership of the public fishery can be used to facilitate 
the adoption of EBFM and thereby increase the sustainability of the use of fish stocks and marine 
ecosystems found in tidal and coastal waters.  
1.4.2 Overview of Methodology and Methods 
This research adopts a critical realist approach that recognises both the bio-physical nature of fish 
stocks and the socially constructed nature of the concept of the public fishery. Such an approach is 
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able to recognise that fish stocks are impacted upon by real actions and processes, 71 as well as by 
the social construction of the public right to fish and other concepts involved in fisheries 
management.  
The objectives cannot be achieved using just the traditional legal methodology of doctrinal research, 
but instead require the adoption of a socio-legal approach in order to open up the field of enquiry as 
well as the range of sources and information available to the research. In line with the 
epistemological standpoint of the research, a socio-legal approach enables, and requires, the 
researcher to consider and investigate the social context of the relevant law and how this impacts 
upon the interpretation and understanding of that law. Indeed, outside the field of law, Bennett et al 
note the importance of “engaging with the human dimensions of conservation and environmental 
management… [in order to] produce robust and effective conservation policies, actions and 
outcomes.”72 
Viewing the term ‘socio-legal’ as an umbrella term that incorporates a multitude of different 
methodologies and approaches that all focus on an involvement of the social nature and context of 
law, the specific methodology adopted for this research is a legal geography methodology. Again, 
legal geography encompasses a wide range of approaches to research,73 but these all cohere around 
a focus on “the relationships between law, space and society”.74 The benefit of this focus is, as noted 
by Bartel et al, that “by questioning what the law is and what it does spatially – legal geography 
gives overdue attention to the interrelationships among the environment, people and social 
institutions”.75 In the context of this research the legal geography methodology requires the 
investigation of how the public right to fish, and people’s interpretations and experiences of it, 
impact upon the fish stocks inhabiting or passing through the coastal waters of England. O1, O2 and 
O3 all focus on different elements of this overall investigation.  
O1 will consider the state of the law in relation to the public fishery. Typically, a legal research 
question investigating the position of the law in relation to a particular topic will adopt a doctrinal 
 
71 i.e.: the real action of taking a fish from the water and not returning it alive to that water, as well as other 
physical actions that result in disturbance to the reproduction of a fish stock 
72 Nathan J Bennett, Robin Roth, Sarah C Klain, Kai Chan, Patrick Christie, Douglas A Clark, Georgina Cullman, 
Deborah Curran, Trevor J Durbin, Graham Epstein, Alison Greenberg, Michael P Nelson, John Sandlos, Richard 
Stedman, Tara L Teel, Rebecca Thomas, Diogo Verissimo, and Carina Wyborn, ‘Conservation Social Science: 
Understanding and integrating human dimensions to improve conservation’ (2017) 205 Biological 
Conservation 93, 94 
73 Josephine Gillespie, ‘A legal geography of property, tenure, exclusion , and rights in Cambodia: exposing an 
incongruous property narrative for non-Western settings’ (2016) 54(3) Geographical Research 256 
74 Ibid. 
75 Robyn Bartel, Nicole Graham, Sue Jackson, Jason Hugh Prior, Daniel Francis Robinson, Meg Sherval and 
Stewart Williams, ‘Legal Geography: An Australian Perspective’ (2013) 51(4) Geographical Research 339, 340 
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approach, often referred to as ‘black letter law’ research.76 However, in order to understand not just 
the ‘what’ of the law, but also the ‘why’ of it, this research shall adopt a textual research method 
based on the doctrinal method, but enlarged with consideration of the social context of the public 
fishery where relevant. This is based upon Bennett and Layard’s “legal geographically infused 
doctrinal method”.77  
As set out in O2 above, the social context of the public fishery shall be investigated through a case 
study focusing on the district of the Devon and Severn Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority 
(D&S IFCA). The case study was designed following Yin’s approach to case study design78 and 
involved observation of public meetings of D&S IFCA, semi-structured interviews with 26 people 
involved in fishing in various ways within the D&S IFCA district, and consideration of the publicly 
available documents published by D&S IFCA in relation to the management of net fishing within the 
district. All of this data will be analysed using a process of thematic analysis79 in order to understand 
how the public fishery is understood and experienced and how this impacts upon fisheries 
management within the D&S IFCA district. The data will also be analysed to understand what the 
challenges and issues for fishing are within that district.  
O3 will use geographical concepts including that of the “lawscape”80 to interrogate the public right 
to fish and the coastal areas depicted within the case study in order to identify the legal geography 
created by the understanding of the public right to fish within those areas.  
1.5    Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis contributes to the field of knowledge through the application of the legal doctrine of the 
public trust to the English and Welsh public fishery and connections made between this public trust 
and the implementation of EBFM. In addition, the thesis takes this knowledge out to a community 
involved in fishing activities to consider the socio-legal context of the public right to fish and the 
impacts such context has on the management of fisheries within that community. Finally, the thesis 
applies a legal geography approach to the analysis of the public right to fish, using this to elucidate 
the lawscape of the public fishery.  
 
76 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 
17 Deakin Law Review 83 
77 Luke Bennett and Antonia Layard, ‘Legal Geography: Becoming Spatial Detectives’ (2015) Geography 
Compass 9/7 406-422, 412 
78 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4th Edition, SAGE Publications, 2009) 
79 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’ (2006) 3:2 Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 77 
80 Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, environment, law (Routledge, 2010) 
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1.6    Property Rights in Fish 
This thesis will consider property rights in respect of the public fishery in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
However, at the outset it is important to explain the meaning and context of the key terms used, as 
well as distinguishing between fish and fisheries. It is also important to note that much of the 
understanding of this area of law must come from early case law and legal writings, both of which 
use a multitude of terms when describing fishing interests, often interchangeably. The effects of this 
on the conclusions that can be drawn from the early writings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 
3.  
At its most simple, a fishery is a right to catch fish either in the sea or in a particular body of water.81 
In this context, the public fishery (otherwise known as the public right to fish) is therefore the right 
members of the public have to fish in tidal waters of the United Kingdom. In English law there is no 
public right to fish in non-tidal (i.e. internal waters). The rights to fish in these waters are owned 
privately through exclusive fisheries, which are explained below.  
1.6.1 Exclusive (or Several) Fisheries 
An exclusive fishery (often called a several fishery and sometimes referred to historically as a free 
fishery) is one in which a person (real or legal) has the sole right of fishing in a particular area. A 
several fishery can belong to one person or to a number of people, but as a property right, it must 
belong to someone. Where it belongs to more than one person, the fishery is often referred to as a 
common of fishery. It is still an exclusive fishery however, because only a certain class of person is 
entitled to exercise the fishery and, thus, all others are excluded.  
A several fishery can either derive from the ownership of the soil82 or by grant from such an owner. 
By its nature, the existence of a several fishery excludes all other rights of fishing in respect of the 
fish the subject of the right of fishery. Thus where a general several fishery is granted in tidal waters, 
it will exclude the public right of fishing.  However, as hinted at above, this exclusion is only in 
relation to the specific right granted. So where a several fishery in respect of a particular fish is 
granted, it is possible for this right to exist in concurrence with other fishing rights in respect of other 
fish. An illustration of this would be a several salmon fishery in tidal waters granted to a subject, 
which would leave the public fishery for all other fish intact.  
 
81 James Paterson, A Treatise on the Fishery Laws of the United Kingdom (first published Macmillan and Co, 
1863, BiblioLife LLC, 2010), B 
82 In English law, ownership of land entitles the owner to the ‘profits’ of that land, such as wood from trees or 
the harvest of crops growing on the land, or, in the fishing context, fish caught in the water covering the land.  
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Several fisheries are much more common in non-tidal waters (as there is no public right to fish 
within such waters), however they can exist within tidal waters. Such tidal several fisheries tend to 
derive from a grant of the fishery to a subject by the Crown.  Although it should be noted that the 
court in Malcomson v O’Dea83 held that the ability of the Crown to grant a several fishery out of tidal 
waters was removed by the Magna Carta, which means that the only several fisheries that can exist 
in tidal waters today are those granted prior to the Magna Carta (i.e. no later than the end of the 
reign of Henry II in 1189)84 or granted by (or under) legislation from Parliament.  
1.6.2 The Public Fishery 
The public fishery, sometimes referred to as the common fishery (as distinct to a common of fishery 
which was explained above), is a non-exclusive fishery that exists in tidal waters. Its status as a 
property right is unclear and will be considered in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.   
1.6.3 The Object of the Fishery: Fish 
A fishery, being a right to catch fish, is a separate concept from that of the fish themselves. English 
law classes fish (and all other wild animals) as ferae naturae. This means that they are ownerless 
unless and until they are reduced to possession by someone.85 At that stage, the possessor’s 
ownership is qualified and so continues only for so long as they possess the animal, such that if the 
animal escapes then the ownership ceases. If the possessor kills the animal then their ownership 
crystallises.86  
Royal fish (whales, porpoises and sturgeon) are an exception to the ferae naturae rule and if caught 
within U.K. territorial waters such fish belong to the monarch. 87 However, a subject may hold a 
franchise entitling them to catch such fish within a particular location, either by virtue of a Crown 
grant or by prescription.88 
 
83 Malcomson v O’Dea and others (1863) 10 HLC 593; 11 ER 1155, 1165-1166 
84 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the attribution of the prohibition on Crown grants of 
several fisheries to the Magna Carta is erroneous, for the text of the Magna Carta only refers to the defence of 
river banks (see Richard Barnes, ‘Revisiting the Public Right to Fish in Tidal Waters’ (2011) 26 The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 433, 442-443 for further comment). Appleby suggests that this mistaken 
attribution “lends weight to sentimental arguments that somehow the public right to fish is a basic human 
right to all [people]” (Thomas Appleby, ‘The Public Right to Fish: Is it fit for purpose?’ (2005) 16 (6) Journal of 
Water Law 201, 202)  
85 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Animals (Volume 2, 2017), paragraph 9) 
86 Subject to various rules on the ownership of animals killed by trespassers (see Halsbury’s Laws of England, 
Animals (Volume 2, 2017), paragraph 13) which are only of relevance to fish in a several fishery. 
87 Lord Hale, A Treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, in Stuart A Moore, A History of the Foreshore 
and the Law Relating Thereto (Stevens & Haynes, 1888), 412 
88 Ibid., 413 
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1.7    Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised into 8 chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the problem and the research 
project, including the methodology used in the design of the project. Chapter 2 moves on to 
examine that methodology in detail, including consideration of the various methods adopted for the 
different steps in the project. Chapter 3 sets out a review of the literature in relation to the 
ownership of the public fishery and the concept of the public trust, followed by Chapter 4 containing 
the legal analysis of the ownership of the public fishery (O1). Chapter 5 introduces the case study 
(O2), including further detail on the methods used (including thematic analysis). Chapter 6 presents 
the analysis of the case study data as it relates to the case study research questions. Chapter 7 then 
draws together O1 and O2 to identify the legal geography of the public right to fish and what this 
might mean for the fish stocks in tidal and coastal waters (O3a and O3b). Finally, Chapter 8 draws 






CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH STRATEGY 
2.1    Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the research strategy and the matters considered during its 
design, allowing the reader to assess the legitimacy of the strategy adopted. In order to achieve this 
aim, the chapter is split into two parts. The first part discusses the methodological approach adopted 
for the research, presenting the epistemological foundations of the research, together with detailed 
consideration of the socio-legal approach taken and the rationale for such an approach. The second 
part considers the data collection methods used as part of the research strategy, as well as the 
analysis techniques. The aim of this discussion is to present the justification for the adoption of the 
case study as a method, and thematic analysis as a technique of analysis. Further discussion of the 
process of the specific case study and the thematic analysis of the data collected within the case 
study is presented in Chapter 5.  
2.2    Methodological Approaches 
2.2.1 Epistemology 
Danermark et al distinguish between different types of social research, suggesting that there are at 
least three different types: (i) research using social theory to attempt to identify the composition of 
the social world; (ii) research whose purpose is to map the social world by collecting data about 
specific parts of it; and (iii) research aiming to solve specific social problems (“applied social 
science”).1 The brief description of these different strands of social research illustrates succinctly the 
different motivations that prompt research within each of their boundaries. Within human 
geography specifically, research centres on the twin concepts of the interrelationships between 
humans and their environment and the regional concept.2 Focusing on human-environment 
interrelationships, the present research fits most comfortably within Danermark et al’s third 
category, as research motivated by a social problem. This social problem can be interpreted at 
different levels of detail, but the connective imperative joining these different levels is the problem 
of how to reconcile the needs and desires of a human population for fish as a source of food, with 
the needs of the natural world in order to sustain itself and the need of humans for the natural 
world to be able to sustain itself.  
A research project motivated by one or more social problems does not, as a direct result of that 
motivation, require the adoption of any one particular epistemology to the exclusion of all others, 
 
1 Berth Danemark, Mats Ekström, Liselotte Jakobson and Jan Ch. Karlsson, Explaining Society: An Introduction 
to Critical Realism in the Social Sciences (Routledge, English Translation, 2002), 177 
2 Paul Cloke, Chris Philo and David Sadler, Approaching Human Geography (Paul Chapman Publishing, 1991), 4 
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but it does suggest a more pragmatic type of epistemological approach to research and knowledge.3 
The present research project adopts a broadly critical realist epistemology. Critical realism starts 
from the premise that we must distinguish between the world in its physical sense and how humans 
represent the world. In a particularly pertinent illustration of these two different elements, Dickens 
suggests that “[t]here are real differences between how people construe fishes, but this is a wholly 
different matter from how a fish is physically constructed.”4 Thus critical realism melds the positivist 
view that there is an intrinsic reality of the world ‘out there’, with idealist approaches, such as the 
social constructionist approach that all humankind has access to is our own representations and 
constructions of the world.5  
In contrast, a fully positivistic approach postulates that objective knowledge of the ‘truth’ of reality is 
not only possible, but should be the ultimate aim of research, yet takes no account of the social 
nature of the inter-relationships between the observer and the observed.6 At the other end of the 
spectrum, a fully social constructionist approach holds that there is nothing we can know of the ‘real 
world’ other than our social constructions of it,7 which logically ends in the conundrum that if 
absolutely everything is a social construction, then on what basis can we make judgments between 
alternative constructions?8 Indeed, Sayer suggests that pure constructionism cannot account for the 
fallible nature of our knowledge: “…the experience of getting things wrong, of having our 
expectations confounded, and of crashing into things – that justifies us in believing that the world 
exists regardless of what we happen to think about it.”9 Thus critical realism directs us to separate 
ontology from epistemology,10 and recognise that the human inability to fully access reality “does 
not justify the conclusion that there is no ontological distinction between the ideas we have of nature 
and what the ideas are about”.11 
 
3 The term “pragmatic” is used here to suggest the generally used lay meaning, as opposed to the philosophical 
movement of pragmatism.  
4 Peter Dickens, Reconstructing Nature: Alienation, Emancipation and the Division of Labour (Routledge, 1996), 
73 in James Proctor, ‘The Social Construction of Nature: Relativist Accusations, Pragmatist and Critical Realist 
Responses’ (1998) 88(3) Annals of the Association of American Geographers 352, at 360 
5 Cloke et al (n2), 133-134 
6 Colin Robson and Kieran McCartan, Real World Research  (4th Edition, Wiley, 2016), 21-22 
7 See for example, Kenneth Gergen, An Invitation to Social Construction (Sage, 1999) in Dave Elder-Vass, The 
Reality of Social Construction (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 234 
8 Dave Elder-Vass, ‘Towards a realist social construction’ (2012) 70 Sociologia Problemas e Prácticas 5-24 
(English translation), 9 
9 Andrew Sayer, Realism and Social Science (Sage, 2000), 2 
10 Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds Books Ltd, 1975) 
11 Kate Soper, What is Nature? (Blackwell, 1995), in Nick Stevenson, ‘Questions of Hermeneutics: Beyond 
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This approach is similar in many ways to Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. He too eschews full social 
constructionism and acknowledges that the natural world is “out there.”12 However, this strand of 
pragmatism does not give primacy to the ontological distinction that is at the centre of critical 
realism, believing instead that, although it is clear that there is a reality ‘out there,’ “there is simply 
no value in discussing it.”13 No description or interpretation of the world can be any closer to ‘reality’ 
than any other because humans have no access to ‘reality’, so while some descriptions or 
interpretations may be more useful for some purposes; that is as much as a neo-pragmatist is willing 
to concede in relation to our attempts to know ‘reality.’14 Therefore, while a critical realist views the 
quest for knowledge as the task of developing increasingly accurate representations of reality,15 a 
neo-pragmatist views the quest for knowledge as the task of developing more learned responses to 
our environments, which will in turn prove more useful in addressing social problems in our 
environments.16 Proctor suggests that this key difference can be described as an “optimism” on the 
part of critical realists.17 An optimism that despite the acknowledgement that humans are incapable 
of direct access to the reality of the world, “this admission need pose no fatal blow to the project of 
finding better explanations for reality.”18 Set against this, pragmatism shares the admission, but has 
none of the optimism. Perhaps then human geography can be labelled an optimistic discipline, for 
unlike pragmatism, critical realism has managed to establish a “solid foothold” in geography.19 
Indeed, the lack of the ‘optimism’ described by Proctor means that a disadvantage of pragmatism as 
a guiding epistemological framework is that it can be a struggle to assess when one representation is 
more useful than another if one cannot compare those representations to what we observe of 
reality.20 As such, pragmatism was not deemed a suitable framework for the present research.  
Nonetheless, as suggested by Hood, researchers do not often “fit neatly into the categories of any 
one typology”21 and this project is no different. The critical realist approach adopted for this project 
also draws from constructionism and can be likened to Elder-Vass’ approach of ‘realist 
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constructionism’22 in which the researcher is required to identify and interrogate the social 
constructions impacting upon the matter at hand but also to acknowledge the underlying ‘reality’ of 
that matter. Thus recognising that “discourse is powerfully shaped by social interests,” while at the 
same time, objective material realities play a constraining role.23 In this approach, the ‘real’ nature of 
the world (as opposed to “just our knowledge of such a world”) can be examined through our 
constructions of it.24 However, it is important to recognise that such understandings of the world are 
“always partial, limited and necessarily dependent upon further empirical and discursive revision.”25 
In the context of this project, such an epistemological standpoint suggests that we can construct the 
public right to fish in as many different ways as we like, but fish stocks will still continue to be 
impacted upon by real actions and processes.26 Cardwell and Thornton illustrate this when noting 
that each of the dominant approaches to fisheries management – in particular market-based 
fisheries management and area-based conservation – is based upon “a particular way of thinking 
about the sea.”27 For example “market-based management is inextricable from an economic 
imagination of the sea… [as] flat, placeless, and mathematical, spatially equivalent across its extent, 
and populated by discrete, quantifiable units of resources that can be measured, predicted and 
controlled.”28 Therefore, adopting this approach for the present project, the task is to try to identify 
the constructions placed upon the public right to fish and fishing activity under it (as well as those 
that could be placed upon it), and to consider how they influence real actions and processes. 
2.2.2 Legal Research Methodologies 
The traditional approach to any legal research question has generally been a doctrinal approach 
(also often referred to as ‘black letter law’). Such an approach is centred on a positivist view of law 
that focuses on what the law is with regard to a particular situation and does not seek to engage in 
“moral and political value judgements”29 as to what the law should be in that particular situation. 
Indeed, the methodology adopts the paradigm that the law is a distinct field of study that can be 
separated from outside influences like politics, economics and morality. However, this inability to 
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consider the social or environmental (or any other) context of the law in any way renders the 
doctrinal methodology incapable of answering the questions set by the research. Instead, the 
methodology needed to be able to provide access to the wide range of sources necessary to address 
each of the three objectives of the research. As such, a different approach is called for and this is 
found in the field of socio-legal approaches to research.  
2.2.2.1 The Socio-legal Approach 
The question of what the socio-legal approach is and what it entails is one that can be, and indeed is, 
answered in many different ways depending upon who is being asked.30 As suggested above, it is less 
of a single methodology than a collection of methodologies or approaches to research that all share 
a desire to explore the relationships and interrelationships between law and society. Behind this 
desire is a shared conviction of the inadequacy of traditional legal study and its adherence to the 
belief that the law can be viewed and studied as a distinct field, separate from morality, politics, 
economics and all other outside factors that would seek to influence it.  
This is illustrated by the meaning ascribed to socio-legal research by the Socio-Legal Studies 
Association31 in its Statement of Principles of Ethical Research Practice:   
“Socio-legal studies embraces disciplines and subjects concerned with law as a social 
institution, with the social effects of law, legal processes, institutions and services and with 
the influence of social, political and economic factors on the law and legal institutions.”32 
Nonetheless, many commentators have sought to provide a definition of socio-legal studies, and 
perhaps Silbey puts it best when she describes socio-legal studies as “doubling the social”.33 In other 
words, socio-legal research takes the social as its topic of inquiry (i.e. the social actions of human 
beings) and then uses social science research methods to investigate that topic. However, even this 
neat explanation cannot define all of socio-legal research, for social science methods, though 
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popular in this field, are not a prerequisite for a socio-legal study and many socio-legal researchers 
would not class themselves as social scientists.34   
2.2.2.2 Law in Context 
Socio-legal studies are sometimes described as studying ‘law in context’. This term draws attention 
to the guiding theory of all socio-legal approaches, namely that the law is shaped by many factors 
(such as history, politics, economics, the environment and so on) and in turn shapes those factors,35 
therefore these relationships need to be recognised and explored in order to understand the law. 
Described in this way, similarities can be seen with other epistemologies such as coupled social-
ecological systems in geography,36 whereby one cannot acquire a complete picture of an ecosystem 
if the behaviour of that ecosystem is separated from the behaviour of the people who use it.   
In an observation that is particularly pertinent to this project, Selznick notes that property rights, for 
example, are particularly vulnerable to non-contextual thinking:  
“A non-contextual approach to property rights has been an especially damaging feature of 
modern legal history. Since the seventeenth century, property rights have become abstract 
and individualized; they have also become ahistorical, detached from the special contexts, for 
example, of land tenure and inheritance, which limited the claims of ownership. The idea 
spread that ownership carries with it rights of domination, that is, the owner can do what he 
wants with ‘his own property’. This perspective captured the legal imagination, despite the 
many restrictions and responsibilities recognised by law. This image of private property has 
obstructed rational public policy in many areas, such as environmental protection, gun 
control and corporate governance.”37 
Thus socio-legal research attempts to bring the context back into the equation. It is important 
however not to treat the matter as ‘law and context’. The ‘and’ suggests that the two are separate 
entities and not connected to each other.38 Feenan suggests that the better approach is not to think 
of law and society as two separate realms, but to look at all the interfacing points between them: 
“[t]he ‘socio’ in socio-legal studies means to us an interface with a context within which law exists, be 
that a sociological, historical, economic, geographical or other context”.39 
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2.2.2.3 Legal Geography 
The concept of the ‘socio-legal’ is often described as a methodology. However, as discussed above, 
its content is so wide as to make it unable to provide sufficient methodological guidance on its own. 
Instead, it is used in this research as an overarching guiding approach, resulting from the critical 
realist commitments of the research. The methodology adopted for the present research is that of 
legal geography. This is a methodology that seeks to study the ways in which law and geography are 
intertwined with each other and, in this regard, it is an example of a socio-legal approach. The idea 
that space could affect law is one that was alien to most lawyers until comparatively recently. 
Indeed, as noted by Bartel et al, “[the law] is often ignorant of geographic influences as well as its 
own geographic actions and effects.”40 
However, in the 1980s, geographers such as Clark started to examine how law and space interacted 
with each other, with Clark noting, for example, that “[l]egal obligations and rights are understood in 
radically different ways by groups at different social and spatial locations”.41 Blomley took up the 
cause and developed a critical legal geography that sought to be more than just ‘law and 
geography’.42 He argued that the two concepts should not be treated as distinctive categories that 
are entirely separate from each other until one impacts upon the other.43 This critical legal 
geography recognises that law creates spaces and that spaces ‘create’ laws (in the sense both that 
the interpretation and implementation of laws is dependent upon place, but also that places can be 
important in the instigation and design of laws) and seeks to investigate the relationships between 
the two.  
2.2.2.4 What is included within Legal Geography? 
Just as, to the uninitiated at least, the discipline of geography may seem to encompass almost 
anything relating to either or both of humans and the world around us, so legal geography has been 
described as a “generic term” that encompasses a wide variety of research activities from a range of 
traditional academic disciplines.44 Although it may be a “heterogeneous, interdisciplinary project”, 
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lacking in any common methods, concepts or debates,45 what ties all these research activities 
together is the focus on “the relationships between law, space and society”.46  
If legal geography is about the ideas of ‘space’ and ‘place’,47 about how law creates places and how, 
at the same time, places affect the interpretation and enactment of law, then one of the ways in  
which legal geographers can consider and interrogate such issues is through considering the 
relations between humans and the environment.48 Bartel et al note that “by questioning what the 
law is and what it does spatially – legal geography gives overdue attention to the interrelationships 
among the environment, people and social institutions”.49 This focus on the place of the environment 
in human society can be seen in Buffery’s legal geography of the River Severn, in which she asserts 
that law and geography meet in the “everyday, lived experiences of people in their environment”.50 
Indeed, by focusing on this idea of the ‘everyday’, it is possible to see that law and geography 
interact most frequently in “the existence, security, ownership and distribution of the goods for 
life”.51 
2.2.2.5 The aims (or achievements) of Legal Geography 
Delaney suggests that instead of asking what legal geography is, we should be asking what it is good 
for.52 Just as legal geography encompasses a wide variety of research activities, it is also used for a 
variety of purposes. For some, it is a tool to start a debate about what the legal geography of a 
particular space should be; to open eyes to the legal geography existing at present and to entreat 
others to question whether this is an appropriate or desired legal geography. This is how Collis53 uses 
legal geography in her study of the development of the legal system in respect of the geostationary 
orbit (the “GEO”).54 Collis notes that her work provides an “anatomy of the legal geography of the 
GEO” that is “expository rather than argumentative,” aiming to draw attention to importance of the 
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GEO by setting out the legal geography as currently found in the space.55 This is a necessary first step 
in enabling scholars to start thinking critically about whether such legal geography is appropriate or 
whether changes should be sought.  
For Delaney, at least part of the answer to his question (of what legal geography is good for) is in its 
ability to expose the power balances at play in geographies and how these can result in unjust 
geographies.56 Power is often experienced through the law and the legal, in the form of “rules, 
rights, authority, punishment and so on”.57 In this way, a consideration of how the law shapes and 
configures social spaces is also a consideration of where the law places the power in such spaces and 
what consequences such shaping, configuration and placing has for justice (or injustice). Such power 
imbalances and injustices are shown by Kay in her study of conservation easements in the USA.58 
Conservation easements are voluntary, but legally binding, agreements between private landowners 
and either land trusts or government agencies, under which the landowner agrees (in perpetuity) to 
give up certain of their property rights (while still retaining their ownership of the land) in return for 
a tax deduction. The aim of the system is to achieve the conservation of land by landowners giving 
up their rights to develop such land or extract resources from it. Kay’s study of the development and 
use of the conservation easement system identifies that its origin in law as a tax deduction (and so 
likely to be used by wealthier than average landowners) has created a “unique geography” of public 
lands in the USA consisting of pockets of concentration in high value real estate areas.59 Similarly, 
the fact that the private owner retains ownership of the conservation lands (again, a result of the 
origin of the system in the tax code and not in the previous system of public land acquisition) also 
results in publicly funded conservation land that is physically inaccessible to the public60 (though 
they may enjoy public goods benefits as a result, such as cleaner air and the benefits of increased 
biodiversity).  
Delaney is perhaps envisaging only the power balances between humans when he talks of just and 
unjust geographies, but this aim of exposing power balances can be equally applied to articulating 
the power imbalances between humans and the environment (including all non-humans in it). By 
enabling a focus on human-environment relationships, legal geography can provide a way of 
revealing and understanding the role of the practices and institutions of law in anthropogenic 
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environmental change.61 Such a role was exposed by Benidickson in a study of the legal geography of 
the Great Lakes-St Lawrence system in continental North America, arguing that the conception of 
the lakes simply as the boundary both between the USA and Canada and between different states 
within the USA and within Canada (as was the dominant conception until the latter half of the 20th 
century) was a factor in the environmental problems experienced within the system:  
“The commercial fisheries of the Great Lakes were undermined through the combined 
impacts of over-exploitation, habitat destruction, and pollution. Industry participants were 
reluctant to acknowledge the role of over-fishing in stock depletion and largely unwilling to 
accept local/domestic regulatory restrictions that were not equally applicable to competitors, 
whether nearby or across the international boundary.”62 
The application of different legal and regulatory regimes in different parts of the same ecosystem 
therefore resulted in the undermining of those regimes and a lack of compliance by those the 
regimes were targeted at. As this example shows, legal systems have spatial effects on the world and 
it is therefore important to “[read] law spatially” in order to understand such geographies and 
effects before attempting to make any change to such systems.63 Indeed, this example also 
illustrates the crux of the realist constructionism approach (as discussed above) by recognising the 
interplay between the reality of the effects on the Great Lakes fish stocks and the human 
constructions that have presaged the collapse of such fish stocks.    
2.2.2.6 Legal Geography and the Public Right to Fish 
Cardwell and Thornton call for a greater focus by geographers on “human-ocean relations” and 
marine policy, “particularly in the exploitation of oceanic creatures.”64 In an area such as fisheries 
management, that is heavily grounded in law and regulation, legal geography would appear to be an 
ideal methodology to employ to achieve that focus. As discussed above, legal geography enables a 
focus on legal processes and the ways that they shape how natural resources are viewed and 
governed and how they are allocated to particular uses.65 Furthermore, legal geography requires a 
recognition of the important role that spaces play in the outcomes of the law, with spaces being “not 
simply the inert sites of law but [being] inextricably implicated in how law happens.”66 
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Using a legal geography methodology for this project enabled a focus on the relationships between 
the public right to fish and the fish stocks inhabiting or passing through the coastal waters in Devon 
and the Severn estuary in particular and the coastal waters of England and Wales in general. Such 
focus involved consideration of how the legal processes at play in the public right to fish shape how 
the fish are viewed and how their ‘use’ is regulated, in addition to the physical numbers and location 
of the fish. In achieving this focus, importance was placed on “[i]nterrogating legal categories for 
their spatial effects on the world... as well as identifying the spatial assumptions these categories 
contain, perpetuate or undermine.”67 This involved embracing, and identifying at play, established 
geographical concepts, such as space and place,68 together with the legal geographical concept of 
the lawscape.69 As the von Benda Beckmanns note, spaces are socially constructed,70 and law plays a 
large role in that construction. Hence the description of the concept of space as the “organising 
principle” of legal geography.71  
The identification of the legal geographies of the public right to fish is detailed in Chapter 7. 
2.3     Methods 
The methods that those adopting the legal geography methodology can employ are varied, but 
generally fall into two categories: traditional social science methods (such as fieldwork and other 
empirical studies) and a more textual method. Unusually, both have been used in this research in 
order to address the objectives set out in Chapter 1 and thus enable a rounded understanding of the 
role of the public right to fish.  
2.3.1 Doctrinal+ Method 
Objective 1 has been approached using a method the researcher has termed ‘doctrinal+’. This 
method is based upon the “legal geographically infused doctrinal method” described by Bennett and 
Layard.72 The doctrinal methodology is generally defined by its insular nature, and so arguably a 
doctrinal method ‘infused’ with legal geography ceases to be a doctrinal method. However, if viewed 
in a less dogmatic way, what Bennett and Layard are describing with their talk of infusion is the 
ability of the legal geography methodology to use methods that are focused on textual 
interpretation and analysis (as opposed to the more traditional geographical fieldwork) in a way that 
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gives recognition to elements typically ignored by more orthodox textual methods (such as the true 
doctrinal method). This is supported by their citation of Delaney as advocating “a method of 
contextual case analysis…, in which legal decisions are subjected to an analysis that seeks to identify 
both the ‘legal moves’ and the ‘spatial imaginaries’ used by [the decision maker]”.73  
In this way, this textual method takes some of the main advantages of the pure doctrinal method 
(being its methodical approach to sources in its quest for coherence and its use of the tools of legal 
reasoning) and adds to that engagement with “different ways of knowing the world”74 through a 
consideration of sources and matters that are beyond the pure doctrinal method. So the doctrinal+ 
method allows (and indeed requires) a researcher to determine not only what the law is, but also to 
consider a much wider range of sources than are normally available to a doctrinal researcher in 
order to consider why the law is; i.e.: the historical and geographical context for that law. This 
approach corresponds neatly to the epistemological framing of the research in critical realism, by 
moving away from the notion of the law as a closed category unaffected by human interpretations 
and towards a notion of the law as constituted by the interpretations of those that follow or apply it.  
Part of the ‘different ways of knowing the world’ is to consider the roles being played by 
geographical concepts such as space and place.75 Bennett and Layard suggest that the task for legal 
geographers is to “tease apart” the strands of legality, spatiality, sociality and temporality “and to 
attempt to identify what work [these strands] are doing at any particular place and time.”76 Looking 
for spatiality in the law involves “looking for spatial assumptions and biases or evidences of 
abstraction,”77 which, when dealing with case law in particular, will entail questioning how 
judgments were reached, both in terms of the presence or absence of geographical concepts in such 
judgments, but also considering the spatial and historical contexts in which such judgments were 
made.  
2.3.2 Case Study 
Answering Objective 2 has been achieved using a case study; the case being the management of 
fisheries in the Devon and Severn Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority’s (“D&S IFCA”) 
district. This case study also feeds into Objective 3. The purpose of the case study was to seek expert 
evidence as to how the public right to fish affects the management of fish stocks in England and 
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Wales. The use of a case study allowed a narrowing of the focus of the research down to a 
manageable size by looking at one particular geographical area; namely the area from coastal 
baselines out to 6 nautical miles around Devon and in the English side of the Severn Estuary.78  
The case looked in part at the new byelaw prohibiting fishing with nets in estuarine waters (and 
requiring a permit for fishing with nets in all other waters in its district) brought into force by D&S 
IFCA in March 2018. This was the culmination of a long period of consultation and debate, during 
which the progress of the byelaw towards enactment was slowed, and at times threatened entirely, 
by the concerns of consultees and committee members as to the impact of the byelaw proposed.79 
The case study has not focussed entirely on this byelaw as a result of the need to engage with a 
wider range of fishing activities than just netting and angling,80 as well as those that may not engage 
with IFCA activities as well. However, the focus on the byelaw provided a good lens through which to 
look at both the pressures on fish stocks in the D&S IFCA’s district and also the impact the public 
right to fish has on those pressures.  
The details of the case study and the analysis of the data collected within it are discussed in Chapter 
5. Within this section the case study as a method is discussed, together with the methods of data 
collection and analysis.  
2.3.2.1 The Case Study as a Method 
If the term ‘method’ is understood as a tool to collect or analyse data, 81 then the case study is not a 
method in itself, rather a way of choosing the data to be studied. In other words, the choice to carry 
out a case study does not require a researcher to use any particular set methods of data collection 
or of data analysis, these choices remain open to the researcher and must be made using the 
guidance of the research methodology.  
Case studies have been categorised in many different ways, but such categorisations all tend to be 
based upon the purposes of the research forming the case study. For example, Stake suggests that 
case studies can generally be split into three categories: intrinsic, instrumental and collective.82 The 
present research would be best described as an ‘instrumental’ case study; “...selected to provide 
 
78 This is the Inshore Fisheries and Conservation District for D&S IFCA, as specified in clause 3 of the Devon and 
Severn Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Order 2010 
79 Conversation between researcher and IFCA Committee Member 
80 As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, netsmen and hook and line anglers have traditionally fished in 
similar areas and there are tensions between the needs of the two groups such that the IFCA’s ‘netting byelaw’ 
was of interest to both netsmen and hook and line anglers.  
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insight into an issue or obtain a better understanding of something.”83 This is similar to Yin’s 
‘revelatory’ type of case study, used to study a phenomenon that has not been widely studied 
before,84 and also to Eisenhardt’s description of the case study as focusing on “understanding the 
dynamics present within single settings.”85 
For the present research, the overall aim was to establish how the public right to fish ‘works’ in 
practice, including how those involved in fishing understand and experience it. As noted above, the 
choice of a case study to examine this aim guided the choice of data to be studied, it also allowed 
the use of a mix of methods of data collection, which provided a richer base of data to study,86 
something that was considered important in an area that has not been studied in any great detail 
previously. Guidance as to the sourcing of the data was provided by following the five steps for case 
study research design suggested by Yin.87  
2.3.2.2 Case Study Design 
Yin’s approach to the case study as a research tool was chosen as it provides an element of rigour 
that is necessary in order to counter any possible accusation of case study research inevitably 
leading to “sloppy” or “biased” research.88  Although Blaikie suggests that such criticism is rooted in 
a positivist belief of research that “only numbers can be used to describe and explain social life 
validly and reliably,” a belief that is at odds with the epistemological approach of this research, it is 
nevertheless important to be able to address such critics and a case study designed and structured 
using a set method that adequately considers the demands of research design is the best place to 
start. The issue of reliability and replicability which is implied in the criticism of case study research 
noted by Blaikie is addressed at section 2.3.3.2 below.  
Applying Yin’s approach started with setting the case study questions and using these to set the 
propositions (or purpose) of the case study; what should the researcher study to be able to answer 
the research questions? In the present case, the questions were set as follows:  
1. How do people involved in fishing understand and experience the public right to fish? 
2. How do these views and experiences impact upon fisheries management?  
 
83 Norman Blaikie, Designing Social Research (2nd Edition, Polity Press, 2009), 191 
84 Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4th Edition, SAGE Publications, 2009), 48 
85 Kathleen M Eisenhardt, ‘Building Theories from Case Study Research’ (1989) 14(4) Academy of Management 
Review 532, 534 
86 Rhys Evans, ‘Case Study Method in Sustainability Research’ in Alex Franklin and Paul Blyton (Eds.), 
Researching Sustainability: a guide to social science methods, practice and engagement (2011, Earthscan), 68 
87 See generally, Yin (n84), 25-65 
88 Blaikie (n83), 191 
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3. What do people involved in fishing perceive as the current challenges for people so 
involved?  
In addition, the purpose of the case study was identified as being to understand how the public right 
to fish is experienced in practice, in order to be able to assess its current importance in fisheries 
management and the possibilities for its future role.  
With the questions and purpose set, the subsequent stage in the design of the case study was to set 
the “unit of analysis:”89 the ‘case’ to be studied in order to answer the case study questions. The 
case chosen was the D&S IFCA and its district.   
There are 10 Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities (“IFCAs”) established for England, and 
each of these is responsible for managing estuarine and coastal fisheries90 within their district, which 
covers the area of territorial waters adjacent to their coastline and extending out to 6 nautical miles. 
D&S IFCA’s district covers the entirety of the Devon coastline (both North and South) and the English 
side of the Severn Estuary.91 There were several reasons for choosing this case. The public right to 
fish (as shown in Chapter 4) applies throughout the UK’s territorial waters and EEZ, however, the 
coastal area was assumed to be the area in which it would have greatest impact as this plays host to 
both recreational fishermen and commercial fishermen and, additionally, the role of the common 
law is greater (alongside a lesser role for European law). The district of D&S IFCA was chosen as 
providing a geographically bounded area in which to study the phenomenon of fisheries 
management, as well as a route to participants and data through the D&S IFCA itself.  
It had originally been intended that the case should be the experience of D&S IFCA in the bringing in 
of a byelaw to restrict the practice of fishing with nets by prohibiting it completely in estuaries and 
requiring a permit in order to carry out the activity in any other areas of their district.92 By using the 
byelaw process as a lens through which to look at the issues involved in managing fisheries in coastal 
areas, it was envisaged that the case would provide an insight into the role of the public right to fish 
and its impact upon the management of fisheries. However, the case has been widened to focus on 
the broader management of fisheries by the D&S IFCA within their district, rather than just netting. 
This was required in order to be able to recruit participants from the fishing community that do not 
undertake net fishing or recreational hook and line fishing (the traditional competitor to net fishing 
in estuarine and coastal areas). A wider range of participants with a wider background of fishing 
 
89 Yin (n84), 29 
90 Although the Environment Agency are responsible for managing certain migratory stocks such as salmonids 
91 A map of this area is shown in Appendix 1 
92 Devon and Severn Inshore Fisheries & Conservation Authority, Netting Permit Byelaw 2016 (in force 1 March 
2018) <https://secure.toolkitfiles.co.uk/clients/15340/sitedata/4E/Netting_Permit_Byelaw/Netting-Permit-
Byelaw-2016-Signed-copy.pdf> accessed 24 July 2018 
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methods, together with a wider range of sources of data, provides a richer set of data and one that 
can have more application to the question of how the public right to fish impacts upon fisheries 
management. The criteria for inclusion into the case are dealt with in Chapter 5.  
Under Yin’s model of designing case studies, the next step is to determine how to link the data 
produced or collected with the propositions, or in this case the purpose, of the case study. In other 
words, how the data will be analysed in order to answer the case study questions. There were two 
parts to this element of research design. The first involved choosing an appropriate method of data 
analysis. Thematic analysis using a reflexive approach was chosen as an apposite method given the 
exploratory focus of the case study. The use of thematic analysis is discussed in more detail below at 
sections 2.3.3 to 2.3.3.2  and in Chapter 5. The second element involved a continual reflection, 
during the period of data collection and analysis, as to how the data being collected and analysed 
was addressing the case study propositions.93 
The final of Yin’s five steps in case study design involves identifying criteria for interpreting the 
findings of the case study. Yin discusses the need to “identify and address rival explanations” for the 
findings of the case study analysis.94 Whilst this will be addressed in the data analysis through the 
use of various tools to ensure validity (as discussed in section 2.3.3.2 below), there is also a need to 
address such rival explanations when designing the case study.95 For the present case study, this was 
a particular focus during the pilot interviews,96 when different topics and questions were tried out to 
ensure that such rival explanations were put to the participants for them to either rebut or confirm. 
2.3.2.3 Data Collection: Interviews 
As part of the case study, a series of semi-structured interviews were carried out with participants 
involved in fishing.  The aim of these interviews was to gain an understanding of how the public right 
to fish is viewed by those involved in the day to day practice of fishing (whether as fishers, or in 
related industries and sectors, or through the management of fishing). By eliciting the “actor’s 
definition” of the legal concept that is the public right to fish,97 it is possible to start considering how 
that concept might shape the practice and management of coastal fisheries.  
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Interviews were identified as the most suitable method to gather this data as they allow for the 
development of a conversation with each of the participants to probe their views and experiences.98 
As a comparator, the use of questionnaires, for example, would have been a blunt instrument 
unlikely to yield the same considered and developed data.99 Many actors may not consciously think 
about the public right to fish at all and so a questionnaire, even with open-ended questions, would 
be less likely to yield useful data than an interview in which the researcher can probe the participant 
to tease out their views on a topic they may not have considered before, as well as encourage more 
reticent participants and steer or prompt those that travel too far away from the topic.100 
A semi-structured technique was adopted for the interviews to ensure consistency in the topics and 
themes discussed with each participant. Such a technique also allows for flexibility in the discussions 
with participants, which is more likely to lead to conversation and avoid the interview becoming a 
simple question and answer session.101 
As with any research method, interviews come with limitations, and one of the most important of 
these is the bias that the researcher may (advertently or inadvertently) introduce into the data.102 
This comes primarily through the use of leading questions, for example, or failing to clarify 
participants’ responses during the interview and thus relying on ambiguous data. In order to try and 
limit this effect, several strategies were adopted, including practising questioning techniques in a 
round of pilot interviews to identify suitable question types and eliminate those that were too 
leading,103 as well as ensuring that any clarification missed during the interview was sought from 
participants during the transcription approval stage.  
As well as the interviewer’s role, the interviewee also plays an important role in shaping the 
interview.104 This became apparent during an early interview at which the interviewee turned up 
with a quantity of internet research they had carried out on the public right to fish in an attempt to 
provide ‘better’ answers to my questions. The actual result was a less useful interview as the 
answers were less authentic and more focused on what the participant felt would be helpful for the 
research. As a consequence, future participants were given minimal detail on the topics to be 
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discussed at the interview and reassured that no preparation was needed for the interview as the 
researcher was interested in the participants’ own personal views and opinions.  
2.3.2.4 Data Collection: Devon & Severn IFCA 
In addition to the interviews, the case study includes data collected from the D&S IFCA. This data 
falls into two categories: (i) publicly available documents published by the D&S IFCA in relation to 
the Netting Permit Byelaw, and (ii) observation notes of the public meetings of the D&S IFCA 
Committee attended by the researcher. As discussed above, the purpose of including both of these 
strands of data was to provide a rich base of data to study.  
Participant observation is well-established within the cannon of social science methods. However, 
full observation, in which the researcher “takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and 
events of a group of people” in order to learn about that group,105 was not deemed appropriate for 
the current case study. As well as the practical limitations of time, location and access, the topic of 
the research does not require the deep understanding of “people’s daily lives, structure of events, 
social structure and expectations and values”106 that participant observation aims to provide. The 
public right to fish is expected to play some role in the management of coastal fisheries, however full 
immersion in the field, as is required with participant observation, is not required in order to elicit 
this role. Instead, observation was used as a tool to contextualise the discussions regarding 
management practices held with interview participants. By observing the meetings of the D&S IFCA 
Committee at which management decisions were discussed and taken, the statements of 
participants regarding such management decisions could be considered in the context of the D&S 
IFCA as a whole. Such observation allowed the researcher to “observe events that informants may be 
unable or unwilling to share when doing so would be impolitic, impolite, or insensitive, and observe 
situations informants have described in interviews.”107 In addition, the observation of D&S IFCA 
meetings and the use of D&S IFCA data allowed for the exploration of the ‘D&S IFCA’ view, as a 
separate view to those provided in interviews by members of the Committee and members of staff.  
2.3.3 Data Analysis: Thematic Analysis as a Method 
The data collected within the case study was analysed using a process of thematic analysis, which 
involves analysing the data to generate themes that tell a story about what is going on in the data. 
At its most simple, thematic analysis is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns 
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(themes) within data.”108 It is a widely used term in qualitative research, with many researchers 
claiming to ‘identify themes’ in their data or referring to themes as ‘emerging’ from their data. It is 
important, however, to recognise that the term ‘thematic analysis’ can be applied to a range of 
approaches that may centre on the idea of locating or generating themes and patterns within data, 
but diverge in many aspects of theory.  
2.3.3.1 Thematic Analysis: the process 
The theoretical flexibility of thematic analysis means that there are different approaches to the 
method, depending upon the theoretical background chosen for the research in question. Braun et 
al. suggest that the majority of approaches cohere around three broad “schools”.109 The first is the 
“small q” school of approaches, which are concerned predominantly with coding reliability; in other 
words, attempting to achieve the ‘correct’ and ‘accurate’ coding of a dataset.110 These approaches 
can be typified by Boyatzis, who presented thematic analysis as a way of ‘translating’ qualitative 
data into a language understandable by quantitative researchers.111 The reference to “small q” is a 
reference to the only partially qualitative nature of such coding-reliability approaches; while they 
may make use of qualitative tools and techniques for analysing data, such approaches are rooted in 
a quantitative/positivist philosophy that views reality as ‘out there’ and waiting to be discovered.112 
Coding reliability approaches therefore work on the assumption that the themes are already sitting 
there in a dataset and it is the task of a researcher (or more usually a team of researchers) to 
discover these themes, thus coding needs to be reliable, accurate and replicable in order to produce 
acceptable outputs.  
The second school of thematic analysis approaches includes the reflexive thematic analysis approach 
developed by Braun and Clarke.113 These approaches operate wholly within the qualitative paradigm 
and can be referred to as “Big Q” approaches.114 For researchers using a reflexive thematic analysis 
approach, the idea of coding reliability is not only not desirable, but not possible:  
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“Within a qualitative paradigm, there is no one right way to analyse the data, because there is no 
single truth... at best [coding-reliability approaches] can only show that two coders have been 
trained to code the data in the same way, not that the coding is somehow accurate.”115 
Instead the subjectivity of the researcher is recognised; the researcher is actively engaged in 
generating themes from their own reading and understanding of the dataset (informed by their own 
experiences and theoretical understandings), as opposed to finding or discovering codes that are 
residing within the dataset.  
The third ‘school’ of thematic analysis, labelled by Braun et al as “codebook” thematic analysis,116 sits 
between the coding reliability and reflexive approaches, sharing the “broadly qualitative underlying 
philosophy” of the latter, but adopting some of the more structured measures of the former.117 
For the present research, neither a coding reliability approach nor a codebook approach to thematic 
analysis was suitable. Foremost, such approaches do not fit with the epistemological underpinning 
of the research. A critical realist approach to research recognises that reality can only be accessed 
through human experience and therefore that research can only provide interpretations of reality 
seen through such lenses, as opposed to one true and accurate view of reality. Approaches that test 
the accuracy and replicability of coding, and attempt to avoid all issues of researcher subjectivity, are 
not compatible. Furthermore, the use of a code book to guide the coding process and the deductive 
quality this gives to the coding process works well when the research is attempting to prove or 
disprove a hypothesis, but less well when the research is not driven by a hypothesis, but instead 
seeking to find out more about an under-studied area. For the present research, the aim was not 
prove or disprove any particular hypothesis in relation to the public right to fish, but rather to find 
out about the understanding and experience of public fishing rights by those involved in fishing 
activities on a day to day basis. Finally, coding reliability approaches generally require a team of 
researchers to code the same data so as to be able to apply some measure of the level of agreement 
in coding between researchers, thus for practical reasons it is not ideal for PhD projects.  
Instead this research adopted a reflexive approach to thematic analysis, guided by that developed by 
Braun and Clarke.118 As noted above, although thematic analysis is not “wedded to any pre-existing 
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theoretical framework”119 (unlike Grounded Theory, for example), it is equally not a-theoretical and 
a series of choices will be made by any researcher using thematic analysis, including reflexive 
thematic analysis.120 Such choices are guided by what the researcher wants to find out from their 
data.  
The first ‘choice’ has been described above and involves theoretically situating the approach to 
thematic analysis, having regard to the underlying epistemology of the research. In this instance, a 
critical realist epistemology necessarily resulted in an approach to thematic analysis that sat 
“between the two poles of essentialism and constructionism... [and acknowledged] the ways 
individuals make meaning of their experience, and, in turn, the ways the broader social context 
impinges on those meanings, while retaining focus on the material and other limits of ‘reality’.”121 
Thus, the research was seeking to understand how those involved in fishing activity experience and 
view the public right to fish and how this impacts on the management of coastal fisheries. The 
critical element of this approach (as opposed to a purely realist approach) recognises that 
experiences take place within a broader framework of society and that, for example, the cultural 
references of a particular participant or community will shape how they make sense of such 
experiences, accordingly the thematic analysis needs to reflect this in the generation of codes and 
themes in order to tell a more rounded story of the data.  
There was no hypothesis or theory to test and so the process of coding followed a mostly inductive 
approach in which codes and themes are generated from the data, rather than being applied to the 
data. However, it remained important to recognise that even where the researcher wishes to remain 
theory-neutral during the process of coding, all researchers bring with them into their work some 
theoretical “commitments” and so it is never truly possible to code in a “vacuum”.122 The process 
involved in the specific thematic analysis conducted for this research is described in detail at Chapter 
5.   
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2.3.3.2 Thematic Analysis: Validity & Reliability 
Any research project needs to satisfy its audience of the validity and reliability of the findings of the 
project.123 Guest et al suggest that the key concept for the researcher to focus on is validity, given 
that valid data is by its nature reliable.124 However, the term ‘validity’ is often more naturally 
associated with quantitative research and the positivist paradigm.125 Certainly validity in qualitative 
research has been assigned many different names, such as trustworthiness,126 accuracy,127 rigour,128 
and credibility129 to name a few. Nonetheless, each of these terms can be seen as attempts to 
describe a central concept: the extent to which the research is actually assessing what it is intending 
and purporting to assess.130 The overall question to be answered in relation to qualitative research is 
the same as that to be answered in respect of quantitative research: has the researcher has satisfied 
their audience that both the outcomes of their research and the processes used to come up with 
these outcomes are appropriate and accurate? The difference between quantitative and qualitative 
research comes in how the researcher answers this question. What is important for validity in the 
positivist paradigm is not relevant to establishing the validity of qualitative research carried out 
within the constructivist or critical paradigm, and vice versa; or as Creswell and Miller note, the 
procedures used to establish validity in research will vary depending upon the ‘lens’ adopted by the 
researcher.131  
For example, the qualitative researcher is not as focused, as the quantitative researcher would be, 
on the generalisability (external validity) of their findings. Instead the focus must be on 
‘transferability’. This shifts the burden of proof in respect of generalisability away from the 
researcher and onto those that would seek to generalise the research findings: “…the [qualitative 
researcher] cannot specify the external validity of an inquiry; he or she can only provide the thick 
description necessary to enable someone interested in making a transfer to reach a conclusion about 
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whether transfer can be contemplated as a possibility.”132 Such an approach has been taken in this 
thesis by providing thick description of the context and characteristics of the case study.  
Validity in the Research Design Process 
The notion of the validity of research should not simply be a matter assessed at the end of the 
research process, but rather built into the research design at all stages.133 For example, the use of a 
case study as a way to collect data using multiple methods (through interviews, observation and 
from textual sources) provides an element of triangulation that helps to establish the validity of the 
present research.134  
In addition, Kruger and Casey advise a seven step process for designing a guide for data collection in 
order to ensure that the data collected is of suitable quality.135 Although in the context of focus 
groups and multiple researcher teams, their basic guidance for the preparation of the data collection 
guide is equally applicable to the preparation of the interview topic guide for the present research, 
and many of their seven steps were followed, albeit by a single researcher in conjunction with the 
supervisory team rather than a multi-researcher team. This process started with brainstorming 
topics and then questions within topics based upon the output of the first research phase and upon 
the literature reviewed at the outset of the case study phase. Attention was then paid to the 
phrasing and sequencing of these questions in order to ensure that these were appropriate and 
likely to facilitate useful discussion with the participants. The topic guide was tested in a pilot 
process (as described in Chapter 5), which helped to increase the validity of the data collected by 
ensuring that the questions made sense to participants.136  
Validity in the Collection and Transcription of Data 
The validity of qualitative research can be assessed on two bases: the validity of the data collected 
and the validity of the outputs coming from the process of analysis of that data. Discussions on 
validity in qualitative research tend to focus on the latter as this is where the suggestions of 
subjectivity and lack of rigour most often arise.137 However, the former can be seen as a necessary 
starting point for the latter; without accurate, credible data, the analysis of that data is of less value.  
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Guest et al suggest that the inductive nature of qualitative research provides a solid base of validity 
through the use of open-ended questioning and the ability of the researcher to address issues such 
as a participant not understanding a question by contemporaneously elaborating or rephrasing the 
question,138 thus ensuring that the data collected provides an accurate account of the participant’s 
experiences and views.  
In order to help ensure the consistency of the dataset, all audio recordings and meeting observation 
notes were transcribed by the researcher following the protocol described in Chapter 5.139 
Furthermore, an initial process of “member checking” was carried out, consisting of a request to 
each participant to review the written transcript of their interview and check that they were happy 
with their comments.140 The participants were explicitly informed that if they were not happy with 
any of their comments or felt that they did not properly reflect what they were trying to get across 
then the comments could be amended or removed. This process of validation of the raw data by the 
participants ensured the trustworthiness of the dataset.  
Validity in the Data Analysis Process 
The aim of assessing the validity of the data analysis process is to establish that the constructs the 
researcher has identified in the data are appropriate and have been accurately applied. This can be 
done in several ways, although the validation of data analysis needs to be coherent with the 
theoretical underpinning of the method of analysis. For example, with coding reliability approaches 
to thematic analysis, the reliability measures adopted (such as using a team of researchers, applying 
a codebook and testing for an acceptable level of agreement between coders) are used in order to 
avoid subjectivity in the creation of constructs and to ensure consistency in the application of 
constructs.141 Similarly, in such larger projects an external review or audit may be carried out in 
order to assess the validity of the analysis. However, as well as being unsuitable for the present 
research due to time and cost constraints, the reflexive method of thematic analysis adopted makes 
such measures theoretically unsuitable too: 
“The aim of coding and theme development in reflexive TA is not to “accurately” summarize the data 
nor to minimize the influence of researcher subjectivity on the analytic process, because neither is 
seen as possible nor desirable. The aim is to provide a coherent and compelling interpretation of the 
data, grounded in the data.”142 
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Many scholars recommend the use of some form of ‘member checking’ of the analytic process (in 
addition to checking of the raw data as discussed above) in establishing the validity of qualitative 
research.143 Means of member checking vary in their formality,144 with the common purpose being 
described as “taking data and interpretations back to the participants in the study so that they can 
confirm the credibility of the information and narrative account.”145 Lincoln and Guba privilege 
member checking as “the most crucial technique for establishing credibility.”146 However, its use to 
“correct errors and to eliminate the possibility of misrepresentation and misinterpretation” is rooted 
in a positivist epistemology.147 In the context of the reflexive thematic analysis adopted in the 
project, the benefit of and rationality behind member checking for this purpose is less apparent. As 
noted by the proponents of the reflexive approach, there is no one, correct, way to analyse data: 
“[i]t’s what you bring that shapes how you make sense of data… It’s not a case of deciding what’s the 
‘right’ interpretation, you need to think about ‘what story do I want to tell based on my data?’”148 
Reflexive thematic analysis does not seek to eliminate all researcher subjectivity; arguably this is not 
possible as noted above.149 Instead, the researcher must acknowledge their background knowledge, 
experience and theoretical leanings and what these bring to the analysis. The result of such 
acknowledgement is an understanding that the researcher and the participants will likely have 
different viewpoints on the analytic process.150 The most prominent of these differences being that 
the researcher’s viewpoint is based upon analysis of an entire dataset, to which participants do not 
generally have access.151  Member checking, when used in this epistemological framework, does not 
then serve the purpose of allowing the researcher to ‘correct’ or modify the analysis based on 
participant feedback because no such ‘corrections’ or modifications are required; it is acceptable, 
and perhaps even to be expected, that participant and researcher interpretations may differ in 
places. Without such a purpose, analytic member checking ceases to be a useful tool in establishing 
the validity of an analysis and thus it has not be used in this research.   
The validity of the data analysis was instead ensured through procedural tools. An audit trail of the 
analytic process was kept by the researcher, recording the process of the thematic analysis such as 
 
143 For example, Cresswell & Miller (n123), 127 
144 Lincoln & Guba (n125), 314 (The Delphi method provides an example of formal member checking elevated 
to an essential part of the method) 
145 Cresswell & Miller (n123), 127 
146 Lincoln and Guba (n125), 314 
147 Lara Varpio, Rola Aijawi, Lynn V Monrouxe, Bridget C O’Brien and Charlotte E Rees, ‘Shedding the cobra 
effect: problematizing thematic emergence, triangulation, saturation and member checking’ (2017) 51 Medical 
Education 40, 46 
148 Braun et al (n122), 12 
149 Varpio et al (n147), 43 
150 Ibid, 46 
151 Morse et al (n133), 16 
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the development of the themes, decisions made to move codes in or out of proposed themes and 
the refinement of the central organising concept of each of the themes.152 Elements of this audit trail 
are included in the description of the process of analysis in Chapter 5. In addition, a negative case 
analysis was conducted (again, as discussed in Chapter 5) in order to try to guard against selective 
reporting of the data.153 Further validation is provided by the use of multiple quotes drawn directly 
from the data in written analysis. Such use of quotes is a widely promoted tool to illustrate the 
analytic conclusions drawn from the data154 by connecting “the phenomenological world of the 
participant to the data summary and interpretation generated by the researcher.”155 
2.4 Conclusion 
The strategy for the present research, together with its theoretical underpinning, has been 
presented and discussed. Figure 1 shows how the various approaches and methods selected for the 
research fit together into a coherent scheme. 
 
Figure 1: The research strategy represented pictorially 
A legal geography methodology has been selected, as a socio-legal approach to research that will 
enable the consideration of the public right to fish and the ways in which it shapes how the natural 
resource of fish is viewed and governed and how the resource is allocated to particular uses.156 
Within that methodology, a mix of textual method (doctrinal +) with social science method (case 
 
152 Guest et al (n124), 17 and Nowell et al (n126), 3 
153 Guest et al (n124), 18 
154 Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (n128), 82 and Guest et al (n124), 18  
155 Guest et al (n124), 18 
156 Cantor (n65) 
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study) enables the research to address a legal audience, while at the same time stepping outside the 
traditionally close sphere of law and considering the role played by the social and geographical 
strands that co-constitute the public right to fish.   
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: 
A LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter (together with Chapter 4) addresses the first research question, considering whether 
and how the public fishery is owned. This chapter 3 introduces the concepts of property and 
ownership and then places the research question within the current field of literature on the public 
fishery both in general and with the specific focus on its ownership, identifying the possible 
alternatives for ownership, including the public trust. The chapter also considers the most 
appropriate approach to take in answering a legal research question in an area such as the public 
fishery that has ancient and opaque legal roots.  
3.2 Why ask the Question of Who Owns the Public Fishery?   
Decisions about how to manage fisheries in the UK following our exit from the European Union are 
being made as the Fisheries Bill1 makes its way through the Parliamentary procedure, and will 
continue to be made even after the Bill passes into law. As we “take back control”2 of fisheries in 
England, it is important that we understand the legal nature of what is being ‘controlled.’ Without a 
full understanding of how the public fishery is held and by whom, the risk is that the management of 
fisheries in the UK may end up being based upon incorrect assumptions. Not only does this present a 
risk of a challenge (either judicial or political) from interested parties, but it also presents a missed 
opportunity to consider the nature of the public fishery and the extent to which some of the current 
problems of unsustainable fishing may be addressed by fully understanding and utilising the concept 
of the public fishery.  
3.3 The Meaning of Ownership 
Answering the question of who (if anyone) owns the public fishery and what the nature of that 
ownership is, requires the consideration of what might be termed a ‘pre-question’: what do we 
mean by ownership? This pre-question can be broken down into three elements: (i) the difference 
between ownership and regulation: (ii) the different models of ownership and property; and (iii) 
consideration of the object of ownership. The third of these elements was addressed in Chapter 1, 
 
1 Fisheries HL Bill (2019-21) 71 
2 See, for example, Fishing for Leave, ‘This unique chance to take back control of our fishing waters’ (13 August 




where the importance of drawing a distinction between the fishery (as a right of fishing) and the fish 
was addressed. This section 3.3 will now consider the first two elements of ownership.  
3.3.1 Ownership as Distinct from Regulation or Jurisdiction 
What we do in any space can be controlled in many ways, but these can be broadly separated into 
two categories: (i) ownership and (ii) regulation by the State. The latter is also known as legislative 
jurisdiction.  
Ownership, otherwise known as the system of property law, controls actions in a space by bestowing 
certain rights upon owners and corresponding duties upon all non-owners. These rights entitle their 
holder to do certain things in relation to the space that is subject to those rights.  The nature of 
these rights will vary according to the model of property used by the society in which the space is 
located and also according to the space itself. However, such rights often include a right to control 
how others use the space.  
Regulation, on the other hand, is an act of State that can control how subjects (either all or a 
specified grouping of them) can use a space. Regulation can apply to space subject to ownership (as 
in the case of the Town and Country Planning Acts) or can apply in a space that has not been 
propertised (as in the air space in the ‘upper stratum’).3 While regulation necessarily implies a 
legislative jurisdiction on the part of a State, it does not imply proprietary ownership.4 A State or 
body may have legislative jurisdiction either with or without proprietary ownership. Similarly, a State 
or body may have ownership without legislative jurisdiction.  
In the present context, the UK Government and the devolved administrations clearly have legislative 
jurisdiction in respect of estuarine, coastal and sea fisheries. What is not clear is whether there is 
any proprietary ownership in respect of the public fishery in any emanation of the State. This 
question is important because it frames the role of the government in the future of the public 
fishery. Legislative jurisdiction denotes a power on the part of the government to regulate and 
protect fisheries. Conversely, ownership of the public fishery (depending on the nature of that 
ownership) might bring with it a duty to regulate and protect fisheries.  
 
3 See Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252 
4 Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada v Attorneys General for the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec and 
Nova Scotia [1898] AC 700 (PC), [709] (Lord Herschell) 
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3.3.2 What Does Ownership Mean?  
The terms ‘ownership’ and ‘property’ are used by many property theorists interchangeably.5 Indeed, 
the common law generally labels all property entitlements as ‘ownership interests’.6 A detailed 
investigation of any divergence in the content of the concepts of ‘property’ and ‘ownership’ is 
beyond the scope of this research, and so it shall suffice for present purposes to note that in this 
thesis, both of the terms are used to denote the interests one or more legal persons may have in 
connection to an object. Such interests may vary depending (inter alia) upon the persons and the 
object, and multiple persons may hold interests in relation to an object. As such, while ‘ownership’ is 
equated with ‘property’, it is not accurate to equate ownership of a property right in respect of an 
object with ownership of the object itself.  
The concepts of ownership and property have evolved such that the historical debate surrounding 
ownership and property rights, which was historically based on a dichotomy that tended to 
universally accept the conceptual structure of property and focus instead on the justification for 
property, has been turned on its head.7 The modern debate now widely accepts a common view on 
the justification (or point) of property and the “fierce debates” take place around the concept of 
property.8 Thus many academic commentators now generally agree that the “point of property… is 
to work out the morally best way to manage our collective goods… [being] those resources that in a 
state of nature we would think of as available to everyone”.9 Instead the debate focuses on how 
property rights can and do achieve that ‘point’.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to study and analyse such “fierce debates” in detail. Nonetheless, 
any question involving the ownership of a property right must first consider and justify the position 
to be taken within the debate on ownership and property. As well as satisfying academic rigour, the 
determination and justification of the starting point for any ownership query allows us to see how 
any such starting point can affect our views on ownership and property, which in turn can affect how 
we treat it. For example, Lametti notes that “[t]he dominance of a rights-based view of property 
makes legal and lay observers think about private property in a certain way, organizing our thoughts 
around the idea of full-blooded ownership and setting it up as the paradigmatic way of relating to 
objects of social wealth. We thus see property as a set of relatively absolute rights”.10  For Lametti, 
 
5 David Lametti, ‘The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth’ (2003) 53 University of 
Toronto Journal 325, 333; see also, Frank Snare, ‘The Concept of Property’ (1972) 9(2) American Philosophical 
Quarterly 200 
6 Lametti (n5), 358 
7 Larissa Katz, ‘The Regulative Function of Property Rights’ (2011) 8(3) Econ Journal Watch 236 
8 Ibid., 236 
9 Ibid.,  
10 Lametti (n5), 377 
54 
 
the consequences of the dominance he refers to manifest themselves in a general ignorance of the 
duties and obligations of an owner in respect of a scarce resource.   
To satisfy the socio-legal approach adopted for this research, it is also important to recognise how 
social and historical contexts can influence how property and ownership is viewed by a society. This 
is neatly illustrated in Anderson’s examination of the public’s rights of access to private land in the 
UK (colloquially termed the ‘right to roam’) from an American perspective.11 The ‘right to roam’ (as 
noted below), changes the nature of property ownership by limiting the owner’s rights to exclude 
others from the property. In considering the reasons for the lack of a ‘right to roam’ for the public in 
the USA, Anderson suggests that there is no need for such a right in the USA, partly because there is 
much more publicly owned land and partly because the social set up in the USA was different to that 
in the UK.  
“In Britain, much land was concentrated in a small group of aristocratic owners who traced 
their holdings to royal grants. The general public resented the idea that ‘the privileged few 
could dictate the terms on which the countryside was used’. In contrast, the American 
landowner class was much larger and less exclusive. Because most landowners earned their 
property through labour or service in a war, the public presumably felt they had earned the 
right to exclude and respected the corresponding rights of others.”12  
In other words, the pursuit of a more egalitarian society that the USA was built on, combined with 
other opportunities for public recreation and exercise, have produced a system of property that is 
much more heavily focused on the owner’s right to exclude all others. Irrespective of any particular 
views on the perspective taken by Anderson, the point remains that the social context of property 
(as of any other legal concept) is key in understanding its operation.  
3.4 The Concept of Property/Ownership 
The lay understanding of the term ‘property’ is of a physical object; for example a house, a piece of 
land or a laptop computer. However, practitioners and academics are in broad agreement that “the 
beginning of truth about property is the realisation that property is not a thing but rather a 
relationship which one has with a thing”.13 Although even that statement is somewhat controversial 
as property is less about our relationships with objects, than our relationships with others in respect 
of or through objects. It is in respect of these relationships, and their nature, content and extent, 
that the debate in contemporary property theory is found. This section considers the main theories 
 
11 Jerry L Anderson, ‘Countryside Access and Environmental Protection: An American View of Britain’s Right to 
Roam’ (2007) 9(4) Environmental Law Review 241 
12 Ibid., 4 
13 Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2009), 15 
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as to the nature of property, together with a reflection on the types of property and their relevance 
to the research question.  
3.4.1 The Structure of Property 
The model of property that is generally accepted by practitioners, students and those in the field of 
property law but outside the field of property theory is known as the ‘bundle of rights’ theory. 
Indeed, many have suggested that the bundle of rights theory has reached paradigm status such that 
we may now consider it (in the terminology of Kuhn)14 normal science and move on to dealing with 
particular problems in the field of property law such as the justification of property and the conflicts 
between different justifications.15 
To continue with the Kuhnian model of scientific progress, the ‘bundle of rights’ model of property 
appears to be somewhere on the spectrum between awareness of anomalies and crisis point. Within 
the specialist field of property theory it is subject to many critics and there are several alternative 
models of property put forward by property theorists. It is beyond the scope of this research to 
consider these models in great detail, but a summary of each of the main theories is needed in order 
to be able to situate the current research and justify the position taken.  
3.4.1.1 The Bundle of Rights Approach 
This model is generally attributed to Wesley Hohfeld, although his seminal work didn’t actually use 
the term ‘bundle of rights’. Hohfeld wrote about rights in general and asserted that the term ‘right’ 
was used indiscriminately to mean many different things, including privilege, power and immunity.16 
Hohfeld called for more consideration of the content of ‘rights’, arguing that all ‘rights’ can in fact be 
characterised as a set of jural relations between people, which can be split into jural opposites and 
jural correlatives.17 As such a property right is not a right to a thing, but a set of legal relations with 
other people in respect of that thing.  
Hohfeld’s work on jural relations is generally combined with Honoré’s writing on the incidents of 
ownership18 to create the ‘bundle of rights’ model of property. According to Honoré, ownership is a 
collection of several rights: “the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to 
 
14 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd Edition, University of Chicago Press, 1970) 
15 Lawrence C Becker, ‘Too Much Property’ (1992) 21 Philosophy and Public Affairs 196, 198-199 in James 
Penner, ‘The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property’ (1996) 43 UCLA Law Review 711, 713, see also Pamela 
O’Connor, ‘The Changing Paradigm of Property and the Framing of Regulation as a Taking’ (2011) 36(2) 
Monash Law Review 50, 55 
16 Wesley Newcombe Hofeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 
23(1) Yale Law Journal 16, 30 
17 Ibid. 
18 Anthony Maurice (Tony) Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in Anthony Gordon Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
(Oxford University Press, 1961) 
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the income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights or incidents of 
transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition on harmful use, liability to execution, and the 
incident of residuarity”.19 Thus the bundle of rights model of property posits that property is a 
bundle of separate rights in respect of a thing, each right being a set of legal relations with people 
other than the owner.  
The bundle of rights model is sometimes likened to a bundle of sticks held by each owner. This is 
neatly illustrated in the description of the nature of an easement in Lord Leconfield v Lord Lonsdale, 
in which it was stated that “if the owner of close A has a right of way over close B, this right is held as 
additional to the ordinary rights of ownership in close A, and correlatively it is so much subtracted 
from the ownership of close B.”20 Thus a ‘stick’ (being the right to keep the owner of close A out of 
their property) is taken out of the ‘bundle’ of close B’s owner and a corresponding ‘stick’ (being the 
right for the owner of close A to access over close B) is added to the ‘bundle’ of close A’s owner.  
The criticism of the bundle of rights model of property is manifold,21 but the majority centres on the 
inability of the bundle model to say anything about the ‘thingness’ of property.22 Put another way, 
the model is a “slogan”23 that has no content and so is unable to tell us anything about different 
types of property or how to distinguish between bundles of rights and specific rights.24 In addition, 
even proponents of the bundle of rights model accept that there is no set collection of rights that 
when held together will always equal property. Which means that the bundle of rights model cannot 
tell us what is property and what is not, just that when it exists, property is a complex of distinct 
rights between people in respect of things.   
Claeys suggests that the bundle of rights model can be interpreted in three different ways:  
(i) As a “value neutral analytical specification vocabulary”.25  
(ii) As a coordinated conception of property that defines it as including “any valuable right 
that could conceivably belong in the bundle”.26  
 
19 Ibid., 113 
20 Lord Leconfield and others v Lord Lonsdale (1869-70) LR 5 CP 657, [696] 
21 For example, Penner argues that Hohfeld and Honoré’s work cannot be put together in the way the bundle 
model requires because Honoré’s work is based on propositions that are incompatible with Hohfeld’s 
characterisation of property rights (see Penner (n15), 732). 
22 Michael Heller, ‘Three Faces of Private Property’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 417, 431 
23 Penner (n15), 714 
24 Heller (n22), 431 





(iii) As an ad hoc conception of property based on the argument that “all possible organizing 
conceptions for property are “so riddled with qualifications that property can only be 
regarded as an ad hoc ‘bundle of rights’ without any distinguishing features””.27  
The specification interpretation of the bundle model is entirely acceptable but unable to answer the 
question ‘what is property?’28 The other two interpretations also suffer the same fault: neither 
involve any reliable way of distinguishing between what is property and what is not. Furthermore, 
neither tell us anything about what property might involve, such as what powers and duties an 
owner might have and what decisions an owner might make. Therefore one must look to another 
theory to find a justified definition of property.  
3.4.1.2 The Exclusion or Boundary Approach 
The exclusion approach is advocated by scholars led by James Penner. At its core it is an attempt to 
address the criticisms of the bundle of rights model of property that hold that the bundle model is 
unable to tell us when property exists and what the key characteristics of property are. This is done 
by developing the bundle of rights approach by “searching for one single, essential stick in the bundle 
of rights that is definitive of the concept of property”.29 For Penner that stick is the right to exclude 
others from one’s property. In other words, property is only found whenever the owner has a right 
to exclude all others from his or her property, so property turns on the duty of all non-owners to 
exclude themselves from property they do not own. This focus on exclusion has led to the approach 
being named a ‘boundary approach’.30 
Critique of the boundary approach is focused in two areas. First that by focusing only on the 
boundaries of property, it is reduced to “nothing more than the space left for use of the thing by the 
owner once all others are kept out”.31 The problem with this is that the model therefore fails to tell 
us anything about the kinds of decisions that owners can make within such boundaries.32 As well as 
not specifying what property enables an owner to do in respect of the object of property, critics 
argue that an exclusive focus on boundaries does not allow for any account to be taken of the 
different types of resources that can be subject to property relationships.33 In other words, the 
 
27 Ibid., 618 (quoting Jesse Dukeminier et al, Property (6th edition, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2006), 81, 
note 2) 
28 As Penner confirms (n15), 741 
29 Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo M Peñalver, An Introduction to Property Theory (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 4  
30 Larissa Katz, ‘Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law’ (2008) 58(3) Toronto Law Journal 275 
31 Ibid., 282 
32 Katz (n8), 239 
33 Lametti (n10), 345 
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boundary model requires that all property relationships are the same, notwithstanding the wide 
variety of types of resource that can be the subject of property relationships.  
As well as such critique, it becomes apparent when considering the nature of property and the 
territory that it creates, that exclusion is not a valid model for a theory of ownership given the “rich 
realm” of law focused on the inclusive nature of property.34 Indeed, Blomley notes that such 
inclusion can be found in a range of examples from nuisance law (which permits the state to enter 
private property in order to protect the interests of public aesthetics and hygiene), to adverse 
possession (which restricts an owner’s right to exclude after a certain period of non-exercise), to the 
doctrine of necessity (which requires an owner to permit access to others where absolutely 
necessary).35  
3.4.1.3 The Agenda-Setting Approach 
As illustrated above, critics of the exclusion or boundary approach can easily point to instances in 
which property clearly exists but the owner does not have a right to exclude all others from his or 
her property. As Alexander and Peñalver note, “[t]he problem with privileging one strand in the 
bundle… is that it is a relatively easy task to come up with examples of private property systems in 
which the right is almost entirely absent or, at best, subordinated to other rights”.36 To take an 
example from the English and Welsh legal system, there are over three million acres of land37 that 
are subject to the general public’s ‘right to roam’ under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 
(CROW 2000). On such land, members of the general public are entitled to wander freely wherever 
they please (subject to certain exceptions discussed below). The boundary model of property has a 
hard time reconciling this inability to exclude a large class of others from the property with the core 
features of the model.  
However, if the focus is shifted from the act of exclusion to the intention behind it, then it becomes 
possible to reconcile these initially troublesome incidents of property law. The principal thesis of 
Katz’s work on property is that “the central concern [of the concept of ownership in property law] is 
not the exclusion of all non-owners from the owned thing but, rather, the preservation of the owner’s 
position as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing”.38 So provided that other people act 
 
34 Nicholas Blomley, ‘The territory of property’ (2016) Progress in Human Geography 40(5) 593, 598 
35 Ibid. 
36 Alexander and Peñalver (n29), 4 
37 The Ramblers’ Association <http://www.ramblers.org.uk/advice/paths-and-access/england/what-is-the-
right-to-roam.aspx> accessed 19 May 2017 
38 Katz (n30), 275 
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consistently with the owner’s agenda for the property, then the owner’s position is not threatened 
and there is no need to rely on exclusion to protect that position.  
To return to the right to roam example, CROW 2000 contains certain exceptions to the general ‘right 
to roam’ on open access land.39 These include (inter alia) prohibiting access to any land that is within 
20m of a dwelling, land that is used as a garden, and land that has crops growing on it. These 
exceptions support the agenda-setting model of property. For example, members of public 
exercising access rights over land that has crops growing on it would risk damage to the crop and 
therefore would conflict with the owner’s chosen agenda of using his or her land in a certain way to 
maximise profit from it. However, access over land that is left fallow or land that is used for livestock 
would not conflict with any such agenda and so does not threaten the owner’s privileged position. 
Similarly, access over a private garden or within proximity to a dwelling is in conflict with the 
owner’s imputed agenda of privacy for his or her home. As Katz notes (in the context of the similar 
Scandinavian custom of Allemansratt),40 “[t]he owner remains clearly in charge throughout… it is for 
the owner to decide where to place his dwelling house and whether or not to farm certain fields or to 
leave others fallow. The owner’s choices constrain the kinds of decisions others can make about rural 
land, such as where to hike”.41 
3.4.1.4 Property Law in Practice 
Theoretical debate on the nature and extent of property can be far removed from what some may 
term ‘real life’. In this regard, Gray and Gray note that the dominant models of property in land in 
the English and Welsh legal system “fluctuate inconsistently between three rather different models of 
property... whether property in land is to be understood in terms of empirical facts, artificially defined 
rights, or duty-laden allocations of social utility”.42 These three models can be summarised as:  
(i) Behavioural – property as fact. 
(ii) Conceptual – property as a right. 
(iii) Obligational – property as a responsibility.43 
As well as fluctuation between models, the common law seems to be able to adopt more than one 
model at the same time. The system of adverse possession provides an example of this. Adverse 
possession is a legal concept under which a person who is not the legal owner of a property can 
 
39 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, Schedule 1 
40 Allemansratt goes further than CROW 2000 by allowing members of the public not just to walk over rural 
land, but to use it for recreational purposes, so long as that use is not inconsistent with the owner’s use of the 
land. 
41 Katz (n30), 299 




become the legal owner by possessing that property for a specified period of time. Thus it is a 
concept based almost entirely on property as a set of facts (focussing on the factual possession by 
the adverse possessor), operating within a system of property as a set of rights.  
Gray and Gray suggest that, far from such fluctuation and seeming inconsistency creating problems 
for the common law, the fact that “these alternative models of property do not exist in resolute 
opposition, [but]… are bound together in a creative tension… is part of the richness of our land 
law”.44 The methodological approach adopted for the present research means that the task of this 
thesis is not to impose a specific theory of property upon the research, but to be aware of the 
various theories of property, together with those that currently hold sway with the judiciary, 45 and 
to seek to establish how the adoption of particular theories of property by individual courts may 
shape the decisions that they give and therefore the law that is made by those decisions.  
3.4.2 The Categories of Property 
Property is generally referred to as constituting three different and discrete forms: private property, 
common property and state (or collective) property.46 The definition of private property is the focus 
of much of the debate in property theory and is hotly contested as discussed above. Nonetheless, it 
is sufficient for present purposes to define it using Waldron’s proposition that private property is 
based upon an idea that “each resource belongs to some individual”.47 Conversely, common property 
is often conceived of as property that does not involve any exclusion; “everyone has privileges of 
inclusion and no one has rights of exclusion”.48 Finally, state (or collective property) has facets of 
both of the other types of property. It is subject to the interests of the collective, but those interests 
are represented by the state, which holds rights of exclusion and has the sole power of decision-
making in respect of the property.49 
However, Hartley argues that this trilogy fails to see the true nature of property as a spectrum 
between the three discrete points of private, state and common property.50 As such, all private 
property (and, on the above interpretation, state property) is (to a greater or lesser extent) common 
property, and vice versa. This is because “[p]roperty rights do not exist fully formed only later to be 
 
44 Ibid., 51 
45 Heller (n22), 431 
46 For example, see Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Press, 1988), 37-42 
47 Ibid., 38 
48 Heller (n22), 420 
49 Ibid., 420-421 
50 Tilman Hartley, ‘Commons, communities, and the global economy: a definition of property for the twenty-
first century’ (Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Sheffield, April 2015) 
<https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2015/HartleyPSA2015Commons,%20communit
ies,%20and%20the%20global%20economy-%20a%20definition%20of%20property%20for%20the%20twenty-
first%20century.pdf> accessed 26 March 2018 
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limited by outside intervention; on the contrary, property rights are already bounded and delimited 
when they are created, and are defined… within the context of the wider social arrangements which 
we develop to manage resources.”51 Thus what a person can do with their private property is limited 
by the rights of others, just as with common property. In a similar vein, Rose views all property as 
inherently public, with the state delegating management of those elements that don’t need 
collective management (i.e. private property).52 
Reaching a similar conclusion, but coming from the other end of the spectrum, some scholars argue 
that all property can be thought of in terms of exclusion, not just private property. For example, 
Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop argue that common property should not be described as “everyone’s 
property” (as suggested above), but instead that it should still be defined on the basis of exclusion: 
“[t]he concept “property” has no meaning without [the] feature of exclusion of all who are not either 
owners themselves or have some arrangement with owners to use the resource in question.”53 This 
view is also taken by scholars like Heller, who agree that, just like private property, it is also possible 
to understand common and state property in terms of exclusion, with the differences between them 
being found in the range of interests that have to be taken into account when making decisions 
about who to exclude.54 
The rejection of the classical model of three discrete forms of property fits with the ‘real world’, 
which has thrown up complex property systems that often do fall in-between the three classical 
types of property, such as anticommons property and liberal commons property.55 Indeed, Heller 
describes the trust as a form of liberal common property, being “a legal invention that encourages 
people voluntarily to come together and create limited-access and limited-purpose communities 
dedicated to shared management of a scarce resource.”56 This construction of the trust supports the 
notion of common property as both allowing for and requiring some form of exclusion.   
This precis of the types of property is not intended as an exhaustive account (or even a detailed 
summary) of the literature on the types and nature of property. Instead it is presented in order to 
illustrate that it is not sufficient to question ‘what is property?’ without taking into account the type 
of property under consideration. Much of the debate concerning the content and extent of property 
 
51 Ibid., 9 
52 Carol Rose, ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property’ (1986) 53(3) 
University of Chicago Law Review 711, 719 
53 Siegfried von Ciriacy-Wantrup and Richard Bishop, ‘”Common Property” as a concept in natural resources 
policy’ (1975) 15(4) Natural Resources Journal 713, 715 
54 Heller (n48), 420-421.  
55 Ibid., 422-432 
56 Ibid., 428-429 
62 
 
and ownership focuses on private property. Whether this is a consequence of seeing private 
property as the most important subset of property in general,57 or of seeing private property as 
“logically prior” to other conceptions of property,58 is outside of the scope of this research. 
Nonetheless, the theoretical focus on private property must be acknowledged.  
The public fishery, if an instance of property, will not be (at least at present) a member of the class 
of private property, but rather some form of common or state property (or perhaps something in 
between as per the discussion above). However, this does not mean that the theoretical debate on 
the nature of private property is irrelevant to this research. Many of the core features of private 
property, and particularly the debate around the nature of property, are the same across the 
different branches of property. Indeed if property is seen as a spectrum between absolute 
ownership and no ownership at all, then debates on the nature of private property have applicability 
in relation to any consideration of common or collective property, and vice versa.    
3.5 The Public Fishery: The Literature and Options for Ownership 
As considered at section 3.3.1 above, control of a person’s actions within a space can be achieved 
either as a result of acts of regulation or ownership in that space (or both). While these two types of 
acts can exist concurrently, they are distinct categories. To date, the academic focus on fisheries law 
has tended to concentrate on the regulation of fisheries (through national and EU law on matters 
such as quota and the Common Fisheries Policy).59 However, this literature, although on the face of 
it concerned with regulation, has strayed into the realms of ownership, generally without any 
recognition on the part of the commentators.  
As an illustration, there is a well-developed field of literature concerned with considering the 
benefits and disadvantages of introducing what is often termed ‘rights-based management’ for 
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58 E.g.: James W Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford University Press, 1996), 111f in Heller (n48), 373 
59 See, for example, Nathalie Steins and Victoria Edwards, ‘Institutional analysis of UK coastal fisheries: 
implications of overlapping regulations for fisheries management’ (1997) 21(6) Marine Policy 535; Jeremy 
Phillipson and David Symes, ‘’A sea of troubles': Brexit and the fisheries question’ (2018) 90 Marine Policy 168; 
Pablo Pita, Sebastián Villasante, Robert Arlinghaus, Pedro Gomes, Harry V. Strehlow, Pedro Veiga, José 
Vingada, and Kieran Hyder, ‘A matter of scales: Does the management of marine recreational fisheries follow 
the ecosystem approach to fisheries in Europe?’ (2018) 97 Marine Policy 61; and Stephen C. Mangi, Andrew 
Kenny, Lisa Readdy, Paulette Posen, Ana Ribeiro-Santos, Francis C. Neat, and Finlay Burns, ‘The economic 
implications of changing regulations for deep sea fishing under the European Common Fisheries Policy: UK 
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fisheries.60 This includes Costello et al.,61 who studied Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems 
around the world62 and argued that ITQs could help to reduce the rate of collapse of global fish 
stocks. However, this literature tends to overlook the importance of the regulation/ownership 
distinction and suggests ‘solutions’ to the current situation in relation to fish stocks that do not 
always adequately consider the issue of ownership in the spaces in question.63 Taking Costello et al. 
as an example again, Appleby notes that in their argument for the adoption of some form of rights 
based management system they use the terms “quota, privilege, right, share and asset” almost 
interchangeably, yet these terms all have “a subtly different legal definition, giving a different suite 
of rights and obligations, and existing within differing administrative frameworks”.64 The failure to 
make distinctions between these terms and to use the appropriate term for the system being argued 
for leads to an assumption amongst commentators, particularly those from a non-legal discipline, 
that all catch share systems of fishery management involve essentially privatising the public fishery 
by giving fishers a private property right to catch a certain proportion of fish. Yet there is little 
recognition given to the public right to fish and how any privatisation might affect the public when 
such assumptions are made.  
Macinko and Bromley have raised this objection in the context of USA fishing law, arguing that the 
fishery resource within the American Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) is a public resource and that 
what the literature fails to recognise is that any introduction of ITQs in any form must recognise this 
public ownership and ensure that “the American public receive some financial return for the use and 
capture of their resources.”65 However, the public ownership can never be properly recognised until 
it is properly understood. Macinko and Bromley’s initial commentary was focused on explaining the 
problems with arguments for rights-based management in fisheries and, as such, failed to elaborate 
on the assertion that the American fishery was publicly owned.  
And so it is that for a debate, such as that surrounding ITQs, that is focussing on the rights each 
fisher has and therefore on the ownership of the fishery, there is surprisingly little comment on what 
 
60 See summary in Christopher Costello, ‘Introduction to the symposium on rights-based fisheries 
management’ (2012) 6(2) Review of Environmental Economics & Policy 212; see also Allison K. Barner, Jane 
Lubchenco, Christopher Costello, Steven D. Gaines, Amanda Leland, Brett Jenks, Steven Murawski, Eric 
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61 Christopher Costello, Steven D Gaines and John Lynham, ‘Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?’ 
(2008) Science 1678 
62 The ITQ is only one method of rights based fisheries management and involves fishers being allocated a 
dedicated share of the total catch, as determined by scientific methods.  
63 Adam Ayers, John Kittinger and Mehana Blaich Vaughan, ‘Whose right to manage? Distribution of property 
rights affects equity and power dynamics in comanagement’ (2018) 23(2) Ecology & Society 37 
64 Thomas Appleby, ‘Privatising fishing rights: the way to a fisheries wonderland?’ (2013) Public Law 481, 483 
65 Seth Macinko and Daniel Bromley, Who Owns America’s Fisheries? (Island Press, 2002), 4 
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that ownership is at present. Where the ownership of the public fishery is recognised as an issue 
worthy of focus in the literature, a range of opinions as to which of the above options might be 
correct has been expressed. The potential options considered by the literature are tripartite:  
(i) The public fishery is owned by no one and open to all (often termed res nullius).  
(ii) The public fishery is owned by the public as a whole.  
(iii) The public fishery is owned by some emanation of the Crown on behalf of the public.  
 
What these three options have in common is the element of public involvement. Arguably they each 
achieve similar end points, namely the ability of all members of the public to fish in the seas, yet 
their ways of doing so (and therefore whether and how any restrictions can be put upon the exercise 
of any right by the public) are very different.  
 
The public ownership angle is starting to gain traction in the minds of policy makers and judges. In 
The United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations (UKAFPO) case, Cranston J (in 
considering a judicial review application brought following a reallocation of fishing quota by DEFRA) 
acknowledged that “[t]here is some force in the Interveners’ point that statements about fishing 
quota and the fixed quota allocation system have always to be understood against the background 
that fish are a public resource.”66 Similarly, in their 2018 report on the Implications of Brexit for 
Fishing Opportunities in Wales, the Public Policy Institute for Wales made several references to the 
fishery as a “public resource” and a “public good” and even to the lack of compensation to the public 
for the use of this common resource.67 Indeed, in a debate in the House of Lords, Lord Gardiner, on 
behalf of the government, stated that “[t]he Government are clear that there is a public right to 
these fish. Indeed, lawyers have advised me that UK case law recognises that fish are a public asset, 
held by the Crown for the benefit of the public.” 68 Although Lord Gardiner speaks of a public trust 
(the concept of which will be considered below), the ownership of the public fishery has not been 
explicitly stated in either statute or common law. Without a proper understanding of the nature of 
the public ownership referred to in these examples, the recognition of the public interest is built 
upon shaky foundations.  
 
Macinko and Bromley revisited the American public fishery, considering the nature of the public’s 
interest in it, and concluded that there the fishery cannot be res nullius as the USA has proclaimed 
 
66 The United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of State  for Environment, Food 
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itself sovereign owner of all sovereign rights within its EEZ, including the fishery, and so on this basis 
the fishery is owned by the government as a form of common property that is open to all.69 This 
argument may apply in England and Wales, although the picture is more complex as a result of the 
existence of the Crown and it is also unclear what position the common law takes, and how that 
might fit with a proclamation of sovereign rights.  
 
In the English and Welsh literature, the minimal focus on the content and form of any ownership of 
the public fishery has two lines of approach: ownership by the Crown on some form of trust for the 
public and ownership by the public (which is sometimes mixed up with ownership by no one and 
open access for the public).  
3.5.1 A Crown Trust for the Benefit of the Public 
Appleby argues that the public fishery is owned by “some aspect of the Crown”70 on trust for the 
public, but does not reach a conclusion as to which aspect that is (the Crown Estate, some other 
aspect of the Crown or the UK Government) and neither does he consider what responsibilities and 
duties any such owner may have. Barnes is not convinced by the argument that the public fishery is 
held by the Crown on some form of trust, suggesting that there is no explicit basis for such an 
approach and, furthermore, that the court in the Royal Fishery of the Banne case71 unequivocally 
rejected such an approach. 72   
 
In the Banne case the Irish court was called upon to consider the question of whether the salmon 
fishery in a tidal and navigable section of the River Banne belonged to the Crown or had been 
granted to the lord of the adjoining manor by virtue of the general words in the grant of the manor 
to him. The court held that the River Banne was indeed a royal river and that the salmon fishery in it 
was a royal fishery that appertained to the king for his benefit, with the reporter stating that: “… 
although the king permits his subjects for their ease and advantage to have free passage on such 
navigable rivers, he has notwithstanding a sole interest in the soil of those rivers and also in the 
fisheries, although its produce is not generally taken and appropriated by the king, if not of 
extraordinary and fixed yearly value”.73 This passage seems to suggest not only that there is no trust 
of the public fishery, but also that there is no public ‘right’ to fish at all, only a tacit licence from the 
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72 Richard Barnes, ‘Revisiting the Public Right to Fish in British Waters’ (2011) International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 433, 453 
73 Case of the Royal Fishery of the Banne [1610] Dav 55 
66 
 
king because he doesn’t deem the majority of the fish worth enough to exclude the public from the 
fishery. Thus, at first glance, the argument of a lack of a Crown trust appears to hold water.  
 
However, this research must follow the “doctrinal +” method described in Chapter 2 by widening the 
field of sources available for consideration in order to understand the law more fully. In this 
instance, it is important therefore to not take the reporting of the Banne case at face value, but 
instead to try and understand the provenance of the reporting of the case available to present day 
scholars and the impact that this may have on the conclusions that can be drawn from the case. 
Dating from 1610, the only contemporaneous reporting of this Irish case is by Sir John Davies, an 
English politician and poet who was then the Irish attorney general. It is to Sir John’s report that 
Barnes refers to support his argument that a Crown trust does not exist. Yet there are several 
difficulties with any such use of the Banne case, all of which are rooted in the geopolitics at play at 
the time of the case. The Nine Years’ War between the Gaelic Irish Lords and the English had 
recently finished and the English were in the process of ‘civilising’ the Irish, in part through the 
wholesale eradication of Irish Brehon laws and their replacement with the English common law.74 
 
Davies’ involvement in this process of ‘civilisation’, as attorney-general, means that getting a firm 
grip on the accuracy of his reporting of the case is problematic. Davies has been described by one 
commentator as putting English law into effect in Ireland “through active manipulation of legal 
doctrine and management of the courts”.75 Whilst not conclusive, this does not suggest an 
independent and impartial approach to the reporting of cases.  
 
In the mid-1800s Davies’ report of the case was considered and made the subject of scathing 
criticism in the Dublin Review.76 Certainly some of this criticism appears to be warranted, particularly 
concerning the inconsistencies in Davies’ arguments and the lack of any authority cited for the 
proposition that the king has the sole interest in the fishery in a navigable river.77 However, the 
source of the criticism and the style of it cannot be ignored. The Dublin Review was a Catholic 
journal founded with the aim of promoting Catholic progress,78 and the section dealing with the 
Banne case starts with a lamentation (that turns polemical) on behalf of the Irish people as to their 
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exclusion from the resources that should naturally be theirs. The author notes that at many areas of 
the coast of Ireland, the public is prevented from fishing for sustenance and to provide a livelihood: 
 
“That this injustice is illegal, is a proposition which we shall render as clear and 
unquestionable as any legal proposition can be, and make so plain and obvious, that no 
reasonable being can refuse it credence, or hesitate to conclude with us, that those who 
perpetrate this illegal injustice, differ from highwaymen in one respect only, that of preying 
upon the ignorance, instead of upon the fears of their victims.”79  
 
The paper was written amidst the background of the build-up in Ireland of the conditions that lead 
to the Great Famine starting in 1845 and so this perspective is understandable, but it (and the tone 
in which it is expressed) also mean that the credence to be given to its consideration of Davies’ 
reporting must be reduced somewhat. 
 
A more measured consideration of Davies’ reporting of the Banne case can be found in Hale’s first 
treatise, in which he argues that the conclusions drawn by Davies from the findings of the case are 
unwarranted.80 Hale submits that although the court held the tidal and navigable section of the River 
Banne to be a royal river, this term was used not as a reference to the propriety in the river and the 
fishery, but “as in reference to the common use of them, as the Kinges highway is so called, though 
the propriety of the soyl may be in a subject”.81 In other words, though the propriety in a tidal river 
may be in a subject, any nuisance to the public interest in such waters would be “punished at the 
Kinges suit, as in the case of a nuisance in a highway”.82 This interpretation leaves the possibility of a 
trust for the benefit of the public still intact, which is in direct contrast to the view that the case 
provides an example of a court refusing to apply a public trust interpretation to the public fishery.  
 
With these questions over the accuracy of the reporting of the Banne case, the reliance on it to 
refute a public trust argument is problematic, and so stripping out this section of Barnes’ argument  
leaves a statement that there is “no explicit basis for [a] ‘doctrine of trust’” in respect of the public 
fishery. This chapter and chapter 4 will challenge both this statement and the conclusion drawn from 
this statement that such a trust must therefore not exist, suggesting instead that a public trust 
approach is still possible in English law and considering how it might be established.  
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3.5.2 Public Ownership and Res Nullius 
Instead of a trust for the benefit of the public, Barnes argues that the public fishery is an open access 
fishery for all members of the public and that it is held “by individuals as members of the public”.83 
Whether this is a credible argument depends upon whether the public right to fish is viewed as a 
proprietary interest (a “right”) or as a liberty.84  
 
Appleby asserts that the public right to fish is a proprietary interest.85 If this is the case, arguably ‘the 
public’ is too wide a class to hold a proprietary interest in the public fishery.86 Therefore, on this 
interpretation of the public right to fish then what Barnes is suggesting is that the public fishery is 
owned not by the public as a class, but instead by no one and therefore open to access by all: res 
nullius. Yet the common law abhors a vacuum. The concepts of bona vacantia87 and escheat88 are 
evidence that the common law dislikes ownerless rights and will always seek to vest them in an 
ultimate owner,89 which suggests that an ownerless fishery may not be tolerated.90 
 
Barnes takes the opposite view that what we call the public right to fish is actually better described 
as a liberty; a freedom to fish in tidal waters. He acknowledges that case law has referred to public 
fishing both as a right and as a liberty, but suggests that on balance there is a greater treatment of 
public fishing as a liberty.91 If this is the correct interpretation of public fishing then it is easier to see 
how the liberty could be exercised by the public but owned by no-one. It is possible that the 
right/liberty arguments are in fact masking the true nature of the public fishery. Using the public’s 
rights over public highways as a potential analogy, these are not owned by anyone,92 being more 
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akin to a liberty to pass over the public highway and so could be seen as similar to public fishing. 
However, while the right to pass over a highway is not owned by anyone, the highway itself is 
subject to ownership93 (and that owner has various statutory duties to keep the highway in such a 
condition that the public rights over it can be exercised).94 Therefore if the analogy with public 
fishing is a good one, it would suggest that while no one owns the public liberty to take fish from 
tidal waters, the public fishery must vest in someone (potentially with duties to ‘maintain’ the public 
fishery to be suitable for use by the public in exercising its liberty of fishing).  
3.5.3 A Liberty or a Right?  
As the previous section shows, there is some confusion in the literature as to whether the public 
right to fish is indeed a right, or whether it is a liberty. Helpfully historic writers have tended to use 
these terms almost interchangeably. For example, in De Jure Maris Hale describes the public rights 
to fish in the following terms:  
“… the common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea or creeks or arms 
thereof, as a public common of piscary, and may not without injury to their right be restrained of 
it.”95 (emphasis added) 
Within this short section, three distinct terms with very different legal meanings have been used to 
describe the same public fishery. This can most likely be explained by understanding the historic 
pattern of use of the term ‘liberty’ and how the legal meaning of the term has changed since Hale’s 
time. In brief, while modern writers generally agree that liberties are concerned with what you can 
do, while rights are concerned with what you have,96 in Hale’s time the term ‘liberty’ likely had a 
much more narrow meaning, with a liberty describing “a royal privilege, or branch of the king’s 
prerogative, subsisting in the hands of the subject”.97 
Given the difficulties in relying on the historic use of terms to understand the present day public 
fishery, it is worth considering whether classifying the public fishery as a right or a liberty is in fact 
necessary in order to answer the question of its ownership. It has already been noted in section 
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3.5.2 above that the public right to fish being classed as a liberty does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that it is incapable of ownership. In addition, when focusing on whether any practical 
consequences follow from the right/liberty distinction, it is important to consider whether the law 
recognises a liberty as a separate category of interest, and if so, whether that category is treated 
differently in law than the category of ‘right’.  
The Law of Property Act 1925 (“LPA 1925”) contains various mentions of liberties. However, none of 
these are in the list of interests that are capable of subsisting as legal interests and being conveyed 
at law.98 Therefore if a liberty is a legal category of interest separate to right, it can only exist in 
equity, by virtue of section 1(3) LPA 1925. This conclusion is supported by the use of the term 
‘liberty’ in the rest of the LPA 1925. It is used five times in the whole of the Act: twice in reference to 
equitable easements, liberties or privileges,99 and the rest in section 62, which contains three 
subsections detailing the general words implied into conveyances. For example, section 62(1) 
provides that any conveyance of land shall be deemed to include and convey all “…liberties, 
privileges, easements, rights and advantages whatsoever, appertaining or reputed to appertain to 
the land.” Given the uses of the term ‘liberty’ already noted, its use in section 62 in a long list of 
interests in land (both legal and equitable), suggests that it is capable of existing as a separate 
interest in land, but that it falls within the category of equitable interests and not that of legal 
interests.  
However, both legal and equitable interests are capable of, and indeed require, ownership. 
Therefore, while classification of the public fishery as either a ‘right’ or a ‘liberty’ can help determine 
whether it can exist at law or in equity, it cannot help determine whether it is capable of ownership, 
other than to suggest that if the fishery can be properly described as a right or as a liberty within the 
meaning of LPA 1925 then it must be capable of ownership as all legal and equitable interests are.   
3.5.4 The Scottish Public Fishery  
It is worth noting at this stage that the position in Scottish law appears much clearer than that in 
English law. Scottish cases abound with statements (some more explicit than others) that in Scotland 
the public rights in water (the public right of navigation and the public fishery) are held by the Crown 
on some sort of trust for the public.100 Generally, these statements are not questioned by the courts 
and so it would appear to be the case that in Scotland, the public fishery vests in the Crown in trust 
for the public. Indeed, as Agnew et al note, the Scottish government did not accept the verdict of 
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Cranston J in the UKAFPO case101 that fishing quota is a possession under the ECHR,102 reiterating its 
view that quota is not capable of being a possession and belonging to any person or persons as it is a 
public asset.103  
The public trust concept in Scottish law is rooted in the categorisation of Crown rights in Scotland 
(inter regalia) as either being part of the regalia minora (belonging to the Crown but capable of 
being granted out to a subject) or part of the regalia majora (inseparable from the Crown and 
incapable of being granted to a subject). This categorisation developed from Roman law (which had 
a much more direct impact on Scottish jurisprudence than on its English counterpart)104 and does 
not exist explicitly in English law.  
However, it was suggested in Lord Leconfield v Lord Lonsdale that the difference between Scottish 
and English law was not as great as the above suggests, with the Special Commissioners for English 
Fisheries stating that: 
“About the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries there was a close 
communication between the sovereigns and great nobles of [England and Scotland], some of 
the latter holding estates in both countries. The early laws have always been considered 
identical, the most ancient law treatise accepted in Scotland, called Regiam Majestatem, 
being a copy of Glanville's English treatise, which was written in the reign of Henry II. Hale 
(Hist. C. L. 219) says “many of the laws of Scotland hold a congruity and similitude, and many 
of them a perfect identity with the laws of England, at least as the English law stood in the 
times of Henry II, Richard I, John, Henry III, and Edward I.””105 
Yet, while this excerpt suggests that the Regiam Majestatem was simply a direct copy of Glanville, 
the description of the treatise by the University of St. Andrews (which holds two of the remaining 
manuscripts of the Regiam Majestatem) indicates a more diverse set of sources for the manuscript: 
“The Regiam Majestatem is collection of Scottish statutes and legal texts…  It is based on the 1188 
‘Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae’ (Treatise on the laws and customs of the 
Kingdom of England) of Ranulf de Glanvill, and also incorporates features of thirteenth century canon 
law, and the Scottish Celtic Laws of the Brets and Scots.”106  
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Added to this, Hall’s translation of Glanvill’s Treatise107 notes in its introduction that the influence of 
Glanvill’s Treatise on the author of the Regiam Majestatum was much more dilute than the 
straightforward copying suggested in the Lord Leconfield case: “…his chief source and model was 
‘Glanvill’… [but] the use made of the earlier treatise was not uniform. In the early part of the Regiam 
the borrowings are carefully revised; in the middle there is a light revision only, with the writs left 
out; the end is native law, with no ‘Glanvill’ at all. This general pattern is spasmodically interrupted 
by chapters based wholly on canon or civil law, or on some source as yet unknown”.108  
Glanvill’s Treatise is concerned mostly with writs and does not cover public rights or the public 
fishery. It is therefore likely that the any statements on such matters in the Regiam Majestatem, to 
the extent that they are accurate statements of the Scottish law at that time, 109 are not based on 
English law, at least not on Glanvill’s statement of English law. Thus, although research is needed in 
order to understand whether a Crown trust of the public fishery exists in English law, it is safe to 
conclude that Scottish and English law are divergent on this point in terms of the mechanics of any 
such trust.  
3.5.5 Summary of Literature 
As set out above, the debate on the ownership of the public right to fish in English and Welsh law is 
far from extensive. Typically, commentary on the public right to fish in the literature tends either to 
ignore the issue of ownership or to acknowledge the confusion and move on quickly.110 Barnes 
provides one view on why the public right to fish might have been overlooked in favour of regulatory 
concerns, arguing that “for commercial fishing… the common law has long since been overtaken by 
statutory regulation”.111 However, as discussed in section 3.2 above, regulation can only ever 
address part of the issue; the public fishery is a public asset in some form or another and so any 
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regulation of that asset must take proper account of the asset and all its features, including the 
ownership of that asset. With the focus of Parliament currently on fisheries management (amongst 
other Brexit related issues), there is a need to establish the nature of the public’s interest in its 
fishery in order to be able protect it. The key question being whether the government has a mere 
power under its regulatory jurisdiction to protect the public fishery (as must be concluded from the 
suggestion by Barnes that the public fishery is ownerless), or whether it has a duty to protect the 
fishery arising from its ownership (as is concluded from the suggestion by Appleby and others that 
the public fishery is vested in the Crown on trust for the public). It can therefore be seen that the 
question of who owns the public fishery, and how, can make sense of, and bring clarity to, the 
debates in the literature about how to regulate and manage fisheries.  
This section 5 has set out a series of arguments regarding property and the public fishery. These 
arguments all lead to the same place; the possibility that a public trust of the public fishery exists, 
and therefore that certain duties arise on the Crown (and the state) in respect of the management 
and protection of the fishery. The following section 6 will explore the concept of the public trust, 
both in general and in its application to fisheries.  
3.6 The Public Trust 
As noted above at section 3.5.1, there are suggestions in the literature that the public fishery is 
owned on trust for the public as a whole, in other words that it is a public trust asset. The public 
trust doctrine is an established concept applied in a variety of jurisdictions, to a variety of natural 
resources. This section explores the concept and considers whether it could have a place in English 
law and what form that place might take.  
3.6.1 The Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine (“PTD”) is a concept that originates in the management of the foreshore 
and rights of navigation. It is built around a core belief that certain natural resources (usually 
including the foreshore, tidal waters and navigable waters) are “uniquely public”112 and therefore, in 
order to avoid the overuse and degradation they may otherwise be at risk of suffering,113 such 
common-pool resources should “...be held in trust by government, which must manage their 
consumptive use and protection on behalf of present and future citizens.”114 
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It is often the case that such uniquely public resources are vested in the state and that the state’s 
ownership is subject to various duties to the public. However, the existence of the PTD in respect of 
any resource does not, of itself, mean that such resource is incapable of private ownership. Rather, 
that any private ownership interests that do exist must be regulated by the state in order to protect 
the public interest in the resource in question. Or as Stevens so eloquently puts it “... the public trust 
[lingers] over the land like the smile of a juridical Cheshire cat.”115 
3.6.1.1 The Origin of the PTD 
The PTD is often said to originate in Roman law, with the “gemstone” of modern public trust law116 
being the statement of Justinian117 in the sixth century that: 
“The sea is common to all, both as to ownership and as to use. It is owned by no one; it is incapable 
of appropriation, just as is the air. And its use is open freely to all men. The same is true of the shore, 
which derives its character from the sea...”118  
The traditional story of the origin of the PTD then shifts from Roman law to early English common 
law and then to the settlement of North America and the almost wholesale adoption of that English 
common law by the early British settlers.119 However, each of these ‘steps’ in the development of 
the current day PTD is more complex than the generally accepted history would suggest.120 Indeed, 
Jarman describes the Roman doctrine as a separate doctrine from that that developed in English 
common law, despite some of the similarities that exist between the two doctrines.121 Nonetheless, 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider in detail the historical origins of the public trust. For 
present purposes it is sufficient to acknowledge the generally accepted path of its development and 
focus on the relatively modern consideration and application of the doctrine.  
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3.6.1.2 The PTD Today 
The concept of the public trust originated in the importance of tidal foreshore and navigable 
waterways for the passage of boats and ships and therefore for commerce.122 In the 1970s, Sax 
revived the concept of the public trust and argued that the utility of the doctrine was much wider 
than this, suggesting that the doctrine could be used as a tool for the protection of natural 
resources, indeed, he suggested that “public trust problems are found whenever governmental 
regulation comes into question.”123 The focus of the resurgence of public trust discussions since Sax 
has therefore been in the field of environmental protection, as opposed to commerce.124  
As well as widening the concept of the doctrine as explained above, Sax also sought to “[unhook the 
PTD] it from its traditional moorings on or around water bodies and [apply] it to dry land as well,”125 
by examining the application of the doctrine in various American cases concerning the use of natural 
resources. Taken together with his later writings on the PTD, Rose suggests that Sax’s ultimate aim 
for the PTD was to shift the focus on its historical connection to water and turn it into “a more 
general device for managing change and recognising community values in diffuse resources.”126 
Indeed, Jarman suggests that there are two separate forms of public trust in the USA the public trust 
of tidelands and the “upland public trust” applying to the approximate third of land in the USA that is 
owned by the federal government.127 Within each of these public trusts, arguments have been made 
that trusteeship duties exist in respect of a range of resources and uses, including fisheries,128 
wildlife,129 and the elements of the hydrologic cycle,130 as well as for non-consumptive uses such as 
recreation131 and preservation.132 However, the centrality of water and its uses for human life mean 
that it is still in water and the multitude of uses to which water is put that the PTD has its strongest 
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hold,133 from the internal waters of the USA,134 to the emerging arguments for the application of the 
PTD to the high seas,135 and the coastal waters in between.  
The thrust of the modern day PTD is summarised into three core elements by Takacs: “the sovereign 
holds certain resources in trust for the common good; the public has some kind of right to protection 
of these resources; and while democracy may seem subverted when a court overrules the acts of 
elected officials, such judicial acts in fact serve democracy by preserving rights invested in all the 
people.”136  Thus the PTD can be seen as more than a general duty of any government to act for the 
good of its citizens, instead imposing on the relevant arm of state “a special, and more demanding, 
obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain public resources.”137 However, it is important to 
note that the PTD takes a different form (sometimes subtly, sometimes more dramatically) in each 
jurisdiction that it appears in. For example, in the USA, there is not one common interpretation of 
the PTD across the country, but instead, 51 differing incarnations, with each state (together with the 
federal government) developing its own PTD to meet the needs experienced by that state.138 
3.6.1.3 The PTD as a Concept in English Law  
The PTD is arguably at its most developed in the legal system of the USA. As noted above, each state 
employs some form of public trust over some collection of public resources. Within England and 
Wales, the PTD is generally thought of as an American concept that is not found in our legal 
system.139 However, this view is not shared outside of the UK, where English common law is often 
used as the root of a country’s public trust. In the first American case to make use of the PTD as it is 
understood today, Arnold v Mundy (1821), the court held that the PTD existed in the law of 
Massachusetts as a result of its existence in English common law. Kirkpatrick CJ stated: 
“I am of opinion, that when Charles II. took possession of this country, by his right of discovery, he 
took possession of it in his sovereign capacity; that he had the same right in it, and the same power 
over it, as he had in and over his other dominions, and no more; that this right consisted in granting 
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the soil to private persons, for the purposes of settlement and colonization, of establishing a 
government, of supporting a governor, of conveying  to him all those things appurtenant to the 
sovereignty, commonly called royalties, for the benefit of the colonists, who came over here clothed 
with all the essential rights and privileges secured to the subject by the British constitution; but that 
he could not, nor never did, so grant them as to convert them into private property; that those 
royalties, therefore, of which those rivers, ports, bays, and coasts were part, by the grant of king 
Charles, passed to the duke of York, as the governor of the province, exercising the royal authority, 
for the public benefit,  and not as the proprietor of the soil, and for his own use… And I am of opinion 
further, that, upon the Revolution, all those royal rights vested in the people of New Jersey, as the 
sovereign of the country, and are now in their hands.”140 
Similarly, in Illinois Central Railroad Co v Illinois (1892)141 the PTD was confirmed to exist in the 
Californian legal system, with the court’s judgment stating that:  
“[P]rior to the Revolution, the shore and lands under water of the navigable streams and waters of 
the province of New Jersey belonged to the King of Great Britain as part of the jura regalia of the 
Crown, and devolved to the state by right of conquest… after the [Revolution], the said lands were 
held by the state, as they were by the King, in trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery, and 
the erection thereon of wharves, piers, lighthouses, beacons, and other facilities of navigation and 
commerce. Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris -- in other words, they were held for the 
use of the people at large.”142 
Thus English common law was often seen as the origin of the PTD in American jurisprudence. 
Similarly, in the (much more recent) landmark Indian case M C Mehta v Kamal Nath (1997) the 
Indian Supreme Court recognised the PTD as a concept existing within India law for the first time, 
confirming that “[o]ur legal system – based on English common law – includes the public trust 
doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the public trustee of all natural resources which are 
by nature meant for public use and enjoyment.”143 The implication from the judgment being that the 
USA has the PTD as part of its “common law heritage” and so, as another former British colony, so 
must India.144 
The interesting counterpoint to these cases is the general absence of any explicit mention or use of 
the public trust in English case law. Passages can certainly be found in a number of historic and some 
more recent cases that suggest the existence of a public trust in English jurisprudence. For example, 
in Dickins v Shaw Bayley J stated that “[t]he right of the crown is not, in general, for any beneficial 
interest to the crown itself, but for securing to the public certain privileges in the spot between high 
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and low-water mark.”145Similarly in Loose v Lynn Shellfish the court stated that “[i]t appears to us 
that the basic principle is that a court should not be too easily persuaded that the Crown has been 
deprived of a property or a right, given that the property or right is held for public good.”146 However, 
there is no case that has explicitly confirmed the existence of the PTD in English law that has acted 
as a precedent for future cases.  
However, as well as the cases referred to above, it is also possible to point to passages in a number 
of cases that suggest an alternative basis for the public interest in tidal waters and tidal fisheries. For 
example, in Sir John Constable’s Case it was argued that “although the Queen has jurisdiction in the 
sea adjoining her realm, she still has not property in it… for it is common to all men, and she cannot 
prohibit anyone from fishing there.”147 Whilst in Adair v National Trust, Girvan J stated that “there is 
a common law right vested in the members of the public to take shell-fish from the foreshore and this 
in an incident of the right to fish.”148 All that can be concluded with any certainty, therefore, is that 
the PTD is believed by many to have roots in English common law and that English common law, 
while not explicitly recognising the PTD is equally not overtly hostile to it.  
3.6.2 The Public Trust and its Place in Property Law  
In considering the ownership of the public fishery and whether the public trust is a relevant concept 
to that question, it is important to identify the nature of the public trust concept. Sax argued that 
“[t]he “public trust” has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no more – and no less – than a 
name courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.”149 For him, 
rather than the PTD being the property concept, the relevant property concept was instead common 
property and the PTD was “a legal tool that any citizen could use to fight exploitation of resources 
that should rightfully be protected common property.”150 
The reference to common property is used by a number of authors, such as Takacs, 151 who describes 
the PTD as suggesting “that certain resources… are common, shared property of all citizens, 
stewarded in perpetuity by the State.”152 Similarly, in the international context, Ciriacy-Wantrup and 
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Bishop consider the argument that the high seas fisheries should be treated as the common heritage 
of mankind and suggest “one might well wonder if the ultimate solution is to treat these resources as 
a giant common managed as a trust by some international agency such as the United Nations.”153 
Broadening the theory beyond common property, but still in keeping with Sax’s view that the PTD is 
not a property concept, Osherenko describes two different applications of the PTD in the context of 
submerged lands in Oregon and Massachusetts; “some parcels have become public property held by 
states and subject to the public trust. Far more prevalent is common ownership of the seabed, water 
column, and marine resources: these are protected by the public trust doctrine, with the government 
acting as a fiduciary to protect the ownership interests of the people.”154 This description of the PTD 
frames it, like Sax, as a legal tool to recognise and protect the public interest in natural resources; 
one that can apply to a number of different underlying property types.  
However, Sax’s view that the PTD is not a property concept has not been universally accepted. 
Epstein,155 for example, argues that the PTD represents “property belonging to the public, inalienable 
by their purported agents in the legislature,”156 which would seem to be describing some form of 
common or state property. In a similar vein, Kanner summarises the PTD as revolving around the 
“duty of sovereign states to hold and preserve certain resources, including wildlife, for the benefit of 
its citizens. Described simply, the doctrine provides that natural resources belong to the whole 
public.”157 Again, the notion of a state holding property or property rights on behalf of the public is 
redolent of a property concept, as opposed to Sax’s legal tool.  
Ryan goes further and describes the PTD as “a “trust” – in which a bundle of specifically designated 
private property rights are assigned to the “public” and delegated to the oversight of the sovereign 
as trustee.”158 Similarly Lazarus describes the historical purpose of the doctrine as “to provide a 
public property basis for resisting the exercise of private property rights in natural resources deemed 
contrary to the public interest.”159 Both of these examples squarely locate the PTD within the system 
of property law, rather than outside it.  
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Perhaps the differing views of the proprietary status of the PTD can be traced to its development 
since its apparent origin in Roman law. The Roman law concept of certain resources, such as the sea, 
being open to all needed no ownership interest. Whereas the common law was structured 
differently. Indeed, Stevens suggests that “the common law introduced into the public trust a 
concept less important in Roman times: ownership. The common law abhorred ownerless things. It 
was held therefore, that the ownership of beds of navigable waters was in the King.”160 
As interesting as this debate about the nature of the PTD is, it is submitted that ultimately the end 
point reached may be the same whether the public trust is framed as a theory applied to common 
property to ensure its management for the benefit of the public as a whole, or as a property concept 
itself. On either approach there is a property interest at the heart of the matter and so the key for 
the present research will be to establish whether the public fishery is a property interest and if so, 
the nature of such interest. Only then can the application of the public trust (or otherwise) be 
determined.  
3.6.3 The Content of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The concept of the public trust is valued by those that support its use in natural resources 
management for three key elements; its connection to stewardship, the democratisation of natural 
resource management it can encourage and its focus on intergenerational equity. Each of these 
three elements are summarised below.  
3.6.3.1 Stewardship 
Environmental stewardship is a concept that has seen increasing focus as communities and 
governments seek to manage and use natural resources in a sustainable way.161 Bennett et al set out 
a framework for evaluating successful stewardship of natural resources, which includes the 
importance of “institutional capital” in the success of stewardship aims.162 “Institutional capital” is 
defined as the ability of local communities to steward natural resources resulting from “broader 
governance, including systems of institutions [including]… laws and policies…”163 Thus, the broad 
framework of law applying to particular natural resources has an impact on successful stewardship.  
The public trust concept is often described by referring to the notion of stewardship. For example, 
Takacs suggests that the key to the public trust is that it “[constrains] how Earth’s resources can be 
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used and… [guides] who must bear responsibility for stewarding resources for the public good.”164 
Similarly, Turnipseed et al describe the “core elements” of the PTD as including “the notion of 
stewardship or trusteeship on behalf of current and future citizens.”165 Linking this stewardship basis 
with the framework of Bennett et al, it is suggested that by “converting aspirational stewardship 
goals to substantive trusteeship duties,”166 the application of the PTD to specific natural resources 
could help to provide the institutional capital needed for successful stewardship. This can be seen in 
the argument of Brady, that embracing the PTD is a way to enable the “[adoption of] a stewardship 
ethic into property law.”167 A property law system infused with stewardship ethics in such a way 
becomes part of a system of institutions that can then empower would-be stewards to implement 
stewardship practices.  
3.6.3.2 Democratisation 
In his seminal review of the capacity of the public trust to provide protection for natural resources, 
Sax argued that the adoption of the doctrine was a way to democratise the use and management of 
such resources. In his review of American cases that applied the doctrine, he noted that while 
corruption was generally rare, “it will often be the case that the whole of the public interest has not 
been adequately considered by the legislative or administrative officials whose conduct has been 
brought into question.”168 Thus, by the application of the doctrine, the court is empowered to bring 
the public interest to the fore by requiring those making decisions with unclear public benefits to 
justify the public interest in the decision and not to “rely on traditional presumptions of legislative 
propriety or administrative discretion.”169 As such, decisions based on “wrongful discounting of 
natural resource values vis a vis competing economic use values” can be challenged by the wider 
public.170  
Applying a strict view of the concept of democracy, the PTD, as manifested to date, has been 
criticised as “anything but democratic,” in that its application has been used by the judiciary to 
challenge decisions taken by elected legislatures.171 However, Sax is using the term to describe a 
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wider view of the role of the public, suggesting that democracy requires the ability for members of 
the public to be able to challenge decisions of the legislature and the executive based on the failure 
of such decisions to consider the value of the resource in question to the wider public, including 
future generations of that public.172 While it is not suggested that a public trust in England would 
necessarily give citizens standing to challenge administrative decisions, it is this wider understanding 
of democracy as a philosophy of life (rather than as a narrow understanding of democracy as a series 
of procedures and processes) that the doctrine has the potential to contribute to English fisheries. 
Dewey characterised democracy as a system under which all those in society can have a share in 
shaping and managing society.173 Applying this interpretation, then the public trust can be seen as 
one tool for achieving democracy in the use of public resources like the public fishery. The public 
trust focuses on the legitimacy of decision making and asserts that decisions about public resources 
must be made for the benefit of the public as a whole, rather than for the private benefit of any one 
person or group of people.  
3.6.3.3 Future generations 
The PTD is a concept that “looks beyond the needs of the present generation”174 in two, 
complementary, regards. The ‘public’ within the public trust can be read as referring to both the 
present generation as a whole and the future generations yet to come, thus decisions in relation to 
trust resources must consider all generations. Additionally, the ‘trust’ analogy can be drawn on to 
highlight the importance of protecting “the corpus of the trust,” thus ensuring that the ecosystems 
that play host to the natural resource in question are preserved in perpetuity.175 Together, the 
application of the doctrine both allows and requires a broader focus for natural resource 
management than the here and now; “it incorporates the rights of future generations to articulate 
actions necessary to preserve options for the future.”176 Indeed, Brady argues that the key benefit of 
the PTD is “its ability to change the way society considers the needs and rights of future 
generations.”177 In this regard, the doctrine can be seen as not only influencing the minds of policy 
makers and implementers, but also of the public as a whole in relation to their responsibilities with 
regard to natural resources.178  
 
172 See also Michael C Blumm, ‘Public Property and the Democratisation of Western Water Law: A modern 
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3.6.4 Public Trust and Fisheries 
The application of the public trust to fisheries is not entirely clear, with Drayton Jr suggesting that 
“[t]he status of the right to fishery has long been one of the most uncertain areas of the public trust 
theory.”179 As would be expected with a doctrine that is most developed in the USA, the majority of 
commentary on the application of the public trust to fisheries is based in that jurisdiction. Macinko 
and Bromley identify that the US fishery in both tidal waters and the EEZ is owned by the 
government as a form of common property that is open to all,180 yet while they discuss the faults of 
“[t]he public agency entrusted with managing our public fishery resources (our property),” they make 
no explicit reference to the public trust.181 Lynch suggests that the PTD is fully accepted as applying 
to fisheries within the USA’s territorial sea (described as extending to three nautical miles from the 
coast, and being under state management). However, he also adds that courts have not explicitly 
confirmed its application to fisheries within the USA’s EEZ (which are under federal control), thus its 
application to fisheries between 3 and 200 nautical miles from the coast remains an open issue.182 
Nonetheless, Jarman argues that the PTD should extend to the USA’s EEZ in order to protect the 
public interest in fishing in that area.183 
As well as the application of the doctrine, it is important to examine also the content of the doctrine. 
In this area Macinko considered the application of the PTD to Alaskan halibut and sablefish fisheries, 
focusing not on whether the doctrine applied to such fisheries (this appears to be taken for granted), 
but instead on the compatibility of the doctrine with the Alaskan ITQ approach then recently 
adopted for such fisheries.184 He concluded that the modern PTD, as applied to fisheries and other 
natural resources in the USA, has shifted from a doctrine focused on distributive equity to one 
“dominated by emphasis on environmental protection.”185 This is important because although 
privatised fishing rights such as those at issue in the Alaskan context studied by Macinko would 
appear to offend a PTD based on distributive equity, they would be considered “unquestionably 
compatible” with a PTD focused entirely on environmental protection.186 This suggests that the 
content of any public trust applicable to English fisheries will be important to consider in order to 
understand the effects of applying such a trust.  
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3.7 How to Determine the Answer to the Question of Ownership  
There is more than one method of approaching a legal ‘problem’ such as the present. The traditional 
approach can be summarised as starting at the beginning and working forwards. In other words, 
seeking to answer a legal question by going far enough back in the case and statute law to establish 
the origin of the relevant concept and then tracing its historical development through case and 
statute law to the present day. For this project, that would entail answering the question of where 
the public right to fish came from by tracing the origin of the public fishery and trying to establish 
from historical precedent alone how and by whom it is owned. 
However, there is much confusion in the literature and the case law as to how the public fishery 
originated and as to what the public fishery even is.187 So much so that its origin has been described 
as completely “…lost in the darkness of the past”.188 As well as the origin being troublesome, the 
common law in this area “has not always developed on the basis of logic”, but rather “piecemeal and 
not as a reasoned whole”.189 It has been suggested that there is in fact no single origin of the public 
fishery, but instead several separate origins that have converged in the present day public fishery.190 
This view would make sense of the ‘piecemeal’ development of the common law in this area, but it 
means that it is therefore incredibly difficult to answer the research question with sufficient 
decisiveness by considering the historic progression of case law alone. 
Instead, this project adopts a more practical approach, asking not where the public fishery came 
from, but instead considering the current nature of the public fishery. Once that current nature is 
established, it will be possible to then consider how such an article can be held according to law and 
by whom. The conclusions drawn in this exercise can then be supported and corroborated by case 
law, although this is not the decisive factor in the analysis. By coming at the question from the 
starting point of the present and not the past, the research is grounded in practice and should 
therefore hold more relevance to the public right to fish as it operates today.  
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has synthesised the literature on the public right to fish. The importance of the question 
of the ownership of the public fishery was set out, both in terms of the need to identify whether the 
state has a power or a duty to protect the fishery, and in terms of the growing acknowledgement of 
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the public interest in the public fishery despite the lack of legal clarity as to the status of this public 
interest. The options for ownership (or otherwise) of the fishery have been explored and, in 
particular, the possibility of a Crown trust on behalf of the public was considered as the scenario to 
which many of the arguments lead. The Chapter has also presented a review of the public trust 
doctrine and the potential it has to bring benefits to the management of the English public fishery. 
Chapter 4 will now build upon this literature review by seeking to answer the question of how the 
public fishery could be owned and, more specifically, whether a coherent legal argument can be 
made for ownership by the Crown under a public trust. It will then go on to consider what such 




CHAPTER FOUR: THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Building on the literature review presented in Chapter 3, this chapter address the question of how, if 
at all, the public fishery is owned. The present nature of the public right to fish is considered and an 
argument that the public fishery is a proprietary right is presented. The chapter then considers the 
location of the ownership of this proprietary right under a public trust, before concluding with a 
focus on the benefits of interpreting the public fishery as a public trust asset. The usefulness of the 
public trust interpretation will then be explored within the case study set out in Chapters 5 and 6, as 
well as in the examination of the legal geography of the public right to fish in Chapter 7.  
4.2 The Public Fishery as a Proprietary Right 
English property law distinguishes between two categories of rights; those which are proprietary 
(often termed property rights) and those which are not proprietary. The importance of the 
distinction between proprietary rights and non-proprietary rights is based on the elevated 
protections that proprietary rights receive in English law. These protections can be summarised as 
“immunity from summary cancellation or extinguishment, presumptive entitlement to exclude others, 
and entitlement to prioritise resource values.”1 In addition, property rights are characterised by their 
effect on third parties; unlike purely contractual rights, property rights are binding upon third parties 
and third parties can receive the benefits of such rights if the title to the right is transferred to 
them.2 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the origin and history of the idea of the public fishery is difficult to trace 
historically and so the most appropriate way to approach the problem of ownership is to consider 
the present day public fishery and whether and how it is capable of ownership. In this regard, the 
first step in doing so is to establish whether the public fishery can be categorised as a proprietary 
right or not. The answer to this will provide answers to a great many other questions about the 
nature of the interest, including how it can be owned.  
4.2.1 How to Determine ‘Propertiness’ 
The task of determining whether a particular right is of proprietary character or not is not a simple 
one. Indeed, Gray and Gray suggest that “[n]owhere, perhaps, is the imperfect logic of English land 
law more clearly apparent than in its attempt to demarcate proprietary from merely personal rights 
 
1 Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2009), 1.5.32 
2 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL), [1248] 
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in land”.3 In National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth,4 Lord Wilberforce pronounced that a property 
right must be “definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third 
parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability”.5 However, when considered in detail, 
this statement boils down to an assertion that proprietary rights are those rights that can be 
transferred to and enforced against third parties, and that such rights that can be transferred to and 
enforced against third parties are those that are proprietary. As Gray suggests, this argument can be 
simplified to: “”property” is “property” because it is “property””.6 
If there is no simple rule to determine whether something qualifies as a proprietary right or not, 
then approaches used by the courts for answering the question need to be considered, in order to 
identify how to treat the public fishery. Bennett Moses suggests that attempts to define what is 
property and what is not can be categorised into six general categories:7  
(a) Recognised category  
This approach is based upon the idea that something can only be property if it is part of a class of 
rights that have previously been recognised as property. It can be seen in action in Victoria Park 
Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor,8 when it was stated that an incorporeal right only 
“becomes protected by law and so assumes the exclusiveness of property... [when it] falls within a 
recognised category to which legal or equitable protection attaches.”9 The benefit of this approach is 
its clarity. However, it does perpetuate a historically-tied view of property. In addition, without 
guidance as to the scope of such previously recognised categories and as to how to assess whether 
similarity is sufficient enough to place a right within any particular previously recognised category, 
the test offers little help in assessing what is property and what is not.  
(b) Ainsworth  
 
3 Gray & Gray (n1), 1.5.27  
4 [1965] AC 1175 (HL) 
5 Ibid., [1248] 
6 Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 293 
7 Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘The Applicability of Property Law in New Contexts: From Cells to Cyberspace’ (2008) 30 
Sydney Law Review 639, 648 
8 (1937) 58 CLR 479 (Aus); in this case the High Court of Australia held that a sporting event cannot be an 
object of property so as to allow the owner of the land upon which such event takes place to legally prevent 
others from viewing that event from their neighbouring land and commercially exploiting any information they 
acquire as a result of such viewing. 
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As noted above, the problem with the ‘definition’ of property given by Lord Wilberforce in the 
Ainsworth case is that it uses the effect on third parties of the right as both the test for and the 
content of property, which leads to the circular argument described above.  
(c) Commerce 
This approach aims to bring in line the legal meaning of property with the commercial meaning. In 
other words, where commerce treats a particular right as proprietary, so should the courts. The 
problem with such an approach is that rights that do not have commercial value are not necessarily 
devoid of proprietary status.  The important difference is between rights as a class (which are usually 
considered commercially valuable, such as rights to possess land) and rights in particular (which 
may, because of particular circumstances, be considered commercially valueless, such as polluted 
land where the cost of remediation is substantial such that it outweighs any value that might 
otherwise have been attributed to the land). As such, it is not advisable to situate commercial value 
as the essential core of property.  
(d) Excludability 
Advocates of this approach focus on what many consider to be the core characteristic of property; 
the right to exclude others from it. Gray argues that proprietary character has been given to rights 
on the basis of whether the ‘resource’ in question satisfies a three-limbed test of excludability.10 On 
this basis, a right becomes capable of being proprietary when it is possible to exclude others from 
the resource to which that right relates physically, legally and morally.11 This approach is considered 
in further detail below.  
(e) Property constitutes rights in rem 
This approach is based on the theories of Hohfeld12 and Honoré13 and posits that a right or liberty 
only operates in rem (as opposed to in personam) “if it is enforceable against a large and indefinite 
class of people (or operates as one of many rights, each enforceable against a large class of 
people).”14 Similar to the commerce test, this approach (whilst it may be accurate) cannot be the 
essential core of property, because there exist rights which operate against all other members of 
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society but that are not considered rights in rem and are not proprietary (such as the right of all 
members of society to bodily integrity).15 
(f) Property as a core bundle of rights  
The ‘bundle of rights’ approach to property is described in Chapter 3.16 As noted in further detail 
there, while it may be accurate to describe property as a bundle of rights, the problem with using 
that metaphor as the defining concept of property is that there is no one or more rights or powers or 
other form of claim that is present in the same form in every instance of property; “[i]t is therefore 
not possible to point to the absence of a particular right in a thing as indicating that other rights in 
that thing are not proprietary.”17 
It can be seen from the consideration of the various approaches suggested as methods of ‘testing’ 
for proprietary nature, that many accurately describe (either some or all) proprietary rights, but do 
not give sufficient guidance as to how to determine whether a particular right is proprietary in 
nature or not. In the case of the public fishery, fisheries can either be a profit of the underlying soil 
or a profit à prendre,18 both of which constitute proprietary rights, and so it could be possible to 
categorise the public fishery as part of a group of rights that have previously been granted the status 
of property. In addition, it has undeniable commercial value and is enforceable against a large class 
of people, thus it could be argued that the fishery might be classed as property under a number of 
the approaches described above. However, this thesis argues that none of these characteristics, 
either by themselves or together, are sufficient to classify the public fishery as a right with 
proprietary status. However, the excludability approach, and specifically the three-limbed 
consideration of excludability put forward by Gray,19 does have the potential to facilitate 
examination of whether the public fishery can be legitimately categorised as proprietary or not. 
4.2.2  Gray’s ‘Test’ for Excludability 
As noted above, Gray argues that proprietary character has been given to rights on the basis of 
whether it is possible to exclude others from the resource to which that right relates physically, 
legally and morally. As an illustration; sound is not physically excludable because it is not physically 
possible to exclude third parties from hearing sound waves once they have left the premises on 
which they are produced. It is not possible, for example, to prevent those in the vicinity surrounding 
a live open-air concert venue from hearing the music produced in the venue. On the other hand 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1 
17 Bennett Moses (n7), 653 
18 The legal meaning of the term profit is discussed at section 4.5.1 of the current chapter 
19 Gray (n6) 
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certain other ‘resources’ might be physically excludable, but not morally excludable. Thus the court 
in Davis v Commonwealth of Australia20 refused to uphold the Commonwealth’s attempts to exclude 
anyone not authorised by them from using numerous terms relating to the 200 year anniversary of 
the settlement of Australia. The terms the Commonwealth was attempting to restrict use of included 
such common phrases as “200 years” and “Australia”. The court held that the Commonwealth was 
not entitled to restrict the use of such phrases in the way they sought to on the basis that to do so 
would be to restrict the use of common language and inhibit social communication; language and 
the tools of language are not excludable on moral grounds.21 
It should be noted that Gray did not set out a three-limbed test, but rather a consideration of case 
law that elicited the three elements of excludability that had been considered by courts when 
determining whether to extend the ambit of private property to cover a hitherto uncovered 
‘resource’. These three elements of excludability will be considered in the context of the public 
fishery in order to establish whether it is possible to categorise the public fishery as a proprietary 
right.  
Although Gray considered excludability in the context of private property,22 the approach of 
considering the three elements of excludability can also be applied to a consideration of potentially 
public property, such as the public fishery. As noted in Chapter 3,23 just like private property, public 
property (whether state property or collective property) can be viewed from an exclusion point of 
view. The only difference is the range of interests that have to be taken into account when making 
decisions about who to exclude. Rose approaches the issue from the opposite direction, suggesting 
that all property is inherently public, but that the government delegates management of those 
elements of property that don’t require collective management.24 Both of these approaches 
categorise private and public property as elements of the same whole, and thus Gray’s consideration 
of the proprietary status of ‘resource’ is equally useful to public as well as to private property. 
4.2.2.1 Applying Gray’s approach to the public fishery 
Gray summarises his consideration of excludability based on the Victoria Park Racing case25 by 
stating that “[a] resource cannot be propetised if, on any of… [the three grounds covered, namely 
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physical, legal and moral], it lacks the quantity of excludability.”26 Before considering how these 
three categories might apply to the public fishery, it is important to be clear on the resource under 
consideration. As discussed in Chapter 1, a distinction must be drawn between the fish in the sea 
and the right to harvest such fish. It is settled law that the former is not property, instead the 
‘resource’ under consideration is the right to harvest the fish from the sea. Although this resource 
does not fit as well into the orthodox understanding of resources as the fish themselves might, if 
Gray’s extortion to consider property as “not a thing but a power relationship” is followed,27 then it 
is perfectly possible to consider the power relationship in terms of excludability in relation to the 
right to harvest fish in the sea.  
4.2.2.2 Physical excludability  
The public fishery is not an open fishery in the nature of that on the high seas. At common law, it is 
already closed to certain classes of people. Traditionally, the public right was viewed as capable of 
exercise only by the subjects of the United Kingdom.28 More recently, it has been suggested that the 
right is available to all fishers regardless of nationality (subject to the necessary statutory 
provisions), provided that they are fishing from the shores of Britain.29 On this basis, those fishing as 
distant water fleets are excluded from the common law public right to fish.  
That it is possible to physically exclude persons from the public fishery is also evidenced by the 
existence of several fisheries in tidal waters (as discussed in Chapter 1). Although now restricted by 
Malcomson v O’Dea to grants made before the end of the reign of Henry II (1189),30 it is possible to 
exclude persons from the public fishery by royal grant severing a part of the fishery in favour of a 
subject.  
As well as several fisheries, the UK has created two no-take zones in English waters (at Lundy Island31 
and Flamborough Head)32 and one in Scottish waters (at Lamlash Bay, of the Isle of Arran).33 In the 
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areas covered by these zones the taking or harvesting or any sea life is prohibited. Thus the public, 
both recreational and commercial fishers, are prohibited from fishing within these areas.  
Although neither several fisheries nor no-take zones are truly physical means of excluding people 
from exercising the public right to fish, they are in general working to prevent people from fishing in 
specific areas of the sea or tidal waters, which suggests that it is possible to physically exclude 
people from the public fishery. Unlike the sound waves emanating from the premises upon which 
they are produced, it is physically possible to control who is able to exercise the right to fish in 
English waters. 
4.2.2.3 Legal excludability  
Gray elaborates on the nature of legal excludability by framing it as a consideration of whether a 
resource can be protected against potential intruders by means other than ‘propetising’ the 
resource.34 Often (but not always) this will be contractual means, such that if it was possible for a 
party claiming property in a resource to have protected against the alleged intrusion/deprivation of 
the resource through contract law, but they failed to do so, then the court will not step in and 
provide an alternative remedy through property law.35 The common theme being that where there 
are legal means available to exclude third parties from a particular resource but such means have 
not been exercised, then the resource cannot be said to be legally excludable in relation to those 
parties.  
Wheeldon has criticised this element of Gray’s reasoning on several bases,36 which can ultimately be 
condensed to a suggestion that it is not appropriate for the courts to refuse to enforce proprietary 
protection because the claimant failed to take advantage of another form of legal protection. 
However, this suggestion fails to recognise that Gray is considering resources that have not 
previously been determined to be property, thus a court would not be refusing to enforce 
proprietary protection, rather refusing to extend proprietary protection to a previously 
unrecognised resource. Furthermore, the approach that Wheeldon criticises as inappropriate would 
be consistent with the principle of mitigation of losses in tort and contractual law. Just as the ability 
to recover damages in respect of a tort will be compromised where the claimant has failed to take 
any reasonable opportunities available to mitigate the loss they have suffered as a result of the tort, 
so the courts may decline to protect a ‘resource’ as property where the claimant has failed to take 
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reasonable opportunities available to them to protect their resource. When viewed in this light there 
is no inconsistency in Gray’s reasoning.37   
Considering the public fishery, there are no legal means available to exclude third parties (apart from 
distant water fleets) from the public right to fish because its nature means that it is open to all. The 
only legal means of excluding parties fishing from British soil is through legislation by parliament 
(and any consequent regulation made under such legislation). However, the possibility of legislation 
by parliament to allow an owner to exclude others can theoretically apply to any resource and so it 
cannot be taken into account in considering whether legal means of exclusion exist. As Barnes makes 
clear when considering the subject of legal excludability, it is the current law that must provide an 
owner with the means to legally exclude 38 
4.2.2.4 Moral excludability 
The extremes of this element of Gray’s reasoning are obvious; for example air, as a basic need for 
life, would not be morally excludable. However, guidance is needed for anything but the most 
obvious examples. Gray suggests that “[t]he notion of moral non-excludability derives from the fact 
that there are certain resources which are simply perceived to be so central or intrinsic to 
constructive human coexistence that it would be severely anti-social that these resources should be 
removed from the commons”.39 These ‘resources’ are often related to certain fundamental freedoms 
or civic rights, such as the freedom of speech, which enables a court to recognise the superiority of 
such freedoms and rights over property rights.40 Gray draws on the judgment in Davis v 
Commonwealth of Australia in the realm of intellectual property in which the court held that 
common words in the English language are morally non-excludable on the basis that it would 
severely inhibit human communication and expression to allow one party to ‘propetise’ such 
words.41 
 
37 Wheeldon also suggests that the discussion of legal excludability in the Victoria Park Racing case (see n8) is 
incoherent on the basis that the court suggested that the plaintiff could have no property in the information 
relating to the numbers on the racing horses such as to allow them to prevent a third party from commercially 
profiting from such information because it was open to them to impose a condition of entry on all patrons 
requiring them not to disseminate such information outside of the venue. Wheeldon argues that given that the 
third party was overlooking the venue in the Victoria Park case and not a patron of the venue, such contractual 
avenue would not have made any difference (see Wheeldon (n36), 360). Yet, on a close reading of McTiernan’s 
judgment in the Victoria Park case, he was not suggesting that such a course of action would have helped on 
the facts before him, rather offering an example of when the court would be willing to find the exclusiveness 
necessary to enforce the right claimed by the plaintiff. In other words, if the plaintiff had imposed such a 
condition on patrons, the court would have been willing to uphold it and protect the plaintiff’s rights had they 
brought a claim in respect of a breach of such condition.  
38Barnes (n22), 27 
39 Gray (n6), 280 
40 Ibid., 283 
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94 
 
The question therefore becomes whether the public right to fish is a fundamental freedom or right 
such that it would not be morally acceptable to exclude people from it. It should be noted that the 
changing nature of morality means that whether something is morally non-excludable is not an 
absolute and once and for all decision.42  Indeed, the courts have decided that Magna Carta 
determined that it was no longer moral for the sovereign to exclude the public from the public 
fishery by creating a several fishery. Yet this does not mean that the public fishery itself is not 
morally excludable, just that it would not be moral for the unelected sovereign to take away a public 
right and put it into the hands of a private subject. It is still possible for the elected parliament to do 
so. Indeed the Sea Fisheries (Shellfish) Act 1967, for example, permits the appropriate Minister to 
make a several, regulating or hybrid order, which effectively grants a private shellfish fishery to one 
or more persons and allows them to exclude the public from such fishery.  
On the basis that people have been excluded from the common law public fishery by its application 
to those fishing from British shores only, by the clear severing of it in numerous locations by the 
sovereign, and by the ability of Parliament to exclude the public through existing legislation (such as 
the Sea Fisheries (Shellfish) Act 1967 and the creation of no-take zones under fisheries byelaws), it 
would seem unlikely that an argument of moral non-excludability could be successfully raised. It is 
therefore likely that the public fishery would be considered morally excludable.  
4.2.2.5 The consequence of ‘propertiness’ 
Applying Gray’s reasoning to the public fishery leads to the conclusion that it is possible to argue 
that the public fishery is physically, legally and morally excludable.43 This means that the public 
fishery could be sensibly categorised a proprietary right. Section 4.3 will go on to consider whether 
this conclusion is coherent with the existing English common law.   
4.3 The Public Fishery as a Proprietary Right 
A conclusion that the public fishery could be framed as a proprietary right leads to a potential dead 
end in the form of the judgement of the Privy Council (given by Viscount Haldane) in Attorney 
General for the Province of British Columbia v Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada.44 In that 
 
42 Ibid., 295 
43 It should be noted here that this focus on exclusion should not be taken as an assertion that a proprietary 
right necessarily allows its holder to exclude whoever he or she chooses, whenever he or she chooses. Indeed, 
a property right “will often not allow the owner to control access freely or at all, despite the fact that it has 
been removed from the commons” (AJ van der Welt, Property in the Margins (Hart Publishing, 2009), 190 
(n89)) 
44 [1914] AC 153 (PC) - The case asked three questions of the Privy Council with regard to a strip of land 
(including waters) within the Province of British Columbia, but granted by the Province to the Dominion of 
Canada under two statutes. Each of these three questions related to fisheries; in particular, the second 
question asked: “Is it competent to the Legislature of British Columbia to authorize the Government of the 
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case, Viscount Haldane stated that “[t]he right to fish [in arms of the sea and the estuaries of rivers] 
is in their Lordship’s opinion a public right of the same character as that enjoyed by the public on the 
open seas. A right of this kind is not an incident of property…”45 This statement appears to be fairly 
clear on the point, however, this thesis argues that the common law does not necessarily support 
Viscount Haldane’s conclusion of non-proprietary status for the public fishery.  
4.3.1 Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet 
The problem with Viscount Haldane’s words, is that they appear to ignore the proprietary treatment 
of fisheries to date. Several fisheries are acknowledged to have proprietary status,46 and while the 
spread of such fisheries is not clear,47 their existence is not in doubt. Indeed, Viscount Haldane 
himself notes that since Malcomson v O’Dea it has been “unquestioned law” that Magna Carta 
stopped the Crown from creating any new several fishery, but that any that were existing before 
that charter still remain and cannot be removed without competent legislation.48 Yet, if the public 
fishery is not an incident of property, then it is legitimate to ask how such several fisheries can exist. 
Several fisheries can only be created by grant from the Crown to a subject, or by prescription 
presuming such a grant. Either of these two options arguably require some form of overriding Crown 
ownership to start with.49 Whether a direct grant is made by the severing of a portion of the public 
fishery (held by the Crown for the benefit of the public) and granting it to a subject, or by the 
severing of what may have at that time before legal memory belonged beneficially entirely to the 
sovereign, is not of consequence here. Either way, some form of overriding crown ownership is 
surely necessary, otherwise the Crown would have no power to make such a grant on the basis of 
the doctrine nemo dat quod non habet.50 On a similar basis, the ability to establish a several fishery 
 
Province to grant by way of lease, licence or otherwise the exclusive right, or any right, to fish below low water 
mark in or in any or what part or parts of the open sea within a marine league of the coast of the Province?” 
(see [175] (Viscount Haldane)).  
45 Ibid., [175] (Viscount Haldane) Haldane’s use of the term ‘open seas’ is a reference not to the high seas (as it 
might be interpreted today), but to territorial waters (as opposed to internal waters) 
46 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fisheries and Aquaculture (Volume 51, 2013), paragraph 389 
47 Barnes cites Hall as suggesting that several fisheries are rare “and limited to those places capable of 
sustaining exclusive possession” ((n29), 449). Whereas Moore and Moore refute this claim on the basis that 
while the decided case law may not provide evidence of many several fisheries in tidal waters, a detailed study 
of the Domesday Book shows that there were numerous several fisheries in tidal waters in existence at that 
point (Stuart A Moore and Hubert Stuart Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens & Haynes, 1903), 
xlii and 400-405). They go so far as to suggest that several fisheries “…existed in almost every piece of tidal 
water around the coasts which was naturally available for the profitable exercise of an exclusive fishery” (Ibid., 
xlii).  
48British Columbia v Canada (n44), [170] (Viscount Haldane) 
49 The system of fixed quota allocations appears to have created property rights for those holding allocations 
(as confirmed in the UKAFPO case). It is submitted that this is a creation of property rights by the Secretary of 
State that maybe ultra vires, but it is not a creation of property rights without an underlying property interest.   
50 Loosely translated as: one cannot give away what one doesn’t have 
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through prescription51 suggests that there must be someone with an ownership to prescribe against; 
“…for if it lies in prescription it lies in property, for there ought to be some person against whom the 
prescription ought to be…”.52 
4.3.1.1  Does ‘nemo dat quod non habet’ always apply to the Crown?  
The argument based on the doctrine of nemo dat quod non habet assumes that the doctrine applies 
in all instances. Perhaps it is the case that the Crown (or the state) has a special ability to create 
property where non-existed before. To a certain extent, this is accurate; the state has always had the 
power to ‘propetise’ things that were before that time not objects of property. For example, the 
system of intellectual property law in Britain started with royal favours granting effective 
monopolies to subjects in the Elizabethan era and has developed into a sophisticated body of law 
covering all forms of intellectual property.53 What has essentially happened over the course of this 
development has been the creation of new property rights such as copyright and patents, where in 
pre-Elizabethan times no such property existed at all. However, intellectual property is an example 
of the Crown/state creating a new type of property where none at all existed and not an example of 
the Crown/state creating new property rights over an existing type of property (such as land). The 
Crown cannot, in Britain, create new property rights over land (including the sea bed) where it has 
no underlying property right in the land.  
This is illustrated by considering the expansion of the English and then the British Empire. During this 
period several strategies were employed to colonise land outside of England, but none of these 
involved the granting of property rights by the Crown without any prior Crown acquisition. In the 
12th and 13th centuries the English monarch claimed a title to Ireland by right of conquest,54 while 
the settlement of Australia starting in the late 1700s was based on the vesting in the Crown of what 
the settlers believed to be very sparsely inhabited lands (i.e.: terra nullius). The Crown then granted 
property rights to settlers out of this overarching property interest.55  In North America however, the 
property rights of the natives were recognised (although not always perfectly) and land was 
purchased from them by the Crown (or by the first settlers, before this practice of direct purchase 
 
51 Warren v Matthews (1703) 91 ER 312; Carter v Murcot (1768) [1558-1774] All ER Rep 620 (KB) 
52 King v Oldsworth (the Sutton Marshes case) (1637) per Baron Weston (See Stuart A Moore, A History of the 
Foreshore and the Law relating thereto (Stevens and Haynes, 1888), 300) 
53 World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘An explanatory note concerning the origins of the United Kingdom 
intellectual property legal regime’  <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=GB> accessed 6 
December 2017 
54 Nicholas P Canny, ‘The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America’ (1973) 30(4) The William 
and Mary Quarterly 575, 579 
55 See Stuart Banner, ‘Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early Australia’ (2005) 23(1) Law 
and History Review 95 for an explanation of the concept of terra nullius and its application in Australia 
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was outlawed)56 and then transferred to subjects. Similarly, in New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi 
facilitated the purchase of Māori land by the Crown.  
In the present day, the arrangements made by the government for the development of the offshore 
wind sector in the UK provide an illustration of the abilities of the Crown in regard to property 
interests. While the Crown Estate includes the sea bed within territorial waters, the sea bed outside 
of such waters is not included and is generally ownerless (although subject to the international rights 
and obligations contained within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”)).57 Article 56 of UNCLOS confirms that coastal states have sovereign rights within their 
EEZ for certain purposes, including the “economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as 
the production of energy from the water, currents and winds”. This does not grant property in the 
EEZ to the coastal state, but these sovereign rights are a mixture of property and regulatory rights 
created by international law in order to allow coastal states to exploit the resources in the sea. As a 
result of the development of offshore wind technology, section 84 of the Energy Act 2004 vested 
these sovereign rights relating to the production of energy from water or wind in Her Majesty the 
Queen, to be managed by the Crown Estate Commissioners pursuant to the Crown Estate Act 1961. 
Any party wishing to develop an offshore wind farm in the UK EEZ must therefore first enter into an 
Agreement for Lease with the Crown Estate Commissioners, which will oblige the Commissioners to 
grant and the developer to take a lease of the necessary part of the sea bed on grant of all the 
necessary consents for the wind farm and prior to any construction of the wind farm. Section 84 of 
the Energy Act 2004 was needed in order to give the Crown the ability to grant property rights over 
the seabed in the EEZ; without that section, the Crown would have no property interest in the EEZ 
and so would not be able to grant a property interest in it to a developer. In other words, the 
sovereign rights over such areas confirmed in UNCLOS are sufficient in English law to permit the 
state to regulate the development of offshore wind farms in the EEZ, but were not sufficient on their 
own to permit the Crown or the state to grant a property interest in such wind farms.  
This regime can be contrasted with that for submarine cables. Cables and pipelines are subject to 
various international treaties,58 but the law can be briefly summarised for present purposes as a 
freedom for all states to lay cables and pipelines on the sea bed of the high seas and of any EEZ, 
although due regard must be had to a coastal state’s sovereign rights within its EEZ and its area of 
the continental shelf (if this is outside of its EEZ). As such, the Crown Estate Commissioners’ position 
 
56 Ibid., 122 
57 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3 
58 For further details see Tara Davenport, ‘Submarine Communications Cables and Law of the Sea: Problems in 
Law and Practice’ (2012) 43:3 Ocean Development & International Law 201-242 
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on submarine cables and pipelines is that “[their] permission is needed for the rights to lay, maintain 
and operate cables and pipelines on seabed for which [they] are landlord [i.e.: territorial waters]. 
[They] also ask to be informed of cables and pipelines that transit the UK continental shelf (within the 
200 nautical mile limit), as other activities may be impacted”.59 While the system of licensing used by 
the Crown Estate60 does not grant any form of property right to the cable owner, it implicitly 
recognises the Crown Estate’s property rights in the seabed within territorial waters and lack of such 
rights (unless explicitly granted as in the Energy Act 2004) in the UK’s EEZ and area of continental 
shelf.  
That the Crown cannot create new property rights where it does not already hold an interest is 
confirmed in Parker v Lord Advocate.61 The case considered whether there was a public right to fish 
for mussels in Scottish waters. Although dealing with Scottish law, the Lord Ordinary (Lord 
Kincairney) in the Court of Session addressed the issue of Crown ownership, in a passage that relates 
to the broad principles of Crown ownership and so, it is submitted, applies equally in England as in 
Scotland:  
“It is not easy to understand how one who has not a right can confer it, unless in the exercise of some 
special power from one in whom the right was vested; and I am unable to adopt that view, and do 
not think it consistent with the later decisions; and I am inclined to think that if it be admitted or 
settled in law that the Crown can confer a right to fishings which will give an exclusive right to the 
grantee, it is an inevitable inference that such exclusive right must have been vested in the Crown.”62 
The judgements of the Court of Session in this case were approved by the House of Lords, to the 
extent that they did not feel the need to offer substantive judgments themselves. Thus it appears 
that the ‘nemo dat’ principle does apply to dealings by the Crown.  
4.3.1.2 ‘Nemo dat quod non habet’ and the regalia 
Although the ‘nemo dat’ principle clearly applies to the Crown in its present day dealings, it is 
important to consider the historical context of several fisheries and the public fishery. Perhaps the 
Crown had in the past an ability to create property rights where it has no underlying property 
interest, by virtue of its regalia, being the “exclusive rights, privileges and prerogatives” of the 
 
59 <https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/energy-minerals-and-infrastructure/cables-and-pipelines/> accessed 6 
December 2017 
60 See sample heads of terms at 
<https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/5700/heads_of_terms_for_submarine_telecoms_cables.pdf> 
accessed 6 December 2017 
61 [1904] AC 364 (HL) on appeal from the Scottish Court of Session 
62 Ibid., [371-372] 
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monarch.63 The suggestion to be examined then is whether the prerogative of the monarch provided 
a route for the creation of property in fisheries where none existed before.  
To understand how the treatment of public rights in the sea developed, and therefore whether the 
Crown may have had the right to grant a property interest in the sea where it had no underlying 
interest, it is necessary to go back to the beginnings of known theories and laws about the sea and 
the resources in it; the Roman Empire. Although the law of England and Wales is not a civil law 
system (and therefore is not considered as a descendant of the Roman system of law), there are 
aspects of Roman law in the common law system. Indeed, the foundation of the public right to fish is 
generally regarded to be the Roman law principle that the sea is common to all people. 
The first recorded pronouncement on the legal status of the sea is attributed to the jurist Marcianus, 
who was active during the beginning period of the second century.64 Marcianus stated that the sea 
and its shores were common to all men, such that anyone may navigate or fish in it. However, the 
Roman authority most cited with respect to the legal status of the sea is Justinian. Writing in the 
middle of the sixth century, the jurists of Justinian brought the existing Roman texts up to date and 
codified them, producing (inter alia) the Institutes and the Digest.65 Justinian66 asserted that “the sea 
is common to all, both as to ownership and as to use. It is owned by no one; it is incapable of 
appropriation, just as is the air. And its use is open freely to all men. The same is true of the shore, 
which derives its character from the sea.”67 
Justinian placed the sea in the class of res communes; things common to all mankind. However, the 
end of the eleventh century and the beginning of the twelfth century marked the start of a number 
of ‘glosses’ on the classical Roman law texts, attributed to the ‘glossators’; a series of European 
jurists that mainly came from the law school at the University of Bologna. These glosses add to and 
develop the legal theory surrounding the status of the sea and its resources. While Justinian had 
classed the sea as res communes, a number of the glossators now framed the sea as part of the res 
publicae (things belonging to the state for the use of its citizens). For example, Placentinus is 
reported as asserting that the difference between the two classes is whether the use of a thing is 
common to men alone (res publicae) or whether it is common to all beings (res communes).68 On this 
 
63 Percy Thomas Fenn Jr, The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial Waters (Harvard University Press, 
1926), 68 
64 Ibid., 3 
65 Ibid., 17 
66 Although the texts were written by various (unnamed) jurists on the instructions of Emperor Justinian, for 
ease the author is referred to in this text as Justinian 
67 Fenn Jr (n63), 23 
68 Ibid., 39 
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basis, the use of the sea for navigating and fishing makes the sea a res publica. This classification 
accords with the earlier Brachylogus,69 which states that the sea (along with the shore, rivers and 
ports) is a res publica.70  
Justinian’s stance was clear that the sea cannot become an object of property. For example, the 
Digest holds that it is an offence to prevent anyone from fishing in the sea.71 However, the historical 
and geographical context needs to be considered. At the time, and in the place, of the glossators, 
the situation in practice was different; private property was being created in the sea. Fenn Jr notes 
that during the feudal age, “... the grant of a privilege by the king or emperor was generally 
recognised as conveying valid rights in a thing which was by law res communis. In this way a right of 
fishery might be granted in a public river, or even, [according to] the majority of jurists, in the sea.”72 
Therefore, in order to reflect contemporary law practices, Azo73 added a gloss to Justinian to the 
effect that private rights to fish in the sea could be acquired either by royal privilege or long use.74 
This is the beginning of the argument that the Crown has (or had) the ability to grant property rights 
without having an overriding property interest in the object.  
Yet in order to understand the nature of this argument, one must first understand the nature of law 
in mediaeval times. At that point in history law was not ‘made’; “existing law was interpreted, was 
stated, was even suspended”, but it was not made.75 The source of law was custom, either direct 
customary practice or records of such custom in the form of previous laws, like the Roman texts. 
Therefore when the Romans declared the sea to be incapable of being the object of property as a 
result of the law of nature, the matter was considered closed. Nonetheless, the practice of the times 
involved the creation of property rights in the sea, such as the grant of private fisheries. The 
glossators, although dedicated to the task of identifying the ‘pure’ system of Roman law to be found 
 
69 The “Brachylogus” is a text that is believed to have been written in Italy either towards the end of the 
eleventh century or the beginning of the twelfth century (See The Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th Edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 1910), Volume 4, 366 <https://archive.org/details/encyclopaediabri04chisrich> 
accessed 8 September 2020) 
70 Fenn Jr (n63), 36 
71 Justinian, Digest 47.10.14 (Paulus), in Percy Thomas Fenn Jr, ‘Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea’ (1925) 
19(4) The American Journal of International Law 716, 725 
72 Fenn Jr (n63), 43-44 
73 Azo (c. 1150-1230) is known for his influential work Summa Codicis (published circa 1210), which was a 
commentary on the civil law based on Justinian’s works. The Summa Codicis was a key influence on Bracton, 
who copied large parts of it into his treatise on English law De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws 
and Customs of England) 
74 Fenn Jr (n63), 43 
75 Ibid., 45 
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in Justinian’s Corpus, needed to be able to reconcile that system with both itself76 and the current 
practice at their time.  
The inability to ‘make’ new law and the inconsistencies of the old law with current practices in the 
feudal period meant that ‘interpretations’ had to be added to the classical texts. We know that 
feudal law was based on a system of social relations backed by property rights. Maitland describes 
the system as “[a] state of society in which the main social bond is the relation between lord and 
man... [but that t]his personal relation is inseparably involved in a proprietary relation, the tenure of 
land.”77 Furthermore, “[t]he lord has jurisdiction over his men... Jurisdiction is regarded as property, 
as a private right which the lord has over his land. The national organisation is a system of these 
relationships. At the head there stands the king, as lord of all.”78 And so a system of law based 
heavily on a system of property rights didn’t quite know what to do with the sea, a thing that 
classical Roman law had declared was incapable of being the object of property.  
However, feudal law was gradually changing the classical Roman law to fit its purposes. Certain of 
the res publicae of the Roman system (such as ports and navigable rivers) had become part of the 
regalia and vested in the king (or emperor).79 The ius piscandi (the right to fish) was also treated as 
part of the regalia.80 The regalia, vested in the king, gave him the ability to grant rights to subjects. 
However, it is a mistake to think of these as newly created out of nothing. The feudal system held 
that the king was the ultimate landowner in the state; “in him was vested the title to all the lands of 
his subject. If there was to be ownership of the sea, then he must be the first owner.”81 Just as 
feudalism had reordered the system of land ownership to give to the king an overarching interest in 
all land, it had reordered the legal status of the sea. Thus, in a circular form of argument, in order for 
the king to be able to grant private fisheries, he must have an overarching interest in the sea (or at 
least the part of the sea over which the fishery was granted), and so the existence of private fisheries 
was evidence of such interest. In other words, “[f]eudal law made it possible to invest the king with a 
prescriptive title to the adjacent sea” and this prescriptive title was the basis for the private interests 
granted out of it.82 This was the beginning of the theory of territorial waters that was to continue to 
develop until the settling of the great mare liberum vs mare clausum debate in the 17th century.  
 
76 Justinian’s Corpus contains many internal inconsistencies and the law stated within it, being drawn from 
writings produced over a few centuries, was not all in current use even at publication (see James F Skyrms, 
‘Commentators on the Roman Law’ (1980) 32(1) Books at Iowa 3, 4-5) 
77 Frederick William Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge University Press, 1919), 143 
78 Ibid., 143-144 
79 Fenn Jr (n63), 70-71 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 67 
82 Ibid., 68 
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It can be seen then, that the argument that the regalia enabled the Crown to grant a property right 
where it itself didn’t possess an interest is not quite as simple as it seems. The regalia did entail a 
jurisdiction on the part of the Crown over the subject of the regalia, and this jurisdiction, in feudal 
law, was a property interest. Therefore, while the regalia may, on the surface, have appeared to 
grant brand new property rights, the underlying interest of the sovereign was there all along, 
acquired through custom and practice.  
4.3.2  Viscount Haldane’s Judgment and the Proprietary Status of the Public Fishery 
On the basis that the existence of several fisheries must mean that there is some proprietary status 
involved in the public fishery, the problem becomes how to reconcile such status with Viscount 
Haldane’s judgment in the British Columbia v Canada case. As detailed above, Viscount Haldane 
concluded that the public right to fish was “not an incident of property law”.83 
4.3.2.1 The status of Privy Council judgments 
The place of Privy Council judgments within the English common law has been considered recently in 
Willers v Joyce.84 In a separate (and unanimous) judgment of the Supreme Court given by Lord 
Neuberger, he first noted that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (“JCPC”) is not a UK court 
at all and as such, its judgments are not binding on any UK court. However, given that the JCPC is 
(and has been ever since the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876) made up of senior English and Welsh 
judges and that it applies the common law; “unless there is a decision of a superior court to the 
contrary effect, a court in England and Wales can normally be expected to follow a decision of the 
JCPC, but there is no question of it being bound to do so as a matter of precedent”.85 
However, set against this “normal expectation”, it is important to consider the law being applied in 
the judgment in question. On this point, the Supreme Court recognised that ‘the common law’ is not 
one coherent and homogenous body of law. Instead, it is perfectly possible for the common law of 
one jurisdiction, although originally based on English common law, to be different in various ways to 
the current common law of England and Wales.86 Applying this system of precedent set out by Lord 
Neuberger and the Supreme Court to the judgment of Viscount Haldane in the British Columbia v 
Canada case, an English court would not therefore be obliged, as a matter of precedent, to uphold 
the conclusion that the public right to fish does not have proprietary status. It is a decision of the 
JCPC and that part of the decision has not been confirmed (or even considered) by any English court.  
 
83 British Columbia v Canada (n44), [175] (Viscount Haldane) 
84 Willers v Joyce (No. 2) [2016] UKSC 44, [2017] 2 All ER 383 
85 Ibid., [16] (Lord Neuberger) 
86 Ibid., [12] (Lord Neuberger) 
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Whether an English court should still follow the conclusion of Viscount Haldane will therefore 
depend upon whether he and the JCPC in that case were applying English common law or Canadian 
common law, and whether there was a difference between the two in material respects at the time 
of the judgment. The answer to this question will not, however, generally be found in an express 
statement by the JCPC in their judgments. Thus, in line with the doctrinal + approach described in 
Chapter 2, this is the stage at which the geographical and historical context of the law becomes 
extremely important in deciphering whether Canadian and English common law were distinct 
enough to enable a present day court to distinguish Viscount Haldane’s statement on the 
proprietary status of the public fishery. On the subject of the public right to fish, Hamill suggests that 
“the common law as received in Canada is not the same as that which existed in England; Canadian 
courts were allowed to and did adapt the law to meet the new circumstances of Canada.”87 It is 
therefore important to consider how much adaptation might have been undertaken by Viscount 
Haldane in giving his judgment in British Columbia v Canada.  
4.3.2.2 The British North America Act, Viscount Haldane and the Constitution of Canada  
Viscount Haldane played a key role (as a member of the JCPC between 1911 and 1928) in the 
development of Canada’s constitution, even being described as “the wicked stepfather of the 
Canadian constitution”.88 This label is aimed at his involvement in the re-shaping of the British North 
America Act 1867 (the “1867 Act”) (and therefore the relationship between the provinces and the 
Dominion) by the JCPC. During his time on the JCPC, Haldane sat on thirty two Canadian cases and 
wrote nineteen judgements, fifteen of which involved the distribution of powers between the 
central (federal) government and the provinces.89 Robinson argues that during this period the JCPC 
restructured the 1867 Act away from one “designed to set up one strong central government, with 
several clearly subordinated legislatures” and towards an interpretation that “several sovereign 
governments were set up in which, in fact, the residual powers belonged to the provinces”.90  Indeed, 
Haldane’s role is often condensed down to one in which he favoured the provinces over the 
Dominion, yet this is too simple an analysis for the complex pattern of judgments that helped to 
bring life to and shape the Canadian constitution as it is today.  
 
87 Sarah Hamill, ‘The Public Right to Fish and the Triumph of Colonial Dispossession in Ireland and Canada’ 
(2017) 50 University of British Columbia Law Review 53, 75 
88 Frederick Vaughan, Viscount Haldane: ‘The Wicked Step-father of the Canadian Constitution’ (University of 
Toronto Press, 2010) 
89 Stephen Azzi, ‘Viscount Haldane: “The Wicked Step-father of the Canadian Constitution”. By Frederick 
Vaughan’ (2012) 74(3) The Historian 640 
90 Jonathan Robinson, ‘Lord Haldane and the British North America Act’ (1970) 20 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 55, 57 
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Focussing on the 1867 Act, Haldane’s key role in the process of interpreting and restructuring it, for 
Robinson, was founded upon his philosophical views on the nature and role of the state.91 As well as 
his role as a senior judge, Haldane published many philosophical writings and in The Meaning of 
Truth in History he noted that “I am a lawyer whose almost daily duty it is to ascertain the reasons 
why the law has become what it is, because unless I can do so, I am bound to fail in the interpretation 
of its scope and authority”.92 This statement is particularly apt for the present exercise, for, as 
Viscount Haldane suggests, unless we can try to understand at least some of the motivation and 
reasoning behind his judgment, the interpretation of the judgment and its place in the modern 
common law of England becomes an impenetrable task. Robinson suggests that part of what is 
included in Haldane’s requirement to ascertain the ‘reasons why’ behind any law, is an attempt to 
understand the ‘spirit of the age’.93 This is something that Haldane practised himself when, for 
example, interpreting the judgments of his predecessors.94 
To put into practice Viscount Haldane’s stance means to seek to understand the motivations of the 
JCPC and Viscount Haldane at the time of the British Columbia v Canada case and to place them in 
their historical context. Haldane himself believed the role of the JCPC to include not only the 
upholding of the principles of justice, but also the more political role of “assisting in holding the 
Empire together”.95 This role is suggested by Beaudry as promoting “whatever balance of powers 
would better secure a peaceful status quo within Canada”96 and thus keep the Empire together.  
Together with this self-confessed role of Empire-maintaining, Robinson argues that Haldane’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy was a key driver of his approach to his work on the JCPC; 
“Haldane viewed the state as an organism and held that the constitution must embody the willing of 
the individuals and groups of which it is made up, and yet be organized on rational principles”.97 
Putting these two drivers together adds ‘meat’ to the ‘bones’ of Haldane’s and the JCPC’s ‘favouring’ 
of the provinces. Haldane’s initial work as a lawyer in Canada98 had instilled in him the conviction 
that the people of Canada did not want a strong central government and so as a member of the 
JCPC, he saw his job as to interpret the 1867 Act “in a way which gave 'widest capacity' for dealing 
 
91 Ibid., 61 
92 Right Honourable Viscount Haldane, ‘The Meaning of Truth in History’ in Robinson (n90), 64-65 
93 Robinson (n90), 65 
94 Ibid. 
95 Viscount Haldane in Jonas-Sebastién Beaudry, ‘The Empire’s Sentinels: The Privy Council’s Quest to Balance 
Idealism and Pragmatism’ (2013) 1(1) Birkbeck Law Review 15, 19 
96 Ibid., 41 
97 Robinson (n90), 63 
98 Robinson notes that of the nine reported constitutional cases in which Viscount Haldane was involved, he 
argued seven for the provinces (Robinson (n90), 66) 
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with 'property and civil rights' to the provinces”.99 In this way he could both give effect to the will of 
the Canadian people as a whole and, at the same time, strengthen the bonds of the Empire.  
Applying this historical context to the British Columbia v Canada case, the first observation to be 
made is that it becomes immediately less clear whether the JCPC is applying English common law or 
Canadian common law and what any relevant differences between the two might be. If the JCPC and 
Viscount Haldane were involved in a campaign to reshape the 1867 Act to better fit the 
requirements of the new nation of Canada then it is arguable that they were not simply applying 
English law, but were creating a new form of common law applicable to and in Canada only.  
A study of English case law that would have been available to Viscount Haldane in 1914 shows that 
Viscount Haldane’s arguments regarding the public fishery are not foregone conclusions. For 
example, in Murphy v Ryan (a case put before the JCPC in the British Columbia v Canada case), Lord 
O’Hagan stated that “the exclusive right of fishing in the one case, and the public right of fishing in 
the other, depend upon the existence of a proprietorship, in the soil of the private river by the private 
owner, and by the Sovereign in the public river respectively”.100 While in the British Columbia v 
Canada case, Viscount Haldane stated that “the right of the public to fish in the sea has been well 
established in English law for many centuries and does not depend on the assertion or maintenance 
of any title in the Crown to the subjacent land”.101 This apparent contradiction is reflected in the case 
law in general; where the public fishery is considered, statements about its nature are few and far 
between and often contradictory.  
In R v Keyn (the Franconia),102 the seminal case considering whether English jurisdiction extended to 
cover territorial waters or not, Marston notes that the transcript records that during the second 
hearing of the case, Cockburn CJ was of the view that Gammell v Commissioners of Woods and 
Forests103 was not useful to their Lordships’ decision because it concerned salmon fisheries and so 
did not involve a question of proprietary rights because “the right of taking fish is not property”.104 
Although the Franconia case was cited to the JCPC in the British Columbia v Canada case, it is only 
considered in brief in the judgment, with Viscount Haldane stating that their Lordships did not 
propose to deal with the question of whether the Crown had a proprietary interest in the sea bed 
under territorial waters. It is submitted that it is therefore unlikely that the JCPC would have read 
the full transcript of the hearings as well as the judgement. As for Cockburn CJ’s statement, this does 
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not appear to be backed up with any source material and does not make much sense in the context 
of the Gammell case. That case involved salmon fishing in Scottish coastal waters and the court was 
required to determine whether such fishing was part of the public fishery or whether it belonged to 
the Crown beneficially. The Court of Session (and subsequently the House of Lords) held that salmon 
fishing in Scottish waters belonged to the Crown as a patrimonial and beneficial right (i.e. not as part 
of the public fishery), indeed, in the stated opinion of 9 of the judges:  
“Now, upon the first of these points we cannot think that there is the slightest room for doubt. 
According to the concurring testimony of all our law authorities, salmon-fishing is considered as a 
beneficial right of property, and is held to be vested in the Crown; or perhaps, speaking more 
properly, to remain with the Crown, unless it has been made the subject of special grant to a private 
party. It is needless to speculate on the circumstances from which this susceptibility of appropriation 
took its rise—very probably from the value of the fish, combined with that peculiarity of its habits, 
which rendered the operation of catching it in a great measure dependent on, or connected with, the 
possession of the adjacent shore. But certain it is, that by the law of Scotland it is a right of property, 
and, whether granted by or remaining in the Crown, a patrimonial or beneficial right.”105  
Certainly, a private right to fish (as salmon fishing is in Scotland) is widely accepted as a proprietary 
right. For example Halsbury’s Laws of England defines a fishery as a “profit of the soil over which the 
water flows”, when arising from title to the soil it is a corporeal hereditament and when severed 
from the underlying soil it becomes an incorporeal hereditament (in this case, a profit à prendre).106 
Both corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments are property and can be owned by legal persons. 
There would therefore seem to be no basis for Cockburn CJ’s statement to the opposite effect.  
Given the general lack of any authoritative statement on the proprietary nature or otherwise of the 
public fishery, the way was consequently open for Haldane and the JCPC to apply the interpretation 
that suited their motivations and philosophies. The JCPC had already shown itself to be unafraid of 
applying a wide interpretation to the powers and responsibilities given to the provinces by the 1867 
Act to the exclusion of the powers and responsibilities given to the Dominion. For example, in In re 
Marriage in 1912, Viscount Haldane decided that the provinces’ ability to make laws regarding the 
solemnization of marriage operated to exclude the exclusive legislative authority of the Dominion 
with regard to marriage and divorce granted by the 1867 Act.107 This meant that a law made by the 
province of Quebec that provided conditions as to solemnization that affected the validity of the 
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marriage contract was allowed, even though it appeared to be in breach of the grant to the 
Dominion of the exclusive legislative authority regarding marriage. Robinson suggests that “[t]his 
judgment seems explicable only if the [JCPC] believed that public opinion in Quebec would not stand 
for any other decision and that, in Haldane's mind at least, this was a factor which had to be taken 
into account in discovering the 'true meaning' of the Act”.108 
Considering this background, the JCPC would presumably have had no qualms about interpreting the 
power of the provinces to deal with property and civil rights109 so as to exclude the Dominion’s 
exclusive legislative authority in respect of sea coast and inland fisheries.110 Therefore, the fact that 
they didn’t, despite the lack of any body of English case law constraining them to such a conclusion, 
is worthy of further consideration. The effect of the JCPC’s decision was to put the public fishery 
beyond the reach of the provincial legislature in British Columbia, holding that only the federal 
government of the Dominion had any power in respect of the public fishery, and then only a power 
to regulate, and not to grant an exclusive fishery out of it to a third party (as the provincial 
legislature had wished to do).  
It is arguable that, given his published desire to give effect to the will of the people and, in doing so, 
to strengthen the bonds of Empire, Haldane’s approach to the proprietary status (or otherwise) of 
the public fishery in Canada was motivated by an intention to ensure that the public fishery 
remained public. If he had concluded that it was a proprietary interest then the public fishery would 
have formed part of the bundle of “property and civil rights,” the regulation of which had been 
allocated to the provinces by the 1867 Act. Instead, by holding that the public fishery was not an 
incident of property, Haldane ensured that the responsibility for it fell solely to the Dominion under 
section 91 of the 1867 Act.  
This was important because the regulatory abilities of the Provinces and the Dominion were very 
different at the time of the judgment. The Dominion’s responsibility under section 91 was (at that 
time) understood to extend only to the “protection and preservation of fisheries in the interests of 
the public at large”.111 This limitation on the Dominion’s power to regulate fisheries was generally 
interpreted as allowing only such regulation as related to biological conservation.112 The Provincial 
governments were subject to no such limitations in respect of their regulation of property and civil 
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rights and so if regulation had fallen to them, it would be open to them to curtail the public right to 
fish for reasons other than biological conservation. This consideration is hinted at by Viscount 
Haldane when he confirmed that “their Lordships have no doubt that the object and the effect of 
[the relevant provisions of the 1867 Act] were to place the management and protection of the 
cognate public rights of navigation and fishing in the sea and tidal waters exclusively in the Dominion 
Parliament, and to leave to the Province no right of property or control in them.”113 
Thus by denying proprietary status to the public fishery, the JCPC was able to definitively answer the 
Province’s questions about its ability to grant a private fishery in public waters in the negative, safe 
in the knowledge that the only body with any ability to regulate the fishery was only permitted to do 
so when acting in the interests of the public. This interpretation would seem to align with Viscount 
Haldane’s suggestion, in an Australian case before the JCPC in the same month, that “as regards 
Canada... what was in the minds of those who agreed on the resolutions was a general Government 
charged with matters of common interest, and new and merely local Governments for the 
Provinces.”114 As a matter of common interest, the public right to fish enjoyed by all the public of 
Canada, should be regulated by the federal government, which a finding of proprietary status for the 
fishery would not have permitted. This is not to suggest that Viscount Haldane reliably employed this 
principle in his judgments, indeed Wexler argues that Haldane generally tended to insist that “there 
was no reason or principle underlying the division of powers” under the 1867 Act.115 However, as 
both judgments were handed down within a matter of weeks, the latter Australian case does 
provide some evidence of Viscount Haldane’s thinking around the time of the British Columbia v 
Canada judgment. 
It can therefore be seen that the judgment of Viscount Haldane in British Columbia v Canada must 
be viewed in its historical and geographical context. In such context, it is far from clear that the 
judgement applies to anything wider than the Canadian common law. On this basis, it would be 
possible for an English court to distinguish the judgment of Viscount Haldane.  
4.3.2.2 Distinguishing British Columbia v Canada 
If Viscount Haldane’s statements on the non-proprietary status of the public fishery can be 
distinguished as applying to Canadian common law and being inconsistent with English common law 
and the proprietary treatment of several fisheries, then the argument that the public fishery is a 
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proprietary right becomes stronger. The next step in answering the question of the ownership of the 
public fishery is to consider what the consequences of concluding that the public fishery has 
proprietary status are.  
4.4  Options for Ownership of the Public Fishery 
In the literature review presented in Chapter 3, three options for the ownership of the public fishery 
were identified as discussed in the literature; (i) owned by no one and open to all (res nullius), (ii) 
owned by the public as a whole, and (iii) owned by some emanation of the Crown on behalf of the 
public.  
4.4.1 Res Nullius 
Applying the argument that the public fishery is a proprietary right, it is therefore possible to 
eliminate the suggestion that the public fishery could be res nullius. The established system of 
property law in England and Wales provides that all property interests must vest in someone. 
Indeed, in Ho Young v Bess, the Privy Council affirmed the “general proposition that the law abhors a 
vacuum and that title to land must always be in someone, whether the crown or a subject”.116 As 
such, the systems of bona vacantia and escheat (explained below) ensure that no property interest 
can ever be truly ownerless.  
The concepts of bona vacantia and escheat in English law can be traced back to the introduction of 
feudal law in England.  Feudal law is often thought of as coming over to England with William the 
Conqueror, however it was present in England and growing in its spread before the Conquest.117 
Nonetheless, it was the Conquest that cemented and completed the spread of feudal law, so that by 
1100, feudal burdens attached to all land and the theory that all land was ultimately held by the 
sovereign was well established.118 Under this theory, known as the ‘radical title’ of the sovereign,  
the sovereign is the ultimate landowner in the country and in them vests the power to grant 
interests in such land (to then be held from the Crown) and also to acquire any un-alienated land as 
the beneficial demesne119 of the sovereign. Such un-alienated land is sometimes known as allodial 
land, being land that is owned by the sovereign and not subject to any freehold interest. This radical 
title of the sovereign to all land means that property in land can never truly become ownerless, for 
when all other interests disappear or there is no one left to hold them, the sovereign’s interest will 
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remain. Thus, when a person dies intestate and does not leave a surviving relative eligible to claim 
the inheritance, any property interests in land held by that person before their death vest in the 
Crown as bona vacantia.120 Escheat operates similarly, such that when property interests in land are 
disclaimed (either by a trustee in bankruptcy or by a liquidator), the interest of the mesne lord (in 
practice the Crown, or in certain areas of the country, the Duchy of Cornwall or of Lancaster) 
resumes and they hold the property in their own right.121 Thus an apparently ownerless proprietary 
right would, under English common law, actually vest in the Crown.  
4.4.2 Ownership of the Public Fishery 
With the first of the three options discounted, the question becomes whether the public fishery is 
owned by the public as a whole or by some emanation of the Crown or the state as a representative 
of the public. Barnes suggests that the public fishery is vested in the public as a whole.122 This theory 
appears to find some support in the case law, such as in Malcomson v O’Dea in which Willes J stated 
that “[t]he soil of ‘navigable tidal rivers’ like the Shannon, so far as the tide flows and reflows, is 
prima facie in the Crown, and the right of fishery prima facie in the public.”123 However, once the 
public fishery is understood as a property right, the validity of the theory starts to waiver.  
It is generally accepted that ‘the public’ as a class or group of people cannot own a legal interest in 
land. Section 34(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that there can only be a maximum of 
four owners of the legal interest in an estate in land. On the face of the statutory drafting, one could 
be led to suggest that the Law of Property Act 1925 does not apply in these instances because its 
definition of ‘land’ is not wide enough to include land covered by water. This argument would be 
based upon the definition of ‘land’ in the Law of Property Act 1925, as compared with the definition 
of ‘land’ in the Interpretation Act 1978. These are both set out below:  
Law of Property Act 1925, section 205(1)(ix) 
“”land” includes land of any tenure… and other corporeal hereditaments… and other incorporeal 
hereditaments, and an easement, right, privilege, or benefit in, over or derived from land…” 
Interpretation Act 1978, section 5 and Schedule 1 
“”land” includes buildings and other structures, land covered with water, and any estate, interest, 
easement, servitude or right in or over land” (emphasis added) 
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The definition in the Interpretation Act 1978 only applies to Acts passed on or after 1 January 1979, 
which does not include the Law of Property Act 1925. However, it is wrong to assume from this that 
the 1925 Act does not apply to land covered by water.  
Firstly, the 1925 Act definition only sets out things that ‘land’ includes; it does not seek to exclude 
anything from the definition. It is arguable that by the rules of language, ‘land covered by water’ 
must be a type of land, after all, it has ‘land’ within its name. Indeed, Blackstone describes water as 
merely “a species of land.”124 In Hampton UDC v Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co, Earl of Halsbury 
LC describes a reservoir as “land covered with water.”125 Similarly there appears to be no suggestion 
in any case law or practice since the 1925 Act that a parcel of land upon part of which a lake is 
situated does not include the land beneath that lake. The owner of any such parcel of land is rightly 
taken by all interested parties (including the Land Registry) to be the owner of the entire parcel of 
land, regardless of any body of water that may be situated on part of the land. Secondly, the 1978 
Act also differs from the 1925 Act in referring to buildings upon land, yet it has not been suggested 
that prior to the 1978 Act, buildings upon land were not ‘land’ for the purposes of the 1925 Act. On 
both of these bases, the correct construction of the 1978 Act is as one of clarification of the 
definition of land and not one aiming to introduce a new definition that includes land covered by 
water, where it wasn’t included before.  
However, even if it were possible to put together a credible argument for the disapplication of any 
statutory reasons as to why the public cannot be a legal owner of an estate in land, case law would 
not permit such ownership. Lord Cairns was clear in Goodman v Mayor of Saltash that “a fluctuating 
and uncertain body cannot claim a profit à prendre in alieno solo, and indeed cannot be the grantee 
either of a several fishery or of any other kind of real property.”126 His statement was confirmed in 
Smith v Andrews127 and is now considered a fundamental principle of the common law. In practice, 
for example, what is referred to in common parlance as ‘public land’ (such as parks and open 
spaces), is never legally vested in the public as a class. Instead it is held by one or more legal persons 
(usually public bodies such as local councils) on terms that require the owners to make the land 
available to the public or to certain public uses.  
At first glance, in Adair v National Trust, this principle appears to have been overlooked, when 
Girvan J stated that “... there is a common law right vested in the members of the public to take shell-
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fish from the foreshore and... this is an incident of the public right to fish.”128 In that case the court 
had to determine whether the public right to fish included (as the plaintiff alleged and the foreshore 
owner denied) a right to take shellfish from the foreshore, particularly when the tide is out and the 
foreshore is exposed. Girvan J concluded as set out above, but went on to note that “[w]hile there 
are already fine distinctions and examples of illogicality in relation to the law of the foreshore any 
other conclusion in the context of collecting shell-fish would give rise to strange consequences.”129 
The question that Girvan J had to answer was whether the public had a right to take shellfish or not. 
In answering this question, he acknowledged that the law in this area is not “a reasoned whole”, but 
instead contains many contradictions. For him, while an argument could be made that there was no 
right for the public to collect shellfish on exposed parts of the foreshore, this conclusion could not sit 
coherently with the established right of the public to take shellfish from the foreshore when it is 
covered with water. As indicated by his statements noted above, the need to develop the coherency 
and logicality of the law outweighed any arguments against the right alleged by the plaintiff. When 
this context is considered, his statement that the right to collect shellfish is “vested in the members 
of the public” can be seen as a simple (although possibly poorly considered) way of denoting the 
right as a public one, rather than the result a reasoned study of the law on who owns the public right 
to fish and where it is vested. The case turned on whether a public right existed, and not where that 
public right sat in terms of ownership, therefore the statement can be distinguished as obiter 
dictum.  
If options (i) res nullius and (ii) ownership by the public can be discounted, then the public fishery as 
a proprietary right results in a conclusion that that right must vest in the Crown, held on some form 
of trust for the benefit of the public, in other words; a public trust of the fishery. Support for the 
existence of the public trust doctrine as a concept in the English legal system was considered in 
Chapter 3. Here, the consideration of case law support is in the precise context of the public fishery, 
and it is argued that support for the conclusion that the public fishery vests in the Crown on trust for 
the public can be found in a number of cases. In Warren v Matthews the court considered the 
position of fisheries in a navigable river. In holding that the position of a member of the public 
regarding fishing was the same in navigable rivers as in tidal waters, the court concluded that the 
fishery in both was “prima facie in the King and is public.”130 In Blundell v Catterall, Holroyd J noted 
that the sea “belongs to the King” but was “clothed with public interest,” namely the right of 
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navigation and of fishing,131 again suggesting a King holding a property interest but not for his entire 
benefit. The clearest statement of the public trust of the public fishery though comes much more 
recently in the statement of the Supreme Court in Loose v Lynn Shellfish that the public fishery is 
held by the Crown “for public good.”132 Thus there is a clear line of support in English case law for 
the framing of the public fishery as held by the Crown on trust for the benefit of the public.   
Furthermore, the statement of Lord Gardiner, on behalf of the government, that “[t]he Government 
are clear that there is a public right to these fish. Indeed, lawyers have advised me that UK case law 
recognises that fish are a public asset, held by the Crown for the benefit of the public,” adds to the 
argument that a public trust exists of the public fishery.133 Indeed, the conclusion drawn above at 
section 4.3.2.2 that an English court would be able to distinguish the statement of Viscount Haldane 
in the British Columbia v Canada case is strengthened by this statement by Lord Gardiner. Applying 
the rule laid down in Pepper v Hart,134 the statement of Lord Gardiner on behalf of the government 
could be taken into account by a court interpreting the consequent Fisheries Act, where the wording 
of the legislation is ambiguous.  
In addition, the conclusion that the public fishery in coastal waters vests in the Crown under a public 
trust is consistent with the position of the fishery in the UK’s exclusive economic zone. Under section 
41 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, the sovereign rights of the UK under UNCLOS (which 
include the right to exploit all natural resources (including fish) within the UK’s exclusive economic 
zone)135 are vested in Her Majesty. This vesting is on behalf of the public and the rights are currently 
held by the Crown Estate Commissioners, as evidenced, for example, by the awarding of seabed 
rights for offshore renewable energy projects by the Commissioners.136 
4.5  Crown Ownership of the Public Fishery  
The Crown is a term used to mean a range of different things. It can mean the monarch herself, a 
general term for the state, or a specific part of the state forming the Crown Estate.137 If the public 
 
131 Blundell v Catterall (1821) [1814-23] All ER Rep 39 (King’s Bench), 45 
132 Loose v Lynn Shellfish Limited [2016] UKSC 14, [2017] AC 599 (SC), [616] 
133 Lord Gardiner of Kimble, HL Deb, 22 June 2020, Volume 804, Column 31 
134 [1993] AC 593 (HL) 
135 Article 56 of UNCLOS (n57) recognises as belonging to states “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil” 
136 The Crown Estate, Offshore Wind Operational Report (2019) 
<https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/3515/offshore-wind-operational-report-2019.pdf> accessed 30 
June 2020 
137 Or even the head gear the monarch wears 
114 
 
fishery vests in some emanation of the Crown, the precise emanation must now be determined, in 
order to establish the rights and responsibilities attaching to such ownership.  
4.5.1  Which Part of the Crown? 
It is worth noting at the outset that the government, whilst acknowledging the existence of the 
public trust of the fishery (as discussed above), appears currently to be unclear as to where the trust 
asset (i.e. the fishery itself) vests. In debate in the House of Lords on the Fisheries Bill, Baroness 
Bloomfield, on behalf of the government, rejected an amendment to the Bill to expressly vest the 
public fishery in England in the Crown Estate Commissioners as part of the Crown Estate.138 The basis 
of this rejection appeared to be that such a vesting would require the restructuring of both the 
Marine Management Organisation and the Crown Estate Commissioners in order to adequately 
manage the fishery. However, this is a political consideration and should not impact upon where the 
law and precedent deems the fishery to vest.  
In order, therefore, to ascertain which emanation of the Crown the public fishery is vested in, it is 
necessary to understand the nature of the public fishery. In general, a fishery can take one of two 
forms. If it is combined with the ownership of the soil underneath the water then it takes the form of 
a corporeal hereditament,139 for it is a ‘profit’ of the soil. The concept of profits of the soil derives 
from what Gray and Gray term the “third dimension of land”,140 an expression designed to illustrate 
the doctrine that land ownership encompasses not just the surface of the Earth in the area in 
question, but also everything above and below it.141 By this doctrine, a landowner is entitled, for 
example, to produce that grows on his or her land. Applying this doctrine to the law of fisheries, a 
landowner whose property includes the bed of any water is entitled as part of their ownership of 
that property to take fish that are found in such water. On the other hand, where a fishery is 
separated from the underlying soil such that one person owns the soil and another owns the right to 
fish in the water above the soil, these fisheries take the form of incorporeal hereditaments.142 In this 
form, a fishery is an example of a profit à prendre; a right to take something from another’s land. 
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Considering several fisheries in tidal waters, Moore and Moore argue that while it is theoretically 
possible for incorporeal fisheries to exist in tidal waters, it is unlikely and indeed, they suggest that 
case law has introduced a presumption that a several fishery in tidal waters was originally granted by 
the Crown together with the soil beneath that fishery, in other words, as a profit of the soil and not 
as a royal franchise.143 If several fisheries were granted as profits of the soil, this might suggest that 
the fishery from which they were severed (i.e. the public fishery) was also held as a profit of the soil 
on the basis of the Crown’s ownership of the bed of all tidal waters, the foreshore and the seabed of 
the territorial waters. Moore and Moore argue that the historic evidence of several fisheries in tidal 
waters shows that they were generally treated as manorial rights and granted with or as part of 
coastal manors.144 Indeed, they go so far as to suggest that the possible origin of the public fishery 
could be in the “tacit permission [of the Crown to fishing by the public] over all tidal waters so long 
as they remained in the Crown, and were not specially appropriated by the Crown and turned to a 
profit; yet, whenever the Crown granted out a district of land, afterwards called an honour or a 
manor, which comprised within it tidal water and the soil thereof, the mere fact of putting it into the 
possession of a subject ipso facto excluded the exercise of the public right.”145 This idea of tacit 
permission by the crown in respect of its profits is also supported by Farnham.146 
However, just a decade later, Viscount Haldane in British Columbia v Canada was adamant that “the 
right of the public to fish in the sea has been well established in English law for many centuries and 
does not depend upon the assertion or maintenance of any title in the Crown to the subjacent 
land.”147 Nonetheless, although there is an apparent contradiction between the two assertions, 
looked at in the context of the case (and of the preceding body of case law), the two assertions can 
in truth sit side by side quite happily. Viscount Haldane’s statement is made in order to justify the 
lack of investigation by the court as to whether the Crown had proprietary title in the territorial 
waters off the coast of British Columbia. He notes that this question does not need to be answered 
by the court because the public right to fish does not depend on proving the title of the Crown to the 
area of sea bed in question. Instead, the public right to fish is presumed to exist in all territorial 
waters and it is for any person who claims that it does not exist to prove that case by evidencing 
their private fishery (either with or without the subjacent soil). In other words, he is not stating that 
the public right to fish has nothing to do with the Crown’s title to the subjacent soil, merely that 
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proving such title is not a necessary task for anyone wishing to assert the public’s right to fish in a 
particular area.  
On the basis then that several fisheries were all originally corporeal as they were profits of the soil 
belonging to the Crown (even if they have at some time since grant been separated from the 
subjacent soil and become incorporeal), this suggests that the public fishery is also a corporeal right. 
Thus the ownership of the public fishery will depend upon the ownership of the foreshore and 
seabed. The basis of this ownership was discussed in a Special Case brought by the Scottish Salmon 
Farmers Association, the Trustees of the Port and Harbour of Lerwick and the Crown Estate 
Commissioners.148  
In that case the Scottish Court of Session was asked to determine whether the Crown’s ownership of 
the seabed surrounding Shetland was a right based in feudal law or a right based in sovereignty (or 
prerogative).  Shetland (along with Orkney) is peculiar in that it is subject to a hybrid system of Udal 
law (derived from Norse laws) and Scottish law. However, in this instance, the court established that 
Udal law was not applicable and so it was considering Scottish law only. The judges agreed that the 
source of the Crown’s ownership of the seabed around Shetland was the sovereignty and 
prerogative of the Crown and that this gave rise to a proprietary right that is capable of alienation, 
although such right is subject to the burden of the public rights of navigation and fishing that attach 
to it. Nonetheless, Lord McCluskey argued that although the right exists independently of feudal 
theory, feudal law can “support and rationalise” the right.149 Indeed he suggested that “one looks 
inside the feudal system to determine the character and style of all rights held from the King but one 
looks outside it in order to ascertain the source and character of the King’s original right”.150 
While this was a Scottish case, several of the judges drew conclusions as to the seabed surrounding 
the whole of the UK, with Lord McCluskey noting that “… the whole weight of the authorities is in 
favour of the view that the Crown has a proprietary right in the solum of the sea bed in the whole 
territorial waters of the United Kingdom, a right which derives from the prerogative and is qualified 
only by a trust to secure that public rights are protected”.151 As well as the explicit comments that 
their conclusions apply to the whole of the UK territorial waters, Marston notes that that status of 
the territorial sea (being consistently described in legislation as being ‘adjacent to’ Scotland, England 
or Great Britain (as appropriate) rather than in such territories) suggests that “the correct view may 
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be that the territorial sea is held in right of the United Kingdom as a whole and not in right of its 
constituent parts”.152 
Thus the foreshore and seabed are held by the Crown as part of its prerogative. Where the Crown’s 
interest in an ‘object’ flows from royal prerogative, such interest generally forms part of the Crown 
Estate. For example, as part of its prerogative, the Crown is entitled to all mines of gold and silver in 
Great Britain, regardless of whose land they are on or under, and such royal mines are vested in the 
Crown Estate Commissioners. It can therefore be surmised that the public right to fish, based in 
royal prerogative, must sit in the Crown Estate and therefore be subject to the management of the 
Crown Estate Commissioners.  
This conclusion is supported by the analysis of Marston on the more recent history of the Crown’s 
ownership of the foreshore and seabed. Marston notes that the coming into force of the Crown 
Lands Act 1829 (the “1829 Act”) marked the start of “a sustained effort by the Crown to assert the 
rights which it claimed over the foreshore and bed of the sea.”153 The 1829 Act vested the Crown 
possessions and land revenues in the Commissioners of Woods, Forests, Land Revenues, Works and 
Buildings for the purposes of management, although no specific mention was made of the foreshore 
or seabed.  
However, the later Crown Lands Act of 1866 specifically dealt with the Crown’s interest in the 
foreshore and seabed and transferred this from the Commissioners of Woods to the Board of 
Trade.154 The rationale behind this transfer was to unite the Crown’s property interest in the 
foreshore and seabed (until then held by the Commissioners of Woods) with the Crown’s 
jurisdictional interest in the same areas (exercised by the Board of Trade).155  
In 1919 the responsibility for managing Crown foreshore and seabed was passed from the Harbour 
Department of the Board of Trade to the Ports Division of the Ministry of Transport.156 After touring 
a few government departments, the responsibility for managing Crown foreshore and seabed 
returned to the Ministry of Transport until the Coast Protection Act 1949 transferred the 
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management of the Crown’s interest in the foreshore and the bed of the sea back to the 
Commissioners of Crown Lands (the successor to the Commissioners of Woods).157 
Finally, the Commissioners of Crown Lands were dissolved in 1956158 and the property of the Crown 
Estate vested in the newly set up Crown Estate Commissioners. Thus, the Crown’s interest in the 
foreshore and the seabed now vests in the Crown Estate Commissioners as part of the Crown Estate. 
Thus again, as a profit of the ownership of the foreshore and seabed, the public fishery also forms 
part of the Crown Estate and vests in the Crown Estate Commissioners.  
4.5.2  The Public Fishery as a ‘Trust Asset’ 
As part of the Crown Estate, the public fishery joins a wide variety of land and property rights, from 
large tracts of central London real estate, regional shopping centres, out of town retail and industrial 
parks, to swathes of rural farmland to offshore wind developments. Some of these ‘assets’ are 
ancient rights accruing to the Crown through prerogative (such as the foreshore), while others are 
recent purchases. The Crown Estate Commissioners are subject to various statutory duties with 
regard to the management of Crown Estate property, but it is submitted that these duties might be 
enhanced in respect of properties that vest in The Crown Estate through royal prerogative. Thus, the 
general duties of management applying to all property forming the Crown Estate will first be 
considered, followed by the possibility of additional or enhanced duties that may apply to 
prerogative assets held on trust such as the public fishery.  
4.5.2.1 The Crown Estate 
The Crown Estate is vested in and managed by the Crown Estate Commissioners (the 
“Commissioners”), a body corporate which is constituted by the Crown Estate Act 1961 (the “1961 
Act”).159 The 1961 Act provides the statutory framework in accordance with which the 
Commissioners must manage the Crown Estate.  Section 1(3) of the 1961 Act places a duty on the 
Commissioners to “maintain and enhance” the value of and return from the Crown Estate, “but with 
due regard to the requirements of good management”.  
The requirements of “good management” are not expanded upon within the 1961 Act and the 
provisions of section 1(5) of the 1961 Act (that “the validity of transactions entered into by the 
Commissioners shall not be called in question on any suggestion of their not having acted in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act regulating the exercise of their powers…”) mean that 
there is no judicial interpretation to flesh out the meaning of it. 
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The Commissioners state in their public material that their work is guided by their three values of 
commercialism, integrity and stewardship.160 The inclusion of ‘stewardship’ as a core value suggests 
a possible greater focus on long-term considerations than many private businesses. Indeed, in a 
recent article published on the Commissioners’ website, the Chief Investment Officer at The Crown 
Estate states that “[f]or those of us in the real estate industry who have an interest in the long term 
success and cohesion of the UK, we need to play our part in taking a broader view of how the 
economy and society functions and therefore, the impact we have on it.”161 However, it is unclear 
how wide such long-term considerations are.  
In a Report to Parliament by the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (on the 
management of the Crown Estate) the Committee suggested that the term ‘stewardship’ could be 
given a basic meaning incorporating “no more than standards that all organisations should observe 
to ensure that their operations are sustainable in the longer-term – a limited stewardship role – and 
managed in a professional manner.”162 This basic meaning accorded with the evidence submitted by 
HM Treasury that “[g]enerally, the Treasury is satisfied that the Estate is appropriately diversified in 
the UK property market, controls its risks and opportunities to suitable standards, and adopts a 
sustainable method of doing business.”163 However, the Committee considered that the appropriate 
meaning to attribute to the term should be one that involved wider public interests. In particular, 
the Report concluded that there is a significance in the obligation on the part of the Commissioners 
to “maintain and enhance” value and return rather than the usual obligation seen to “maximise” 
value and return; “We consider that there is a distinction between ‘enhance’ and ‘maximise’—ie that 
enhance is less than maximise— which may give the CEC more scope to accommodate wider public 
interests in fulfilling their financial remit.”164 
The Government response to the Committee’s Report confirmed that “The Crown Estate takes a 
long term perspective in considering and periodically reviewing all the assets under its management 
in line with its responsibilities under the Crown Estate Act 1961 and the wider statutory framework. It 
seeks to be a good landowner, a good landlord and a reliable counterparty in its decisions and in its 
dealings. The interpretation of good management and corporate responsibility must be governed by 
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the requirements of the 1961 Act, which place these values in the context of enhancement in the long 
term prosperity and sustainability of the estate.”165  
Thus, the 1961 Act places a duty on the Commissioners to practise “good management,” and this 
duty can be interpreted as wider than that of a corporate entity to maximise profit. However, the 
discussions by Parliament suggest that the widening of the duty of the Commissioners is by 
incorporating an ability to consider wider context, rather than an obligation to, with profit still being 
the main driver. This appears to be consistent with the way in which the Commissioners frame 
themselves; as “a statutory corporation operating on a commercial basis”.166 The general duties of 
management attaching to the Crown Estate, as currently interpreted, do not therefore appear to 
offer an improvement to the present management of the public fishery.  
4.5.2.2 The public fishery: trust duties  
If the public fishery is held by the Commissioners on trust for the public in accordance with the 
public trust doctrine, then the question arises as to whether this means that the Commissioners are 
under additional duties in respect of the public fishery over and above the statutory duties imposed 
on it by the 1961 Act. The use of the term ‘trust’ in a legal context may lead one to assume that the 
full range of fiduciary duties of an equitable trust are at issue, however, as will be seen, the law 
recognises the term as a “protean” one,167 and it is therefore now proper to consider what the 
appropriate meaning is for the ‘trust’ of the public fishery. 
At equity, a trust is commonly understood as an obligation imposed on the holder of property rights 
(the trustee) to exercise those rights for and on behalf of one or more others (the beneficiaries).168 
Such a trust is most commonly created expressly by the settlor, but this need not be the case and it 
can arise impliedly. However the trust is created, the general duty of all trustees is to manage their 
trust assets with “reasonable diligence”.169 This form of trust, sometimes referred to as a ‘true’ trust, 
is not always what is created or implied by the use of the term. Indeed, the varied use of the term 
‘trust’ can be seen particularly clearly when the role of the state as a ‘trustee’ is in question.170 In 
 
165 HM Treasury, The Management of the Crown Estate: Government Response to the Committee’s Eighth 
Report of Session 2009-10 (June 2010), paragraph 5 
166 The Crown Estate, ‘Our Structure & Governance’ <https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/en-gb/our-
business/our-structure-and-governance/> accessed 5 August 2020 
167 Bath & North East Somerset Council v HM Attorney General/The Treasury Solicitor (Bona Vacantia) [2002] 
EWCA 1623 (Ch), [para 25] (Hart J) 
168 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Trusts and Powers (Volume 98, 2013), paragraph 1 
169 Charitable Corpn v Sutton (1742) 26 ER 642, [645] (Lord Hardwicke LC)  




Tito v Waddell (No. 2), Megarry VC confirmed the possibility of a different form of trust when dealing 
with an arm of the state (including the Crown):  
“… the term ‘trust’ is one which may properly be used to describe not only relationships which are 
enforceable by the court in their equitable jurisdiction, but also other relationships such as the 
discharge under the direction of the Crown, of the duties or functions belonging to the prerogative 
and the authority of the Crown. Trusts of the former kind… [are] “trusts in the lower sense”; trusts of 
the latter kind… [are] “trusts in the higher sense.””171 
Thus, while it is possible for the Crown (or any other organ of state) to be a trustee in the ‘true’ or 
‘lower’ sense of the word, in any circumstance where it is claimed the Crown is a trustee, it must be 
considered whether a ‘true’ trust has been created or whether “the governmental powers and 
obligations of the Crown” provide a better explanation than a trust enforceable in equity.172 
Furthermore, Megarry VC went as far as to suggest that in matters concerning the Crown, the courts 
should generally presume a trust in the higher sense,173 unless there is “sufficient indication” that a 
true trust in equity was instead intended.174  
There is clearly no statute or royal grant declaring a trust of the public fishery in England and this 
lack of an instrument of trust should be considered highly indicative of a trust in the higher sense, 
rather than a trust in equity. In Civilian War Claimants Association Ltd v The King, it was stated that 
“[t]here is nothing... to prevent the Crown acting as agent or trustee if it chooses deliberately to do 
so.”175 While this does not necessarily need to be a choice made in the express terms of a trust, it 
must be a choice that can be shown to have been made by the Crown on the construction of the 
facts before the court. In other words, a court cannot impose the role of equitable trustee on the 
Crown. In the context of the public fishery, as shown above, there has been no ‘choice’, as that term 
is generally understood, on the part of the Crown to hold the public fishery on trust for the public.  
Although, Megarry VC was clearly of the view in Tito v Waddell that the Crown should consider itself 
subject to certain moral duties as a result of the existence of a trust in the higher sense,176 the case 
law is clear that such a trust is not justiciable in the courts. Citing Lord Diplock in Ayerst v C & K 
(Construction) Ltd, the court in Re Ahmed held that all that may be properly concluded from the use 
of the term “trust” in such a situation is to distinguish the “trust property” from other property, 
“namely, it cannot be used or disposed of by the legal owner for his own benefit but must be used or 
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disposed of for the benefit of others.”177 However, despite the lack of legal enforcement ability, this 
quote confirms the basis of the public trust; the fishery must be used or disposed of for the benefit 
of the public as a whole.  
4.6 What Does a Public Trust Mean for the Public Right to Fish?  
The conclusion that the public fishery, although held on trust for the public, is not subject to any 
legally enforceable duties or obligations on the part of The Crown Estate over and above those 
contained in the Crown Estate Act 1961, begs the question of how framing the public fishery as a 
public trust asset can be of benefit to the public fishery. It is argued in this thesis that, despite the 
lack of (currently) legally enforceable trust duties on the part of the trustees, a public trust 
interpretation of the public fishery could still contribute to the management of the public fishery for 
greater public benefit. An inability to enforce the trustee duties directly in court does not mean that 
such duties can be ignored by either the trustees or by courts. As statutes will only be taken by a 
court to limit common law rights or otherwise alter the common law where this is clear and 
unambiguous on the face of the statute,178 the public trust duties in relation to the public fishery, as 
part of the common law, must still be taken into account when interpreting ambiguous legislation. 
Thus there is still a role for the courts in interpreting and enforcing the public trust duties placed on 
the Crown and those regulating the public fishery on behalf of the Crown.  
However, the potential benefits of the public trust are not limited to its role in court cases. Indeed 
the key to the appeal of the public trust starts with its name. Rose notes that adoption of the 
doctrine opens up a number of “rhetorical resources” connected to the “charismatic moniker” of the 
public trust. 179 Indeed, Ryan describes the public trust as a notion that is “intuitively arresting,” even 
for those with little knowledge of, or interest in, the legal system generally.180 This is evidenced by 
the “rapid and widespread acceptance” of Sax’s restatement of the public trust theory in the 1970’s 
by American commentators, judges and even governments.181 In the English context, the adoption of 
a public trust interpretation of the public fishery would be able to tap into these resources, as well 
as into the increasing public awareness (discussed in Chapter 1) of the public nature of certain 
natural resources, including fish and the rights to harvest them.  
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The progress made by the Welsh Government in respect of the rights of future generations shows 
that pre-existing legally enforceable rights or duties are not a necessary precursor to greater action 
being taken to conserve resources and opportunities for the wider public and future generations. 
The Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 (the “2015 Act”) was designed to bring 
sustainable development to the fore in all decisions of public bodies. It created a legal duty where 
one did not exist before, obliging public bodies to seek to “act in a manner which seeks to ensure 
that the needs of the present are met without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”182 As has been touched upon in Chapter 1, a similar bill for England has been 
introduced to the House of Lords.183 These legal developments are examples of actions taken to 
recognise the wider public interest in decision making despite the lack of a legally enforceable 
obligation to do so. Adoption of the public trust as a concept applying to the English public fishery 
therefore still has the ability to guide decision making, despite the public trust not being directly 
enforceable in a court. Indeed, as shown by the 2015 Act, legal duties can be created if Parliament 
determines it to be necessary.   
If accepted as part of the English legal system, the presence of the public trust doctrine in the legal 
systems of a number of countries around the world means that application of the doctrine in the 
English context would be against the background of “a body of international legal decisions to help 
guide [any jurisdiction] on the parameters and pitfalls of how government must act as a public 
trustee.”184 This body of law has been criticised by some for not going far enough; for example 
Delgado argues that Sax’s public trust argument was so enthusiastically adopted because it was a 
moderate, incremental approach to environmental protection, but its adoption closed the door on 
several much more ambitious, and possibly much more effective, theories seeking to address the 
environmental crisis.185 Delgado may be correct in this regard, but to achieve change a theory must 
be adopted by those in a position to effect that change. As Delgado himself points out, “most serious 
reform movements fail because society prefers incremental rather than wide-ranging change.”186 The 
benefit of the public trust doctrine in the English context is that, as noted above and in Chapter 1, 
government, judicial and public recognition of the public interest in fisheries is growing, thus 
adoption of the doctrine could be framed as ‘incremental’ rather than ‘wide-ranging’ change. 
Indeed, the suggestion implicit in the debate in the House of Lords regarding whether to accept an 
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amendment to the Fisheries Bill proclaiming ownership of the fishery by the Crown on behalf of the 
public is that as this public trust is already in existence, there is no need to confirm it in legislation.187 
Thus embracing the public trust of the public fishery can be framed as less of a change in the law and 
more of a recognition of the pre-existing, but thus far not recognised, state of the law.  
This is not to suggest that embracing the public trust interpretation of the public fishery would not 
result in change in how fisheries are managed. As has been discussed in Chapter 3, the public trust 
requires decision makers to consider the wider public benefit when managing fisheries, bringing a 
wider spread of interests into the decision making process. This need for management decisions to 
be in the public benefit also aligns with the case law discussed in the previous section in the context 
of ‘higher’ trusts. Public benefit is a concept that is used in charities law to ensure that charitable 
status is given only to organisations whose operations are for the public benefit.188 The concept 
provides that to be for public benefit, a purpose must benefit the public in general, or a sufficient 
section of the public, and not give rise to more than incidental personal benefit.189 Analogising to the 
fisheries context, quota provides a pertinent example of the difference a public trust could make. 
The allocation of fishing opportunities through the quota system currently in place is difficult to 
frame as for the public benefit. As Appleby et al state, “the gifting of quota and other fishing rights 
to individual fishing businesses who just happened to be in the right place at the right time [with n]o 
safeguards… put in place to ensure that proper value was paid in recompense to the public for the 
loss of their right” is difficult to reconcile with the public interest in the fishery and arguably is not 
for the public benefit. 190 
The public trust as a concept is also adaptable enough to reflect changing priorities as understanding 
of the sea and its ecosystems develops.191 In Marks v Whitney, the Supreme Court of California 
described the inherent flexibility of the public trust doctrine and its ability to “encompass changing 
public needs.”192 Thus while the principles of the public trust are fixed, the way in which these 
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principles are interpreted and implemented can develop over time.193 This means that in order to 
pursue ecosystem-based fisheries management (as discussed in Chapter 1), the public trust 
approach is ideally suited to the task of managing of an environment that is not fully understood and 
in which large data gaps currently exist in our knowledge of how the ecosystems within it function. 
As these data gaps are slowly reduced, management approaches can develop in line with the 
growing knowledge and understanding of marine ecosystems, all the while within the overarching 
framework of the public trust and its focus on the need for management decisions to be for the 
overall public benefit.  
4.7  Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the argument for a public trust interpretation of the English public fishery. It 
has shown that the current status of the fishery can coherently be understood as a proprietary right 
and therefore that ownership of this proprietary right cannot be vested either in the public as a 
whole or in no one (res nullius), which leads to the conclusion that the public fishery must vest in the 
Crown on behalf of the public, more specifically in the Crown Estate Commissioners as part of the 
Crown Estate. The nature of this public trust and the duties it involves has been considered, 
concluding that while the trusteeship duties may not be legally enforceable in a court as a result of 
the decision in Tito v Waddell (No. 2), the public trust interpretation still brings a number of benefits 
to the management of the public fishery; in particular the flexibility of the doctrine and its 
overarching focus on public benefit. The following two chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) will now present 
the case study carried out in order to elucidate how the public fishery is understood by those 
involved in fishing. Chapter 7 will then bring that case study together with the conclusions drawn 
from this present chapter with the aim of illustrating the legal geography of the public fishery.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CASE STUDY 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 concluded that a coherent legal argument can be made that the public right to fish is held 
by the Crown on trust for the benefit of the public as a whole. Indeed, that this is the only legal 
argument that can make sense of the public fishery and that can unite both the views of government 
and precedent dealing with the public right to fish. That chapter also examined the benefits that 
applying a public trust interpretation could have for the management of the public fishery. However, 
the nature of the present research and its epistemological commitments, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
suggest that a full understanding of the public right to fish cannot be gained from a study of the 
texts alone. The social context of the public right to fish and how it is interpreted by those that use 
or manage it is important in understanding the operation of the right. Objective 2 of this thesis 
therefore involves a case study designed to elicit such interpretations.  
At this point in the thesis, the focus of the research thus pivots to practice; by taking the doctrinal 
analysis into the case study it is possible to determine whether practice is aligned with the law and 
where the gaps may be between the doctrine and the everyday performance of the law. Identifying 
these points of convergence and divergence enables the full picture of the public right to fish and its 
role in the prosecution of fisheries to be understood. Furthermore, the “broader set of actors and 
knowledge systems” called upon by the case study is able to respond to the requirement of 
ecosystem level approaches (such as EBFM) to move away from the “top-down science-driven 
fisheries management model” and towards management that is more inclusive of the knowledge 
claims of a variety of actors.1 Indeed, in discussing the use of ‘non-scientific’ knowledge in fisheries 
management, Pálsson2 suggests that fishers can sometimes have a better understanding of 
ecosystems than fisheries scientists, because of the former’s understanding “of the nuances and 
non-linear reactions within local ecosystems.”3 In this research, the knowledge of fishers, of those in 
positions ancillary to fishing activities, of managers and of conservationists is drawn upon and 
synthesised in order to determine how the public right to fish is used and understood by this range 
of actors, and thus illuminate the role of the public fishery, both actual and potential, in the 
management of coastal fishing.  
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and negotiating user rights in the Devon inshore brown crab fishery, UK’ (2016) 65 Marine Policy 48, 48-49 
2 Gísli Pálsson, ‘Learning by Fishing: Practical Science and Scientific Practice’ in Fikret Berkes, Carl Folke and 
Johan Colding (Eds.), Linking Social and Ecological Systems: Management practices and social mechanisms for 
building resilience (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 92 
3 Liza Griffin, ‘Scales of knowledge: North sea fisheries governance, the local fisherman and the European 
scientist’ (2009) 18(4) Environmental Politics 557, 560 
127 
 
The methodological considerations of the case study and the method of analysis of the data have 
been discussed in Chapter 2. The present chapter now builds upon those discussions by presenting 
the detailed process both of setting up and running the case study. In addition, this Chapter presents 
the detail of the approach used in conducting the reflexive thematic analysis process applied to the 
case study data, as such, it provides an audit trail, which (as discussed in Chapter 2) is one of the 
approaches employed to establish the validity and rigour of the research. However, first, the chapter 
starts by considering the background of literature relevant to the case study and the contribution 
that the case study can make to this literature.  
5.2 Literature Review 
Prior to the case study commencing, a literature review was conducted with regard to the question 
of the management of coastal fisheries and the impact of the public right to fish, the results of which 
have been updated and are presented below. The purpose of this literature review was to establish 
the need for the present case study. The literature review did not consider the literature relevant to 
the individual case study questions.4 As the aim of the case study was to find out what people 
involved in fishing thought of the public right to fish and its place in fisheries management, the range 
of possible views was unknown at the outset. Instead, a literature review was carried out after the 
analytic process and during the write up of the analytic outputs in Chapter 6. This literature is drawn 
upon throughout the analysis to give context to the analytic findings.  As well as being the only 
practical option, the benefit of this approach is that it can also “[help] to reduce the impact of 
researcher preconceptions.”5 
5.2.1 The Public Right to Fish 
As with the relative lack of attention given to the legal nature of the public right to fish in the 
literature,6 the practical effects of the public right to fish on fisheries management have been 
similarly neglected. There is passing suggestion that the public right to fish may have a detrimental 
impact upon fisheries management, with Phillipson and Symes reporting that in relation to proposals 
for Regulating Orders in Scotland,7 only two have been confirmed since the orders were introduced, 
the rest “faltering due to local opposition to what some saw as an appropriation of common use 
 
4 These questions are set out at section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 
5 Conal Hamill and Helen Sinclair, ‘Bracketing-practical considerations in Husserlian phenomenological 
research’ (2010) 17 Nurse Researcher 16  in Suzy Anderson and Victoria Clarke, ‘Disgust, shame and the 
psychosocial impact of skin picking: evidence from an online support forum’ (2019) 24(13) Journal of Health 
Psychology 1773, 1777 
6 See section 3.5 of Chapter 3 
7 A Regulating Order is granted under the Sea Fisheries (Shellfish) Act 1967 and restricts the public right to fish 




rights”.8 Although Noble’s study of the failure of the proposed Orkney Regulating Order does not 
identify any issues with common use rights.9 
Aside from this brief mention, the practical effects (if any) of the public right to fish on the 
management of fish stocks in England and Wales, or in other common law jurisdictions, are hard to 
find in the literature. Clark et al. studied the effect of policy on the fisheries management work 
carried out by IFCAs (specifically within European Marine Sites), conducting a desk-based study of 
the development of a ‘revised approach’ to commercial fishing within European Marine Sites.10 The 
‘revised approach’ is an important development in the management of fisheries that seeks to bring 
that management into line with the requirements of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive11 and 
therefore arguably give fisheries management an ecosystem focus. However, it is important to 
consider all the drivers behind fisheries management and as such the impact of the legal right of the 
UK public to fish in UK waters needs similar consideration.   
5.2.2 The Management of Coastal Fisheries 
Fisheries management success or failure is often measured in terms of biological factors, such as the 
biomass of a particular species, fishing mortality or population status. In a systematic review of 390 
studies of fisheries management tools, Selig et al reported that such biological metrics were the 
“only indicators consistently reported across the studies.”12 However, the social dimensions of 
fisheries are increasingly recognised.13 Symes and Phillipson have argued for more commitment to 
social objectives in fisheries management, suggesting that such objectives are often seen as 
“irritating consequences of policy” rather than being recognised for their “active influence in shaping 
fisheries policy.”14 Similarly, Barclay et al stress that effective fisheries management requires 
 
8 Jeremy Phillipson and David Symes, ‘Recontextualising inshore fisheries: The changing face of British inshore 
fisheries management (2010) 34 Marine Policy 1207, 1211 
9 Tim Noble, ‘Cooperating in fisheries management: trials and tribulations in Scotland’ (2003) 27 Marine Policy 
433 
10 Robert Clark, John Humphreys, Jean-Luc Solandt and Catherine Weller, ‘Dialectics of Nature: The Emergence 
of Policy on the Management of Commercial Fisheries in English European Marine Sites’ (2017) 78 Marine 
Policy 11 
11 Council Directive 92/43/EEC 
12 Elizabeth R Selig, Kristin M Kleisner, Oren Ahoobim, Freddy Arocha, Annabelle Cruz-Trinidad, Rod Fujita, 
Mafaniso Hara, Laure Katz, Patrick McConney, Blake D Ratner, Lina M Saavedra-Diaz, Anne-Maree Schwarz, 
Djiga Thaio, Elin Torell, Sebastian Troëng and Sebastian Villasante, ‘A typology of fisheries management tools: 
Using experience to catalyse greater success’ (2017) 18 Fish and Fisheries 543, 546 
13 Elizabeth Fulton, Anthony D M Smith, David C Smith and Ingrid E van Putten, ‘Human behaviour: the key 
source of uncertainty in fisheries management’ (2011) 12 Fish and Fisheries 2 
14 David Symes and Jeremy Phillipson, ‘Whatever became of social objectives in fisheries policy?’ (2009) 95 
Fisheries Research 1, 3 
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engagement with qualitative social research.15 Indeed, ecosystem based approaches to fisheries 
management necessitate consideration of social contexts and objectives in order not only to 
facilitate understanding of the full spectrum of goods and services that marine ecosystems provide 
to coastal communities and to the public as a whole,16 but also to facilitate understanding of the 
structuration of the fisheries being studied.   
Such social dimensions are numerous; not only are “fisheries are about relationships between fishers 
and nature,” but also between fishers and others that use and enjoy the marine environment and 
between fishers and the public as a whole. 17 It is therefore important to examine and understand 
these multiple relationships in order to understand how fisheries and their management does and 
should work. As Fabinyi et al assert, fishers’ relationships with others often impact upon their 
relationship with nature and thus these relationships are important to understand when targeting a 
sustainable fishery.18  
In the context of IFCAs in particular, since their inception by the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 
a small number of studies have been carried out that consider (to a greater or lesser extent) social 
issues and objectives in connection with management. Lowther and Rodwell19 (together with Gall)20 
collaborated with the Devon and Severn IFCA to repeat a survey of its members at three instances 
since the inception of the IFCAs in order to understand the perceptions of IFCA members in regard to 
their roles within the IFCA and the role of the IFCA itself. This included a consideration of how 
effective the members considered the IFCA to be in carrying out its stated roles. The studies 
identified a number of perceived obstacles to successful ecosystem-based fisheries management, 
including “conflicting views relating to a series of polarities: conservation versus economic factors; 
fish stock management versus economic issues.”21 The public right to fish has relevance in each of 
 
15 Kate Barclay, Michelle Voyer, Nicole Mazur, Anne Maree Payne, Senoveva Mauli, Jeff Kinch, Michael Fabinyi 
and Graeme Smith, ‘The importance of qualitative social research for effective fisheries management’ (2017) 
186 Fisheries Research 426 
16 Julie Urquhart and Tim Acott, ‘A Sense of Place in Cultural Ecosystem Services: The Case of Cornish Fishing 
Communities’ (2014) 27(1) Society & Natural Resources 3, 4 
17 Maarten Bavinck, Svein Jentoft and Joeri Scholtens, ‘Fisheries as social struggle: A reinvigorated social 
science research agenda’ (2018) 94 Marine Policy 46, 46 
18 Michael Fabinyi, Simon Foale and Martha Macintyre, ‘Managing inequality or managing stocks? An 
ethnographic perspective on the governance of small-scale fisheries’ (2015) 16 Fish and Fisheries 471 
19 Jason Lowther and Lynda D Rodwell, ‘IFCAs: Stakeholder Perceptions of Roles, and Legal Impacts’ (2013) 15 
Environmental Law Review 11 and Lynda Rodwell, Jason Lowther, Charlotte Hunter and Stephen Mangi, 
‘Fisheries co-management in a new era of marine policy in the UK: a preliminary assessment of stakeholder 
perceptions’ (2014) 45 Marine Policy 279 
20 Sarah Gall, ‘Evaluating the Impacts of Integrating Fisheries and Conservation Management’ (PhD Thesis, 
Plymouth University, 2016) 
21 Lowther & Rodwell (n19), 18 
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these conflicts and the case study will address the role the right is playing, together with the role it 
has the potential to play, in smoothing these conflicts.  
As a consequence of devolution, the 2009 Act only introduced IFCAs in England, with Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland being left to choose their own approach to inshore fisheries 
management. Pieraccini and Cardwell compared the structure, formation and membership of IFCAs 
with their Scottish counterparts (Inshore Fisheries Groups) using interviews with fishermen, 
regulators, environmental NGOs and statutory nature conservation bodies to understand how the 
relevant IFCAs and IFGs were working.22 Although this study focused mainly on the principles of co-
management and the ability of co-management to further sustainable fisheries management, it also 
highlighted the underlying tensions within the IFCAs between the interests of commercial fishing 
and conservation,23 which provides useful background when considering the public right to fish and 
its impact on fisheries management. Similarly, Terry et al studied the efficacy of Welsh coastal 
fisheries management in contrast to the English IFCAs, using semi-structured interviews with key 
informants from a range of different sectors and interests involved in fishing and marine 
conservation to understand how Wales’ choice to manage inshore fisheries centrally (as opposed to 
using a model similar to that for IFCAs) was impacting on fisheries management.24  
Outside of the IFCA model, a number of studies looking at the socioeconomic context of fisheries 
and fisheries management in the UK and surrounding areas exist. Reed et al studied inshore fishing 
in England, finding that such fishing was “highly valued not only for its importance in supporting 
livelihoods, but also for the creation of place identities tied to fishing as an occupation and the 
ecological opportunities for fishing.”25 While Grilli et al focused on recreational fishing in Ireland, 
investigating the perspectives on conservation measures held by recreational sea bass anglers.26 
Although neither of these studies considered the public right to fish, its impact was in the 
background of the study by Weir and Kerr, which focused on Scotland and considered the 
perceptions and attitudes held by stakeholders involved in marine planning towards marine 
 
22 Margherita Pieraccini and Emma Cardwell, ‘Towards deliberative and pragmatic co-management: a 
comparison between inshore fisheries authorities in England and Scotland’ (2016) 25:4 Environmental Politics 
729 
23 Ibid.,  741 
24 Alan Terry, Kerry Lewis and Blaise Bullimore, ‘The impact of the Marine and Coastal Access Act (2009) on 
Welsh inshore fisheries and marine management’ (2019) 99 Marine Policy 359 
25 Matt Reed, Paul Coutney, Julie Urquhart and Natalie Ross, ‘Beyond fish as commodities: Understanding the 
socio-cultural role of inshore fisheries in England’ (2013) 37 Marine Policy 62, 62 
26 Gianluca Grilli, John Curtis, Stephen Hynes and Paul O’Reilly, ‘Anglers’ views on stock conservation: Sea bass 
angling in Ireland’ (2019) 99 Marine Policy 34 
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protected areas and the privatisation of marine space.27 Public rights in the sea and the concept of 
the sea and its resources being a public resource were both held to be important by a significant 
number of the participants. Furthermore, in a study of Scottish fishers’ perspectives on Brexit, 
Agnisola et al reported strong feelings relating to fishers’ rights to fish and EU fisheries 
management.28 As well as relevant for their consideration of public rights and interests in relation to 
fishing, these studies also illustrate the ways in which interpretations and practice can align with or 
diverge from the position of the black letter law. For example the study of Weir and Kerr can be used 
to establish alignment between fishers’ perspectives on the resources of the sea as fundamentally 
public and the doctrine of the public trust of the fishery. Similarly, in highlighting the importance of 
place identities in relation to English inshore fishing, Reed et al’s study identifies a divergence 
between the perceptions of fishers and the doctrine of the public right to fish, the latter of which 
applies ‘ageographically’ to the entirety of the public and does not privilege fishers from coastal 
communities reliant upon the local resource.  
The public right to fish or similar public customary use rights exist in countries around the world, 
making studies of such countries of interest in relation to the English public right to fish. Kelly et al 
studied the social licence for marine protected areas in Australia, skirting round the issue of the 
public right to fish, although recognising that “the marine environment is a public resource” and also 
that public participation in decisions made about that public resource is necessary.29 Similarly, Kelty 
and Kelty, in their study of the Bristol Bay salmon fishery in Alaska (USA), reported significant 
support for wider public involvement in natural resource management, with only 6% of respondents 
agreeing that “the health of the salmon fishery is only important if you fish.”30 As well as greater 
public involvement, a number of studies discuss the status of rights to fish. For example, Bennett 
and Dearden studied local perceptions of marine protected areas and other conservation initiatives 
in Thailand, noting that successful conservation initiatives will always require “livelihood and rights 
trade-offs.”31 In addition, Sylvan identifies, in the context of coral reefs around the world, that 
“increasingly, governments will be forced to choose between protecting their publics' right to use 
 
27 Stephanie Weir and Sandy Kerr, ‘Property, power and planning: Attitudes to spatial enclosure in Scottish 
seas’ (2019) 108 Marine Policy 103633 
28 Giulia Agnisola, Stephanie Weir and Kate Johnson, ‘The voices that matter: A narrative approach to 
understanding Scottish Fishers’ perspectives of Brexit’ (2019) 110 Marine Policy 103563 
29 Rachel Kelly, Aysha Fleming, Mary Mackay, Carolina García, Gretta T Peci, ‘Social Licence for marine 
protected areas’ (2020) 115 Marine Policy 103782, 1 
30 Ryan Kelty and Ruth Kelty, ‘Human Dimensions of a Fishery at a Crossroads: Resource Valuation, Identity, 
and Way of Life in a Seasonal Fishing Community’ (2011) 24(4) Society & Natural Resources 334, 339 
31 Nathan James Bennett and Philip Dearden, ‘Why local people do not support conservation: Community 
perceptions of marine protected area livelihood impacts, governance and management in Thailand’ (2014) 44 
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marine resources today against its right to have them there to use tomorrow,”32 suggesting that 
application of the public trust doctrine could be one way to facilitate these choices.  
As this review of the literature shows, there is a need to understand how the public right to fish fits 
into both the legal and social context of fisheries management. A number of the studies referred to 
touch upon the right to fish, or skirt around the edge of it, but do not consider the impact it might be 
having upon fishers and managers’ perceptions and behaviour. This case study is designed to fill that 
gap and therefore provide a view to complement the social understandings elicited in respect of 
fisheries management thus far.  
5.3 Case Study Data Collection: Interviews 
The cornerstone of the case study data was the information provided by the 26 interviewees during 
semi-structured interviews conducted during the period from May to October 2018. This section 
describes the process of selecting these participants, preparing for and conducting the interviews 
and producing transcripts from those interviews to be added to the case study data-set.  
5.3.1 Manner of Interviews 
It was originally envisaged that all of the case study interviews would be carried out face to face. 
However, it became apparent during the process that this would not be possible. Several 
participants fulfilled the eligibility criteria (as discussed in section 5.3.3) and yet lived outside of the 
Devon and Severn IFCA district and so were too geographically distant for the researcher to 
practically meet with face to face. Others had work commitments that meant only evening meetings 
were an option and again, issues of practicality determined that these interviews should take place 
over the telephone.  
In total 7 of the 26 interviews were carried out over the telephone. In qualitative research face to 
face interviews can be viewed as the “gold standard” of interviewing and telephone interviews as an 
inferior alternative.33 The favouring of face to face interviews over telephone interviews is generally 
reasoned as a requirement for the visual cues and other non-verbal data that only face to face 
interviewing are able to provide.34 However, it is unclear whether the lack of non-verbal data is 
actually a problem for researchers.35 Indeed, Novick suggests that where data analysis relies heavily 
 
32 J C Sylvan, ‘How to protect a coral reef: The public trust doctrine and the Law of the Sea’ (2006) 7 
Sustainable Development Law and Policy 32, 35 
33 Gina Novick, ‘ Telephone Interviews in Qualitative Research’ (2008) 31 Research in Nursing & Health 391, 
394 and 397 
34 Herbert J Rubin and Irene S Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The art of hearing data (3rd Edition, SAGE, 2012), 
177-178 
35 Novick (n33), 395 
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on transcripts (as opposed to field notes), which the current project does, the lack of non-verbal 
data is less important.36 Certainly the researcher found that for the current project there was very 
little additional non-verbal material noted in the face to face interviews as compared to the 
telephone interviews.  
5.3.2 Target Number of Interviews 
At the outset of the case study, the target had been for 15 – 20 interviews with eligible 
participants.37 However, as the number of interviews arranged or carried out headed towards 20, it 
became apparent that there were still many people with different interests who were willing to talk 
to the researcher and who would broaden the range of participants. For example, one participant 
suggested an ‘aquaculturist’ who fishes (or perhaps more accurately, farms) shellfish in tidal waters, 
this was a sector of the fishing industry that was not at that point represented in the case study 
participants. Other ‘extra’ participants were approached without recommendation where the 
researcher had identified a need to balance the participation already achieved. For example, as the 
interviews progressed, the uptake of commercial fishermen significantly increased and so the 
researcher identified appropriate recreational fishing target participants to approach in order to try 
and achieve some balance in the participants. Even as the interviews drew to a close, participants 
were still suggesting possible further people for the researcher to talk to. With appropriate time and 
resources, the number of interviews carried out could easily have been at least 30. However, the 26 
interviews provide an acceptable range of participants and for reasons of time, further interviews 
could not be added to the process.  
5.3.3 Eligibility Criteria 
The only attribute required for participation in the interviews was an involvement with fisheries in 
the Devon and Severn IFCA district. This involvement could be through direct commercial activity or 
other commercial interest, recreational activity, management or conservation. The decision was 
taken not to limit participation by requiring a certain number of years’ experience in the relevant 
involvement. This was partly for the practical reason that it would have been difficult to set the 
relevant number in any way that was not arbitrary and risked excluding possible valuable 
participants. For example, 10 years’ experience as a recreational fisherman who goes fishing once a 
month in the summer, is not easily comparable to, say, 3 years’ experience as a full time member of 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 Identified as an appropriate sample size for the method of analysis used, when interviews are part of a 
larger project, in Gareth Terry, Nikki Hayfield, Victoria Clarke and Virginia Braun, ‘Thematic Analysis’ in Carla 
Willig and Wendy Stainton Rogers (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology (2nd 
Edition, SAGE, 2017), 24 
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staff at the IFCA dealing with fisheries management issues on a daily basis. However, more 
importantly, a certain quantity of experience was deemed to be unnecessary as pre-supposing that 
only those with a particular level of ‘experience’ (as must be defined by the researcher) have licence 
to hold opinions about the practice and management of fisheries. Indeed, the public nature of the 
fishery resource means that any views and experiences of the public right to fish by anyone willing to 
discuss the key themes of the case study could have been taken into consideration.  
5.3.4 Selection of Candidates 
Despite the lack of set eligibility criteria, the method of selection of participants and the self-
selecting nature of participants in many qualitative research projects meant that only those with a 
certain level of experience or understanding of fisheries were likely to be willing to participate in the 
case study. As an initial step, it was identified that potential participants would come from the 
following categories:  
(i) IFCA staff members 
(ii) IFCA Committee Members – Each IFCA is run by a Committee made up of the following:  
a. At least one representative from each of the funding local authorities.  
b. One representative from each of the three statutory bodies; Natural England, the 
Environment Agency and the Marine Management Organisation (“MMO”).  
c. A set number of members appointed by the MMO and representing commercial 
fishing, recreational fishing or conservation.  
(iii) The commercial fishing sector – this includes commercial fishermen, as well as people 
involved in commercial fishing in other capacities, such as leaders of producer 
organisations or fishermen’s associations and fish merchants  
(iv) Recreational fishers. 
(v) Staff or members of conservation organisations active in fisheries within the Devon and 
Severn IFCA district.  
 
With regard to the IFCA staff, discussion with the acting Chief Officer of the IFCA identified a number 
of suitable staff members to approach. As for the IFCA Committee members, an initial approach to 
recruit participants was made at the IFCA Committee quarterly meeting in the spring of 2018. 
Together with targeted emails to several of the MMO appointed members of the Committee 
identified by the Vice-Chair as likely to be willing to take part, a total of 10 members of the 
Committee (out of a possible 28) were recruited as participants. These included two of the three 
statutory body representatives on the Committee. An approach was made to the third statutory 
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representative (the representative for the MMO), but this was declined on the basis that it is MMO 
policy that staff do not take part in such research requests. Instead, a written response from the 
MMO press office was offered if the researcher were to submit her questions in writing. This 
opportunity was not taken up as it was felt that press-office approved answers to such questions 
would be unlikely to add anything meaningful to the data. 
With regard to fishing interests, it was judged by the IFCA that a ‘cold,’ blanket approach (e.g. a 
request in the IFCA newsletter for participants or a posting on the IFCA Facebook page) would be 
unlikely to result in any participants. In addition, data protection requirements meant that the IFCA 
could not supply the researcher with the details of fishermen or others in order to approach directly. 
As a result, a different strategy was adopted:  
(i) Initially, the first step taken was for the IFCA staff to approach fishermen by email, on 
behalf of the researcher, that they thought might be willing to participate. A connection 
was also made with the coordinator of the North Devon Marine Pioneer project. This is a 
project run by the MMO and Devon County Council in North Devon, which has links with 
the majority of the commercial fishermen active in North Devon, as well as some 
recreational fishermen. Again, for data protection reasons, the project coordinator was 
unable to provide the researcher with any contact details for individual fishermen, 
however a group email to the project contact list was sent on behalf of the researcher.  
(ii) Neither of the email approaches on behalf of the researcher noted above directly 
recruited any participants and so the focus was shifted to direct contact with potential 
participants. The first step in this focus was to contact a number of members of the 
public that had spoken at recent IFCA Committee quarterly meetings. Several of these 
agreed to participate. 
(iii) Direct approaches by email and telephone were also made to several of the producer 
organisations for recommendations of fishermen within their memberships that might 
be willing to participate, as well as for representatives from within the organisations that 
would be willing to participate.  
(iv) Having initiated contact with various participants, a snowball approach was then 
undertaken to identify possible further participants. This is discussed further below.  
(v) Finally, some ‘cold’ approaches were made to commercial and recreational fishermen 
with publicly identifiable contact details, using databases such as that on the Boat 
Stories website,38 a project funded by North Devon Fisheries Local Action Group and the 
 
38  <http://www.boatstories.co.uk/> accessed 11 October 2018 
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European Fisheries Fund. These approaches were made towards the end of the 
recruitment process and targeted at fishermen that would add to the range of sectors 
and geographical locations already taking part.  
5.3.5 Snowball Sampling 
Snowball sampling is used in this context to refer to the recruitment of new participants through 
recommendations by existing participants. This technique was used particularly to access 
commercial and recreational fishers after ‘blanket’ approaches, as described above, proved not to be 
fruitful. Atkinson and Flint distinguish two uses of the term ‘snowball sampling’; the first being as a 
“method of contact in a practical sense,” and the second as a more formal and statistically focused 
method of sampling.39 In this project snowball sampling was used in the former sense; wider, more 
general approaches to recruit participants had proved unsuccessful and so a different way of 
contacting potential participants was needed. Much of the literature on snowball sampling deals 
with the use of the technique in the latter sense, when concerns of the representativeness of the 
sample arise.40 While this project makes no claim of any particular representativeness of the sample 
of interviewees to a larger population, issues of accuracy and potential bias in the sample of 
interviewees recruited still need to be addressed.   
One of the identified risks of using a snowball sampling technique to recruit participants is that using 
only a few long referral chains can result in a sample of reduced variety as the participants are part 
of the same social network and therefore are more likely to share similar characteristics, which could 
introduce an element of bias into the research.41 However, the technique was not used in this way 
for the current project, with many short and discrete referral chains used instead, which helped to 
reduce the potential for bias in the sample obtained.  
5.3.6 Representation 
The 26 participants can be broken down as shown in Table 1. As noted above this study is not 
intended to be a representative sample such that generalisations can be made to a larger 
population. The purpose of the study is to consider the perceptions of a range of interested people 
as well as the narratives that their perceptions might coalesce around. It is therefore not necessary 
to establish that the sample of 26 participants is an accurate sample of a larger population, however, 
 
39 Rowland Atkinson and John Flint, ‘Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research 
Strategies’ (2001) 33(1) Social Research Update 1 
40 Kath Browne, ‘Snowball sampling: using social networks to research non‐heterosexual women’ (2005) 8(1) 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 47, 51 
41 Atkinson and Flint (n39) and Patrick Biernacki and Dan Waldorf ‘Snowball Sampling: Problems and 
Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling’ (1981) 10(2) Sociological Methods & Research 141 
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Tables 1 to 3 are designed to illustrate the variety within the sample and to identify any biases that 
may exist within the sample.  
Category Number of Participants 
IFCA Staff/Environmental Management 5 
Commercial Fishermen 8 
Other Commercial Interest 4 




Table 1: Categories of Participants 
5.3.6.1 Geographical Range 
 
Location Number of Participants 
Whole District 10 
North Devon 7 




Table 2: Location of Participants 
Table 2 shows the geographical spread of the participants within the Devon and Severn IFCA 
district.42 IFCA staff and the statutory representatives on the IFCA Committee have been categorised 
as covering the whole district, as have members of the Committee that have no particular affiliation 
to any particular area of the district. Fishermen (both commercial and recreational) have been 
allocated to their most active area, as have those with other commercial interests. Finally, those not 
involved with management or fishing activity, such as certain conservation participants, have been 
allocated to the area of the projects in which they have been active.  
It can be seen from Table 2 that the spread of participants between the north and south parts of 
Devon is pretty even, as well as those that cover the whole of the district. Somerset and 
Gloucestershire were both always likely to provide a significantly smaller number of participants. 
This is likely the result of two factors:  
(i) The nature of the coastline in and waters adjacent to Somerset and Gloucestershire 
(being part of the Seven Estuary) means that commercial fishing is not common from 
these counties. Indeed, there is very little commercial fishing in the Severn Estuary,43 
 
42 The geographical boundaries of the district are shown on the map at Appendix 1.  
43 Food Certification International Limited, Severn Estuary: Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority: Final 
Report (Report commissioned by DEFRA; MF0911), 6-9 
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which makes the pool of potential participants much smaller. It should also be noted 
that the extent of the coastline in Somerset and Gloucestershire is smaller than that in 
Devon.  
(ii) The organisational structure of the Devon and Severn IFCA, being a successor body to 
the Devon Sea Fisheries Committee, means that the ‘Severn’ part of the IFCA’s district is 
less represented on the IFCA Committee, where several members have been involved in 
fisheries management since the days of the old Sea Fisheries Committees and so 
necessarily come from Devon as opposed to the Severn.  
5.3.6.2 Fishing Activity 
The commercial fishermen interviewed represented a range of fishing activities, as shown in Table 3.  
Type of Commercial Fishing Activity Number of Participants44 
Potting - large scale (requiring assistants) 2 
Potting - small scale (sole fisherman) 4 
Netting 3 
Rod and line fishing 2 
Hand gathering 1 
Trawling 1 
Table 3: Types of Commercial Fishing Activity 
Given the focus of the research on coastal waters, the researcher always expected potting to be 
heavily represented within the interview participants. Potting is by far the most common catching 
method used for all fish and shellfish landed into all North Devon ports (both by weight and by 
value), while it is the second most common for the ports in South Devon.45 It is also a method of 
fishing that tends to involve daily sailing and returning to port (unlike, for example, trawling activity, 
which often involves boats being at sea for a number of days at a time), meaning that fishermen are 
more likely to be available for an interview.  
However, it was important to involve the widest range of voices in the research, including within the 
commercial fishing sector. To this end, particular effort was made to ensure that at least one 
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<https://www.devonandsevernifca.gov.uk/Resource-library/F-Byelaw-review-work-and-Impact-Assessments> 
accessed 21 August 2020 
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5.3.7 Preparation for the Interviews 
A semi-structured interview requires a topic map detailed enough to guide the conversation during 
each interview and ensure that key issues are covered, but flexible enough to be able to react to the 
interviewee and the topics that they feel are important. The initial development of this topic guide 
was carried out at the research ethics (“Institutional Review”) approval stage, it was then 
significantly developed by testing it in two pilot interviews. After the pilot interviews the topic guide 
continued to be developed as the research interviews progressed.  
The two pilot interviews were carried out first with a member of the supervisory team and then with 
a fellow PhD student who is also an MMO appointed member of the Devon and Severn IFCA 
Committee. Although technically eligible to participate in the research, the closeness to the research 
and the researcher was judged to introduce an unacceptable risk of bias and so disqualified her from 
official participation.  
As well as invaluable practice at the technique of interviewing, the pilot interviews were intended to 
aid in the development of the interview topic guide. Following the first pilot interview it became 
apparent that the concept of the public fishery required further ‘unpacking’ in order to be able to 
get to interviewees’ views and experiences. Instead of straight questions about what an interviewee 
thinks the effect of the existence of the public right to fish is on fishing activity, the topic guide was 
elaborated to look at the attributes of the public right, rather than the right itself. It was judged that 
if the questions were too legal/academic then a lot of the potential interviewees might not know 
how to answer them, even though they would be highly likely to have interesting views and 
experiences of the different attributes that make up the public right to fish.  
The topic guide was therefore extended and elaborated to cover issues like who should be able to 
fish in British waters, how they should be able to fish, whether interviewees agreed with the 
approach of the Devon and Severn IFCA of moving towards a permit-based system for all fishing 
activities. After the second pilot interview, a further section was added to the interview topic guide 
to enable discussion of the outcome of the legal research in Chapter 4 and what that might mean for 
the public fishery. In addition, separate versions of the topic guide were created for fishers, IFCA 
staff, IFCA Committee members and conservation representatives; each guide followed the same 
basic structure, but with small tweaks to reflect the position of the group of participants the guide 
was to be used for. 46 
 
46 A copy of the finalised topic guide for IFCA Committee members is included at Appendix 2 
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This topic guide was not provided to participants in advance of the interview (nor at the interview 
itself, unless they specifically asked to view it). The purpose of this approach was to try and ensure 
an authentic response by participants to interview questions, rather than a pre-prepared response. 
The importance of this approach became apparent after an interview at an early stage of the process 
with a member of the IFCA Committee, which started with the participant placing a sheaf of papers 
on the table and explaining the research they had conducted in order to prepare for the interview. 
Unfortunately, this led to a more stilted interview than others, with the participant at times seeming 
overly focused on the relevance of the public right to fish to each question, which the researcher 
interpreted as a desire to ‘say the right thing’. In order to address this issue, for subsequent 
interviews, it was stressed to participants that no preparation was required and that the researcher 
was interested in the participant’s own personal opinions.  
5.3.8 Transcription Process 
The intended scheme of analysis steers the decision as to how to transcribe any audio recordings. 
For this case study, while the researcher was interested in how participants talked about the various 
issues and concepts discussed, the transcripts were not going to be analysed using discourse analysis 
techniques. It was therefore judged that verbatim transcripts, including all ‘umms’, ‘ahhs’ and false 
starts at sentences was not needed. Neither was recording of the vast majority of non-verbal cues by 
the participants (such as facial expressions and other gestures).  
Nonetheless, the transcripts, produced using a simple manual transcription process all done 
personally by the researcher, kept relatively faithfully to the audio recordings. As noted, ‘umms’, 
‘ahhs’ and false starts at a sentence were removed unless they indicated uncertainty in an answer, in 
which case they were transcribed. Uncertainty was gauged both from the tone of voice of the 
participant and the content of their answer. The rest of the verbal material was transcribed 
verbatim, although any comments deemed to reveal too many personal details (e.g. names and ages 
of children) were removed at the end of the transcription process.  
Each participant was also given the chance to approve their transcript and request the removal or 
amendment of any material that they were not happy with. Some participants asked for certain 
parts of their transcripts to be removed where these related to non-relevant matters or personal 
anecdotes.  
5.4 Case Study Data Collection: IFCA Data and Meeting Observations 
As well as the 26 interviews, data made publicly available by the Devon & Severn IFCA and 
observation notes made during attendance at the IFCA Authority’s quarterly meetings also fed into 
the case study data set.  
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5.4.1 Publicly Available IFCA Data 
As explained in Chapter 2, the focus of the case study broadened out to cover more than just the 
Netting Permit Byelaw introduced by the Devon & Severn IFCA. However, the Netting Permit Byelaw 
was still used as the focus for the collation of publicly available data to bring into the analysis. The 
purpose of including data of this category was to enable a consideration of how the IFCA, as an 
organisation, talk about matters pertaining to the public fishery and the case study questions. 
Although three members of staff of the IFCA were interviewed as part of the interview stage of data 
collection, it was felt important to consider the IFCA as an organisation separate from its individual 
staff and to therefore bring its published views and statements into the data set.  
A focal point for the data was deemed necessary in order to narrow down the eligible data to a 
manageable amount and focus on data most likely to deal with issues relating to the case study 
questions. The focal point of the Netting Permit Byelaw was used as it is the first (and at the time of 
analysis, the only) byelaw for which the IFCA have adopted an open policy with regard to the 
information considered in relation to the byelaw making process. This means that a large amount of 
the information considered and produced by the IFCA has been made publicly available on its 
website.  
A schedule of the documents included in the analysis (together with the identifiers given to them in 
the analysis) is set out at Appendix 3.  
5.4.2 Meeting Observations 
The IFCA Committee meets once every quarter to progress the management of the IFCA. Four of 
these meetings were attended and observed by the researcher from the period of June 2018 to 
March 2019. The observation notes from these four meetings were the final addition to the case 
study data set. Aside from the first meeting at which the researcher was asked to briefly introduce 
herself and the research project to those present, the researcher took no active part in the meetings 
attended, sitting in the public area with other public attendees.47 Selective notes were taken based 
upon the researcher’s perception of the relevance to the case study research questions. For 
example, matters of internal finance (such as the need to recruit staff to cover an upcoming 
maternity leave) were not recorded. 
It is important to distinguish the observation carried out for this case study from the recognised 
qualitative method referred to as participant observation. As a method “in which a researcher takes 
part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means 
 
47 All meetings of the D&S IFCA Committee are public meetings and as such members of the public are able to 
attend and observe such meetings.  
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of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture,”48 participant 
observation was not deemed appropriate for the present study. The purpose of observing the public 
meetings was not to take part in them and use those observations to understand how the meetings 
worked. Instead the purpose was both to observe whether and how the IFCA Committee as a whole 
discussed the public right to fish and matters relating to it, and (as several of the participants sat on 
the Committee) to act as a triangulation point for the interview data.   
5.5 Case Study Data Analysis: The Process of Analysis 
As explained at section 2.3.3.1 of Chapter 2, the case study data was analysed using a process of 
thematic analysis based on the six stage approach of Braun and Clarke.49 Although set out in six 
linear steps, the process was more of an iterative journey than a direct process with distinct steps.50 
5.5.1 Familiarisation 
The first stage of this process is for the researcher to familiarise themselves with the data.51 
Thematic analysis as a whole requires an intimate and ever growing knowledge and understanding 
of the research data and so this first stage is only part of the familiarisation process. Indeed, the 
process of familiarisation had already begun with the researcher transcribing each of the interview 
transcripts, typing up handwritten meeting observation notes and reviewing the IFCA documents to 
enable selection into the case study.  
For this stage of the analysis, the data was reproduced in hard copy and reviewed in full by the 
researcher, highlighting passages relevant to the case study research questions and making notes in 
the margins briefly detailing the perceived relevance. During this stage, early analytic thoughts, ideas 
and questions were recorded in the researcher’s case study journal,52 but not on the hard copy data, 
to try to avoid the risk of feeling wed to particular analytic ideas too early in the process of analysis. 
The depositing of thoughts, ideas and questions for later consideration in a journal was used 
throughout the analysis process for the same reason.  
 
48 Kathleen M DeWalt and Billie R DeWalt, Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers (2nd Edition, 
AltaMira Press, 2011), 1 
49 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’ (2006) 3 Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 77 
50 Virginia Braun, Victoria Clarke, Nikki Hayfield and Gareth Terry, ‘Thematic Analysis’ in P Liamputtong (Ed.), 
Hanbook of Research Methods in Health Social Sciences (Springer Nature, Singapore, 2019), 852 
51 Gareth Terry, Nikki Hayfield, Victoria Clarke and Virginia Braun, ‘Thematic Analysis’ in Carla Willig and Wendy 
Stainton Rogers (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology (2nd Edition, SAGE, 2017), 26 
52 Lorelli S Nowell, Jill M Norris, Deborah E White and Nancy J Moules, ‘Thematic Analysis: Striving to Meet the 
Trustworthiness Criteria’ (2017) 16 International Journal of Qualitative Methods 1, 5 
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After the first review, the data was reviewed again and ‘familiarisation notes’ were produced for 
each transcript or document.53 A sample of these notes is included at Appendix 4. The purpose of 
these notes was to further the familiarisation process by requiring the researcher to summarise each 
element of the data. Reviewing the summaries created also enabled the researcher to look across 
the entire dataset and consider possible patterns. Again, notes on any ideas in relation to patterns or 
otherwise were made in the case study journal.  
5.5.2 Coding the Data 
The next stage in the thematic analysis process was to start coding the data. Terry et al describe this 
step as “the systematic and thorough creation of meaningful labels attached to specific segments of 
the dataset… that have meaning relevant to the research question.”54 As well as the technical aspect, 
the process of coding is also a way of reflecting upon, interacting with and thinking about the data 
being studied.55As noted in Chapter 2, the approach to the coding process depends upon whether 
the analysis is aiming to test a theory or is more exploratory.56 This analysis was data driven and so 
the researcher did not start the process with a set of codes to apply to the data. Instead the codes 
were created iteratively as the analysis progressed.  
Working from the hard copy data, the researcher reviewed each piece in detail and applied one or 
more codes to each segment that was interesting or relevant in the context of the case study 
research questions. The code names were selected by the researcher to represent the perceived 
meaning of the segment of data (whether semantic or latent), with some segments being coded with 
multiple codes. It is important for the analysis process that codes are able to stand apart from the 
data and make sense by themselves, rather than only in conjunction with the data.57 For this reason 
single word codes were avoided and the researcher aimed to ensure that each code name was 
sufficient to be understood by someone not familiar with the data. An example of a coded passage 
of data can be seen below at table 4.  
As well as recording each instance of a code on the hard copy data, a schedule of coding was kept to 
record the name of the code, the number of times it was used and the frequency of use within each 
piece of data. An extract of this schedule is included at Appendix 5.  
 
 
53 Terry et al (n51), 26 
54 Ibid., 27 
55 Nowell et al (n52), 5 
56 Braun & Clarke (n49), 88 




Passage Codes applied 
 
“...basically we’re hitting the minefields, we’re 
hitting the bait collecting, we’re hitting the crab 
tiling, we’re hitting the 
recreational/commercial. Again, there’s a huge 
overlap between real recreational, there’ll be 
grey areas, the grey economy around whether 





Harder to manage/regulate recreational fishing.  
 
Recreational fishers acting commercially.  
 
Blurry distinction between recreational and 
commercial fishing.  
Table 4: an example of data coding.  
The initial coding process resulted in a large number of codes. In order to check the accuracy and 
consistency of the process, a preliminary coding sweep was undertaken. This involved reviewing 
each piece of data in detail again to determine (i) whether any codes created subsequent to the 
initial coding of the document could now be identified in this document, and (ii) to check the initial 
coding and ensure that the researcher was happy that all the identified codes fit with the data they 
had been applied to. Following this coding sweep, and after a gap in order to ensure fresh eyes, a 
second coding sweep of all the data was undertaken. Following this stage, each piece of data had 
been reviewed in detail five times. At the end of this stage, a total of 327 separate codes had been 
identified within the data.  
5.5.3 Data Saturation 
The concept of data saturation is increasingly used in qualitative research to evidence validity of 
sample size and thereby the accuracy of the results of the research (although not without its 
critics).58 Data saturation has been described as the point at which the research can conclude that 
there are “…no new data, no new themes, no new coding, and [that the researcher has the] ability to 
replicate the study.”59 However, in qualitative research focusing on individuals’ experiences and 
opinions, this definition would seem antithetical in that with every new participant, there is the 
potential for new points to be raised.60 Indeed, the reflexive approach to thematic analysis adopted 
for this research would seem to be at odds with the traditional concept of saturation; “in qualitative 
approaches that emphasize the partial, multiple, and contextual nature of meaning, and view 
 
58 See Michelle O’Reilly and Nicola Parker, ‘”Unsatisfactory Saturation”: a critical exploration of the notion of 
saturated sample sizes in qualitative research’ (2012) 13(2) Qualitative Research 190 
59 Patricia I Fusch and Lawrence R Ness, ‘Are We There Yet? Data Saturation in Qualitative Research’ (2015) 
20(9) The Qualitative Report 1408, 1409 
60 O’Reilly & Parker (n58), 194 
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knowledge as the actively created product of the interpretative efforts of a particular researcher…, 
combined with the dataset, the concept of saturation stops making much sense.”61 There certainly 
seemed to be no theoretically appropriate way to use saturation as a method of identifying an 
appropriate sample size at the outset of research.  
Instead, the researcher’s preferred interpretation of saturation in the context of a reflexive thematic 
analysis is the point at which further data collection “becomes counter-productive and that the new 
that is discovered does not necessarily add anything to the overall story.”62 This interpretation of 
saturation requires consideration not only of the size of the sample, but also of the adequacy of the 
sample.63 In the present context, for example, a sample consisting only of 10 potting fishermen from 
North Devon would be highly likely to reach saturation in terms of the lack of new codes or themes 
arising from the data.64 However, it could not be considered ‘valid’ in answering the present 
research question as it would be a sample of only a small sub-set of those involved with fishing 
activities within the Devon and Severn area and it would be likely that other codes or themes would 
arise if the sample was widened to other classes of participant. Sample adequacy has been 
considered above at section 5.3.6. Unlike the example just given, the sample of participants was 
drawn from a range of backgrounds and interests that are considered adequate to provide 
“sufficient depth of information” to answer the present research question.65  
Considering the size of the sample, Mason helpfully draws together the minimal literature on 
saturation in qualitative interview research that gives any numerical indication of when saturation 
might be reached, with numbers including Bertaux’s 15 as the smallest acceptable sample for all 
qualitative research,66 and Green and Thorogood’s marker of “20 or so people” after which little new 
comes out of transcripts.67 In order to establish the adequacy of the sample size for the present 
research, once the final coding sweep referred to above had been completed, the 327 separate 
codes identified were allocated a number and were then considered and categorised into codes that 
 
61 Braun et al (n50), 851 
62 Mark Mason, ‘Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative Interviews’ (2010) 11(3) Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, Article 8, page 3 
63 O’Reilly & Parker (n58), 192 
64 See Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce and Laura Johnson, ‘How Many Interviews Are Enough? An Experiment with 
Data Saturation and Variability’ (2006) 18(1) Field Methods 59 in which data saturation in a sample of a 
homogenous group was found to occur within the first twelve interviews 
65 O’Reilly & Parker (n58), 195 
66 Daniel Bertaux (Ed.), Biography and society: The life history approach in the social sciences (Sage, 1981) in 
Mason (n62), page 3 




were substantively new and codes that were a variation of a previous code. An example of this 
process is shown in Table 5 below.  
Code Classification 
111 “PRTF doesn’t apply to commercial fishing” Variation on codes 28 “Public right to fish 
connected with rod and line fishing” and 47 
“Distinction between commercial and 
recreational fishing re PRTF” 
112 “Commercial fishermen should be obliged 
to contribute to costs of management” 
New 
113 “Obligation to conserve fish” Variation on code 3 “collective responsibility for 
fish stock health” 
Table 5: Code allocation 
Once each of the codes had been categorised in this way, it was possible to establish how many 
substantively new codes each interview transcript produced, which is shown in Figure 1. It can be 
seen that participant number 23 (interview number 22) was the last participant to produce any 
significant number of substantively new codes (5), with the last four interviews producing either zero 
substantively new codes or only 2. As has been noted already, there is always the potential for new 
data to reveal something new, but it is considered that the point of “diminishing returns” was 
reached after participant number 23 (PN23).68 
This proposition is supported by considering the analysis of the other data collected within the 
present case study. When the codes identified in relation to those pieces of data are added to the 
picture, it can be seen that the other data produced very few new codes and even fewer 
substantively new codes (see Figure 2 below). This suggests that this data confirms the analysis 
undertaken of the interview transcripts as well as the proposition that data saturation (as 
interpreted for the purposes of this research) was reached around participant number 23.   
 
 




Figure 1: Coding spread within interview transcripts 
 
 
Figure 2: Coding spread within all data 
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5.5.4 Generating Preliminary Themes 
After coding all of the data, the next step was to start to generate initial themes.69 This stage is often 
referred to by researchers as “searching” for themes,70 suggesting themes that are sitting there in 
the data, awaiting discovery by the researcher. However, this notion does not adequately recognise 
the role of the researcher in developing themes. Indeed, Braun et al describe this step as 
“constructing” themes, likening the process to those of “engineering or design.”71 The role of the 
researcher is to construct candidate themes from the analysis and then test these out against the 
data,72 all the while being careful to allow the themes to be led by the data rather than 
superimposing candidate themes upon the data and then “[embarking] on a “hunt and seek” process 
to find supporting evidence of their existence.”73  
5.5.4.1 The definition of “theme” 
It is important to establish the definition of “theme” used in any thematic analysis as the term does 
not have a universal definition between the different approaches to thematic analysis.74 Braun and 
Clarke suggest that a theme “captures something important about the data in relation to the 
research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data 
set.”75 Using this understanding of the concept of “theme”, the importance is to identify patterns of 
meaning within the data (things that “[capture and unify] the nature or basis of the experience into a 
meaningful whole”),76 rather than just features of the data.77 The latter are sometimes described as 
domain summaries78 and are contrasted against themes by Clarke and Braun, who describe themes 
as “the key characters in the story we are telling about the data (rather than the collection pots into 
which we place everything that was said about a particular domain concept).”79 
An example of a domain summary theme from this project was an early candidate theme “Ideas of 
sustainability/conservation,” which identified all instances in the data that touched upon the 
differing understandings of what sustainability and conservation is, or what its purpose is. The 
 
69 Braun and Clarke (n49), 89-91 
70 Indeed, even Braun and Clarke refer to searching for themes in their initial paper (n49), 89, although they 
have since clarified this use of language (see footnote 71 below) 
71 Braun et al (n50), 854 
72 Ibid. 
73 Lydia DeSantis and Doris Noel Ugarriza, ‘The concept of theme as used in qualitative nursing research’ (2000) 
22(3) Western Journal of Nursing Research 351, 363 
74 Carla Willig, Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology (Third Edition, OUP McGraw Hill Education, 
2013), 58-59 
75 Braun & Clarke (n49), 82 
76 DeSantis & Ugarriza (n73), 362 
77 Braun et al. (n50), 855 
78 Ibid. 
79 Victoria Clarke and Virginia Braun, ‘Using thematic analysis in counselling and psychotherapy research: A 
critical reflection’ (2018) 18(2) Counselling & Psychotherapy Research 107, 108 
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differing interpretations of sustainability and conservation is a feature within the data, but is not a 
theme. Instead, this candidate theme was enveloped into the final theme “Who is Management 
For?” as will be described in Chapter 6.  
One way to avoid identifying domain summaries as themes in the final analysis is to ensure that the 
themes are able to “stand alone as a meaning statement;”80 one or two word themes are much 
more likely to identify features or domains of the data, rather than patterned meaning within the 
data. During the process of theme generation, the candidate themes were tested against this notion 
by repeated consideration of the central organising concept of each candidate theme. This involved 
setting out the “clear core idea that [underpinned the] theme, the essence of what the theme is 
about.”81  
5.5.4.2 The process of theme generation 
The initial step in this process was to print out each of the codes onto a slip of paper and physically 
group them together into possible themes. A snapshot of this process is shown at Figure 3. At the 
end of this initial step, there were 8 candidate themes and only a handful of codes that were not 
allocated to one of these candidate themes.  
Further review of each of the codes within the candidate themes resulted in some movement of 
codes between themes as the researcher developed the concept of each theme, with the result of 
an extra candidate theme being identified, bringing the total to 9 candidate themes. At this stage 
however, many of the “themes” identified were better described as domain summaries, or features, 
of the data, rather than true themes. For example, one candidate theme was “The Role of 
Management”; a theme focusing on how management bodies and management processes are 
viewed, together with the understandings of the purposes of management and what people want 
from management. Framed in light of the definition of a theme as discussed at section 5.5.4.1 above, 




80 Lynne M Connelly and Jill N Peltzer, ‘Underdeveloped Themes in Qualitative Research: Relationship with 
Interviews and Analysis’ (2016) 31(1) Clinical Nurse Specialist 51, 55 
81 Virginia Braun, Victoria Clarke and Nicola Rance, ‘How to use thematic analysis with interview data’ in 
Andreas Vossler and Naomi Moller (Eds.), The Counselling and Psychotherapy Research Handbook (SAGE 




Figure 3: Initial candidate themes 
Further analytic work, including creating thematic maps for each possible theme using Coggle,82 was 
carried out. This involved grouping the codes placed within each candidate theme into different 
groups to represent sub-themes. During this process, some of the 9 candidate themes became sub-
themes of a larger theme, such that by the end of the process five candidate themes remained; 
Balance, Understanding of the Public Right to Fish, Public Interest, Ideas of Sustainability/ 
Conservation and Roles, Perceptions and Challenges. Again, at this stage the candidate themes were 
still very much domain summaries and so focus was paid to developing the name of the theme and 
the central organising concept of the theme.83 
5.5.5 Reviewing the Candidate Themes  
Having generated the themes from the code names only, this stage in the analysis involved 
reviewing the candidate themes identified in the previous stage first against the individual coded 
extracts allocated to each theme, and then against the entire data set.84 The purpose of this stage of 
 
82 A mind-mapping tool. An example of one of the initial thematic maps can be seen at Appendix 6  
83 Braun, Clarke & Rance (n81) 
84 Braun & Clarke (n49), 91-92 
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analysis is to establish first that extracts coded to each theme do indeed form a “coherent 
pattern,”85 and second that the candidate themes (and how they fit together) are valid in the 
context of the entire data set. In other words, do the candidate themes “’accurately’ [reflect] the 
meanings evident in the data set as a whole”?86 
5.5.5.1 Reviewing against collated extracts 
For this stage in the analysis, the coding of the data within NVivo was crucial. Coding summaries 
containing all of the extracts coded to each of the sub-themes were produced and each summary 
reviewed to determine whether the extracts fitted within the candidate sub-theme (and over-
arching theme) and whether the candidate sub-theme adequately represented the meaning within 
the extracts. Where a lack of fit or a lack of adequate representation was identified, there were 
several options taken:87 
(a) Some candidate sub-themes were deleted and the codes placed within them moved either 
to more appropriate sub-themes or to the collection of unallocated codes.  
(b) Some coded extracts were reviewed against the entirety of the extracts within the code and, 
where it became apparent that the extract did not adequately fit with the remainder of the 
extracts within the code, the extract in question was uncoded.  
(c) Some of the uncoded extracts were recoded against a more appropriate code (where this 
could be identified).  
(d) Some candidate sub-themes were redefined to achieve a better fit with the extracts within 
the theme.  
The iterative nature of a reflexive thematic analysis can be seen in this stage of the analysis, with the 
researcher returning to the coding process many times to ensure appropriate coding and to tweak 
any extracts, codes or collections of codes that didn’t seem to fit with the patterns found in the 
data.88 After completion of this stage of analysis, a prototype thematic map was produced for each 
theme.  
5.5.5.2 Reviewing against entire data set 
With the candidate themes refined following review of the coded extracts, the task then was to 
ensure that these themes, taken together, provided an appropriate (and therefore valid) picture of 
the data set as a whole. Each transcript, document and meeting observation note was reviewed in 
 
85 Ibid, 91 
86 Ibid. 
87 An extract of the research journal recording this process for the candidate theme “Different 
Characterisations of the Public Right to Fish Lead to Different Interpretations of it” is included at Appendix 7  
88 Braun et al. (n50), 852 
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detail (for the sixth time in the overall analytic process) to establish whether one or more of the 
candidate themes could be appropriately said to be reflected in each document and whether there 
were other patterns of meaning that could be identified in the documents pertinent to the case 
study questions. No substantial changes were made to the candidate themes during this process as 
it was concluded that the themes developed thus far did provide an appropriate picture of the 
patterns in the data set.  
5.5.6 Defining and Naming Themes  
The penultimate stage in the thematic analysis process adopted involves finalising the themes to be 
presented in the outputs of the analysis.89 It is important in this stage to ensure that each theme 
“[accounts for] the important things captured by the coded data relevant to the central organising 
concept, and the range of those important meanings, and each theme needs to be distinctive.”90 In 
order to determine the relevance and distinctiveness of the candidate themes identified, the starting 
point was to “[identify] the ‘essence’ of what each theme is about (as well as the themes overall), 
and [determine] what aspect of the data each theme captures.”91  It was also essential to consider 
whether and how the candidate themes, when taken together, answer the case study questions.92 
During this process, the themes were refined to 5 and renamed to adequately reflect the data within 
the theme. At the end of this process the five themes were (i) The public right to fish is not just 
about fishing; (ii) The public need to be involved in fishing; (iii) Exploitation of fisheries requires 
balance; (iv) Who is management for?; and (iv) Change is needed, but what change? These themes 
will be explained and discussed in Chapter 6.  
Also during this process, a negative case analysis was carried out. This involves “actively looking for… 
data that contradict common themes.”93 Looking for and presenting such data helps to increase the 
validity of the analytic process by ensuring adequate, rather than selective, representation of the 
data. The negative cases identified are presented in the analysis of the data in Chapter 6.  
5.5.7 Writing Up the Analysis 
The final stage in the analytic process is to write up the analysis in a way that tells a compelling story 
of the data.94 During this process, the researcher “[wove] together data, analysis, and connections to 
 
89 Braun & Clarke (n49), 92-93 
90 Terry et al (n51) 
91 Braun & Clarke (n49), 92 
92 Ibid. and Terry et al (n51), 35 
93 Greg Guest, Kathleen MacQueen and Emily Namey, ‘Validity and Reliability (Credibility and Dependability) in 
Qualitative Research and Data Analysis’ in Guest et al, Applied Thematic Analysis (SAGE, 2014), 18 
94 Braun & Clarke (n49), 93 
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scholarly (and other) literature” in order to present the story of the data and answer the case study 
questions.95 It was also important to keep the focus on validity by including a number of the 
methods identified in Chapter 2, including ensuring appropriate use of quotes from the data to bring 
the words used by the participants to the reader and enable them to judge the foundation for each 
theme.96 
5.6 Conclusion 
As discussed at its outset, this Chapter represents a key pivot in the thesis. In line with the 
epistemological foundations of the research, the case study opens up the research to other types of 
knowledge than doctrinal research (even that conducted using a ‘doctrinal+’ approach discussed in 
Chapter 2) has access to. Socio-legal research is premised on the role of law as an aspect of social 
relationships,97 rather than as a discrete, self-contained system, and of the divergence that can often 
occur between the performance of law and the written law (to continue the metaphor; the 
‘script’).98 The purpose of the present case study was therefore to examine the public right to fish 
within its social context by elucidating how a wide range of actors in the sphere of fishing within the 
D&S IFCA district understand and interpret the public right to fish and, in turn, how such 
constructions of knowledge by these actors might impact upon the management of coastal fisheries 
by D&S IFCA.  
As identified in the literature review presented within this Chapter, fisheries research is now starting 
to focus on the importance of studying not just the bio-physical nature of fisheries, but also the 
social context in which knowledge and understanding of fisheries is produced99 and in which such 
fisheries are prosecuted and managed. However, the role of the public right to fish in this context is 
not yet understood. The case study presented and discussed in this Chapter is designed to address 
this gap in the literature. The practical detail of the methods used for both data collection and data 
analysis within the case study have also been presented in this Chapter. In particular, by presenting 
the forensic detail of the case study and of the analytic process, this Chapter acts as an audit trail of 
the analytic process and thus helps to establish the validity of research in line with the approach 
discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 6 will now set out the findings of the case study, presented as five 
themes generated from the data.  
 
95 Terry et al (n51), 36-37 
96 Guest et al (n93), 18 
97 Roger Cotterell, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?’ (1998) 25(2) Journal of Law and 
Society 171, 183 
98 As often explored in legal consciousness studies, such as Kathryne M Younge, ‘Everyone Knows the Game: 
Legal Consciousness in the Hawaiian Cockfight’ (2014) 48(3) Law & Society Review 499 
99 Pálsson (n2), 93 
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the results of the thematic analysis described in Chapter 5. It presents the five 
themes generated from the data and elaborates each of those themes, drawing upon the voices of 
the participants to tell the story of each theme and, where significant, discussing aspects of the 
themes in the context of relevant literature. Chapter 7 will follow and will draw the analysis within 
this Chapter together with the legal research from Chapters 3 and 4, and reflect further upon the 
literature.  
6.2 Thematic Map 
The thematic analysis described in Chapter 5 resulted in the identification of five key themes in the 
data. These can be organised into a thematic map as shown at figure 1. The thematic map illustrates 
how the five themes (shown in green boxes) connect and relate to each other to tell the story of the 
data.  
 
Figure 1: Thematic map of the analysis 
6.3 The Public Right to Fish is Not Just About Fishing 
The first two of the case study questions (as discussed in section 2.3.2.2 of Chapter 2) addressed 
how people involved in fishing view and experience the public right to fish and how such views and 
experiences impact upon fisheries management. The data shows that there are many different views 
on the role and nature of the public right to fish, however the theme drawing each of these together 
is that the public right to fish is not just about the extractive act of fishing. Within the interpretations 
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placed upon the public right to fish in the data, three sub-themes were identified: (i) fishing is our 
history, culture and tradition – it’s who we are; (ii) the public fishery is an asset of society – it’s how 
we thrive; and (iii) the public right to fish is a management concept. 
It is important to note that participants did not fall into discrete groups based upon these three sub-
themes. Instead many participants adopted different interpretations at different times, depending 
upon the point being discussed. It is also important to note that all three of these interpretations 
were linked together by the almost unanimous understanding that the public right to fish is not an 
untrammelled right and must be subject to limits and controls. Each of the three sub-themes will 
now be discussed in turn, finishing with the notion of limits and controls on the public right to fish.  
6.3.1 Fishing is our history, culture and tradition – it’s who we are 
As identified by Urquhart and Acott, the “common thread that runs through social studies of fishing 
communities …[being] the emphasis on fishing as not just an occupation or a means of earning a 
living” was, as expected, present in the data from this study.1 History, culture and tradition were 
often drawn upon by participants as important concepts to fishing and the communities it takes 
place within.  
Fishing was described by many involved in it, both from the commercial sector and the recreational 
sector, as something that has always been done. One commercial fisherman described the fishing 
history of both his family and his community:  
“Salcombe’s basically built on boat-building and fishing… It goes back bloody hundreds of 
years; I’ve got at least five or six generations that have been involved in boat-building, boat 
maintenance, fishing. My great-grandfathers, they used to build boats and they use to build 
sailing boats and they used to sail out of Salcombe, and they used to work the tides, so they 
could fish with pots or nets. Whatever they caught, they then used to sail to Plymouth, they 
used to land it and then they could come home in the afternoon. And you know, to me, that’s 
what fishing’s about.” (PN11-FSH) 
Similar sentiments were expressed by many involved in recreational fishing or who had been 
involved in recreational fishing earlier on in their lives, with one participant reminiscing that: 
“…we all went fishing didn’t we, or caught a mackerel on a mackerel boat when we were 
kids, or we caught a little crab in a rock pool, or you know we always thought one day we’d 
find a big crab that we could eat and we never did, and we weren’t quite sure how you did 
that!” (PN20-FSH) 
 
1 Julie Urquhart and Tim Acott, ‘A Sense of Place in Cultural Ecosystem Services: The Case of Cornish Fishing 
Communities’ (2014) 27(1) Society & Natural Resources 3, 7 
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Indeed, the concept of tradition was often used to legitimise fishing practices and stress their 
importance. This arose either from participants arguing for the continuing of a traditional way of 
fishing or from participants lamenting the end of a tradition of fishing following regulation. For one 
inshore fishermen, the importance of tradition was crucial:  
“I’m the last of the line here, that’s why I think it should be protected because after me there 
will be no one to do it. And all the knowledge and the history, and you’re going back five or 
six hundred years of history…, doing what I do, will be gone, when I finish that’ll be the end of 
it.” (PN23-FSH)  
The tradition is not just important to the fishermen themselves, but also to the wider community. 
Reed et al noted in their study of English fishing communities that “fishermen [play] a central role in 
enacting the link between the present and the heritage, the sea and the land. The rhythms of fishing 
and the presence of fishermen are part of how the community re-makes its sense of place on a 
regular basis.”2 The importance of tradition to the community was identified by many participants in 
this study too, with one participant recognising the value of the estuarine netting tradition, then 
recently prohibited by the IFCA, to their local communities:  
“From a community and cultural point of view, they will be feeling a great loss, because it’s 
something their fathers and grandfathers taught them, they wanted to teach their sons. [It’s] 
important skills [and] local knowledge that will vanish.” (PN14-FSH) 
That fishing is more than simply a commercial activity and instead provides an identity to those 
involved in it and the communities it takes place in is well rehearsed in the literature. For example, 
Brookfield et al suggest that fishing communities “[understand] and [make] sense of the world from 
a perspective that is garnered from years of involvement with the fishing industry… fishing is the glue 
that holds the community together.”3 While Reed et al assert that fishing “creates a sense of place 
that is valued as part of the creation of self and community identity by residents” of coastal 
communities.4 However, if ‘identity’ is viewed as a concept that “[provides] individuals with a sense 
of self that connects them to other people and to their environment,”5 then the analysis of the 
present data suggests that the public right to fish in fact contributes to this identity, as well as 
creating an identity for a wider population than just fishing communities.  
 
2 Matt Reed, Paul Courtney, Julie Urquhart and Natalie Ross, ‘Beyond fish as commodities: Understanding the 
socio-cultural role of inshore fisheries in England’ (2013) 37 Marine Policy 62, 65 
3 Katherine Brookfield, Tim Gray and Jenny Hatchard, ‘The concept of fisheries-dependent communities. A 
comparative analysis of four UK case studies: Shetland, Peterhead, North Shields and Lowestoft’ (2005) 72 
Fisheries Research 55, 56 
4 Reed et al (n2), 67 
5 Ryan Kelty and Ruth Kelty, ‘Human Dimensions of a Fishery at a Crossroads: Resource valuation, identity, and 
a way of life in a seasonal fishing community’ (2011) 24(4) Society & Natural Resources 334, 336 
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One participant from the commercial fishing sector framed the tradition of fishing as a constituent 
part of the public right to fish:  
“It’s important that we keep the tradition, so there is a right to the tradition in my mind, 
which then gives rise to all the tourism, all the interesting villages, all the quaysides, all the 
activities that people associate with holidays…” (PN20-FSH) 
While for one recreational fisher, tradition was seen as a source for the public right to fish:  
“I just look at it as a customary right basically, that I’ve exercised for at least almost 60 years, 
or 55 years, something like that. It’s just something I do and people have been doing for 
years, since time immemorial.” (PN17-FSH) 
The tradition of fishing was suggested by a number of participants as engendering a sense of identity 
both in fishermen and their communities, but also in the wider public:  
“I think [the public right to fish is] so ingrained in people’s psyche.” (PN10-MAN) 
“I think there is a cultural value in the fact that everybody has the right to go out and do it… 
it’s part of a cultural identity… [it] comes from the cultural mind set of being outdoors and 
the right to exploit that outdoors and our freedoms as a society. And I think the public right 
to fish is wrapped up in that perception. I think it’s an identity which even people who don’t 
fish identify with, the fact that they could and they might one day.” (PN21-MAN) 
However, as well as the tradition of fishing, this sense of identity is also based upon wider traditions 
of English law and society. Many participants brought up the Magna Carta as the source of the public 
right to fish, despite the lack of any real connection to public fishing in the text of that great charter:6  
“…from a sea fishing point of view, my understanding would start with Magna Carta. Magna 
Carta effectively gave everyone in England, the right to collect marine resources from below 
the tidal limit.” (PN15-MAN) 
“… I would think,  if you look back to the Magna Carta or something like that, you know 
there’s probably something written down in it that you’re allowed to put food on [the table], 
which I’m sure there is.  I bet there’s something in there which states that you’re allowed to 
catch food on your plates for your family.” (PN13-FSH) 
Despite the charter being perhaps more accurately described as “a collection of promises extracted 
in bad faith from a reluctant king, most of which concern matters of arcane thirteenth-century legal 
principle,”7 in the present day it is drawn upon in a wide variety of contexts as providing the 
“foundation stone”8 of the English legal system and the rule of law.9 Appleby notes that the 
 
6 Stuart A Moore and Herbert Stuart Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens & Haynes, 1903), 6-18 
7 Dan Jones, Magna Carta: The Making and Legacy of the Great Charter (Head of Zeus, 2014), 1 
8 Ibid. 
9 Joshua Rozenberg, ‘Magna Carta in the modern age’ (British Library, 13 March 2015) 
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“constitutional importance” of the Magna Carta means that its connection to the public right of fish 
raises the status of the right in the minds of the English public.10 
As well as the Magna Carta, many participants referred to the English common law system, based 
upon freedoms, as a source of the public right to fish and a source of national identity:  
“When we live in a country like Britain, which is very good with our own public rights, it's just 
sort of the public right isn't it?” (PN23-FSH) 
“… there should be a certain amount of freedom still in this country.” (PN08-MAN) 
“…you know it’s common law approach, residual rights, I can do anything provided it’s not 
prohibited or harmful to other people.” (PN12-MAN) 
Based upon this, participants stressed the importance of the public right to fish and its role in 
keeping the fishery open to all:  
“[W]e've got a right to put a fish on our table, feed our families and it's a [public] resource, 
so that's why we were conscious not to remove people's opportunities to undertake that 
activity.” (PN21-MAN) 
This view is mirrored in the approach taken by the Devon & Severn IFCA, as described in their 
published documents:  
“The D&SIFCA have taken the view that permits issued for fishing methods should not be 
limited, thereby creating a private fishery as fish is a public resource available to everyone.” 
(ANE-RR) 
Tied to the notion of the UK and England as a country based on freedoms,11 the participants also 
drew upon the notion of self-sufficiency as part of the national identity, with the need for the public 
to be able to provide for themselves and their families through the public right to fish being 
highlighted:  
“Everybody has a right, everybody has a right to put food on their table, to feed their 
families, that’s how I’ve always looked at it.” (PN13-FSH) 
“…the cultural mind-set of being outdoors and the right to exploit that outdoors and our 
freedoms as a society. And I think the public right to fish is wrapped up in that perception.” 
(PN12-MAN) 
These different strands of the public right to fish (a Magna Carta right; a key freedom of society; a 
right to enable healthy self-sufficiency) add up to create a right whose existence is interpreted by 
the participants as contributing more to the country than simply permitting the activity of fishing.  
 
10 Thomas Appleby, ‘The public right to fish: Is it fit for purpose?’ (2005) 16(6) Journal of Water Law 201, 202 
11 Giulia Agnisola, Stephanie Wier and Kate Johnson, ‘The voices that matter: A narrative approach to 
understanding Scottish Fishers’ perspectives of Brexit’ (2019) 110 Marine Policy 103563, 4 
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6.3.2 The public fishery is an asset of society – it’s how we thrive 
This interpretation of the public right to fish shifts the focus from the individual to the wider public, 
starting with the notion that the public fishery is for everyone:  
“Everybody has a right to catch whatever is in the sea, everybody, without exception.” 
(PN11-FSH) 
For a number of participants, expanding the focus to the wider public involved a consideration of the 
relationship between the public and the state in relation to the public right to fish. This relationship 
was suggested by some to be one of the state holding the asset on behalf of the public. For example, 
one recreational fisher suggested ownership by the Crown:  
“[I]t’s a public resource, and in theory I assume that it’s owned by the state, the Queen I 
expect? Well the government I suppose. I mean I take the view that it’s owned by the public, 
they are the owners of the fish stock, I mean who else is going to own it?” (PN17-FSH) 
Similarly, a commercial fisherman likened the fishery to any other natural resource:  
“[T]he country, or the Crown, for want of a better word, owns everything really, to a degree. 
Because if you go out and light a fire and you pollute the atmosphere, that's owned by 
everybody, so you get the Environment Agency would potentially fine you or prosecute you 
for polluting that. So I guess that's sort of where you are with the public fishery, is that that is 
owned by the state or the Crown, or however you want to put it.” (PN25-FSH) 
This understanding of the public fishery corresponds to the construction of the fishery as a public 
trust asset, held by the state (either the government or the Crown) on behalf of the public, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the framing of the public right to fish as an asset of society and 
held for society allowed participants to focus on who gets to exploit that asset for profit and how 
they are given a permission or right to do so. This was summed up by one participant, who 
emphasised the status of the fishery as a public asset:  
“My view is that fish is a public resource and as a nation, or as a society, we allow fishermen 
to use that resource, but it is our resource and not theirs... So really it is up to society how the 
fishermen use, manage that resource.” (PN05-MAN) 
The nature and identity of the ‘public’ that is able to use and exploit the asset was also a focus for 
some participants, although predominantly those who were either commercial fishermen or 
connected to the commercial fishing sector. The prevailing view being that the ability to fish in 
British coastal waters should be reserved for, or at least prioritised for, British boats.  
“I think the majority of people would be inclined to say that there should be a limit off the 




This view is unsurprising, given the rhetoric around “taking back control of our waters” that was 
seen in the run up to the UK referendum on membership of the European Union on 23 June 201612 
and that is still seen during the period of negotiations about the future relationship between the UK 
and the European Union.13 However, underlying the rhetoric is the construction of the fishery 
resource in UK waters as something belonging in some way to the UK as a whole and therefore to be 
used by the UK before any other country. In their study of Scottish fishers’ perspectives of Brexit, 
Agnisola et al also noted the use of language indicating the similar views on the status of the public 
fishery: “Most [participants]  repeated particular buzzwords… such as the government has “given 
away” the fisheries, the industry was “taking back control” of their waters.”14 
As well as considering who can exploit the asset, one participant framed the public right to fish in 
terms of the right of the public to have the fishery resource protected through sustainable 
management:  
“…anyone's allowed to fish, so it's like the public has a right to fish and have the fishery 
managed sustainably.” (PN27-MAN) 
Echoes of this framing can be seen in the discussion by one member of the IFCA Committee of the 
responsibility felt with regard to the protection of fish stocks and marine resources by those involved 
in management:  
“if you have the potential to regulate all fishing activity… I think it just really makes sense, 
you know future proofing. A perfect example [is] the wrasse situation; we didn’t have a way 
of dealing with it, it came from one side, this was a fishery for something that wasn’t fished 
for, how could we have known that was going to happen? I don’t think we were very well 
prepared to respond, even though we had all our different byelaws in place and so on, we 
had some very vibrant discussions in the sub-group around what was going on here. I kept 
feeling; my single feeling was “not on my watch.” You know, that’s my sense of 
responsibility.” (PN19-MAN) 
It can also be seen in the language used by the IFCA in connection with its responsibilities with 
regard to the protection of salmonids:  
 
12 Stephanie Weir and Sandy Kerr, ‘Property, power and planning: Attitudes to spatial enclosure in Scottish 
seas’ (2019) 108 Marine Policy 103633. See also Bryce Stewart and Bethan O’Leary, Post-Brexit Policy in the 
UK: A New Dawn? Fisheries, Seafood and the Marine Environment (2017) 
<https://www.york.ac.uk/media/yesi/yesioldwebsite/researchoutputs/Brexit%20Fisheries%20Brief.pdf> 
accessed 7 April 2020 
13 See, for example, Emily Ferguson, ‘‘Free lunch for EU is over!’ UK to take back 60% of British fish by kicking 
out EU boats: BRITAIN’S fishing industry will take back sovereignty of its waters after the UK leaves the EU, 
preventing the bloc from taking 60 percent of our fish’ The Express (16 November 2019) 
<https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1205285/brexit-news-fishing-industry-boris-johnson-brexit-deal-
eu-fishing-for-leave> accessed 7 April 2020 
14 Agnisola et al (n11), p5 
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“… the role of the IFCA includes protection of sea fish resources (which can include migratory 
salmonids in the marine phase of their lifecycle) and therefor have power and the duty to 
prohibit the netting of sea fish resources if this poses a risk to other marine fauna which 
includes salmon.”[sic] (ANE-RR) 
Such references to ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’ are mirrored in the calls by commentators, such as Lam 
and Campbell, for the recognition of the “fiduciary responsibilities for the sustainable management 
of fisheries and conservation of living marine resources” 15 of coastal states.  
6.3.3 The public right to fish is a management concept – it’s what we do 
As might be expected, the most practical construction of the public right to fish, as an issue for 
management, was used almost entirely by participants involved in management, as well as being 
identified within the IFCA data and meeting observations. For these participants, discussions of the 
public right to fish often included consideration of how the public right to fish fitted into the 
management of coastal fisheries.  
Opinions varied as to the role of the public right to fish and the influence it did or should play in 
management. Some participants framed the public right to fish as the starting point for all 
management:  
“I suppose the starting point is that people are allowed to fish and then rights get removed or 
rescinded, rather than the alternative where no-one’s allowed to do anything unless they get 
[permission].” (PN06-MAN) 
Indeed, one participant described it as the bedrock of management:  
“[I]t sets the whole approach … you know it’s common law approach, residual rights, I can do 
anything provided it’s not prohibited or harmful to other people. So if that’s your starting 
point, it immediately means that if the IFCA wants to do something, it has to justify it. And I 
actually like that and I value it hugely, and what it does mean is that in effect the burden of 
proof is on the IFCA, but I have absolutely no problem with that. I think if any regulator is 
seeking to regulate, it is up to the regulator to justify that regulation, and I think that’s 
exactly how the balance should be. So in a sense the IFCA has the burden of proof against it 
from the outset, and I think that is extremely healthy.” (PN12-MAN)  
For others the role of the public right to fish was less explicit. For example, when questioned directly 
on their view of the role of the public right to fish in the management of fisheries, PN10-MAN 
considered the role as much less important than other participants had suggested:  
“I think [management is] not that much influenced by it.” (PN10-MAN) 
Yet later on, during a broader discussion about management, the same participant appeared to give 
the public right to fish a greater importance:  
 
15 Mimi Lam and Meaghan Calcari Campbell, ‘The Privilege to Fish’ (2012) 17(4) Ecology and Society 19, 20 
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“I wouldn’t change the public right to fish, I think that’s important, and I think the fact that it 
does play on our minds when we’re managing is quite a good thing.” (PN10-MAN) 
However, not all participants involved in management viewed the public right to fish in a positive 
way. When asked directly for their view of the role of the public right to fish in the management of 
fisheries, two participants explicitly denied the right having any role whatsoever:  
“No I don’t think it does. I mean we remind ourselves as an IFCA on a pretty regular basis 
that there is no right to fish, so that’s why we do byelaws!” (PN03-MAN) 
“I don’t think we’ve really talked about it in the sub-group, we might have done but maybe I 
wasn’t listening! I don’t think it gets in the way, or hasn’t yet, because I don’t think anyone’s 
challenged. Under what regulation; where does it exist this public right?” (PN19-MAN) 
These views would fit with the suggestion of Barnes that when it comes to commercial fishing, the 
importance of the public right to fish “has long since been overtaken by statutory regulation.”16 
However, during broader discussions, the same participants appeared to give some importance to 
the role of the public right to fish, albeit in a negative context. These more negative views of the role 
of the public right to fish appear to frame it as an unjustified stop on management; something that 
“gets in the way”, they also focus on the concept of a “right” to fish:  
“It does tap into, the phrase taps into that mind-set that “I have a right to catch these things 
to do with as I wish.” There is quite a selfish motivation [behind it].” (PN03-MAN)  
“I think it’s probably had its time and I think the word ‘right’ is troublesome. Public access to 
fishery I can get, because you can play with the word ‘access’, but ‘right’ is so deeply 
entrenched in “I have a right, therefore you can’t stop me,” I think [it’s] a flawed notion. It 
worked perfectly pre-Magna Carta or roundabout the time of Magna Carta. You know, there 
would have been a time when salmon were trash fish and nobody cared about regulating it 
or anything and of course you could take as much as you like, who cares?! So it’s around the 
value, it’s around the demand outstripping the supply and the stock crashing and I think it’s 
not a great concept if you’re wanting to protect and safeguard future stocks.” (PN19-MAN) 
The focus on the implications of a “right” to fish has been taken up by some commentators, such as 
Lam and Campbell, who argue that the public ‘right’ to fish is in reality a privilege to fish, and that 
the framing of the concept as a ‘right’ is highly problematic, with “serious consequences for the 
sustainability of target fish species and conservation of marine resources.”17  
The negation of the importance of the public right to fish by these participants appears to be at odds 
with the role of the right that is evident in the IFCA data. The documents published by the IFCA in 
 
16 Richard Barnes, ‘Revisiting the Public Right to Fish in British Waters’ (2011) 26 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 433, 452 
17 Lam and Campbell (n15), 19 
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relation to the netting byelaw highlight the view of the IFCA as a whole on the importance of the 
fishery being open to all:  
“The D&SIFCA have taken the view that permits issued for fishing methods should not be 
limited, thereby creating a private fishery as fish is a public resource available to everyone. 
Control of the activity will be achieved via the conditions in the permits rather than limiting 
the overall number.” (ANE-RR) 
In addition, the IFCA data as a whole records the byelaw making process and presents a process very 
much in line with that suggested by PN12-MAN above; one that is careful to justify every step in 
restricting public rights to fish so as to satisfy the “burden of proof”. The guidance provided by 
DEFRA to IFCAs in relation to the making of a new byelaw requires a 28 day consultation period 
before a new byelaw is brought forward.18 In contrast, for the netting byelaw, the IFCA carried out 
two rounds of pre-consultation, followed by an official 2 month consultation period, lasting in total 
over 2 years.19 Furthermore, a feeling of unwillingness to restrict fishing activity lightly can be 
elicited from the discussions with those participants involved in management regarding the netting 
byelaw. For example, one participant described the decision-making process: 
“We had all the reasons for and against [restricting estuarine netting], there was far more 
for ‘for’ than [for ‘against’], but they really wanted to get every bit of evidence in to see if 
there was any reason why it shouldn’t be done.” (PN01-MAN) 
Similarly, another participant explained that:  
“[W]e were criticised by anglers for making it too easy for netsmen. We kept going back to 
them and saying “can you tell us; can you provide this?” And they were saying “you haven’t 
done that with anglers, you should be treating the two sectors the same.” But I think that 
because we felt there were livelihoods involved, we felt comfortable doing it. So we had a 
really long pre-consultation, we had a double length statutory consultation, we tried really 
hard. And I think we made the right decision.” (PN10-MAN) 
Although at first glance these different views as to the importance and usefulness of the public right 
to fish as a concept in management appear to be contrary, it is submitted that they can be brought 
together by focusing on the perception of the word ‘right’. As noted above, some participants, in 
common with commentators, clearly found the use of the word troublesome. However, the 
problems identified are not inherent in the word ‘right’. As one participant noted:  
“I wish it was easier to communicate the detail. So yes there’s a public right to fish, it doesn’t 
mean you can sell anything, it doesn’t mean that you can do what you like when you like. So 
 
18 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, IFCA Byelaw Guidance: Guidance on the byelaw 
making powers and general offences under Part 6, Chapter 1, Sections 155 to 164 of the Marine and Coastal 
Access Act (March 2011), p19 <http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/Upload/About/ifca-byelaw-guidance.pdf> 




it’s the perception of it rather than the actual [right], the actual existence of it and the way, 
you know the way it exists, is actually quite handy. The legalities of it probably play into 
management quite nicely, so no, I wouldn’t want to take it away, I wouldn’t want to change 
it, but I think I’d make more awareness of what it actually means.” (PN10-MAN) 
If the word ‘right’ is interpreted to adequately reflect the attendant responsibilities as well,20 then 
those critical of it (as discussed above) can be satisfied, as well as those who view its importance in 
management as paramount. Indeed, PN03-MAN, a participant critical of the public right to fish and 
its importance, still expressed views regarding decision-making that can find a basis in the public 
right to fish and the need to justify any restriction to fishing activity.  
“I find myself agreeing with the fishermen more often than I do with the environmentalists 
on that authority, despite my background. I mean primarily because I’m always looking for 
the evidence, the justification for decisions that we are considering taking.” (PN03-MAN) 
6.3.4 Limitations and Controls 
The majority of the criticism of the public right to fish in the literature centres around the problems 
with the (supposedly) open access fisheries this right creates21 and the lack of adequate controls on 
fishing activity the existence of the right can lead to.22 However, whichever interpretation of the 
public right to fish that participants chose to adopt, there was near unanimous agreement that the 
public right to fish is not an untrammelled right, but rather one that is subject to limitations and 
controls on the fishing activity it permits. For example, one commercial fisherman discussed controls 
in the context of the fishery being open to all:  
“I think if anyone wants to catch fish, I think they should be allowed to catch fish. I don’t see 
how you can say “well you can do it, but you can’t do it.” And I don’t, just because I’m a 
commercial fisherman, doesn’t mean I should have more right at catching it, than my next 
door neighbour who’s a doctor, you know? If he wants to go out and catch it, he can catch it. 
But there’s got to be rules, and we’ve got to abide by them, and there has got to be a quota 
in some form or another, because you just can’t catch, catch, catch.” (PN18-FSH) 
Often the need for controls and limitations was framed as a necessary corollary of the public right to 
fish:  
“I don’t like the word fair, because lots of things aren’t fair, but I think if it’s a public right to 
fish, if we all believe we have this right, then we all need to be responsible with that right.” 
(PN14-FSH) 
While for some it was a product of the public asset that is the fishery:  
 
20 Mimi Lam and Daniel Pauly, ‘Who is Right to Fish? Evolving a Social Contract for Ethical Fisheries’ (2010) 
15(3) Ecology and Society 16 
21 See, for example, Appleby (n10)  
22 Mimi Lam, ‘Of Fish and Fishermen: Shifting Societal Baselines to Reduce Environmental Harm in Fisheries’ 
(2012) 17(4) Ecology and Society 18; Lam and Pauly (n20); Lam and Campbell (n15); Appleby (n10) 
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“It’s a public asset isn’t it, so it seems a bit off for someone to go and ruin that for other 
people. I don’t have the skill, infrastructure or money to go and harvest these fish, but, it’s 
that sort of, I think that whoever’s doing it is doing it in a way that is going to protect the 
resource in the future.” (PN06-MAN) 
The high level of consensus in the data as to the need for limits and controls on the operation of the 
public right to fish suggests that, contrary to the views in the literature, the right is not understood 
by those involved in fishing as inescapably producing unlimited and wholly open access fisheries, but 
instead as a right that is amenable to and requiring of suitable parameters to ensure sustainable use 
of the resource to which it applies.  
6.4 The Public Need to be Involved in Fishing 
In analysing the data in order to answer the first two of the case study questions, a second theme 
relating to the participants’ understanding of the public right to fish was generated, namely ‘the 
public need to be involved in fishing’. The data making up this theme coalesces around the notion 
that the ‘public’ in the public right to fish creates a public interest in the fishery that needs to be 
recognised in the management of the fishery. Four elements of this public interest were identified 
by participants: (i) the notion of the fishery resource being for everyone, (ii) the public ownership of 
that resource; (iii) the best way to extract value from the resource to benefit the public, and (iv) the 
more general management of the resource for the benefit of the public as a whole. As will be 
discussed, these four elements can all be linked to the crucial features of the public trust, suggesting 
some level of implicit public support for the application of the doctrine to the management of 
fisheries.  
6.4.1 Fish for Everyone 
The public interest in the public fishery was often framed by participants in terms of the public 
interest in the fish themselves, with many classifying fish as a public good.  
“[T]he physical fish are a national resource primarily” (PN07-MAN) 
“You know, it’s a common resource, however you look at it. If a fish is swimming up that creek 
and there’s three of us dive in and one of us comes out with it, he deserves it. But you were all 
entitled to fish for it.” (PN11-FSH) 
This belief that fish are a public good is also seen in the IFCA data (“Sea fish are a public resource.” 
(ANE-RR)), as well as in the general dialogue at policy level involving fisheries. For example, in the 
Fisheries White Paper (published by the government prior to the draft Fisheries Bill)23 it was stated 
 
23 Fisheries Bill 2017-19 <https://services.parliament.uk/Bills/2017-19/fisheries.html> accessed 9 April 2020  – 
although the Bill had completed the second reading and Committee debate in late 2018, the prorogation of 
Parliament in October 2019 meant that it no longer stood and a fresh bill (in the same format as the previous 
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that “[t]he fish in our seas, like our wider marine assets, are a public resource and therefore the 
rights to catch them are a public asset.”24 The notion of fish and the rights to catch them being a 
public resource or asset is coherent with the view of the public trust as safeguarding common 
ownership of natural resources by “the government acting as a fiduciary to protect the ownership 
interests of the people.”25 
However, the precise extent of the public interest is not as clearly agreed upon by participants. This 
can be seen in the considerations of the purpose of fish. Some participants appeared to view the 
purpose as to provide food for humans. 
“[W]hat’s the point in letting something recover, are you just going to let it recover, recover, 
recover and never be allowed to fish it? That really got a lot of people’s backs up.” (PN18-FSH) 
Such views align with the opinions expressed by participants in Lowther and Rodwell’s study of IFCA 
members’ perceptions of their IFCA, that IFCA goals “should relate to the conservation of marine 
ecosystems for direct economic purposes.”26 However others, similar to Lam,27 recognised a wider 
purpose for fish, and therefore a wider public interest in the fishery.  
“[C]ertainly my approach has always been that it's a resource that's open to everybody's 
interest in terms of using it. Even to the one which is more difficult to convey, but this natural 
capital idea, or it came up in terms of divers and the use of a site with wrasse; they've got an 
interest in wrasse because they want to see them on the ground. So there's other ways of 
'using' the fish rather than just the extraction side of it, so there's that element as well just to 
add in there.” (PN21-MAN) 
Indeed, there were a number of participants that viewed the public interest as qualified; limited in 
some way by the interest of the fish themselves, suggestive of an earth jurisprudence approach.28 
“Are fish really there for humans, do they exist for humans? No of course they don’t, they’ve 
got an intrinsic value, it’s part of evolution.” (PN10-MAN) 
 
Bill) was introduced in the House of Lords in January 2020 <https://services.parliament.uk/Bills/2019-
21/fisheries.html> accessed 9 April 2020 
24 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Sustainable fisheries for future generations (White 
Paper), July 2018, p. 26 
25 Gail Osherenko, ‘New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding property rights and the public trust’ 
(2006) 21 Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 317, 326 
26 Jason Lowther and Lynda D Rodwell, ‘IFCAs: Stakeholder Perceptions of Roles, and Legal Impact’ (2013) 15 
Environmental Law Review 11, 17 
27 Lam (n22), 25 
28 See, for example, Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (2nd Edition, Green Books, 2011); 
Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees have Standing? Toward legal rights for natural objects’ (1972) 45 Southern 




“I don't think you should have the right to catch whatever you want to catch, I think that there 
has to be limitations on things, because the fish themselves have a right as well don't they?” 
(PN23-FSH) 
As well as the different views on the extent of the public interest, the difficulty in determining the 
content of the public interest was also acknowledged.  
“It’s difficult to judge what the general public want without asking them.” (PN06-MAN) 
Indeed, in a discussion around the promotion of artisanal fisheries, one participant noted that while 
these were the type of low-impact fisheries that the IFCA should be supporting, a large proportion of 
the fish caught by such fishers ends up in high-end restaurants and gastro-pubs. Which begs the 
question:  
“what about the people that can’t afford fish fingers in Morrison’s because we’ve stopped 
trawling entirely?” (PN10-MAN).  
This shows one of the difficulties at the heart of the consideration as to the nature of the public 
interest in the fishery; the interest covers not just the present public, but also the future public and 
acting the in the best interests of both is difficult, if not impossible. 
The focus of the fishery being for everyone, led many to consider what ‘everyone’ can do for the 
fishery. The concept of responsibility was identified within the previous theme as a corollary of the 
public right to fish. However, in the context of the public interest, a number of participants framed 
this responsibility as a collective one, rather than one attaching to individual fishers. The fishermen 
and the public together being responsible for their resource.  
“I think there is responsibility for the fishers to be more collectively responsible. And 
processors, everybody's got a part to play in it.” (PN21-MAN) 
“I think that’s another element of the whole IFCA that is perhaps underused; the reach into 
communities to have responsibility, responsible buyers. You know how many times do you see 
a pub which will have “freshly caught” this or that?” (PN19-MAN)  
In order to fulfil this collective responsibility, a large number of the participants expressed the need 
to re-engage the public with both fish and the sea as a whole.  
“We need to re-engage people with the sea, as we do with the land. We need to re-engage 
people with the state of our seas and how they could be better; provide more benefits to 
people now and in the future if they were managed better.” (PN03-MAN) 
“[U]nderstanding the health of the sea and the healthy nature of fish when you cook and eat it 
is two of the things that aren’t being worked very hard on.” (PN20-FSH) 
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This need for public involvement in the protection of the fishery is recognised in the literature.29 
Terry et al suggest that the necessary public involvement can be achieved by increasing the 
prominence of debates on the sustainability of fisheries, which in turn should prompt “an emergent 
public” with increasing awareness of the issues and as a result and increased interest in getting 
involved and having their say in the management of fisheries.30 This chimes with the discussion by 
one participant of the recent Landing Obligation (also referred to as the ‘discard ban’) brought in 
under the Common Fisheries Policy:31  
“I think a good example which caused no end of trouble but the driver was right and shows 
what happens was the bycatch campaign. You know, everybody as fisheries managers was 
going "yeah well it doesn't work in mixed fisheries," or "it's going to be a real struggle to 
make it happen," and with all the discard regulation that's going to come in, you know as 
managers you're thinking "that can't work." But I think that what was good was that [the 
public] were just saying "well that can't be right, you're wasting stuff" … And I think if there 
was more understanding of the issues, then I think that's what would drive change, at the 
moment there's too many other things in there” (PN21-MAN) 
The need to re-engage the public with fish and the sea is recognised in many circles, with recent 
campaigns launched by the likes of DEFRA32 and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation,33 to name a 
few. However, a sufficient level of public engagement appears to be difficult to achieve, with Terry 
et al (in the context of their study on the management of Welsh inshore fisheries in the period after 
the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009) suggesting that despite a high level of public belief in 
favour of sustainable fishing, management failures were enabled in part because “the emergent 
public has failed to emerge with significant force to ensure that representatives have acted.”34 
 
29 Anastasia Gkargkavouzi, Stefanos Paraskevopoulos and Steriani Matisori, ‘Public perceptions of the marine 
environment and behavioural intentions to preserve it: The case of three coastal cities in Greece’ (2020) 111 
Marine Policy 103727; Rachel Kelly, Aysha Fleming, Mary Mackay, Carolina García and Gretta Peci, ‘Social 
licence for marine protected areas’ (2020) 115 Marine Policy 103782 
30 Alan Terry, Kerry Lewis and Blaise Bullimore, ‘The impact of the Marine and Coastal Access Act (2009) on 
Welsh inshore fisheries and marine management’ (2019) 99 Marine Policy 359, 361 
31 European Commission, ‘Discarding and the landing obligation’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/discards_en> accessed 8 May 2020 
32 The ‘Sea for Yourself’ campaign was launched in March 2020 and aimed to get more UK consumers eating 
seafood caught in UK waters: Seafish, ‘Sea for Yourself’ <https://seafish.org/article/sea-for-yourself> accessed 
9 April 2020 
33 In November 2019 the Foundation launched a ‘First Aid Kit for Ocean Reframing’, aimed at “NGOs and ocean 
communicators” and providing a new way of talking about the oceans and marine issues designed to 
encourage the public to engage with and value oceans, their resources and marine sustainability: Gulbenkian 
Foundation, ‘Launch of ‘first aid kit’ for ocean reframing’ (22 November 2019) <https://gulbenkian.pt/uk-
branch/launch-of-first-aid-kit-for-ocean-reframing/> accessed 9 April 2020 
34 Terry et al (n30), 365 
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6.4.2 Public Ownership 
When considering the public interest in the fishery, some participants framed it as an ownership 
interest, starting from the basis that the fish in the sea ‘belong’ to the public:  
“I take the view that [the fishery is] owned by the public, they are the owners of the fish stock, 
I mean who else is going to own it?” (PN17-FSH) 
“For me, the Marine and Coastal Access Act is all about trying to incorporate all of those views 
of basically the entire UK population, whether or not they live in Birmingham, whether or not 
they’ve ever been to the sea, they still have some level of ownership and they still have an 
interest in that being properly managed.” (PN10-MAN)  
While the public trust concept does not, of itself, require or result in direct public ownership of a 
resource, the notion of the fishery being an asset that ‘belongs to’ or is ‘owned by’ the public can be 
viewed as an interpretation of a constituent part of the public trust. The public trust concept applies 
to common-pool resources that are “uniquely public”35 and it is submitted that the public 
‘ownership’ interest discussed by the participants in relation to the public fishery is an interpretation 
of this element of public trust theory.  
Viewing the public interest as an ownership interest allowed participants to focus on the 
accountability of fishermen to the public for the use of the fishery resource.  
“I suppose the only thing is we don’t get; we don’t get much return from it. So it’s a public 
right; should we be thinking about getting some return for it?” (PN05-MAN) 
This argument that the public are entitled to some form of return from the use of their resource by 
fishermen is made by Macinko and Bromley in the context of the USA public fishery. 36 Indeed, 
Anbleyth-Evans et al argue that recognising the collective interest in fisheries, as part of the marine 
ecosystem, forms part of an ecosystem approach to marine management, suggesting that private 
aquaculture rights in Chile should be returned as public property and the concessions “re-established 
as leases” ensuring a return to and democratic oversight for the public.37 
The lack of proper recognition of the public ownership interest was a particular concern for 
participants in the context of the current fishing quota allocation system, which was identified as 
being incompatible with the public’s ownership of the fishery.  
 
35 Ellen Sullivan Casey, ‘Water Law - Public Trust Doctrine’ (1984) 24 Natural Resources Journal 809, 812 
36 Seth Macinko and Daniel Bromley, Who Owns America’s Fisheries (2002) and Seth Macinko and Daniel 
Bromley, ‘Property and Fisheries for the Twenty-First Century: Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic 
Doctrine’ (2004) 28 Vermont Law Review 623  
37 Jeremy Anbleyth-Evans, Francisco Aaros Leiva, Francisco Ther Rios, Ricardo Segovia Cortés, Vreni 
Häussermann and Carolina Aguirre-Munoz, ‘Toward marine democracy in Chile: Examining aquaculture 
ecological impacts through common property local ecological knowledge’ (2020) 113 Marine Policy 103690, 7 
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“[T]he fixed quota allocation, where they are seen as tradeable things, forgetting the link back 
to they are granted by society. And I think that is perhaps where some of the issues with 
current fisheries management (the blame of which is always laid at the CFP, it’s not their fault 
because it’s the way the UK government manages quota), that’s where some of the problems 
lie, because people trade and you sell your quota, without sometimes remembering what it 
represents even, let alone where it came from in the first place.” (PN05-MAN)  
The public was framed as an owner entitled to a return when their resource is used by fishers. Lam 
and Pauly argue that the general lack of such a return on public ownership means that “citizens do 
not share the profit if fisheries do well and benefit only by having access to seafood if they pay 
market prices. [While i]f public resources become scarce… the consumer pays more for the resources 
he or she owns.”38 
6.4.3 Value for the Public  
In a similar vein to the consideration of the public ownership interest, some participants discussed 
the public interest in terms of the value that accrues from the use of the fishery. However, instead of 
focusing on a return for the public, these participants considered how the value should be shared 
out and what the best allocation of value would be for the public.  
In this context, value means more than just money made from fishing, but includes also the socio-
economic value of particular fisheries or fishing activities. In considering the socio-economic value of 
the fishery, many participants, together with the IFCA data, identified the particular value flowing 
from inshore commercial fishing.  
“It’s not just straight commercial jobs, straight jobs in commercial fishing, it’s the whole 
tourism sector as well of course down here. Because what happens to the ports and harbours 
and stuff like that is a huge part of tourism.” (PN04-MAN) 
“Being marooned in coastal areas… means there’s a lots of drugs and life problems with 
people with very low incomes and very low expectations… we need to support the local young 
people into the local industries, fishing being one of them, in a much more proactive way.” 
(PN20-FSH)  
“Closure of estuaries (and potential changes to estuary boundary definitions) to all forms of 
fixed and drift gill netting would (for some stakeholders) represent a negative impact in terms 
of historical, traditional and social cost.” (IA Cons) 
While other participants highlighted the value flowing from recreational fishing:  
“Both commercial fishing and recreational fishing, they’re of equal sort of value to the country, 
if you look at it from that point of view...” (PN01-MAN) 
“The general public look at the commercial fishermen and they see; they've got this image of a 
sort of Captain Birdseye doing a wonderful job catching the fish and bringing them the fish 
fingers, whereas the recreational angler, they see as just someone who's having a bit of fun 
 
38 Lam and Pauly (n20), 24 
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and they're not contributing anything. But the actual reality to some degree is that in some 
instance, the recreational angler, in the fact that they buy a lot of fishing tackle, which 
employs people, they stay in Bed and Breakfasts, which supports the holiday industry, they 
invest a lot of money, there's people who guide you, who take people out fishing. So there's a 
lot of money actually brought into local economies with recreational angling, and commercial 
fishing doesn't always do anything for the local economy.” (PN25-FSH) 
This focus on the socio-economic value produced by the fishery led a number of participants to 
assert that the public fishery should be managed to give the maximum socio-economic benefit to the 
public.  
“I think it should be fairly apportioned, from a socio-economic point of view to maximise the 
value to the community, all of the communities, and that it’s sustainable. So if you’re going 
to exploit something it has to be sustainable first and foremost and then takes into account 
the economic benefits, where you can generate the most income from sustainable 
exploitation.” (PN15-MAN) 
It has been observed, at the global scale, that small-scale fisheries catch a similar amount of fish for 
human consumption as industrial-scale fisheries, but employ more fishermen and (through the use 
of more selective fishing technology), tend to cause less environmental harm.39 Indeed, the UK 
government’s own vision for the future of the public fishery is set out in terms that stress both the 
need to act in the best interests of society and the role of the whole of society in achieving this 
(which links back to the strand of this theme discussed above relating to the public’s role in 
protecting their resource):  
“Government’s role is to manage this asset on behalf of society and to get the most benefits for 
today’s citizens and future generations. The few in society who catch fish are responsible for doing so 
efficiently. This means getting the best possible economic and social benefits from fishing for the 
least environmental cost – including safeguarding stocks for the future. It is the role of processors 
and retailers in the supply chain to act sustainably, and the consumer’s role is to choose 
sustainably.”40 
The interpretation of the public interest in the fishery focusing on the value accruing to that interest 
and how it can be best shared out addresses another element of the public trust concept; that the 
trust should “preserve the greatest good for the greatest number of citizens.”41 This argument can 
also be seen in the suggestion of Anbleyth-Evans et al that regimes that recognise the common 
 
39 Lam (n22), 18 
40 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Fisheries 2027 – A long term vision for sustainable 
fisheries (30 September 2011) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fisheries-2027-a-long-term-
vision-for-sustainable-fisheries> accessed 22 April 2020 
41 David Takacs, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights and the Future of Private Property’ 
[2008] 16 NYU Environmental Law Journal 711, 722-3 
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property nature of the fishery resource “can benefit the maximum amount of people and highest 
levels of ecological health rather than the lowest.”42  
6.4.4 Management for the Public 
The (more or less) active management of the exploitation of the fishery resource was recognised by 
participants as a necessary requirement, with the alternative being seen as allowing a ‘free-for-all’.  
“I still think that generally there's a lot of fishers that are very supportive of what… [the IFCA 
does], because they see that regulation has to come in, in order for them to be profitable. You 
know, tragedy of the commons; an unregulated fishery just isn't going to hack it.” (PN21-MAN) 
“The last thing we want, or any fisherman wants, is a total free for all, because we think 
there’d be total abuse on that.” (PN08-FSH) 
The public interest was therefore presented as the beneficiary of management, as well as the 
purpose behind managing and regulating fisheries.  
“[A]s an IFCA we are managing locally on behalf of the local communities, and the local public, 
and the MMO are managing on behalf of the national public outwith that area.” (PN05-MAN) 
“I think the reason we do this is a much bigger picture; it’s about the prosperity of our nation, 
about not even prosperity, but that our nation can thrive, that we have fish, that we have fish 
markets that we can sell to, that we have recreation, you know all the good things in life. But 
the IFCA absolutely are the custodians and are managing other custodians.” (PN19-MAN) 
Indeed, management for a wider range of interests was seen as a development from the 
predecessors to IFCAs (the Sea Fisheries Committees), which focused much more heavily on 
managing for the commercial sector only.  
“[T]here is that position of the commercial catching sector is all important, and there is this 
realisation, I think [the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009] was the first time it was set out to 
help start that conversation from the local managers’ point of view, saying "well that's not 
how it's being viewed anymore."” (PN21-MAN) 
The motivation of managing for the public can be seen in the importance placed on the local 
councillors that sit on the IFCA Committee.  
“We represent a huge constituency around this table, because we’ve got elected members 
from all of the various councils and then we’ve got all of the different interests; conservation, 
the users, whether they be divers, anglers, the commercial sector. It may make it slightly 
unwieldy because it’s big, but that’s what we’re there for.” (PN04-MAN) 
“I suspect the local authority members have a far better grasp… of [the public interest] than 
the scientists and the fishermen and the anglers. It’s extraordinary, they have real value on 
that Committee, because they do represent people in their constituencies and they will talk 
about it and they have perhaps a more lay approach to what’s happening, and I think it’s really 
 
42 Anbleyth-Evans et al (n37), 8 
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important we have that, because what are we doing this for? What the hell are we doing any 
of this for if it’s not to safeguard [the public interest]?” (PN19-MAN) 
Again, this focus on managing for, and because of, the public interest in the public fishery provides a 
further element of the public trust concept; managing the “consumptive use and protection [of trust 
assets] on behalf of present and future citizens.”43 Indeed, when presented with the idea of a public 
trust, some participants viewed it as a version of what the IFCA and/or the government was already 
doing:  
“I think the government are doing that aren't they with these MCZs and these controlled 
zones that they're trying to introduce all the time. I think the government are trying to limit 
fishing activity by that way anyway and give the fish themselves room to breathe. The poor 
little things they need it don't they really. Whether we agree with the way they do things is a 
different matter. You have to think of the future generations, not just [fishing], it's the clean 
seas isn't it and everything else that they have to do. It's a massive responsibility.”          
(PN23-FSH) 
“I think what the Environment Agency does for the environment in freshwater and the MMO 
does for marine fisheries are essentially acting in trust for the good of the whole community 
and not favouring one particular section of society.” (PN15-MAN)  
However, in this context it is important to note that the public trust doctrine “does not connote the 
government’s everyday general obligation to act for the public good; rather, the Public Trust Doctrine 
demands a “special and more demanding obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain public 
resources.””44 Indeed, a number of participants viewed the public trust concept as a promising 
avenue for consideration in relation to the management of the public fishery.  
“I think if there was a clearer understanding of that as our primary responsibility, then I think 
you wouldn't get the same level of politics that comes into play. And it's misguided politics… 
how many examples are there, bass is a good example, how many times the evidence says you 
can't have a fishery, and if they had that sort of guardian role for future generations then that 
would be a much stronger argument to follow that advice.” (PN21-MAN) 
“I think it would be positive to have an unbiased group of different people who are, perhaps 
stewards of fish stocks, I don’t know, it’s difficult to find that word isn’t it. But, you know, we 
have to look after it and we have to all work together, so if a trust of some description were to 
involve all party sensible discussion, you know at all levels of fishing, it’d probably be huge, but 
I think it would be positive.” (PN14-FSH) 
Thus while the public interest clearly has a role in the current management of fisheries, both as the 
prompt for and beneficiary of that management, there appears to be appetite for the recognition of 
 
43 Raphael Sagarin and Mary Turnipseed, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine: Where Ecology Meets Natural Resources 
Management’ (2012) 37 Annual Review of Environment and Resources 473, 474 
44 Takacs (n41), 717 
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a greater role. It should be noted though that one participant took the view that the public right to 
fish was not the best concept on which to base this increased public involvement:  
“I think it’s not a great concept if you’re wanting to protect and safeguard future stocks.” 
(PN19-MAN) 
Linking this statement back to the discussion on the public right to fish as a tool of management (see 
section 1616.3.3 above), perhaps the answer is in the way the public right to fish is used or 
interpreted, or as one participant suggested:  
“[I]f there’s a problem with it, it’s because we’re not regulating it properly, not because it 
exists.” (PN12-MAN) 
6.5 Exploitation of Fisheries Requires Balance 
The themes discussed thus far elaborate on how the public right to fish is interpreted and 
understood. This theme moves the discussion forward by focusing on how to protect what has been 
identified as the concept of the public fishery. Balance is something that was recognised by the 
majority of the participants as required for fisheries management. Ultimately this balance is needed 
to ensure the long-term survival of the fishery, with some therefore seeing sustainability as the 
element to be ascribed the most weight. Within the balancing exercise however, focus also needs to 
be on the balance between the different sectors to ensure the fair sharing out of opportunities in 
relation to the fishery. Indeed, many focused on balance by way of a call for current patterns of 
exploitation to be rebalanced to achieve this notion of fairness. The IFCA’s handling of the netting 
byelaw can be viewed as one large exercise in balancing competing interests and requirements for a 
sustainable fishery, elements of which will be discussed below.  
6.5.1 Nature of Balance 
The requirement for balance was often related back to the statutory duty of the IFCA set out in the 
Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009.45 The IFCA data tended to frame this statutory duty as the 
source of the requirement to balance.  
 
45 Section 153 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009:  
“(1)The authority for an IFC district must manage the exploitation of sea fisheries resources in that district. 
(2)In performing its duty under subsection (1), the authority for an IFC district must— 
(a)seek to ensure that the exploitation of sea fisheries resources is carried out in a sustainable way, 
(b)seek to balance the social and economic benefits of exploiting the sea fisheries resources of the 
district with the need to protect the marine environment from, or promote its recovery from, the 
effects of such exploitation, 
(c)take any other steps which in the authority's opinion are necessary or expedient for the purpose of 
making a contribution to the achievement of sustainable development, and 
(d)seek to balance the different needs of persons engaged in the exploitation of sea fisheries 
resources in the district.” 
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“Devon and Severn IFCA is committed to seeking to balance the social and economic benefits 
of exploiting the sea fisheries resources of the District with the need to protect the marine 
environment from, or promote its recovery from, the effects of such exploitation as per its 
obligations under the Marine and Coastal Access Act (MACAA 2009).” (A5) 
However, a number of participants viewed the statutory duty as enacting the balance required as a 
result of the public interest in the fishery.  
“For me, the Marine and Coastal Access Act is all about trying to incorporate all of those views 
of basically the entire UK population, whether or not they live in Birmingham, whether or not 
they’ve ever been to the sea, they still have some level of ownership and they still have an 
interest in that being properly managed.” (PN10-MAN) 
“… I’m a great fan of section 153 of MACAA because whoever drafted that really encapsulated 
the balancing act which ownership perhaps in that sense conveys.” (PN12-MAN) 
The concept of balance was also referred to in the context of the management of fisheries by the 
European Union:  
“The announcement by the Commission also stated that the emergency ban on trawling would 
be complemented by further measures to ensure that all those who fish sea bass make a 
balanced and fair contribution to saving the stock.” (A2) 
This might suggest a more fundamental source for the requirement of balance than the 2009 Act 
and the public right to fish. Indeed, Ruhl identifies the universal presence in environmental law of 
“[trade offs] between costs and benefits in terms of resource allocation and social welfare.”46 
Similarly, Bennett and Dearden note that “livelihood and rights trade offs are an inherent part of 
implementing successful conservation initiatives.”47 Examples of this type of balancing can be seen in 
numerous locations and situations. For example, in a study of marine spatial planning in Barbuda, 
Johnson et al assert that the zoning plan agreed for the study area “balances economic, conservation 
and cultural uses” of the sea.48 However, it is submitted that each of these instances of balancing 
exercises being carried out are tied to resources that are in some way public and therefore require 
management for the benefit of the public as a whole, as with the public fishery.  
In the present research the content of the requirement to balance was somewhat varied, with a 
focus both on balance between different types of users of the fishery resource, and on balance 
between the use of the resource and the need to conserve the fishery for current and future 
 
46 J. B. Ruhl, ‘Working both (positivist) ends toward a new (pragmatist) middle in environmental law’ (2000) 
68(3) George Washington Law Review 522, 536 
47 Nathan James Bennett and Philip Dearden, ‘Why do local people not support conservation: Community 
perceptions of marine protected area livelihood impacts, governance and management in Thailand’ (2014) 44 
Marine Policy 107, 114 
48 Ayana Elizabeth Johnson, William James McClintock, Ogden Burton, Wayde Burton, Andrew Estep, Kathryn 
Mengerink, Read Porter and Stephanie Tate, ‘Marine spatial planning in Barbuda: A social, ecological, 
geographic, and legal case study’ (2020) 113 Marine Policy 103793, 1 
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generations. In discussing the netting byelaw, one participant described the motivation for the 
byelaw by referring to the need to balance the needs of different users of the fishery:  
“It was about balancing the level of exploitation. Firstly, to consider protecting the 
sustainability of the salmon and sea trout stock and then a consideration of an equitable 
balance between the rod and net fisheries taking account of their respective socio-economic 
values.” (PN15-MAN) 
While another participant, in setting out the role of the IFCA, focused on the need for a balance 
between the exploitation and conservation of fisheries:  
“[W]e are responsible for managing the inshore fisheries out to 6 nautical miles within the 
district, to help develop fisheries, to help further conservation objectives and just to keep that 
balance,” (PN05-MAN) 
This latter type of balance was sometimes expressed as balancing the needs of all of the public in the 
use of the fishery.  
“I think that the way that we approach our work, with the consultation and setting out our 
rationale, it does involve all sectors; it involves the public, it involves environmental groups. 
When the decisions are taken all of these things are sort of put into our pot so that you can see 
all these different issues and try and find a solution.” (PN09-MAN) 
“I think it’s just treating everyone equally. That’s a really fundamental principle here – if you 
treat all people equally, we’re going to regulate all of you, but the extent of the regulation will 
be appropriate to the damage or the benefit of what it is you do; benefit to society, damage to 
the environment, we have to measure that up.” (PN19-MAN) 
The balance between exploitation and conservation was also presented as a balance between 
managing for now and managing for the future.  
“Sometimes, because we've got so much to do, people aren't asking for that change because 
they're doing ok out of it, and that's always a tough question when you say we are going to 
manage for a sustainable fishery of that stock in the future… [B]ass is a good example, you 
could see effort going that way, absolutely going hell for leather because it's a non-quota 
valuable species and stock was starting to reflect that. We should have; you know scientists 
would have known way before it nosedived that that wasn't a good combination, but nobody 
really wanted to hear that. You know, things were still good enough that nobody really wanted 
to hear it, and I think that's something that never changes.” (PN21-MAN) 
“[I]t's a big challenge [for the IFCA] to be able to conserve the fish as well as keeping the 
fishermen on board, because that's not easy. Fishermen are notoriously argumentative! I don’t 
know many fishermen that are not argumentative, but it's because they're very protective of 
their rights as well. Everybody is protective. So you can look at the fishery officers and you can 
think they're just there to take everything away from you, but they're not. They're there to try 
and conserve, so there is a future for it.” (PN23-FSH) 
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The belief in the concept of balance can be seen in the importance placed by the IFCA and those 
involved in management in the role of the IFCA as providing a forum for different interests to come 
together. One participant, in discussing the role of the IFCA Committee stated that:  
“What has changed enormously is the incorporation of angling as a voice on Sea Fisheries 
Committees, as it has with conservation and ecology and so on. So I think we have a much, 
much better balance, a much stronger voice.” (PN19-MAN) 
Similarly, during a discussion at the IFCA Committee public meeting on 14 December 2018 in 
connection with the need to recruit new members from the main Committee to sit on the Byelaw 
and Permitting Sub-Committee, the then Chair of the IFCA noted that the quorum for the Sub-
Committee is 8 people, which might be considered quite large, however: 
“fishing is not a uniform profession and there are many different people with differing 
interests. When we make decisions which impact on everyone who works in the marine 
environment, everyone needs to be able to feed into this; it needs to be an open process.” 
Therefore the quorum is set at a larger than may be expected number.” (MO-3) 
Furthermore, numerous examples of the balance being referred to by many participants can be 
found in the documents published by the IFCA in relation to the netting byelaw.  
“Traditional fishing and its value was debated when trying to balance this social issue with 
known serious concerns relating to bass stock levels.” (ANE-RR) 
“Members were able to consider if access for netting within estuaries was appropriate when 
balanced against the existing evidence base, pre-consultation response, social impact 
(traditional fishing opportunities), the duties for D&S IFCA and the application (where 
appropriate) of a pre-cautionary approach.” [sic] (IA Fin(S)) 
As indicated from these extracts, one of the areas in which the participants revealed conflict in 
respect of the balance to be drawn was in the weight to be given to tradition and heritage. For some 
fishermen, an inadequate weight was being given to the importance of their traditions of fishing.  
“I am the last of the line here, that's why I think it should be protected because after me there 
will be no one to do it. And all the knowledge and the history, and you're going back five or six 
hundred years of history here in [redacted], doing what I do, will be gone, when I finish that'll 
be the end of it.” (PN23-FSH)   
“[W]hen it’s your livelihood and it’s what you do, and it’s what you’ve done with your children 
and your grandchildren, and you’ve learnt from your father and your grandfather, it’s 
important. It’s not just something that’s talked about at the racecourse in Exeter by a bunch of 
people who don’t know what they’re talking about.” (PN20-FSH) 
This view is strongly linked to the interpretation of the public fishery and of fishing as providing an 
identity, as discussed in section 6.3.1 above. However, it can be seen that the IFCA, while clearly 
including tradition in the balancing exercise, placed a different (and lesser) weight on the 
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importance of tradition, prioritising it only where that tradition was compatible with sustainability, 
which correlated with much older traditions and much more inefficient (and often uncommercial) 
methods. The following extract considers the traditional methods of herring fishing in the Severn 
Estuary.  
“Within Bridgwater Bay National Nature Reserve and the River Parrett estuary are two 
recreational netters who were part of the Wessex Fishermens Association and have been 
fishing for 40 years, ‘for codling and whiting, mainly mullet for pleasure, any sprats are given 
away’. They said the area is a historic herring fishery, with herring barrelled at Lilstock since 
the eighteenth century. They require three men on board a specialist flat bottomed boat, 
called a Somerset Flatner once widely used in inshore waters of Somerset, to enable them to 
drift net for sprat, herring and mullet from the mouth of the Parrett to Steart Island. It is 
believed to be the only one of its kind still operating along this coastline. They set 3 trammel 
nets along Steart Island (two of which are in the mouth of the River Parrett and one is off the 
headland) and one across the mouth of the Huntspill River. They also set two tiers of stake 
nets on a large sandy area in Bridgwater Bay, known as The Gore. There were three or four 
fishers operating in this area, now they are the last remaining. They have been given fishing 
gear each time a fisher has ceased operating but they repeated the rhetoric of the other 
fishers that ‘no young people are taking up fishing like this’ due to the extreme tidal 
conditions on the Severn estuary that demand a hard amount of work yet do not reap a large 
financial reward. Stake net fishing on The Gore would cease to exist if any headline 
restrictions were imposed as a result of the netting consultation, as nets can only be hung, 
set and retrieved from the shore.” (A6) 
Following detailed considerations of the various traditional fishing methods that take place in the 
estuary, some of which can be traced back as far as the Doomsday Book, as decision was taken by 
the IFCA to amend the proposed prohibition on all estuarine netting to allow these traditions to 
continue. The common characteristics of these traditions, such as the mud-horse fishery in the 
estuary,49 are that they are inefficient, carried out by minimal numbers of fishermen and often at a 
subsistence level only, thus compatible with sustainability requirements. It can therefore be seen 
that sustainability is the key factor in the weight attributed to tradition. In fact, a number of 
participants suggested that sustainability should be the key factor in any balancing exercise; coming 
above all other issues.  
 “I think it’s much better to just accept each licence based on the stock and the efficiency of the 
boats and the effort that they’re putting in. That way we have, scientifically, a better chance of 
safeguarding stocks. That may sound quite cool, cold and sort of calculating, but protecting 
the stocks protects everything else; it protects the community, it protects the fishermen. If we 
don’t protect the stock, none of that matters. So everything we should do, whether it’s for 
 
49 See, for example, Laura Elvin and Michael Taylor, ‘Britain's remaining mud-horse fisherman says business is 
suffering following Hinkley Point C construction’ (Somerset Live, 14 November 2017) 
<https://www.somersetlive.co.uk/news/somerset-news/britains-remaining-mud-horse-fisherman-775588> 
accessed 10 April 2020 
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anglers, whether it’s for [commercial fishermen], should be about protecting that stock.” 
(PN19-MAN)  
“If you start from the sort of principles around sustainable management of natural resources 
and sustainable management of those natural resources both now and in the future, you’ve 
got an inter- and intra- generational equity… You’ve got some key environmental parameters, 
which should and must be in play. And you then go to what are the public interests, plural, in 
the management of that resource?” (PN03-MAN) 
This approach aligns with commentators like Lam, who notes that “[t]he public right to fish can only 
be protected if the sustainability of the living resources themselves is not harmed.”50 In this way, the 
privileging of sustainability in the balancing exercise can be viewed as the protection of the public 
interest in the fishery by ensuring that the greatest number of people (both present and future) will 
be able to enjoy it.  
6.5.2 Fairness 
The need for balance was indirectly identified by many participants who spoke of unfairness 
(expressly or impliedly) in the current management of fisheries and of the favouring of a sector, or a 
part of a sector, that the particular participant was not a part of. For example, participants involved 
in recreational fishing tended to consider the balance to be too heavily weighted in the commercial 
sector’s favour.  
“[T]here's been a lot of controversy recently with the bass fishing, because throughout the 
summer there was a total ban on recreational anglers keeping bass, and commercial boats 
were still allowed to take a quota of bass, which seemed to be very unfair when most anglers 
may take the odd fish to eat, but they're certainly not taking huge numbers, whereas the 
commercial boats could take like a tonne of bass, well the entire angling population of north 
Devon would struggle to catch a tonne of bass over a season.” (PN25-FSH) 
At the same time, several participants involved in the commercial fishing sector felt that the balance 
was unfairly weighted in favour of recreational fishers.  
“I would like there to be more balance I think. So, for example, I used to work in Looe and we 
had charter angler vessels that had commercially registered because they couldn’t handle the 
amount of fish that was being thrown away by the people who came to catch them on their 
vessels, so they wanted to sell them [and] so they actually got licensed so they could. So 
thinking about those vessels, all around the country, that it is a business for them, and those 
individuals who go and pay them to go and catch fish, get to keep the fish. And that’s not 
really different from a single fisherman operating the same vessel with a number of rods on. So 
from a stock conservation or stock management point of view, I think angling business in 
particular need to be brought into regulation.” (PN14-FSH)  
 
50 Lam (n22), 24 
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As well as unfairness in the balance between the sectors, there was also a feeling of unfairness 
within the commercial sector.  
“The old statistic, and I’m sure you can update me on this, it was something like 95% of the 
vessels in this country are small inshore boats that catch about a maximum of 5% of total 
tonnage of fish. Whereas the larger boats account for 5% of the vessels, but account for 95% of 
the fish landed overall; those are the boats I feel that we need to heavily police and control and 
restrict movements and quotas. Really for 95% of the boats landing 5% of the fish, we’re 
spending an inordinate amount of time over that, and that’s just wrong; the balance is wrong, 
we need to redress the balance.” (PN08-FSH) 
The expressions of unfairness were matched by discussions, by both those involved in management 
and those subject to management, of the need for fairness when considering the needs of all 
sectors.  
“I’ve never seen the public right to fish as the problem. I think it’s the management of the 
public right to fish that’s the problem, and the rules that are applied and the fairness of the 
rules that are applied.” (PN17-FSH) 
“We want, I think, to have a fair share of what there is there and it seems we’re not really on 
the same level playing field as elsewhere.” (PN08-FSH) 
“I’ve sort of taken that message and taken the view that if all the sectors feel that you are 
being disproportionately unfair to them then probably you’ve got the balance right. It’s when 
one sector thinks that you are protecting it that you have screwed up. So it’s an incredibly 
difficult job, and you’re only succeeding if everybody thinks you’re failing, if that isn’t a 
tautology.” (PN12-MAN) 
Ultimately, the requirement of fairness can be linked back to the public right to fish and the need to 
ensure the fishery is as open as possible, while still acting in the best interests of the public as whole:    
“I don’t like the word fair, because lots of things aren’t fair, but I think if it’s a public right to 
fish, if we all believe we have this right, then we all need to be responsible with that right. And 
so yeah, I’d like to see a bit more inclusivity with regard to fishing, just the practice of fishing.” 
(PN14-FSH) 
Indeed, the call for fairness in the balance between sectors was often seen in calls by the 
participants for rebalancing management effort in relation to the different interests in the fishery. 
This was identified by some as a task of moving away from a previous position of fisheries 
management being almost entirely focused on the commercial catching sector and towards greater 
recognition of the wide range of interests in the public fishery.  
“[T]here is that position of the commercial catching sector is all important, and there is this 
realisation, I think [the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009] was the first time it was set out to 
help start that conversation from the local managers’ point of view, saying "well that's not 
how it's being viewed anymore."” (PN21-MAN) 
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“One of the big frustrations of the recreational angling sector is that many IFCAs had not 
moved forward from their remit as a Sea Fisheries Committee, when they were generally 
perceived to be acting in the favour of commercial fishing interests. Devon and Severn IFCA did 
move forward and they took into account their responsibilities set out in the [Marine and 
Coastal Access Act 2009], which is to rebalance the level of exploitation to more sustainable 
forms of fishing.” (PN15-MAN) 
The concept of balance is not new to fisheries management, as can be seen from the inclusion of the 
requirement in the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 as a target for IFCAs. Additionally, those 
studying fisheries management have used the concept in a variety of ways. For example, Sovacool 
suggests that Total Allowable Catch limits are in essence “an attempt to balance two competing 
concerns in fisheries management: protection of stocks and harvesting.”51 While Siple et al note that 
balancing the direct effects and benefits of harvesting fish with “the indirect effects that fisheries 
have on natural, economic and social systems” is a central part of ecosystem-based fisheries 
management.52 However, the present research demonstrates that balancing the needs and interests 
of the different sectors involved in fishing, as well as of the public as a whole, is seen as an essential 
part of protecting and promoting the public interest in the fishery, and thereby an essential part of 
the public right to fish. The process of the IFCA developing and making a byelaw, such as the netting 
byelaw, can be viewed as an extended exercise of balancing all of these needs and interests. This is 
illustrated in the following extended extract from the IFCA document summarising the byelaw 
progress for members of the IFCA Committee:  
“Although members were aware that there would be a negative impact (for some) created 
by the introduction of new measures, members considered the proposals in light of key areas 
of the IFCA’s main duties as specified in section 153 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 
2009; including sustainable exploitation of sea fisheries resources (especially in the light of 
the critical state of Bass stocks) and also seeking to balance the different needs of persons 
engaged in the exploitation of sea fisheries resources in the district. Guiding principles 
including the objective of reducing illegal netting activity was also discussed at this meeting.  
• The Sub-Committee viewed and discussed information collected during the 
preconsultation [sic] 
• The Sub-Committee recognised that significant and detailed social and economic 
data from those most affected by potential changes to legislation had generally not 
been submitted in the Consultation responses.  
• The Sub-Committee reviewed all available economic data that was available to them 
at this time which indicated that commercial interests within estuaries were low.  
• The Sub-Committee recognised that there would be some negative impact for some 
fishers, but on balance the other factors outweighed this possible impact.  
 
51 Benjamin Sovacool, ‘A Game of Cat and Fish: How to Restore the Balance in Sustainable Fisheries 
Management’ (2009) 40(1) Ocean Development and International Law 97, 106 
52 Margaret Siple, Timothy Essington and Éva Plagányi, ‘Forage fish fisheries management requires a tailored 
approach to balance trade offs’ (2019) 20 Fish and Fisheries 110, 110 
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• On balance, at this stage, members felt that the key drivers for the Byelaw and the 
principles already developed outweighed the impact for those wanting to use nets 
within the estuaries.” (ANE-RR) 
6.6 Challenges 
The third question the case study set out to answer was to identify the challenges facing the 
management of fisheries, as perceived by the participants. Linking this discussion of challenges to 
the analysis as a whole, these challenges can be viewed as the challenges facing the pursuit of the 
balance identified as the key ingredient in managing for the public.  
The challenges were expressed by some in very practical terms, such as the lack of funding and 
resources available to the IFCA compared to the duties placed on them and the extent of the area 
they are responsible for. 
“I think we’re doing so much for our budget, but I think the public think we’re a much bigger 
organisation or think that we should be able to just do far more than we do, and that’s 
frustrating for everyone. It’s frustrating for officers, it’s frustrating for NGOs, who would like 
things to happen quicker, it’s frustrating for the industry if they think that we’re not 
attending things quickly enough, but the reality is; that’s how we’re funded and that’s 
probably not going to change.” (PN10-MAN) 
In addition, the unequal allocation of funds nationally appears to be presenting particular challenges 
for Devon & Severn IFCA. It was noted at the Committee Meeting held on 14 December 2018 that 
DEFRA metrics suggest that D&S IFCA should have 23 enforcement officers for their size and duties, 
whereas at the moment they have 4 (MO-3).  
 
As well as these very practical challenges, two main themes were identified as underlying the 
challenges discussed by the participants: (i) a lack of agreement as to who management is for; and 
(ii) a lack of agreement in the change being called for by participants to protect the fishery.  
 
6.6.1 Who is Management For?  
The participants identified two key objectives for fisheries management by the IFCA (and other such 
bodies). The first is to protect the resource for everyone:  
“[W]henever I put in a consultation response about things it’s on behalf of the fish. So 
sometimes I’ll remind them of the North Devon fisheries, but we’re not there to represent 
fishermen, champion sustainable fisheries, but I’m not there to take the place of a fisherman, I 
am there to take the place of how do we manage this resource in a way that is sustainable.” 
(PN10-MAN) 
While the second is to facilitate the commercial fishing industry:  
“[T]here is in the social survey world and consultation world…  [a saying] to make it robust and 
meaningful and useful; “It’s not about us without us.” In other words don’t make decisions 
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without us, because without us you won’t make useful, meaningful decisions and you won’t be 
able to get those decisions carried out. So if you consult with people first, in a meaningful way, 
and get them on board, and make decisions that are with them, jointly, which everybody feels 
that they can move forward with, you won’t have to spend your time wandering round trying 
to fine people.” (PN20-FSH) 
Both of these objectives come into the balance required by the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 
and as discussed in section 6.5 above. However, not all participants recognised these competing 
purposes of management, and tension could be seen where there was a mismatch between the view 
of the participant as to the purpose of management and the balance required. For example, some of 
the participants expressed dissatisfaction with the IFCA or with management in general.  
“[T]hey don’t understand that we are small men, under 8m, we should be able to fish [for] 
what we want to fish for, not be dictated the same as the 27m beamer, because that’s what 
we’re treated as, all the same. We shouldn’t be, I only fish 6 or 7 months of the year, so I 
should be able to jump whatever I want, loads to be fished for, but you can’t, you’re governed 
all the time, and that’s a big bugbear.” (PN16-FSH)  
This dissatisfaction was often expressed as a problem of fishermen not being consulted or involved 
in management enough.  
“I think the IFCA’s good, it was good, [but] they’re getting a lot of fishermen’s backs up lately. 
They seem to be, you know all these different permit things coming in and everything and fines 
for this, fines for that, but they never listen.” (PN18-FSH) 
Indeed, many felt management with fishermen would be better than the current situation.  
“The management of fisheries just needs to be much more inclusive because no one will know 
the reality of being at sea like a fishermen and no one will know the science like a scientist.” 
(PN14-FSH) 
“[T]here has to be regional management and the fishermen have to be involved with that 
regional management… the fishermen along this coast here should be involved. Obviously 
have officers from outside that would be involved as well, but you have ports like Ilfracombe, 
Appledore, Bideford and Clovelly and they should be representatives from each one involved 
with the regional management. That's how it should work and that's the only way it will work, 
because then you're looking after your own interests. If you get somebody in from outside 
telling you what you should be doing, that won't work. Not at all.” (PN23-FSH) 
The aim of involving fishermen in the process of management more can be seen in the IFCA data as 
well:  
“The permit schemes will also allow D&SIFCA to communicate directly with users to increase 
understanding and awareness of the management and allow permit holders to actively 
participate in shaping future management. This reflects strongly the Government’s Big Society 
and Localism agendas by encouraging local people to participate in the decision making 
process and helping to empower local communities.” (IA Cons) 
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However, involving fishermen in management will not, by itself, avoid the tension. If the purpose of 
management is viewed by such fishermen as to benefit and facilitate the commercial fishing 
industry, then it will be difficult to avoid this sense of dissatisfaction when decisions have to be 
made that might have a negative impact on current commercial fishermen.  
In addition, the tension cannot simply be described as one between the view taken by managers and 
the view taken by commercial fishermen. The lack of clarity over the purpose of management can 
also be seen in management circles. Despite the acknowledged benefit of the IFCA model being the 
larger number of interests included around the management table,53 one participant suggested that 
management could still be skewed to commercial interests: 
 “[O]ne of the big issues with the IFCA [is] the local authority members who sit on [the 
Committee]… They do get an introduction to IFCA business, but there’s often no awareness of 
marine or wider environmental issues with their qualification often only being that they 
represent a commercial fishing port as a County Councillor… This is a fundamental flaw as you 
can clearly see which angle they may take in a discussion on measures to constrain commercial 
fishing activity.” (PN15-MAN) 
Indeed, the lack of clarity perhaps extends right up to the government, with some participants 
involved in the IFCA expressing views that the government often protects commercial interests too 
much.  
“[T]he government has baulked at putting in place highly protected marine protected areas, 
despite the advice… They’ve done that because they’re not prepared politically to take the hit 
in home waters of putting those in place. The benefits are very clear; the benefits of highly 
protected marine areas with no fishing, in terms of recovery of stocks, spill-over effect, you 
know you can see examples of that all around the world. Indeed the FCO, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, is putting in place a vast [amount of] highly protected marine areas 
in our UK Overseas Territories.” (PN03-MAN) 
“[I]t’s very confusing, because at the same time, for us and the MMO, you get something like 
the 25 Year Environment Plan, which is really ambitious and you think “well but if we’d tried to 
start actually implementing any of that, government wouldn’t let it through.”” (PN10-MAN) 
This view of the priorities held by those in government can also be seen in the description by some 
commercial fishermen of the Fisheries Minister as existing to champion the commercial sector’s 
interests.  
“I know George Eustice is going to fight the corner for the Channel cod situation, because the 
quota, the 9% against 84% is an absolute nonsense, and he know that.” (PN13-FSH) 
“[W]hat I see and what we discuss in our [Producer Organisation] meetings is [that the IFCA 
are] just a loose cannon you know. They've got to be jumped on, it's got to be the Minister or 
 
53 Terry et al (n30), 365 
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whoever's in charge of them has got to look at this lot and think what a shower they all are, 
I'm afraid to say.” (PN26-FSH) 
The problem of government ‘capture’ was identified by Lam as arising from the “conflicting roles of 
government as both regulator and trustee of public fishery resources and also facilitator of private 
fishing enterprises,”54 leading to an industry with more power than is appropriate for a public 
resource.  
Similar tensions between competing purposes can be seen in the views expressed by the 
participants on sustainability and conservation. Many participants expressed or recognised a clear 
tension between fishing interests and conservation interests.  
“I think, I mean lots of times conversations are quite polarised; it’s either a conservation 
perspective or a fisheries perspective” (PN06-MAN) 
“[F]ishermen using towed gear… they have to be very much aware of where they’re not 
allowed to go. So that’s what they’re mostly concerned about in terms of the IFCA. In fulfilling 
their conservation objectives, that puts them in opposition to the fishing industry.”            
(PN07-MAN) 
Indeed, one participant referred to conservationists as “green terrorists” (PN26-MAN). Yet at the 
same time, a number of the participants involved in fishing expressly viewed themselves as 
conservationists.  
“Most fishermen are conservationists anyway, because it’s not in anybody’s interest to take 
the last one of anything. So fishermen, no matter whether they’re catching shellfish or whether 
they’re catching white fish, it doesn’t make no difference, if they start to see a decline in the 
area they’re fishing, they’ll move somewhere else. And that’s just a natural thing.” (PN13-FSH) 
“[A] real fisherman, a genuine fisherman, is a conservative anyway, a conservationist anyway, 
because without conservation you don't have fishing.” (PN23-FSH)  
Even those that did not expressly articulate this view were keen to discuss the (voluntary) efforts 
they took to conserve fish stocks.  
“I do honestly believe, certainly looking at the younger fishermen coming up round here, how 
more environmentally aware they are, and where their father or their forefather wouldn’t have 
had no qualms about “oh we’ll keep that, we’ll keep that,” [instead they’re saying] “that’s got 
to go back, that’s undersized” or “we’ll get a bigger one later, we’ll put it back.” It’s not just 
about take, take, take. If you’ve got a lobster that’s carrying berries, well ok, when it sheds all 
its berries you can take it, but some of us do ‘v-notch’ them, so you take a notch out of its tail, 
it’ll take a few years to grow out, so you’re not allowed to land that with a ‘v-notch’ in. You 
don’t have to ‘v-notch’ it, but you’re just thinking of the future, you’re thinking, particularly 
undersized females, I tend to ‘v-notch’ them, because you know it will give it a few years to 
reproduce.” (PN18-FSH) 
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Thus the tension does not seem to come from opposition to the idea of conservation or 
sustainability itself, but rather how these concepts are interpreted. In a similar way to the different 
views as to who management is for, different views as to who conservation is for can be seen. The 
IFCA stresses the importance of sustainability as a medium to long term exercise, thereby focusing 
on sustainability for a wide class of people, including future generations.  
“Recognising that sustainable development is where the management of the fishing activities 
seeks to maximise the social, economic and environmental benefits in the medium and long 
term.” (ANE-RR) 
However, some involved in the commercial fishing sector appeared to place more importance on the 
interests of the current fishermen.  
“[T]his is the North Devon Coast – it’s hard and there’s very few places to shelter and I think 
the draconian sort of effect that it’s having is a bit like a hammer to crack a nut. We’re all for 
conservation here if it’s meaningful; it’s got to have an output at the end of it. There’s no point 
saying “oh we’re not going to fish; we’re going to stop everything happening here.” We’ve got 
to have a reasonable outcome and also take into effect I believe the economic impact on small 
fishing boats. Otherwise we’ll have no future.” (PN08-FSH) 
This difference in understanding of the purpose of ‘conservation’ is similar to that noted by Kelly et 
al in their study of marine protected areas off the coast of Tasmania. In that study, participants “fell 
into two groups, one that wished to sustainably use the ocean, and another whose desire was solely 
to protect the ocean” (emphasis added).55 These two focuses are also identified by Cardwell and 
Thornton, who suggest that the conservation movement’s uptake of marine protected areas as the 
solution to ocean use problems is based on the core concept of conservation biology, being “to 
preserve biodiversity for biodiversity’s sake, rather than for economic maximisation.”56  
It is submitted that the differing views of the purpose of conservation can be linked to the differing 
views of the purpose of management. At the heart of both is conflict over who the fishery resource 
is for. If it is indeed a public trust asset then it must be managed for the benefit of the public as a 
whole, including future generations, but management for the public must also involve appreciating 
the use and benefits that the resource can provide to humans, including as a food source and the 
multitude of uses and benefits that flow from that.  
The lack of a common understanding of these matters presents a challenge for the IFCA and other 
bodies involved in managing and protecting the fishery. One possible solution to that challenge, 
identified by participants in the present research, is to focus on communication between everyone, 
 
55 Kelly et al (n29), 5 
56 Emma Cardwell and Thomas Thornton, ‘The fisherly imagination: The promise of geographical approaches to 
marine management’ (2015) 64 Geoforum 157, 159 
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particularly in terms of how sustainability/conservation issues are presented to industry. A large 
number of the participants agreed that benefits flow from sustainable fishing. For example, one 
participant agreed that:  
“You know management is necessary, we do need to protect fish stocks for our own futures” 
(PN14-FSH) 
Yet the benefits of sustainable fishing and conservation measures were felt by a number to be 
insufficiently communicated to fishermen.  
“[I]n a way I think the problem is the regulators regulate on the basis of scientific evidence 
and the precautionary principle and they don’t do emotion. The difficulty is, however, you 
can only really counter emotion with emotion, and therefore, you know if regulators turned 
round and said “well yes you do have the public right to fish, we recognise the importance of 
the tradition,” but nobody made the point very strongly at all, if there’s no fish, you’re not 
going to have a tradition. That didn’t enter into it, and I think now it’s improving, because as 
I understand it, if you look at the Lyme Bay, one of the selling points was “well look, if you’ve 
got a healthy local fishing industry, there’s something to pass on to your children, to your 
sons and your daughters,” and that was one of the things that was taken up by those that 
were then converted to supporting it, the fishermen.” (PN12-MAN) 
Another participant identified the importance of the language used when communicating on 
sustainability and conservation issues, stressing the need to use language that unites all of those 
interested in the oceans, rather than dividing them:  
“It’s really sad and it’s built and built and built now to the point where it’s so adversarial that 
it can be so difficult to find common ground, where sometimes all it needs is a change of 
words. So I find that the words used by conservation agencies and NGOs are very war-like, 
you know “we need to,” “we are battling,” “we are challenging.” Actually no, it’s not a war, 
you want the same thing. Sit down, use words that are common and realise that everyone 
just wants fish stocks in the marine environment to be alright. Some want to keep them, 
some want to catch them, and all we need is it all to be common and work together.” (PN14-
FSH) 
With clearer communication of the point of management, being to manage for the benefit of the 
public as a whole, and the benefits such management can bring to all, the challenge identified in the 
data can be addressed.  
6.6.2 Change is Needed but What Change?  
The desire for some form of change in management practices was shown across the data.  
“[I]t’s got to be managed from somewhere, and it could be better than it is, it’s not really 
working. It’s not really working.” (PN18-FSH)  
“It just irritates me, the whole way I think British fishing is run is just wrong. All the quota thing 
I think is ridiculous.” (PN24-FSH) 
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Many participants gave focused suggestions for what that change should look like. For example, 
some participants focused on the recreational sector and the need to introduce management there.  
“[I]f you’re going to put regulation on the commercial guys, the anglers, in some way, shape or 
form, should be policed.” (PN11-FSH) 
“My own view is that every exploitation of a fishery is at least going to have to be examined in 
terms of its impact for potential regulation. You might decide that a particular one is so low 
key that it doesn’t need it at the moment, but I don’t think it is any longer a sustainable 
argument that there’s no need to examine for potential regulation any exploitation of fishery.” 
(PN12-MAN) 
At the same time, there were arguments that the focus for management change should be on the 
commercial fishing sector, although within this focus different views were expressed, with some 
calling for more restrictive measures, such as this potting fisherman: 
“I mean we've got a much freer hand than mobile gear, you know with trawlers and netters, 
they're far more restricted, and [the same for] fish than with shellfish. I mean we'd like to see 
some more restrictions brought in for shellfish really.” (PN22-FSH) 
Similarly, a participant involved in commercial fishing but sitting on the IFCA Committee suggested 
an additional focus for increased regulation of the commercial sector.   
“I do think that if you’re going to commercially extract fish for profit that you should be 
properly regulated, monitored, controlled and counted, because at the end of the day, the 
work of a fisheries scientist in terms of counting the fish and trying to determine whether 
that stock is being harvested within sustainable limits or not, requires data to be collected. So 
commercial fishermen should be under obligation to provide that data.” (PN07-MAN)  
While others called for less restrictive measures, or measures that are designed to help the 
commercial sector (or parts of it), such as this suggestion from a participant in the commercial 
sector:  
“I personally advocate for under 8m vessels to be sort of deregulated, because I think their 
stock impacts are probably very minimal. You know when you see an under 8m boat on the 
sea, you think “oh that’s going to be terrible,” but then you see it push off shore and it looks 
tiny! So I think they should have, perhaps not limits on what they can do, perhaps more 
availability. They should be able to do more, but there needs to be a tighter categorisation or 
characterisation of their vessels on engine power and all of those things.” (PN14-FSH) 
“I think that you need to be very careful about when you start restricting sea fishing, like the 
herring fishing, that it should be looked at in a better way and that the artisan fishermen and 
skills, well their territory needs protecting to continue the traditional fishing and that the skills 
exchange needs to be supported financially as being a sort of proper apprenticeship, things like 
that. I think there’s a whole need for reviewing the whole gamut in relationship to the strength 
and support for young people making an income in their own communities.” (PN20-FSH) 
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In addition, a number of participants identified a need for change in the relationship of fishing to 
other uses of the sea.  
“[T]he mobile gear guys, they’re the ones that are being slagged at the minute, because 
there’s more and more bodies out there trying to claim their little bit of the sea, and that’s 
making the sea a smaller place for the mobile gear fishermen.” (PN13-FSH)  
“[W]e have to have space for fishing. We can’t have space for aquaculture, windfarms, 
renewables and aggregate dredging, MPAs and so on, and not say, “actually you can fish 
here.” You know, it’s madness to expect them to fight each other and all of those other 
industries.” (PN14-FSH)  
As this variety of types of change illustrates, the challenge for fisheries managers is how to achieve 
change when it might not be the type of change everybody wants, and how to keep fishermen on 
board, despite not giving them everything they demand. In a context where nothing can please 
everyone, Johnson et al suggest that “the quest for complete consensus can be derailing… political 
and social leaders must accept that and commit to implementing a plan that best meets the 
community’s needs and has the potential to restore and sustain marine resources.”57 This phrase 
almost mirrors the requirements that the public trust places on the trustee of the resource and 
those managing on their behalf; to find solutions that provide the most benefit for the public as a 
whole and that encourage the conservation of marine resources to allow such benefits to continue 
for future publics. It is therefore submitted that the adoption of the public trust as a guiding 
principle for the management of the public fishery could help to address the challenges identified by 
this theme.  
In addition, this theme links closely with the “Who is Management For?” theme. It is submitted that 
increased understanding of the purpose of management and better communication of the benefits 
of management in maintaining sustainable fish stocks, should increase the levels of consensus 
around the types of change that are necessary to increase sustainability. Indeed, in support of the 
benefits of well-though out communication, Cardwell and Thornton suggest that identifying and 
working with how fishers view the sea and their place in it, is the key to introducing measures that 
will be embraced by the commercial sector.58 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and discussed the five themes generated from the analysis of the case 
study data. ‘The public right to fish is not just about fishing’ and ‘the public need to be involved in 
fishing’ show the patterns in the data relating to the participants’ views and experiences of the 
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public right to fish. Building upon these, the theme ‘exploitation of fisheries requires balance’ 
reflects the strong consensus in the data for balance in the way we exploit the public fishery, both 
between sectors and between exploitation and conservation. The challenges in achieving this 
balance, however, are shown in the themes ‘who is management for?’ and ‘change is needed, but 
what change?’  
In the context of the wider debate regarding the public right to fish, Appleby asserted in 2005 that 
“[t]he public right to fish in tidal waters as it is currently understood is the legal embodiment of a 
culture and philosophy of over-fishing.”59 The story told by this data, over a decade (including the 
passing of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009) later, is of a public right that actually performs a 
valuable role in fisheries management and society. Unlike Lam and Pauly’s suggestion, the public 
right to fish does not have to be interpreted as “an entitlement that fails to consider external costs”; 
when framed in a public trust context, as shown by the analysis above, the right can and must 
consider such costs. Indeed, the analysis suggests that the public right to fish and the public interest 
in the fishery resource that this right creates could help us to reach the balance that is identified by 
the participants to be the necessary target of fisheries management. However, to do so, the 
challenges identified above will need to be addressed, both in terms of giving clear communication 
as to the purpose of management and the ultimate beneficiaries, as well as in terms of bringing the 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION (A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE PUBLIC 
RIGHT TO FISH) 
 
7.1   Introduction 
This chapter will address Objective 3 by discussing the legal geography of the public right to fish. The 
concept of the lawscape will be explored in relation to the present research in order to build upon 
and contextualise the understanding of both the legal basis of the right, as set out in Chapter 4, and 
the understanding and experiences of those involved in fishing in relation to the right, as drawn from 
the case study and discussed in Chapter 6. Bringing these two elements of the research together 
elucidates a rounded picture of the role of the public right to fish in England’s coastal seas and the 
potential for the public trust interpretation to facilitate a more sustainable approach to fisheries 
management.  
7.2   The Lawscape as a Concept 
A lawscape is a concept that aims to “better explicate human-environment relationships.”1 Graham 
suggests that the landscapes that surround us are shaped by the land uses practised and permitted 
by the society inhabiting or using that landscape.2 Thus such landscapes, when read legally, allow us 
to “see our land use practises and the law system in action” and from this to understand the 
interaction between the law and practice and the environment.3 The ability of law to shape the 
landscape has been noted by numerous scholars outside the field of legal geography, such as Duck, 
whose consideration of the coastal nature of many of the UK’s railway lines concluded that the 
rather precarious positioning of these coastal lines was in part a product of the preference of the 
railway founders to build upon Crown owned foreshore and thus avoid complicated and expensive 
legal deals with a patchwork of private landowners.4 However, the concept of the lawscape does not 
focus merely on the effect of law on the landscape, but rather on “the interaction of human laws 
with the laws of Earth’s systems, [viewing this] as a complex network of relationships rather than as 
two separate spheres: human and non-human, culture and nature.”5 
By examining coastal waters and coastal environments as a lawscape, the picture of how the public 
right to fish is enmeshed with the space within which it is enacted can be elucidated. The lawscape is 
 
1 Tayanah O’Donnell, Daniel F Robinson and Josephine Gillespie (Eds.), Legal Geography: Perspectives and 
Methods (Routledge, 2020), 5 
2 Nicole Graham,  Lawscape: Property, environment, law (Routledge, 2010), 2 
3 Ibid. 
4 Robert Duck, On the Edge: Coastlines of Britain (Edinburgh University Press, 2015) 
5 Nicole Graham, ‘Sydney’s Drinking Water Catchment: A legal geographical analysis of coal mining and water 
security’ in O’Donnell et al (n1), 201 
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built up by reading the landscape (or, in this context, waterscape) “for regulatory and social 
impacts”6 as well as reading the law, including its implementation and enforcement, for the impacts 
of the physical nature of the space in which it operates. The picture that appears then enables an 
understanding of how the right to fish ‘works’ and whether the public trust interpretation of the 
right has the potential to steer the management of the public fishery towards ecosystem-based 
fisheries management and thus towards sustainable exploitation of the fishery resource.  
7.3   The Sea as a Lawscape 
As discussed in Chapter 2, legal geography as a movement and a methodology was born out of a 
particular concern that the law “frequently operates as if space does not matter.”7 Such operation 
can be seen in many jurisdictions, including English common law, in which space – whether it be land 
as traditionally understood, or space covered with water – tends to be treated the same. This “anti-
[geographical]”8 approach is particularly seen in the treatment of the sea by the law. The Territorial 
Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 states in its introductory text that “the rightful jurisdiction of Her 
Majesty, her heirs and successors, extends and has always extended over the open seas adjacent to 
the coasts of the United Kingdom and of all other parts of Her Majesty’s dominions to such a 
distance as is necessary for the defence and security of such dominions.” Thus the Act provides that 
anyone committing an offence within the territorial waters of the UK may be “arrested, tried and 
punished” in accordance with the laws of the UK.9 Whether the offence took place at sea or in the 
centre of Birmingham is irrelevant in the eyes of the law.  
However, English law has extended further than just territorial waters. Pue’s consideration of the 
classic case from the late 1800s; R v Dudley and Stephens,10 in which a group of sailors were tried for 
murder after killing and eating their ailing cabin boy in order to avoid starvation whilst stranded on 
an open dinghy in the middle of the South Atlantic ocean, shows just how far the law can reach and 
just how willing it is to ignore geographic specifities.11 In a judgement still studied by law students 
today, the sailors were found guilty of murdering the cabin boy, with Judge Coleridge remarking that 
despite the fact that “the prisoners were subject to terrible temptation, to sufferings which might 
 
6 O’Donnell et al (n1), 6; see also Robyn Bartel, Nicole Graham, Sue Jackson, Jason Hugh Prior, Daniel Francis 
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break down the bodily power of the strongest man, and try the conscience of the best,”12 it was the 
duty of the court “to declare that the prisoners’ act in this case was wilful murder.”13 Thus, as Pue 
notes, “the situation of men starving to death on a small dinghy in the high seas [was treated as] 
legally tantamount to premeditated murder in a private club in London.”14 This case is a vivid 
illustration of the view that the law can take; the sea is simply an extension of land and the law can 
be applied in the same way in both.  
As well as the application of the same expectations of behaviour regardless of context shown by the 
law in the Dudley and Stephens case, it is also pertinent to consider the prior question of the 
application of the law to the actions that took place on the lifeboat as it drifted in the high seas, 
some 1600 miles from the Cape of Good Hope. The English court held that it did have jurisdiction to 
try the defendants on the basis that section 267 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 provided that all 
offences committed at sea, wherever that may be, would be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Admiralty of England provided that they were convicted by a seaman or apprentice who either at 
the time of the offence, or at any point in the preceding 3 months, was employed in a British ship, 
and the yacht that Dudley and Stephens had been crew on was a British vessel.  Indeed, showing the 
disregard of the law in this instance for the geography of any action, the statute states that such 
offences shall be “inquired of, heard, tried, determined, and adjudged in the same manner and by 
the same courts and in the same places as if such offences had been committed within the 
jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England” (emphasis added). Thus, for British jurisdiction, the location 
of the offence appears to be irrelevant.  
7.3.1 What is the sea?  
It may seem an obvious question, but it is worth considering how the sea has been constructed by 
lawyers and scholars, for this has bearing on law’s relation with the sea. In cartography, the sea 
 
12 (n10), 279 
13 Ibid., 288 
14 Pue (n8), 568. Interestingly, in Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 
(HL) the House of Lords had to consider whether the defence of duress was available to a charge of second 
degree murder. Before distinguishing the ruling in the Dudley and Stephens case as relating to the defence of 
necessity and not that of duress, Lord Morris of Borthy-y-Gest stated that “If then someone is really threatened 
with death or serious injury unless he does what he is told to do is the law to pay no heed to the miserable, 
agonising plight of such a person? For the law to understand not only how the timid but also the stalwart may 
in a moment of crisis behave is not to make the law weak but to make it just. In the calm of the court-room 
measures of fortitude or of heroic behaviour are surely not to be demanded when they could not in moments 
for decision reasonably have been expected even of the resolute and the well disposed” [670]. This suggests 
that the law will in some circumstances distinguish between different contexts of an action, however Lord 
Morris made it clear that he did not see his judgment as overruling Dudley and Stephens, which leads to the 
conclusion that while the law is capable of recognising that not all decisions are made in the “calm of the 
court-room”, this only extends to pressures placed on a defendant by another person, rather than by the 
situation that defendant finds themselves in (as in Dudley and Stephens). 
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tends to be depicted as an empty blue space “separating the areas claimed as possessions of 
sovereign states.”15 The idea of emptiness can be seen in Jones’ suggestion that this binary leads to 
“an understanding of the land as the place where ‘society’ exists, [while] the sea is simply a zone of 
exchange.”16 Although it is important to recognise that this notion is not universal. For example, in 
considering Aboriginal constructions of the sea, Jackson notes that the “elemental distinction 
between the land and the sea” that characterises European culture, is not found in Aboriginal 
culture.17 Indeed, Aboriginal cultures view the sea as far from empty, instead tending to make “no 
proprietal distinction” between land and sea, with customary tenure often encompassing both and 
“sacred sites and Dreaming paths” also being located at sea.18  
Nonetheless, in international relations (an area where the sea, as a physical divide between many 
states, is an important focus) the Western/European approach takes precedence. In this field, 
Steinberg identified three different, but related, constructions of the sea: as “resource provider,” as 
“transport surface” and as “battleground or “forcefield.””19 Two out of three of these configure the 
sea as merely a canvas for human activity. As an example, the debate in the 1600s between Grotius’ 
idea of mare liberum and Selden’s notion of mare clausum20 is based upon a construction of the sea 
as place of transit. The focus of the debate being on who had a right to travel across the sea. The 
construction of the sea as a place of transit can be seen in English common law also. In Blundell v 
Catterall, Best J remarked that it was “not… disputed that the sea, which has been called the “great 
highway of the world,” is common to all.”21 In Brinkman v Matley, the court confirmed the 
importance of the sea both as a highway and as a container of resources for human use, by 
confirming that the public right of navigation and the public common of fishery are the only rights 
that the public possess in respect of the sea.22  
In Roman law (which contains the earliest recorded pronouncements on the legal status of the 
sea),23 the sea and its shores were classed as res communes and so viewed as common to all people, 
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19 Philip Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11 
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meaning that anyone could navigate or fish within the sea.24  The classification of the sea as such 
distinguished it as separate from the land and as something not susceptible to sovereign claims.25 
Being unsusceptible to such claims, the sea has become a space in which the international 
community “becomes real.”26 Thus, coming forward to much more recent history, through UNCLOS27 
the international community sought to establish a communal approach to the sea. However, this 
approach started with the sea as a “blank canvas” to be divided up into different zones,28 each with 
different rules applying to them. At this point, the treatment of the sea becomes less distinct from 
the treatment of land, with the sea being constructed as yet another area that can be divided up 
between the members of the international community. And so UNCLOS created a series of different 
spaces within the sea. The sea up to 12 nautical miles from a state’s coastline, for example, was 
classified as territorial waters; it thus became the territory of the relevant state. This sea now 
arguably has more in common with the land within a state, than with the open oceans. Conversely, 
the high seas, being the area of the sea outside of individual states’ territorial waters and exclusive 
economic zones, are characterised by the freedoms that are available within them. The high seas are 
constructed as an area available for the use of all mankind, both as a resource provider and as a 
transport surface.  
However, as Jones notes, “as the use of a space changes, the understanding of the space changes, 
and, ultimately, the way that space is ordered.”29 This can be seen in the negotiation of a new 
international treaty in relation to the high seas relating to biodiversity in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, known informally as the BBNJ treaty.30 As technology develops and the use of the sea 
intensifies, the view of the sea as a place of freedom becomes less tenable. At the same time, the 
importance of the sea is growing in human understanding, with the sea now estimated to contain up 
to 80% of all life on the planet,31 as well as maintaining all life on earth through its role regulating the 
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temperature of the planet, providing oxygen and storing carbon.32 With this background, it is hoped 
that the BBNJ treaty will enable sustainable use of the sea by humankind. De Lucia suggests that a 
fundamental step for the treaty is to adopt an ecosystem approach to the regulation and 
management of the sea, and that such adoption would help the international community move 
towards “elaborating a different legal space, an oceanic ‘lawscape’ aligned with ecological 
realities.”33  
7.3.2 The sea and its multiple lawscapes 
Of course ‘the sea’ is a very large area, covering approximately 70% of the surface of the Earth34 and 
containing 99% of the living space on the Earth.35 To talk of the lawscape of the sea is to talk in 
extremely general terms. The sea has multiple lawscapes, with the focus of this research on the 
coastal sea of England. Nonetheless, certain elements will be common to any lawscape involving the 
sea, the most important arguably being movement. Unlike the land, “the sea is in constant 
motion.”36 This makes it difficult to simply transplant land-based legal approaches onto the sea. 
Many attempts at regulating humans’ use of the sea are based upon demarcating a space and then 
setting out what is permitted and what is prohibited within that space,37 for example, UNCLOS sets 
up four different types of sea spaces; territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, continental shelf 
and the high seas. Yet there can be no fences or walls at sea to mark out these zones and the water 
is constantly moving, making static zones like this much less certain than their counterparts on land.  
Not only is the water itself constantly moving, but the life within it is too. In the case study discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6, one fisherman explained his frustration at regulations based upon science when 
that science is carried out by people who, in his view, don’t understand the movement inherent in 
the sea:  
“Why is it that they will not take notice of people, just because we haven’t got letters and such after 
our names, why is it that they don’t just say, “well if we fish there why won’t we catch anything 
there?” It's because the pattern of that particular species means it has swum through, that’s there. 
They need to go to sea and spend more time on board the fishing boats and see where people fish 
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33 Vito De Lucia, ‘The BBNJ negotiations and ecosystem governance in the arctic’ (2020) Marine Policy 103756, 
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34 Christina Nunez, ‘Climate 101: The oceans’ (National Geographic, 21 March 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/habitats/ocean/> accessed 25 August 2020 
35 NASA Science, ‘Living Ocean’ <https://science.nasa.gov/earth-science/oceanography/living-
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and how the cycle of fish travel round. Very rarely do you get any one species staying in any one 
area, they’re mobile fish, they will move.” (PN13-FSH) 
In coastal areas, the movement of the sea also creates rhythms; the daily rhythm of the tide and its 
the seasonal patterns. This in turn creates “rhythms of fishing” that correspond to the rhythms of 
the sea.38 As one participant noted in connection to estuarine salmon fishing: “[the fishermen] know 
how to go, in the right place at the right time, the state of tide, through the season, through the year, 
and catch a fish” (PN20-FSH). These rhythms extend further than just the fishermen though, with 
Reed et al, in a study of English fishing communities, suggesting that the rhythms of fishing impart a 
rhythm to the coastal communities that the fishermen live and work in, with “fishermen playing a 
central role in enacting the link between… the sea and the land.”39 The importance of acknowledging 
these rhythms in the management of fisheries was stressed by the same participant when discussing 
the consultation undertaken by D&S IFCA in relation to the netting byelaw:40  
“[T]hey did the fishing consultation in the summer, it’s ridiculous, it’s an insult to people’s you know, 
they say well you’ve got to come in for fish and talk to us, well why didn’t you start it in February? 
Why don’t you understand what you’re talking about, that’s the first thing about consultation, is to 
understand where people are, what people want to talk about and when they can discuss it... And 
you’ve got a long time, particularly on this North coast, when fishermen are not out, so you’ve got a 
period of 4 or 5 months in the winter time when you should set up your consultation.” (PN20-FSH) 
As this quote shows, a perceived failure to acknowledge such rhythms by decision makers in the 
marine environment can lead to a lack of acceptance of the related actions taken by such decision 
makers.  
7.3.3 The sea as a distant place 
As well as the movement of the sea, its location is fundamental to its lawscape. More specifically, its 
location in connection to humans. In the case study, one participant contrasted the situation of 
managing activity at sea with that of managing activity on land:  
“I think if it was something that the general public could envisage more clearly and understand, 
they wouldn't do it. So if it was some other sort of resource on the land that they could see, like trees 
and stuff, and then it was like, "no we're going to have to clear this lot out and we'll just hope that 
we get a good [replacement in future years]," [it wouldn't be accepted].” (PN21-MAN) 
 
This comment illuminates the problems law can face when it has to operate in a place that is difficult 
to access and oversee. The difficulty of access creates two problems; the more obvious of the two is 
 
38 Matt Reed, Paul Courtney, Julie Urquhart and Natalie Ross, ‘Beyond fish as commodities: Understanding the 
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39 Ibid. 
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that enforcement of any rules and regulations is much more difficult. But equally important, as 
shown in the quote above, is that a place that is difficult to access is therefore generally not 
accessed by the public and so does not attract their attention and concern as easily as more 
accessible places.  
 
Enforcement of regulation 
In a discussion of how rural spaces are shaped by their distance and isolation from humans, Pruitt 
notes that the reduced enforcement capabilities of actors in such spaces has a profound effect on 
the lawscape of such spaces.41 In the context of the sea, Walters observes that the idea of a the sea 
as a lawless place is ever-present: “however much the ocean may have been striated by the modern 
forces of commerce, geopolitics and international law, however much it has been rendered 
predictable, navigable, exploitable, etc. by these interventions, there exist circumstances under which 
the ancient idea of the high sea as a lawless space beyond sovereignty and justice is capable of being 
reactivated.”42 Pruitt recognises that this notion of “lawlessness” (or at least of spaces that are less 
lawful than others) arises when legal actors start to “manage their expectations of law’s force” in the 
context of the particular setting.43 In the lawscape of the coastal waters, this can be seen in the 
views held by those involved in the management of fisheries regarding what is achievable when 
regulating fishers’ behaviour:  
 
“You can post notices about whether such and such an activity is regulated and requires a permit, 
and if you haven’t got a permit don’t do it. But then you’re never going to have the enforcement 
capability to do anything about it, so that’s where you have to decide whether something is worth 
putting into legislation and then creating a toothless tiger.” (PN07-MAN) 
 
The reduced ability of law to regulate behaviour in a distant and geographically expansive place like 
the sea (even the coastal sea covers a dauntingly sized area for enforcement officers, and one which 
is mostly far from human oversight) can also have an impact on those being regulated, as well as the 
regulators. In the context of fisheries management, Randall notes that the difficulty of enforcing 
fisheries regulation over large geographic ranges “potentially lowers avoidance costs to a level below 
that of continued compliance, increasing the incentives for noncompliance.”44 In addition, Pruitt 
 
41 Lisa Pruitt, ‘The Rural Lawscape: Space Tames Law Tames Space’ in Irus Braverman, Nicholas Blomey, David 
Delaney and Alexandre Kedar (Eds.), The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 191-193 
42 William Walters, ‘Bordering the Sea: Shipping Industries and the Policing of Stowaways’ (2008) 7(3) 
Borderlands 1, 5 
43 Pruitt (n41), 195 
44 Jeffrey K. Randall, ‘Improving Compliance in U.S. Federal Fisheries: An Enforcement Agency Perspective’ 
(2004) 35(4) Ocean Development & International Law 287, 295 
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suggests (in the context of rural space) that “[s]uch uneven presence of law enforcement and other 
legal actors presumably fosters an ethos of self-reliance that influences attitudes about the role of 
law… as well as towards the state more generally.”45 The presumption of self-reliance is borne out in 
the case study, where a number of strands of self-reliance can be identified. Some participants 
talked about fishermen dealing with their own disputes over who can fish in particular areas:  
 
“There used to be sort of a reckoning at sea if either the Cornish pots came into Devon or the Devon 
pots went into Cornwall.” (PN20-FSH)  
 
“[T]here is a suggestion that the salmon netsmen protected the areas they fished and prevented 
anybody else netting for other species. There was essentially an unofficial turf war that used to take 
place to protect what they perceived was their own interests.” (PN15-MAN) 
 
While another participant explained his reasoning behind ceasing to fish in his local estuary, 
explaining the need for self-preservation in the face of a perceived failure by the fisheries authorities 
to enforce the law within the estuary and coastal waters. 
[W]e started getting the… illegal netters who travel all over. I mean they’ve been caught in Poole 
Harbour and down in Cornwall. There’s two or three little boats and they go round on trailers and 
they just wipe everything out. But they started tying nets across estuaries, cutting off creeks, so 
they’d tie a net on here, go right over the other side and tie it to a tree and wait for the tide to go 
out. And they’d absolutely obliterate the fisheries. Devon Sea Fisheries, you know they chased them 
around, but every time they seemed to get them, they didn’t prosecute them and then they sort of 
carried on. And it all got messy and a few of us said we’re not getting involved in this, and so we 
stopped our legal netting.  Just simply because there were police on the quays at night, there were 
boats up the estuary tearing around looking for them, they never did any damage, they caught them 
once a year or something. It was like a token gesture. And we, I used to take my son with me, and I 
said look, we’re not netting, we’re not getting involved. Because if you go out there, you might be 
doing it legally, but if you get dragged into that. So we basically stopped doing it.” (PN11-FSH) 
 
A final strand of self-reliance can be identified in relation to informal arrangements and voluntary 
agreements between fishermen, in effect taking management into their own hands. A number of 
participants discussed voluntary measures fishermen had agreed upon in order to ‘regulate’ fishing 
within their locality. For example, one fisherman described how trawling in their local bay had been 
ended by the fishermen themselves:  
“[S]ee down this end of the bay there’s no trawling at all. My family and all the families around here 
they stopped that back in whenever; that’s what annoys us at fishing meetings when like IFCA go on 
about oh the MMO want to put in these conservation areas down here, well this has been a 
‘conservation area’ for about a hundred years down here, it’s nothing new.” (PN16-FSH) 
Similarly, one of the management participants observed collective efforts by fishermen to control 
their harvest:  
 
45 Pruitt (n41), 198 
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“[T]he fishermen were so up for the 4 tonne [limit on cockle harvesting], they went "right, voluntarily, 
nobody lands a cockle over the 4 tonne, and if they do there's all hell to pay" … it was a voluntary 
agreement, [but] there was enough pressure from the majority to influence everybody and they 
daren't break it.” (PN21-MAN) 
Such examples are not unique to commercial fishing, with the IFCA documentation noting that:  
“[r]ecreational anglers have been campaigning for an increased [minimum landing size] applicable to 
all sectors for some time now, and minimum club sizes for sea bass far exceed the legal [minimum 
landing size], for example the bass [minimum landing size] for the Bristol Channel Federation of Sea 
Anglers is 55cm.” (A4)46 
The reference to “pressure” in the above quote from PN21-MAN almost directly references the 
notion of social pressure discussed by Nielsen and the recognition that “social relations and 
normative values of fishers’ have an impact on [their]… behaviour.”47 In the context of the case 
study, several examples were given, as shown above, of the use of such pressure to ensure 
sustainable fishing by those actively prosecuting the fishery in the face of regulation seen to be too 
weak or non-existent.  
The distance and size of the sea and the consequent reduced ability to enforce official law in the 
coastal sea can result in self-reliance by fishermen as seen above, but the focus on the self can also 
lead to more self-interested behaviour by fishermen. This can be seen in the example of berried 
lobsters (female lobsters bearing fertilised eggs on the underside of their abdomen) discussed by a 
number of participants. In order to promote the sustainability of the fishery by ensuring these eggs 
are able to hatch, the government introduced a nationwide ban on the landing of any berried 
lobsters by English fishermen in October 2017.48 One fishermen discussed how this law was being 
flouted due to a lack of enforcement:  
“There are people, what they do is they scrub lobsters. So if you get a hen that’s got berries on it, 
they’ll get a brush and they just scrub them off, it’s not a very nice thing to do and there is a test for it 
now, there’s a chemical test. The IFCA’s got it and they’ve demonstrated it and brought it round to 
our meetings before, but they never use it, and we always go on about this. Why not use it? Because 
you know it goes on, there’s people still doing it, why don’t you just turn up on a Monday morning at 
Salcombe, or one day at Plymouth Quay, all you need is one man and a van, or a couple of you, do a 
few tests on some hen lobsters and just see what shows up? The word will soon get around “of the 
IFCA were here testing.”  (PN18-FSH) 
This behaviour was acknowledged by a participant involved in management, but the participant also 
noted the impact such behaviour can have on other fishermen:  
 
46 The legal minimum size for sea bass is currently set by the European Union at 42cm (Council Regulation (EU) 
2020/123 of 27 January 2020 fixing for 2020 the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish 
stocks, applicable in Union waters and, for Union fishing vessels, in certain non-Union waters [2020] OJ L25/1) 
47 Jesper Raakjær Nielsen, ‘An analytical framework for studying: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries 
management’ (2003) 27 Marine Policy 425, 427 
48 The Lobsters and Crawfish (Prohibition of Fishing and Landing) (Amendment) (England) Order 2017 
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“You know one that frustrates a lot of people locally is scrubbed lobsters. When they remove all the 
eggs off them. So the vast majority are supportive of the legislation that you leave the berried 
lobsters in, it's so obvious that they're covered in eggs, just put them back in. But there's a few 
unscrupulous ones, then if they see that they're not being enforced effectively, then you go "well he's 
just made an extra £200 today, another £200 tomorrow, you know morally I don't think it's right, but 
flipping heck he's taking the mick, I'm not putting them back just for him to take." Then it just 
snowballs.” (PN21-MAN) 
 
The example of berried lobsters and the possible effects of a perceived lack of enforcement suggests 
that Pruitt’s assertion that law is “less effective at achieving its goals” in rural spaces, “largely 
because legal actors and institutions are not present – at least not consistently and meaningfully so – 
in rural places,”49 could be equally appropriate to the sea (even the relatively near coastal sea). The 
effects of distance and this reduced presence of law in the coastal sea can be seen in the difficulties 
experienced by the IFCA when seeking to enforce spatial restrictions within their area.50  
 
Distance as a barrier to public engagement 
As noted in the quote at the beginning of section 7.3.3, public engagement with the sea and with 
fishing is affected by the geographic location of the sea and by the location of the fish within the 
water column (and so not visible to the vast majority of the public). As one participant in the case 
study noted: 
“To many people, unfortunately, the sea is often grey, cold and dangerous, you know it’s bit like the 
story of milk coming from cows, people don’t get that fish fingers come from the sea. They have no 
conception of how they are transformed from a whole round fish into a fish finger, and they probably 
don’t care whether it’s pangasius [basa] or cod or haddock or hake or a mixture of any of them.” 
(PN03-MAN) 
Public perception of, and interactions with, the marine environment is important (particularly when 
seeking to implement ecosystem-based management approaches) because “public views can play a 
significant role in supporting reforms”51 and thus public views can shape the focus of those involved 
in marine policy and regulation, which will then shape the lawscape of the sea and coastal waters.  
In a large-scale study of the understanding of the UK public in connection to marine climate change 
issues, Chilvers et al found that while the level of knowledge and engagement by the participants of 
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marine environmental issues was higher than expected, the visibility and proximity of impacts was 
an important factor shaping public understanding and that “awareness and concern was highest for 
impacts that are more visible, tangible and ‘available’”, such as coastal erosion.52 Indeed, Safina 
suggests that, humans being visual creatures, the fact that oceans tend to look the same to humans 
whether full of fish or not, means that depletion of fish stocks does not attract significant levels of 
public concern.53 Set against this notion, the lower levels of public engagement in respect of fisheries 
can be explained by the reduced visibility of the fish and of the activity of fishing, together with the 
remoteness for a large section of the public of the harms caused by unsustainable fishing. The low 
levels of public engagement have an impact on the lawscape of the coastal sea. The successes of 
campaigns like Surfers Against Sewage in respect of bathing water quality54 and the #2minute beach 
clean in respect of litter in coastal areas55 can be attributed in part to their connection to areas of 
the coastal waters that are the most accessible to the public: beaches.56  
In Gkargkavouzi et al’s study of public perceptions in coastal cities in Greece, positive attitudes 
towards the marine environment and reasonable levels of knowledge of marine issues were found 
among the participants. Such participants also favoured the use of education “as a highly relevant 
tool for marine conservation that will allow for a social change towards a marine literate society that 
will systemically engage in marine conservation behaviours.”57 Using education to bring the sea and 
the fish within it ‘closer’ to the public was suggested by many of the case study participants too (see 
Chapter 6 above), thus recognising the role that proximity can play in facilitating public awareness of 
an issue, and consequently public demand for change and the laws and regulation that can be 
prompted as a result of such demand.  
 
52 Jason Chilvers, Irene Lorenzoni, Geraldine Terry, Paul Buckley, John K Pinnegar and Stefan Gelcich, ‘Public 
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7.4    The Role of the Public Right to Fish 
Focusing on coastal waters (meaning for present purposes the area encompassing the tidal reaches 
of estuaries out to 12 nautical miles from coastal baselines, as regulated by IFCAs), fishing and 
fishing communities play a large part in the lawscape of these waters. Considering some of the 
suggested origins for the public right to fish reveals an intertwining of the geography of the sea and 
the geography of the island of Britain as a potential impetus for the right.  
The reporting of the Royal Fishery of the Banne case, discussed in Chapter 3, suggests that the 
monarch had the sole interest in what we now refer to as the public fishery, but that “its produce is 
not generally taken and appropriated by the king, if not of extraordinary and fixed yearly value.”58 In 
other words, public fishing was tolerated because it was not worth the cost of seeking to prevent it 
for all but the most valuable fish. Similarly in British Columbia v Canada Viscount Haldane suggested 
that the public right to fish was “probably a right enjoyed so far as the high seas are concerned by 
common practice from time immemorial, and it was probably in very early times extended by the 
subject without challenge to the foreshore and tidal waters…, if, indeed, it did not in fact first take 
rise in them.”59 The picture that emerges from these two descriptions is one of a public allowed to 
fish in the sea and tidal waters because challenging such activity was not practical or beneficial. As 
Farnham suggests: “[the King] had neither the time nor the inclination to interfere with the taking by 
his subjects of such fish as they chose.”60 This view of the origin of the public right to fish can be 
linked back to the understanding of the sea as a distant place; the size and geographical location of 
the coastal waters meant that enforcement of any prohibition on public fishing in those waters was, 
in early times, very difficult, and thus common practice by the public gradually crystallised into a 
right to fish.61  
This crystallisation may have been encouraged in order to encourage public fishing. As time 
progressed and states within Europe became more powerful, the geographical isolation of Britain as 
an island separated from the mainland continent of Europe meant that a powerful Navy was 
important. The preamble to the Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1756 (which confirmed for all inhabitants of 
Great Britain the right to fish for white fish in all waters in Scotland) notes that “the extending and 
improving of the British fishery is of great importance to this kingdom, as it not only adds 
considerably to the national wealth, but is moreover a fruitful nursery of able seamen for public 
 
58 Case of the Royal Fishery of the Banne [1610] Dav 55 
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service”.62 Thus public fishing was not just tolerated, but encouraged for the valuable role it could 
perform in equipping the country with men trained at sea that could be transferred into the Royal 
Navy.  
Conversely, the nature of the public right to fish can be seen in the impact of public fishing on the 
physical make-up of the sea; “fishing activity… puts into motion a series of events that shapes the 
physical landscape.”63 The right operates as a freedom to fish in any manner desired provided that 
regulation has not restricted such fishing;64 as one participant described it: “it’s [a] common law 
approach, residual rights, I can do anything provided it’s not prohibited or harmful to other people” 
(PN12-MAN). This renders the marine environment susceptible to new and damaging fishing 
techniques and methods until regulation catches up with technology and controls such activity.  
Scallop dredging in Lyme Bay (which falls partly within the district of D&S IFCA)65 provides an 
example of this phenomenon. The dredging method of fishing for scallops involves a vessel typically 
using two dredges, each of which pull a series of heavy duty metal framed nets over the seabed; 
metal teeth on the front of the dredge dig into the seabed and flip scallops out of the sand and into 
the nets.66 This activity was a relatively recent development in Lyme Bay, starting in the 1980s.67 As 
technology developed the dredging became more intensive and more marginal areas were targeted.  
The activity of dredging is damaging to the seabed and the creatures that live upon it,68 and in areas 
where the activity has taken place the geography of the sea has changed as a result of the activity: 
“repeated dredging over many years homogenises the substrate leading to flattened gravel- 
dominated substrates, devoid of upright surface fauna and flora.”69 Thus the public right to fish had 
permitted activity that physically changed the structure of the seabed and the ecosystem supported 
by it, consequently shaping the geography of the coastal environment.   
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But the role of the public right to fish can be observed in more than the physical geography of 
coastal waters. As observed by Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos in his description of the impact of a 
fishing boat at work: “[w]hen a fishing boat moves into [an area], a whole assemblage of material 
and immaterial bodies moves along, that includes human bodies, politics, law, finance; but also 
biodiversity, climate change, iron and wood and water, fish and plankton, histories and jurisdictional 
boundaries.”70  If the fishing boat in the example is moving into English coastal waters, then it is 
doing so under the public right to fish. However, even that simple statement belies the structuring of 
space in the coastal environment carried on by law. The public right to fish inscribes into law a space 
that it applies in – being tidal waters. This is a socially constructed space, even though constructed 
by reference to physical characteristics.71 The problems of this social construction can be seen in the 
line of cases attempting to define the precise boundary of the public rights of fishing and navigation, 
all on exactly when waters turn from tidal to non-tidal.72 The inscription of this space into law and 
the consequent rights given with the space, including the public right to fish, create a space that has 
a particular “social, political, and economic relevance.”73 The space is at once one of industry as well 
as one of self-sufficiency and recreation.  
Yet it is also a space that is often considered by some policy and decision makers in the marine 
environment to be homogenous. One participant in the case study involved in fishing activity off the 
south coast of Devon referred to the pressure for space caused by the intensification of use of the 
sea:  
“It’s something that I’ve raised in the White Paper response, is that we have to have space for fishing. 
We can’t have space for aquaculture, windfarms, renewables and aggregate dredging, MPAs and so 
on, and not say, “actually you can fish here.” You know, it’s madness to expect them to fight each 
other and all of those other industries.” (PN14-FSH) 
This intensification is partly a result of the potential of the sea for renewable energy generation,74 
although it is also influenced by other expanding uses of the sea including dredging, shipping and 
aquaculture.75 The typical approach to marine energy developments has thus far been to choose the 
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best site for such development and expect fishers to move on elsewhere.76 This can be seen in the 
description by a participant of a proposed wind farm development in their local area:  
“[T]here was proposed an offshore windfarm, did you know that here? It was going to be the largest 
on in Europe, but because of tariffs and things they pulled the plug… [T]hey were going to put that up 
over traditional fishing grounds for the squid and the ray as well. So we were up in arms over that.” 
(PN08-FSH) 
The resulting squeeze on fishers of this approach was described by one of the case study participants 
in the context of the activity of English fishers in the Channel:  
“We are, as fishing, being squeezed into smaller and smaller spaces, and that has unintended 
impacts on stocks. So, for example, the mid-Channel fishermen in the mid-Channel blocks, they used 
to be more nomadic, and since a few changes in legislation they’ve been forced to stay concentrated 
in areas for like 5 or 10 years now. So they’re not going to put pressure on other areas of stock, 
they’re not exploring new areas, they’re just stuck where they are. That doesn’t feel particularly 
sensible.” (PN14-FSH) 
Thus the increased marine development in the sea, together with the increase in restrictions on 
fishing in particular areas (such as in Marine Conservation Areas),77 appears to be having the effect 
of concentrating the effort of fishers into smaller and smaller areas. This was likened by the 
participant to farming the sea, rather than fishers acting as free-roaming hunter-gatherers.78 
Similarly, another fishing participant explained the squeeze for space and the result that “years ago 
we used to fish it all and we’d rotate it, but now [we can’t]… [and] if you get too many boats in one 
area they’ll soon clear it out” (PN16-FSH). The proposed solution for the pressure for space in the 
marine environment comes in the form of marine spatial planning. Yet Janßen et al note that 
fisheries and fishing activity is rarely “fully integrated into today's marine spatial plans,”79 adding 
that even where marine spatial planning has taken account of fishing activities, marine space is 
treated very much as homogenous, with all space being equal, meaning that “[v]ery often, [those] 
MSP processes fail to identify those priority areas which are of increased relevance for fisheries or for 
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77 See Marine Management Organisation, ‘Managing fisheries in marine protected areas (4 June 2018) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/managing-fisheries-in-marine-protected-areas> accessed 25 
August 2020; and Marine Management Organisation, ‘Marine protected areas: strategic management table’ (5 
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fish species during different life stages.”80  Furthermore, in those areas where marine spatial plans 
recognised valuable areas for fishing, the classification of these areas was generally based on the 
economic value of the fishery, ignoring areas that might have social and cultural value, such as areas 
used by small-scale fishers or recreational fishers.81 
In the UK steps have been taken to address the need to recognise the different values attributed to 
marine spaces by fishers. The Marine Policy Statement adopted in 2011 acknowledges that 
“[m]arine developments have the potential to prevent, displace or encourage fishing activities. There 
are potential social, economic and environmental impacts of displacement of fishing activity caused 
by other sea uses, particularly if from well established fishing grounds.”82 Furthermore, the draft 
Marine Spatial Plan for the South West area currently provides that “[p]roposals [for development in 
the marine area] that may have significant adverse impacts on access for fishing activities must 
demonstrate that they will, in order of preference: a) avoid b) minimise c) mitigate significant 
adverse impacts d) if it is not possible to mitigate the significant adverse impacts, proposals should 
state the case for proceeding.”83 It remains to be seen whether this approach will be successful in 
enabling fishers to protect their access to the areas of the sea that have the most value for them. 
But what is clear is that the increased pressure on the resources and space of the sea creates zones 
of use within the coastal sea, very similar to the position on land. 
7.5   The Role of Fisheries Management 
As noted in Chapter 2, power in any particular space is often experienced through the law,84 thus in 
determining how the law shapes and configures social spaces, one must also consider where the law 
places the power in such spaces. In this context power is understood as a “capacity to act” rather 
than as “something held over others.”85 Power in a particular space is often exercised through spatial 
governance,86 accordingly, in the coastal lawscape, examining fisheries management in the coastal 
sea provides a window into the distribution of power in this space and how such a distribution 
shapes the fishing activity within the space and thus the geography of the space.  
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7.5.1 The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 
It is important to note that power, at the human level, depends upon “an individual’s or group’s 
position and power within various social relationships.”87 Thus it is ever changing such that “people 
have more power in some relationships than others, or at some historical moments and not 
others.”88 The position of the commercial fishing sector in relation to coastal waters provides an 
illustration of how distributions of power can change. Prior to the Marine and Coastal Access Act 
2009, fishing activity in inshore coastal waters was managed by Sea Fisheries Committees. The 2009 
Act replaced these Committees with Inshore Fishing and Conservation Authorities. What this meant 
for the commercial fishing sector is explained by a case study participant:  
“[I]t’s essential that there are fishing industry representatives on the IFCA, that there is a balance. 
When it was Sea Fisheries Committee the balance was difference; there was a 50% requirement from 
the local catch; those local authorities that paid the funding of the Sea Fisheries Committee and the 
other 50% were taken up from industry. Nowadays, the balance has shifted away from the industry 
and towards the conservation NGOs and the recreational sector as well. So whilst there is still 50% 
local authority, the other 50% now is an amalgamation. So there are only 4 industry appointees on 
the Devon & Severn IFCA, which is something of a disappointment really compared to what it was 
when it was the Sea Fisheries Committee.” (PN07-MAN) 
As Ribot and Peluso note, “[p]rivileged access to the individuals or institutions with the authority to 
make and implement laws can strongly influence who benefits from the resource in question.”89 Thus 
the creation of IFCAs by the 2009 Act and the requirement that their running be opened up to a 
wider spread of interests acted to shift some power away from the commercial sector and towards 
other sectors, including the recreational and conservation sectors. In addition, the balancing role 
given to each IFCA in section 153 of that Act90 compounded this power shift. The netting byelaw, 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, can be framed as one outcome of the shift in power. D&S IFCA’s 
published material makes it clear that one of the drivers for the introduction of this byelaw was to 
enable the enhancement of recreational angling opportunities within the district:   
“The recreational angling sector has been recognised as a large group in England with a survey 
estimating 884,000 people spending a total of over £1 Billion in 2012. The Fisheries Minister, at the 
time, stated that sea angling creates money and jobs as well as contributing to the national 
economy. Putting statistics aside, the information makes it clear that this sector is of significant 
importance and it is known that the D&SIFCA District is a key area for local and visiting anglers. The 
Netting Byelaw review has been identified by D&SIFCA as a development opportunity for this group.” 
(ANE-RR) 
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Furthermore, the IFCA confirmed in its initial Impact Assessment that:  
“Responses from the recreational sea anglers [to the pre-consultation] would indicate that this 
sector would recognise the closure of estuaries to netting for sea fish as a significant step towards 
recognising and balancing their needs and interests with other sectors.” (IA Cons) 
Thus it can be seen that the structural change in management brought about by the 2009 Act is now 
shifting the power between players in the fishery in order to achieve “balance [between] the 
different needs of persons engaged in the exploitation of sea fisheries resources in the district.”91 In 
addition, the implementation of the netting byelaw has had an impact on the ecosystems of the 
estuaries in the district. One target of the byelaw was to aid the conservation of bass stocks, but the 
effect is expected to be wider than this, as noted by one recreational fisher: 
“…myself and a lot of our club members fish for the grey mullet in the estuary as well, and they're a 
valuable fish. I mean the anglers are, as regards to the mullet, I would say 99% catch and release, so 
therefore anglers aren't having any impact on the stocks of mullet, whereas; the mullet are very 
slow-growing fish, so therefore if a netter can come in and take out a whole shoal, they can 
devastate the fishing in the estuary for several years.” (PN25-FSH) 
The redistribution of power away from the commercial sector has also benefited the conservation 
sector. The change in name of the bodies responsible for management of the inshore waters (from 
Sea Fisheries Committees to Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities) suggests a fundamental 
shift towards conservation outcomes. Indeed, IFCAs are now tasked with ensuring an appropriate 
“balance [between] the social and economic benefits of exploiting the sea fisheries resources of the 
district … [and] the need to protect the marine environment from, or promote its recovery from, the 
effects of such exploitation.”92 However, the statutory duty is not the only influence on the balance 
of power in this situation. The make-up of conservation bodies has an impact on the level of power 
that such bodies are able to access.  
As bodies that exist in order to promote conservation, they have an immediate benefit over other 
interests in the fishery; commercial fishers, together with a great deal of recreational fishers, have a 
job that takes up their time, thus engagement with management needs to fit around their fishing 
activity, or, in the case of recreational fishers, around their ‘day job’. This is explained by one of the 
case study participants.  
“…the other key issue that I’ve seen, and no doubt commercial fishermen find it exactly the same, is 
that Government Organisations and NGOs, Wildlife Trusts, etc. have professional staff who can 
represent their interests, whereas recreational fishermen do not have a body that can represent them 
professionally. It is very difficult for people with jobs to be represented effectively because meetings 
 
91 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, Section 153(2)(d) 
92 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, Section 153(2)(b) 
210 
 
are held during the day, weekdays and people have to take leave to attend meetings. It’s then very 
difficult for some sectors to defend their interests effectively.” (PN15-MAN)  
In addition, the increased average educational level of those involved in conservation bodies and 
specialist training that they might receive, can lead to “expert status” being assumed for those 
representing conservation bodies.93 It then becomes difficult for fishers to counter arguments made 
by the conservation sector, as explained by one fishermen in the case study: 
“But the scientists who come along, no disrespect to anybody who’s been to university, but they tend 
to go down the road of university types who don’t seem to grasp the actual hands on situation. Why 
is it that they will not take notice of people, just because we haven’t got letters and such after our 
names?” (PN13-FSH) 
Indeed, the current method of regulating fisheries based on scientific data as to the state of stocks 
and the impact of fishing activities privileges participants able to engage with and use such data 
when arguing for their preferred outcome. Thus, the professional, and often highly educated, 
conservation representatives have an advantage over the average fisher in this scenario.  
7.5.2 The Commercial Sector 
Despite the shift of power away from commercial fishermen, as described above, the commercial 
sector, or at least elements of it, still holds significant power within the lawscape. Although 
described as one sector, the commercial sector in the UK is better understood as “quite a large 
number of separate industries” who have in common the extraction of living resources from the 
sea.94 It is therefore important to understand how the power is distributed between these 
industries.  
In the UK, commercial fishing vessels are categorised into one of two groups; under 10m and over 
10m. 79% of vessels are under 10m in size.95 These small-scale vessels tend to operate in inshore 
waters only, while the larger vessels can operate in both inshore waters and further offshore. The 
under 10m vessels are not generally members of a recognised producer organisation, which means 
that those vessels that target species subject to quotas are allocated the necessary quota through a 
shared community pool.96 Conversely, vessels over 10m in size are generally members of recognised 
producer organisations97 and receive quota allocations through such organisations. Yet despite the 
dominance of small scale vessels in terms of the make-up of the UK fishing fleet, some 94% of the 
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UK’s quota allowance is controlled by recognised producer organisations and thus available 
predominantly to the larger-scale vessels only.98 The result of this organisation of fishing vessels is 
explained by a participant in the case study: 
“[T]he under 10s have a disproportionately small amount of quota. Therefore their days at sea are 
limited, the quantity, the volumes, the tonnages of what they can catch of particular species are 
hugely limited in ways that means that the viability of the sector [is limited].” (PN03-MAN) 
Indeed, another participant expressed disappointment that the government does not intend to use 
the Fisheries Bill to re-organise the way existing quota is distributed in the UK:99 
“[T]hat’s the single biggest thing we could probably do to improve inshore [fisheries], from a 
fisherman’s point of view… to sort of make fishing more equitable.” (PN10-MAN) 
The distribution of quota within the commercial sector therefore shows the distribution of access to 
large parts of the fishery resource and thus the distribution of power. Indeed, it is difficult for 
smaller boats to penetrate the stranglehold of the large fishing businesses, as noted by one 
fisherman:  
“[I]f you’ve got a big pot of money you go straight in, buy as much quota up as you can get. Of course 
the smaller guys who couldn’t afford it,  I know a fisherman, I’m not going to mention names,  who 
went to get quota and the people who they were competing against had  a never-ending pot of 
money, so it didn’t matter how high this particular person went, they were always going to go 
higher. And that was the problem, so now the under 10m pool if you like, there isn’t a lot of quota 
there.” (PN13-FSH) 
The difficulty of accessing quota means that the smaller inshore boats are concentrating on a small 
number of stocks (often shellfish as these are not currently subject to quota) to provide their 
livelihood:  
“I mean a lot of our fishermen are so hemmed by quota that they have to fish very specific species 
and can't diversify as much as they'd like to.” (PN27-MAN) 
In addition, the inability of the smaller inshore boats to physically access areas further offshore 
concentrates this activity in particular areas.100 As well as the potential this concentration has for 
significant impact on the ecosystems those stocks form part of, it also exposes the smaller inshore 
boats to increased competition as they are unable to move further offshore:  
“[There is] huge concern from local fishermen [in north Devon] that there are big boats coming from 
Cornwall and just potting north Devon to pieces and the north Devon fleet, as you know, they're so 
small and the tides in the Bristol Channel area really scary, [so] they can only come out at certain 
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times from the harbour and go back. So the window is really small and these big boats apparently 
are just kind of squeezing them to the shore and there's a lot of competition for space.” (PN27-MAN) 
7.5.3 A Public Trust of the Public Fishery 
Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 have discussed the distribution of power between different participants in 
fisheries management and within the commercial sector, however, one group with a significant 
interest in the public fishery has not yet been considered: the public. Chapter 4 concluded that the 
public fishery is held upon trust for the public as a whole. This means that the public fishery should 
be managed for the public as a whole, thus placing importance upon the wider public interest in 
management decisions. The statutory duty placed on IFCAs in respect of management reflects this to 
some extent, by requiring IFCAs to “seek to balance the social and economic benefits of exploiting 
the sea fisheries resources of the district with the need to protect the marine environment from, or 
promote its recovery from, the effects of such exploitation.”101  
The make-up of IFCA Committees, including members from each of the funding Councils, is designed 
to ensure adequate representation of the public. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 6,102 many of these 
Council members view their role as representing commercial fishing ports within their district. 
Coming back to Ribot and Peluso’s assertion that “[p]rivileged access to the individuals or institutions 
with the authority to make and implement laws can strongly influence who benefits from the 
resource in question,”103 the lack of adequate representation of the wider public within the decision-
making authority means that this wider public interest can struggle to make it into the balancing 
exercise. The result of this is that the distribution of power with regard to the fishery does not 
currently match the distribution of interests in the fishery.  
Despite the current lack of alignment between power and interest in the public fishery with regard 
to the wider public interest, the discussion in Chapter 6 confirms that the public interest in the 
fishery is clearly accepted by a majority of the case study participants. Embracing the public trust of 
the fishery would enable a shift of power in this lawscape away from the commercial sector and 
towards the wider public, thus reflecting the distribution of interests in the resource. In this way, 
embracing the public trust as the guiding principle for the exploitation of the fishery resource is 
another step along the path started down by the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 when it 
established IFCAs and gave them a duty to balance the exploitation of marine resources with the 
conservation of those resources. As participants in the case study noted, the process of moving 
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towards greater recognition and protection of the public interest appears to have stalled in some 
regards and within some IFCAs:  
“One of the big frustrations… is that many IFCAs had not moved forward from their remit as a Sea 
Fisheries Committee, when they were generally perceived to be acting in the favour of commercial 
fishing interests. Devon and Severn IFCA did move forward and they took into account their 
responsibilities set out in the Marine Act, which is to rebalance the level of exploitation to more 
sustainable forms of fishing.” (PN15-MAN) 
“I think there is clearly a difference in terms of how much certain areas of the country have accepted 
that different role as IFCAs compared to Sea Fisheries Committees. Some haven't made such a 
transition yet.” (PN21-MAN)  
The government acceptance of a public trust in respect of the fishery104 now needs to be capitalised 
upon in order to ensure that the wider public interest is more thoroughly addressed in decisions 
made by IFCAs and other fisheries managers. Part of this process will be determining where the 
wider public interest lies. The suggestion by a number of case study participants is that the wider 
public interest is served not only by encouraging sustainable fishing, but also by privileging fishing 
activities that provide the widest socio-economic benefit:  
“I think it should be fairly apportioned, from a socio-economic point of view to maximise the value to 
the community, all of the communities, and that it’s sustainable. So if you’re going to exploit 
something it has to be sustainable first and foremost and then takes into account the economic 
benefits, where you can generate the most income from sustainable exploitation.” (PN15-MAN).  
Seeking sustainability in tandem with the widest socio-economic benefit is likely to privilege those 
fishers using low impact methods to catch a small number of fish; recreational fishers and smaller-
scale inshore boats operating sustainably. As one fisherman noted:  
“In order to be a genuine fisherman you have to be a conservationist, because you’re in it for life. 
Fishing is inefficient and it has to be. That’s the only way it can be a long-term activity. My nets miss 
an awful lot of fish and lobsters climb out of the pots, it’s very inefficient, but that’s the way it should 
be.” (PN25-FSH)  
As these smaller boats constitute 79% of the UK fishing industry, enabling their fishing, provided that 
it is sustainable, spreads the benefits arising from the use of the public fishery in coastal waters to 
the widest range of people. Furthermore, spill over benefits are seen in coastal communities, both in 
terms of wider employment related to fishing, and in terms of tourism benefits:105  
“[I]t’s important that we keep the tradition, so there is a right to the tradition in my mind, which then 
gives rise to all the tourism, all the interesting villages, all the quaysides, all the activities that people 
associate with holidays, which if we lose it, we’ll never get it back. And I feel, just walking in 
[redacted] with you today, that we’re on the cusp of losing it.” (PN20-FSH) 
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Thus the greater recognition of the wider public interest not only redistributes some power away 
from the commercial sector, but it also has the potential to ensure that the power remaining with 
the commercial sector is more evenly distributed within that sector. However, power is rarely given 
up without complaint and thus in order to avoid the status quo prevailing, the public may need to 
assert their interest in the fishery. This was recognised by a number of participants in their 
discussions of the need for education of, and engagement with, the public in order to ignite a sense 
of ownership and responsibility in the wider public in respect of the fishery resource:  
“We need to re-engage people with the sea, as we do with the land. We need to re-engage people 
with the state of our seas and how they could be better; provide more benefits to people now and in 
the future if they were managed better.” (PN03-MAN) 
“[U]nderstanding the health of the sea and the healthy nature of fish when you cook and eat it is two 
of the things that aren’t being worked very hard on. And I think that it’s important that we 
understand which fish is glutting and which fish isn’t and the seasons of fish.” (PN20-FSH) 
“[I]t's like plastics, where did that come from? You know plastics has now become a massive 
campaign that everybody [has adopted]; they started moaning about 10p for a bag, but now they 
see different things and it's all of a sudden, "that can't be right, we want a sea change, and [we] 
demand change." And I think fisheries management and the rest is still too poorly understood by 
most for there to be that level of change. It will continue until there is that sort of step change.” 
(PN21-MAN)  
The need for public engagement with the sea and the fish and other life within it was discussed in 
Chapter 6 and has been recognised by a range of commentators and bodies active in marine 
management and conservation.106 However, it is suggested that the public trust, which recognises 
that the asset that is the fishery is held for the benefit of all of the public, could provide a hook upon 
which to base public engagement campaigns.  
7.6    The Role of EBFM 
In Chapter 1 the current view of EBFM as the route to more sustainable exploitation of fisheries was 
discussed and it was noted that the current understanding of those involved in fisheries 
management and regulation is that transitioning to EBFM is the way to increase the sustainability of 
fisheries exploitation. As discussed both in Chapter 6 and in section 7.5.3 above, sustainable use of 
fishery resources is a fundamental part of acting in the wider public benefit and thereby recognising 
the public interest in the public fishery. Thus transitioning to EBFM is part of the public trust 
responsibilities of fisheries managers in England.  
When considered in the context of the legal geography of the coastal sea, transitioning to EBFM can 
be viewed as a transition towards geographically sensitive management. An ecosystem exists within 
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a geographical space and, similarly to legal geography, the space and the ecosystem are co-
constitutive. Thus, while purely single species management is able to take some account of the 
spaces in which a species are found, EBFM is able to take this approach further and place each 
species within the geographical contexts in which they live by focusing on issues such as bycatch, 
habitat, food web impacts and forage species.107 In this way, a move towards EBFM is a move 
towards law and regulation that reflects the complex nature of the spaces it applies to. If legal 
geography entails thinking about how law makes space and how place makes law,108 then EBFM can 
be interpreted as recognition, some might say finally, by those involved in fisheries regulation that 
preservation of the resources of the sea must come through law working with the spaces and 
ecosystems it applies to, rather than imposing normative stipulations that ignore the interconnected 
nature of the sea and the life within it.  
7.7    Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the legal geography of the public right to fish. By examining the 
lawscape of coastal seas in the context of the public right to fish, the role of the public right to fish in 
social relationships and human-environment relationships in this area is revealed. The effects of the 
physical location of the sea as distant from human habitation, together with its wide geographical 
expanse, have been shown in both the historic possible origin of the public right to fish and the 
current difficulties in managing fishing activities and enforcing fishing limitations. As well as the 
physical nature of the sea playing a role in the constituting of the public right to fish, this chapter 
also sets out the important role that the current framing of the right plays in constituting the 
physical nature of the sea, by allowing any fishing activity unless and until such activity is limited by 
regulation. However, it was concluded in Chapter 6 that a common thread running through the data 
was of an acceptance by a great many of the participants that the public right to fish is not an 
unlimited right and should not be interpreted as such.109 Embracing the public trust of the public 
fishery recognises this principle and provides an opportunity to address the problems that can arise 
when new technologies are developed that the law does not adequately provide for. The flexible 
nature of the public trust is perfectly suited to address such problems by allowing local fisheries 
managers to act quickly to ensure that any exploitation of the fishery resource is in the public 
benefit.  
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In addition, this chapter considered the allocation of power within the exploitation of fishery 
resources within England’s coastal seas. Although the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 
attempted to redistribute power by watering down the influence of the commercial sector, and 
opening up management to other interests, including recreational fishers and conservation bodies, 
this job is not complete as significant power remains with the commercial sector, and in particular a 
small portion of the commercial sector made up of larger vessels that are members of recognised 
producer organisations. Again, embracing the public trust of the public fishery has the potential to 
carry on the start made in redistributing power, by recognising the public interest in the fishery and 
ensuring that fisheries management decisions are made by considering the wider public benefit of 
any proposed actions (or inactions). This will include a focus on sustainable fishing and therefore a 
transition to EBFM, which has the ability to contribute to the lawscape of the coastal sea by 
recognising the existing relationships of the life within the coastal sea and the need for any 










CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1  Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the impetus for the present research results from declining fish stocks 
around the world.1 Many commentators on fisheries management issues argue that in order to 
address this decline, management approaches should shift away from a species-specific focus and 
towards an ecosystem level focus, otherwise known as EBFM.2 The aim of this research was to 
broaden the understanding of the public right to fish: both to determine the nature of this right and 
the implications such nature may have for its management, and to consider whether embracing the 
public ownership of this right would enable the facilitation of a move towards EBFM in English 
fisheries. Indeed, Chapter 1 discussed the concept of EBFM and the links between it and the doctrine 
of the public trust, suggesting that a public trust of the public fishery would, through the need to 
manage the fishery sustainably for future generations, require a transition to EBFM.  Chapter 2 
discussed the methodological approaches taken for this research project and detailed the methods 
used. This was followed by Chapter 3, which synthesised and presented the literature on the public 
right to fish and the public trust doctrine. The research findings of this project have been presented 
in Chapters 4 and 6 and synthesised in Chapter 7 in the context of the legal geography methodology 
adopted. This chapter concludes the thesis by drawing these findings together to address the 
research objectives, together with evaluating the study and reflecting upon avenues for further 
research.  
8.2 Research Objectives 
Three objectives were set for the research and discussed in Chapter 1. In this section the conclusions 
to each objective will be presented and discussed.   
8.2.1 Objective 1: Ownership of the Public Fishery  
The first objective was to establish who, if anyone, owns the public fishery and what rights, 
responsibilities and duties are attendant on any such ownership. The literature was not clear on 
where such ownership lay, although three possibilities were identified; that the fishery is owned by 
no one and open to all (res nullius), that the fishery is owned by the public as a whole,3 and that the 
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fishery is owned by the Crown and held on trust for the benefit of the public.4 Using the doctrinal + 
approach discussed in Chapter 2, this research has concluded that a coherent legal argument can be 
made that the fishery is held by the Crown on a public trust for the benefit of the public as a whole, 
and indeed that this is the only option that appears to fit the proprietary nature of the right. This 
conclusion also accords with the government’s stated position that the public fishery is held on trust 
for the British people.5  
The conclusion that the public fishery is owned on trust by the Crown means that the suggestion 
that the fishery is res nullius or in some way vested in the public as a whole6 can be dismissed. 
Instead the focus must be on what ownership under a public trust means for the management of the 
fishery, and especially for the prospect of moving towards EBFM. This was discussed in both 
Chapters 3 and 4. In terms of the bodies involved in management of the fishery, this research 
concluded that the fishery, as part of the prerogatives of the Crown, is vested in the Crown Estate 
Commissioners as part of the Crown Estate. However, this conclusion does not fit with current 
practice, as fisheries are managed by the IFCAs and the Marine Management Organisation and not 
by the Crown Estate Commissioners. The situation is thus that the fishery is vested in one organ of 
the Crown, with defined duties under the Crown Estate Act 1961, but is actually managed by another 
organ with no specific duties in respect of the public fishery. It is submitted that it is important for 
the government to address this defect in the current management structure of fisheries in order to 
bring clarity regarding the duties incumbent upon those managing the public fishery.  
Furthermore, with regard to the duties the public trust imposes on the bodies managing the public 
fishery, the primary shift in management required to uphold the public trust duties sitting on the 
Crown is that management decisions taken must be for the wider public benefit and not merely for 
the benefit of existing fishermen, or a small class of them. The notion of wider public benefit also 
requires a consideration of the needs of future generations of the public,7 thus foregrounding 
stewardship8 and sustainable uses of the fishery resource. In addition, by providing a framework for 
 
4 Thomas Appleby, ‘Privatising fishing rights: the way to a fisheries wonderland?’ (2013) Public Law 481 and 
Thomas Appleby, ‘Fisheries Law in Action: An Exploration of Legal Pathways to a Better Managed Marine 
Environment’ (DPhil Thesis, University of the West of England, 2015), 31 
5 Lord Gardiner of Kimble, HL Deb, 22 June 2020, Volume 804, Column 31  
6 Barnes (n3) 
7  Timothy Patrick Brady, ‘”But Most of it Belongs to Those Yet to be Born:” The public trust doctrine, NEPA, 
and the stewardship ethic’ (1990) 17 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law review 621; and Mary 
Turnipseed, Raphael Sagarin, Peter Barnes, Michael C Blumm, Patrick Parenteau and Peter H Sand, 
‘Reinvigorating the Public Trust Doctrine: Expert Opinion on the Potential of the Public Trust Mandate in U.S. 
and International Environmental Law’ (2010) 52(5) Environment 6, 8 
8 David Takacs, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights and the Future of Private Property’ 
[2008] 16 NYU Environmental Law Journal 711, 712 
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decision making rather than a strict set of rules, the flexibility of the public trust doctrine is such that 
management approaches should be able to adapt and develop as understanding of the sea and its 
ecosystems increases. This flexibility, together with the requirement for sustainability flowing from 
the need for wider public benefit, means that embracing the role of the public trust in the 
management of fisheries can move fisheries management towards an ecosystem approach, as 
envisaged by the Government’s 25 Year Environment Plan.9  
8.2.2 Objective 2: Operation of the Public Fishery 
The purpose of objective 2 was to understand how the public fishery ‘works’ in practice. By taking 
the doctrine of objective 1 out to those involved in the practice and management of fisheries, the 
aim was to understand the social context of the public right to fish and how this shapes its 
interpretation and use in fisheries management. To this end, the objective involved a case study 
designed to elicit the challenges, issues and pressures experienced by those involved in fisheries in 
the D&S IFCA district and to understand how the public right to fish is understood and experienced 
in the context of such challenges, issues and pressures and of fisheries management as a whole in 
the district. As discussed in Chapter 5, the practical effects of the public right to fish on fisheries 
management have been neglected up until now: there have been some suggestions that the public 
right to fish acts as a licence to overfish,10 or as a brake on sustainable fishing proposals,11 but the 
topic has not been studied in any detail.  
Through a case study drawing on interviews with 26 people involved in fishing or its management in 
the D&S IFCA region, together with the observation of public meetings of the IFCA and data made 
publicly available by the IFCA in connection with a recent byelaw, the research concluded that the 
public right to fish is performing a crucial role in fisheries. As discussed in Chapter 6, the themes 
generated through a reflexive thematic analysis that ‘the public right to fish is not just about fishing’ 
and ‘the public need to be involved in fishing’ suggest a right that is valued by society and, as argued 
by some, the foundation of management of the public fishery by D&S IFCA. In addition, the 
discussion of the theme ‘the public need to be involved in fishing’ shows a clearly framed interest of 
the wider public in the use of the public fishery, which is in line with the conclusion of the research 
 
9 HM Government, A Green Future: Our 25 Year Plan to Improve the Environment (HM Government, 2018), 
106-107 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/693158
/25-year-environment-plan.pdf> accessed 11 May 2020 
10 Thomas Appleby, ‘The public right to fish: Is it fit for purpose?’ (2005) 16(6) Journal of Water Law 201, 205 
11 Jeremy Phillipson and David Symes, ‘Recontextualising inshore fisheries: The changing face of British inshore 
fisheries management (2010) 34 Marine Policy 1207, 1211 
220 
 
discussed in section 8.2.1 that the public fishery is held upon trust for the benefit of the public as a 
whole.  
The need for balance in the way the public fishery resources are exploited was identified by a large 
number of the case study participants and discussed in Chapter 6 under the theme ‘exploitation of 
fisheries requires balance’. Ultimately the notion of balance is needed to ensure the long-term 
survival of the fishery, with some participants therefore seeing sustainability as the element to be 
ascribed the most weight. Within the balancing exercise however, focus also needs to be on the 
balance between the different sectors to ensure the fair sharing out of opportunities in relation to 
the fishery. Again, these concerns can be addressed by the public trust doctrine, which comes with 
an inbuilt focus on the need to conserve the fishery resource for future generations, and hence 
ensure that current uses of the resource are sustainable, together with a public benefit requirement 
that can work to redress the balance between and within the sectors that exploit the fishery 
resource.  
The case study also identified the challenges that exist in connection with embracing the public trust 
doctrine in fisheries management, these centre around the different views and perspectives as to 
the ultimate purpose of fisheries management and its intended beneficiaries, as well as the 
connected concern of bringing a range of, often divergent, stakeholders together to embrace a clear 
strategy for the benefit everyone. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, while there is a clear 
difference of opinion between participants as to who management is ultimately for, there is much 
more agreement around the benefits of sustainable fishing and conservation, which suggests the 
way to address the challenges identified is by focusing on and addressing communication in order to 
ensure that the purpose and benefits of potentially restrictive measures are suitably presented to 
those likely to be affected by them.  
This research shows that it is time to put to bed the notion that the public right to fish is simply a 
hangover from medieval times that facilitates over-fishing. As shown in objective 1, when the public 
ownership of the public fishery is recognised, the public right to fish becomes a powerful tool in 
moving towards more sustainable fishing, and thus towards EBFM. Indeed, the case study shows 
that those involved in the practice of fishing already identify this public interest in the fishery and 
the notion of balance in the use of fishery resources that it prompts.  
8.2.3 Objective 3: Legal Geography of the Public Fishery & its Future 
The final objective of the research was to synthesize the outputs from objectives 1 and 2 within the 
context of the legal geography methodology, in order to consider how both the doctrine and the 
perceptions and experiences work together to co-constitute the public fishery and the spaces in 
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which it operates. Again, the general perspective on the public right to fish in the context of fishery 
management, discussed in Chapter 3 and section 8.2.2 above, means that the legal geography of the 
public fishery has not been considered before.  
The present research identified the ways in which the nature of the public right to fish is intertwined 
with the nature of the coastal sea. The location of the coastal sea as distant from human habitation, 
coupled with its geographical expanse can be seen to have acted as a possible catalyst in the origin 
of the right as well as affecting how fishing activities can be organised and controlled. Similarly, the 
nature of the right itself, acting as a right that permits all fishing unless and until restricted by 
regulation, can also be seen in the physical state of the coastal seas and the marine ecosystems that 
make up such seas. Nonetheless, as identified within the case study and discussed in Chapter 6, a 
substantial majority of the participants expressed the view that the public right to fish is not an 
unlimited right, a view which aligns with academic commentary on the right12 (but not always with 
judicial precedent).13 Thus the public trust of the fishery, a doctrine that recognises the need for 
limitations on individual exercises of the public right to fish for the benefit of the wider public as a 
whole and also provides a flexible framework for management, provides an opportunity for fisheries 
managers to address the issues raised by developing technologies and practices, enabling them to 
react promptly to ensure that all exploitation of the fishery resources satisfies the requirement for 
wider public benefit.  
As well as considering the intertwined nature of the public right to fish and the coastal sea, the 
research also reflected upon the distribution of power in relation to the exploitation of fishery 
resources within the coastal seas of England. The key role of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 
in redistributing power away from the commercial catching sector was identified. However, as 
alluded to by a number of case study participants and discussed in Chapter 6, while the 2009 Act did 
shift some power away from the commercial sector and towards recreational fishers and 
conservation bodies, significant power remains with the former sector, and in particular with the 
small fraction of that sector made up of larger vessels with membership of producer organisations. 
The research concluded that the public trust is a tool that has the ability to finish the job started by 
the 2009 Act and continue the reallocation of power such that it reaches a sustainable balance 
between all of the interests in the public fishery resource, including the interests of the wider public.   
 
12  Stuart A Moore and Herbert Stuart Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (Stevens & Haynes, 1903), 96 
13 See Girvan J in Adair v National Trust [1998] NI 33 (Ch), who described the public right to fish as “an 
untrammelled right to reap the harvests of nature” [44] 
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In addition to presenting the legal geography of the public right to fish, objective 3 also asked 
whether and how the ownership of the public fishery could be used to facilitate the adoption of 
EBFM and thereby increase the sustainability of the use of fish stocks and marine ecosystems found 
in tidal and coastal waters. This thesis has argued that EBFM, as a route to more sustainable use of 
fishery resources,14 is therefore a requirement of the public trust duty of the Crown to hold the 
fishery on trust for the wider public, including future generations. As such, embracing a public trust 
interpretation of the public fishery would enable policy makers and fisheries managers to be more 
specific about the trade-offs required in order conserve the fishery and its resources for future 
generations. In addition, as discussed in the context of the case study, one key element in the 
transition to sustainable use of fisheries resources and therefore in the transition to EBFM, is for 
stakeholders to align their views as to who management of the resource is ultimately for. As 
government are starting to be more open about,15 management of the resource is ultimately for the 
public and thus clear acknowledgment of the public trust is the first step in stakeholders aligning 
their views as to the purpose of fisheries management.  
8.3 Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
As introduced in Chapter 1, this thesis contributes to the body of knowledge in a number of key 
ways. Firstly, by carrying out a detailed legal analysis of the nature of the public right to fish, the 
thesis answers the question left unanswered by the literature of who owns the public fishery. As has 
been discussed above, it is now clear that the public fishery vests in the Crown, which holds the 
fishery on trust for the benefit of the public as a whole. In addition the doctrine of the public trust 
can be connected with the drive towards EBFM to show that embracing the public ownership of the 
fishery supports and requires the transition to ecosystem approaches to fisheries management as a 
route to more sustainable uses of the fishery resource, which is for the benefit of the wider public.  
The thesis further contributes to the body of knowledge by adopting a socio-legal approach and 
taking the legal analysis of the public right to fish out to a community involved in fishing activity in 
order to understand the social context of the right and its interpretation and use. As has been 
discussed in Chapter 5, the role of the public right to fish in fisheries management has not been 
considered by researchers, with focus being given instead to other areas of law and policy. This 
research illuminates the role of the public right to fish in fisheries management and how it is 
understood and interpreted by selection of those most involved in the exploitation of the fishery 
 
14 Ray Hilborn, ‘Future directions in ecosystem based fisheries management: A personal perspective’ (2011) 
108 Fisheries Research 235 
15 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Sustainable fisheries for future generations (HM 
Government, 2018) and Lord Gardiner of Kimble, HL Deb, 22 June 2020, Volume 804, Column 31 
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resource.  An additional contribution of the thesis is in the area of legal geography. As discussed 
above and in Chapter 7, this thesis has analysed the legal geography of the public fishery in English 
coastal waters, using the concept of the ‘lawscape’16 to identify the ways in which the two concepts 
are co-constitutive as well as the distribution of power within the lawscape.  
The final contribution of the thesis is related not to the content of the research, but to the 
methodology used to piece together that content. Whilst all socio-legal research generally requires 
an element of doctrinal enquiry, the approach of this research has been to meld together detailed 
doctrinal-based research, using a doctrinal+ method described in Chapter 2, with socio-legal 
approaches that firstly build upon that research by taking it out to a local community to establish its 
role in practice, and then synthesise the two strands using a legal geography methodology. As 
discussed above, this mixing of methodological approaches produces a more relevant piece of 
research than any of the approaches can provide on their own.  
8.4 Policy Implications 
In Chapter 2 the strategy for the research was presented, starting from the premise that this 
research was motivated by a social problem; being the problem of how to reconcile the needs and 
desires of a human population for fish as a source of food, with the needs of the natural world in 
order to sustain itself (and indeed, the need of humans for the natural world to be able to sustain 
itself). It is important therefore to consider how the research can address the social problem 
identified; “[a]fter all, the point of critical analysis must be, as Marx said long ago, not merely to 
understand the world but to change it.”17 In June 2020, the Minister for the government stated in 
the House of Lords that the government is clear that the public fishery is held by the Crown for the 
benefit of the public.18 This thesis has concluded that this position is supported in law, as well as 
aligning with the views of many of those involved in fishing that contributed to the case study. The 
next step is therefore to hold the government to its acceptance of the public trust.  
Despite this stated acceptance, there are still many areas of the government’s strategy for the 
management of fisheries that are incompatible with the public trust nature of the public fishery. 
Appleby et al note, for example, that current system of fixed quota allocation units and its 
interpretation by the court in the UKAFPO case19 means that fishing opportunities for quota species 
 
16 Nicole Graham,  Lawscape: Property, environment, law (Routledge, 2010), 2 
17 Chad Staddon, ‘Towards a critical political ecology of human-forest interactions’ (2009) 34 Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 161, 163 
18 Lord Gardiner of Kimble, HL Deb, 22 June 2020, Volume 804, Column 31 
19 The United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of State  for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs [2013] EWHC 1959 (Admin) 
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in UK waters have effectively been privatised and concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
individuals and corporations.20 Furthermore, many of these FQA holders are not British and so the 
profits of the exploitation of their FQA units are mostly not benefitting the British economy in any 
way.21 This runs counter to the public nature of the fishery and to the need for management 
decisions to be made in the public benefit, it also runs counter to the views expressed by a number 
of the case study participants that the exploitation of the public resource of fish should deliver the 
maximum socio-economic benefit within our shores.  
In addition, the current structure of the Fisheries Bill is one that sets a worryingly large number of 
objectives for the management of fisheries to seek to achieve.22 While these include a sustainability 
objective, an ecosystem objective and a national benefit objective (amongst others), fisheries policy 
authorities are given a wide remit to interpret these objectives and to “proportionately” apply 
them.23 As this suggests, there may be instances in which pursuing two or more of the objectives 
would be incompatible and the policy authorities need to decide which objective to privilege. The 
suggestion of this thesis is that the public trust should lead any such decisions, ensuring that the 
public interest in the fishery is protected. Furthermore, these objectives are currently only for 
consideration by the fisheries policy authorities, which is the Minister in England, together with the 
comparable office in the devolved administrations.24 Thus, the government needs to ensure that the 
key bodies in England that take fisheries management decisions; the Marine Management 
Organisation and the IFCAs, also apply the public trust interpretation to their decisions.  
As identified by the case study and discussed in Chapter 6, one of the key factors that will be crucial 
in the sustainable management of the public fishery is the engagement of the public as a whole. In 
order to hold the government to their acceptance of the existence of a public trust in respect of the 
fishery, the public need to take ownership of that resource and thereby push the sustainable 
management of it up the political agenda. However, as noted in Chapter 7, the geographic location 
of the sea and of the fish within the water column acts as a barrier to public interest and 
engagement.25 If the public are to take ownership of the fishery, then their interest in and 
engagement with the sea, its ecosystems and, crucially, fishing, needs to be a key focus. IFCAs have a 
 
20 Thomas Appleby, Emma Cardwell and Jim Pettipher, ‘Fishing rights, property rights, human rights: the 
problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries’ (2018) 6(1) Elementa Science of the Anthropocene 40 
21 Greenpeace, ‘Revealed: the millionaires hoarding UK fishing rights’ (2018) 
<https://unearthed.greenpeace.org/2018/10/11/fishing-quota-uk-defra-michael-gove/> accessed 25 August 
2020 
22 Fisheries HL Bill (2019-21) 71, cl 1 
23 Ibid., cl 2(1)(c) 
24 Although they will filter down to other bodies through Fisheries Statements required by the Bill 
25 See Chapter 7, Section 7.3.3 
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crucial role to play in increasing public interest and engagement, as the bodies that are most 
accessible to the public within coastal areas. However, as one IFCA staff member noted, although 
when the IFCAs were established they had a remit to facilitate public engagement, this element of 
their remit appears to be a casualty of the stretch on resources and funding in all public bodies:  
“[W]hen I first started… with the IFCA, we’re meant to be ‘recognised and heard’, so we were going 
to a lot of big public events; the Bristol Festival of Nature, the Big Bang Event in Exeter, Fish Stock. 
But I think we tend to find that as much as those are nice to do, we don’t actually get that much 
engagement with our core stakeholders through that, so we’re starting to sort of wind it down to 
more tailored stakeholder events, which I think is good and bad. I think only time will tell whether it’s 
the right move or not, but I don’t think we have a lot of choice at the moment.” (PN10-MAN) 
The public trust means that the public are a ‘core stakeholder’ in fisheries management and so 
holding the government to their acceptance of the public trust means ensuring that engagement by 
IFCAs and the Marine Management Organisation with members of the public is encouraged in order 
to improve engagement by the public with their resource. It is suggested that such bodies could use 
the terminology of the public trust, a phrase recognised as having rhetorical power in engaging the 
public,26 in order to interact with members of the public. Thus informing and increasing the sense of 
ownership and responsibility of the public in respect of the fishery resource.  
8.5 Reflections and Limitations 
Chapter 2 presented the strategy for the research and reflected upon the methodological choices 
made. In addition to those reflections, this section reflects further upon the methods used and the 
limitations that may exist in respect of the research produced. As discussed in Chapter 2, the first 
element of this research was carried out using a method termed ‘doctrinal +’. It is important to 
recognise the nature of this method of research, as with much other doctrinal research. Sagarin and 
Turnipseed note the often partisan approach of legal research: “[l]aw review articles are built on 
extensive knowledge of legal precedent, but because they are essentially framed as arguments, they 
tend to rely on judicial opinions and other articles that support the commentator’s viewpoint and 
relegate opposing views to an unelaborated “but see ...” citation in the footnotes.”27 In the present 
research, arguments for each of the possible ownership options were considered and presented, 
with the conclusion being drawn that the public trust argument is the most coherent with the 
 
26 Carol Rose, ‘Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust’ (1998) 25 Ecology Law Quarterly 351, 362; Erin 
Ryan, ‘Public Trust and Distrust: The theoretical implications of the public trust doctrine for natural resource 
management’ (2001) 31 Environmental Law 477, 495 
27 Raphael Sagarin and Mary Turnipseed, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine: Where Ecology Meets Natural Resources 
Management’ (2012) 37 Annual Review of Environment and Resources 473, 475 
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current state of the public fishery and the law. Nonetheless, precedent supporting the other 
ownership options also exists (as discussed in Chapter 4), which reflects the confused nature of the 
body of precedent relating to the public right to fish in English law. Yet the government’s clear 
acknowledgement of the public trust provides justification for focusing on the arguments relating to 
the public trust, as opposed to those relating to any of the other ownership options. As discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 3, it is a concept that has found growing support in connection with the fishery 
resource in the statements of public bodies and the government and thus research was needed as to 
whether such statements could be backed up with legal arguments.  
The case study was discussed in both Chapters 2 and 5, with the latter presenting the detail of those 
that participated in the case study. Whilst the case study makes no claims of the findings being 
generalizable to the larger population of the D&S IFCA area or to other areas,28 it is important to 
reflect upon the method of recruiting participants through personal introductions and snowball 
sampling. Although all research is subject to the issue of self-selection bias to some extent (even 
probability sampling can be affected by lack of response from some of those selected),29 such 
sampling methods increase the possible effects upon the research of the ability of participants to 
self-select to take part in the research; such that those that choose to take part are those with ‘an 
axe to grind’ or with already vocalised opinions, whereas those less vocal in their opinions and 
experience may not come forward to participate. For example, the researcher was not successful in 
gaining an interview with any of the members of the IFCA Committee representing any of the 
funding local authorities, presumably due to either or both of the pressures on their time and their 
perceptions of the importance of the research. Although self-selection bias is difficult to fully 
address in qualitative research, the use of a case study involving other strands of data has helped to 
reduce the impact of any such bias within the interview participants, for example, by enabling the 
thoughts and opinions of those IFCA Committee members discussed above to be included through 
the meeting observation notes.  
Chapter 5 presented the detail behind the thematic analysis of the case study data. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the issue of research rigour and validity looms large in any thematic analysis. In the 
present research, by using techniques such as an audit trail and a negative case analysis (as 
discussed in Chapter 5), it is submitted that this research shows an acceptable level of rigour and 
validity. Nonetheless, the role of the researcher is an important one to consider. Any reflexive 
thematic analysis is limited by the knowledge and understanding of the researcher(s) undertaking it, 
 
28 The relationship of generalisability and qualitative research is discussed at Section 2.3.3.2 of Chapter 2 
29 As explained in Sanford Braver and R. Curtis Bay ‘Assessing and Compensating for Self-Selection Bias (Non-
Representativeness) of the Family Research Sample ’(1992) 54(4) Journal of Marriage and Family 925 
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but in a project with a single researcher, like the present research, there are fewer options for 
minimising this limitation. Had more researchers been involved in the thematic analysis process, it 
would have provided an opportunity to discuss interpretations applied to data extracts and the 
themes generated as a result. This is not to suggest that other researchers would have helped to 
ensure that the thematic analysis was ‘correct’ (as discussed in Chapter 2, a reflexive thematic 
analysis is not premised on there being one correct way to interpret data), but rather that the 
involvement of other researchers would have provided a forum for discussion and recognition of the 
interpretations being given to data and the consequences of such interpretations.  
There is also the possibility of other ways of analysing the data collected within the case study, 
which may have led to different conclusions being drawn. Other theories could be applied to the 
analysis and result in different themes being generated from the data. For example, actor network 
theory has been used to identify and explain relationships and interrelationships between actors 
(including non-human actors) and the networks created by these relationships.30 This theory, being 
described as one that enables researchers to “attune themselves to the world, … [by training their] 
perceptions and perceptiveness, senses and sensitivity,”31  would fit with the critical realist 
epistemological framing of the current research. The theory has also been used by some 
geographical researchers in the study of spaces,32 and so could have taken the place of the legal 
geographical analysis applied in the present research. However, while the use of other theories is 
possible, it is submitted that the focus of the present research on the legal nature of the activity of 
fishing and the space created by the understandings and interpretations of the law is what is most 
needed in a field, like fisheries management, that relies heavily upon law and regulation and at a 
time at which the legal basis of fisheries management is under such focus as the country deals with 
the impact of the exit from European Union regimes of fisheries management and what this may and 
should mean for fishing in UK waters.  
8.6 Further Research 
The case study carried out within this research project necessitated the selection of a geographically 
bounded area to study. However, the findings of this research with regard to the views of those 
involved in fishing activities and their management could be strengthened by expanding the scope 
out to take in the full extent of the region of England. While the views expressed by the participants 
are not expected to vary particularly based on geographical location within England, widening the 
 
30 See, for example, Staddon (n17) 
31 Annemarie Mol, ‘Actor-Network Theory: sensitive terms and enduring tensions’ (2010) 50 Kölner Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft 253, 261-262 
32 Johnathan Murdoch, ‘The Spaces of Actor Network Theory’ (1998) 29(4) Geoforum 357 
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remit of the study out to the national level could provide an opportunity to consider the approaches 
of the different IFCAs and whether these are comparable to D&S IFCA or not. In turn, this would 
allow for a consideration of whether the approach taken by the relevant IFCA has any affect upon 
the opinions disclosed by those involved in fishing within that IFCA’s district.  
In addition, in the legal geographical analysis of the public right to fish, the theory of legal pluralism 
is sitting in the background. The concept of legal pluralism “asks questions about what norms and 
rules exist in particular situations, how they connect and add up, what social values underpin them, 
and what mechanisms are working to reconcile legal differences that may exist at temporal and 
spatial scales.”33 This can be seen in English fisheries management in the co-existing layers of law 
and regulation from both national and European authorities, but also in the discussions of the case 
study participants of the informal rules and norms that apply to their activities. Von Benda 
Beckmann suggests that legal pluralism “can help in providing better insight into the complexities 
around law and rights,”34 while Jentoft argues that analysing fisheries management from both a 
legal pluralism perspective and an interactive governance perspective can provide benefits.35 Thus 
revisiting the case study data with a legal pluralism perspective could provide a useful insight into 
how this concept is at play in coastal fisheries management in the D&S IFCA district.  
Finally, the current research suggests some level of social licence for the idea of nature having its 
own voice, as discussed at section 6.4.1 of Chapter 6. There are a number of movements around the 
world that have attempted to shift away from a homocentric view of nature and towards an 
approach that recognises the rights of nature (or particular) elements of it to exist and prosper, such 
as the rights for nature movement36 and the theory of earth jurisprudence.37 Proponents of the 
earth jurisprudence movement argue that in order to truly embrace ecosystem-based management 
approaches, we need to discard the traditional view of humanity as standing apart from and in 
control of the natural world,38 instead viewing humanity as but one interconnected part of the 
 
33 Svein Jentoft, ‘Legal pluralism and the governability of fisheries and coastal systems’ (2011) 43(64) The 
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 149, 150 
34 Franz von Benda Beckmann, ‘Legal pluralism and social justice in Economic and Political Development’ 
(2001) 32(1) IDS Bulletin 46, 54 
35 Jentoft (n33) 
36 Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees have Standing? Toward legal rights for natural objects’ (1972) 45 Southern 
California Law Review 450; and Anna Grear (Ed.), Should Trees Have Standing? 40 Years On (Edward Elgar, 
2012); see also examples of rights for nature in Catherine Iorns Magallenes, ‘Nature as an ancestor: two 
examples of legal personality for nature in New Zealand’ (2015) VertigO-la revue électronique en sciences de 
l'environnement Hors-série 22 and global examples in Catherine Iorns Magallenes, ‘From Rights to 
Responsibilities using Legal Personhood and Guardianship for Rivers’ in Betsan Martin, Linda Te Aho and Maria 
Humphries-Kil (Eds.), ResponsAbility: Law and Governance for Living Well with the Earth (Routledge, 2019), 216 
37 Peter Burdon, Earth Jurisprudence: Private Property and the Environment (Routledge, 2015) 
38 Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (2nd Edition, Green Books, 2011), 44-46 
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ecosystem, with other parts equally entitled to exist and flourish.39 Indeed, Meyers suggests that the 
public trust is an ideal vehicle to facilitate this shift away from homocentric approaches to 
environmental protection and management.40 Building on the findings of this research then, further 
research could focus on the compatibility of a public trust interpretation of the public fishery with an 
earth jurisprudence centred approach to the exploitation of fisheries and whether such an approach 
has potential to further the implementation of EBFM and to further increase the sustainability of 





39 Ibid., 95-109 
40 Gary D Meyers, ‘Variation on a Theme: Expanding the public trust doctrine to include protection of wildlife’ 
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Interview Topic Guide 
 
Common Law Fishing Rights in the Sea                     
Interview Topic Guide – IFCA Committee 
 
CHECKLIST 
 RECORDING WORKING?   
 Introduced research?  
 Reviewed ethics key points? 
 
1. Introduction  
a. Let’s start by talking a bit about your involvement with fisheries – how did you come to 
be appointed to the Committee? 
b. Follow up with questions aimed at eliciting their broader experience (if that has not come 
out in the preceding questions), such as:  
What is your role on the Committee? 
What do you bring to the Committee? 
What is your background? 
 
2. Challenges/issues facing fishing/fisheries management  
a. What do you think is the biggest challenge/issue the IFCA faces in managing fisheries? 
b. What do you think fishermen would think was the biggest challenge they face?  
c. The new byelaws  
 
i. Can you tell me a little about the motivation for bringing in the new netting 
byelaw?  
ii. How do you feel that the procedure for bringing in the new netting byelaw 
performed? Is there anything that has been or may be changed with regard to 
the proposed hand-gathering byelaw?   
iii. What was the role of the public in the procedure?  
iv. How do you think the new netting byelaw will be received by those involved in 
affected practices?  
v. And moving on to the proposed hand-gathering byelaw, can you tell me a little 
about the motivation of the IFCA in bringing that forward?  
vi. As I understand it, the netting byelaw took a lot of Committee time, do you 
foresee a similar outcome for the hand-gathering byelaw?  
vii. What, if any, objections do you think might be made to the hand-gathering 
byelaw?  
viii. How do you think that current fishing activity will need to change to 
accommodate the new byelaws?  
 
3. Public Right to Fish 
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a. What do you think people’s fishing rights in the sea are?  
b. Do you think that the existence of a public rights to fish in the sea have any effect on 
how the IFCA carries out its management activities. If you think there is any effect, 
would you categorise it as positive or negative?  
c. Currently, with vessel licences and quota, there are some fishers that are heavily 
regulated and some, such as recreational anglers and some commercials that are 
generally not regulated at all. Do you think this situation works or do you think that one 
camp should be brought up or down towards the other?  
d. Who do you think should be able to fish in the sea?  
e. Who, if anyone, do you think owns the fish in the sea?  
f. Is there anything that you would change about the public’s rights to fish if you had that 
power?  
 
4. My research 
I’ve been looking in particular at who owns the public fishing rights and have concluded that they are 
most likely owned on trust for the public, so one body is responsible for them and should account to 
the public for them. The overall aim of the PhD is to take that research and put it together with what 
comes out of these interviews to suggest the future for fishing rights. 
a. If the fishery is in public ownership, where do you think it should sit? Local government, 
central government, the Crown Estate, for example?  
b. The idea of a trust for the benefit of the public suggests more direct duties such as to 
conserve the resource at the heart of the trust for the public as a whole, including future 
generations. Do you think this might add anything to the management work that the 
IFCA undertakes? (ie would it give them any extra powers or add extra weight to the 
conservation objective?) 
c. There’s also the issue of the resource being managed for the public benefit. This feeds in 
to quota and the effective gift of that to fishermen active at the time. Do you think there 
is any way to reframe quota and recognise the public nature of the resource?  
 
Closing question: is there anything else you want to talk about or think I should know?  
 
 
Themes to give to interviewees prior to interview if asked 
- Your background 
- The challenges faced in fisheries management today 
- The netting byelaw – motivation, procedure, reception 
- Public rights to fish in the sea and their impact upon management 







Devon & Severn IFCA Data 
 
Document Abbreviation 
Impact Assessment (Consultation Stage) IA Cons 
Annex 1 - Actions & Communication Plan for Netting Pre-Consultation A1 
Annex 2 - The Pre-Consultation A2 
Annex 3 - Analysis of MMO Landings Data 2011-2015 A3 
Annex 4 - European sea bass: Ecology, stock status and management update A4 
Annex 5 - Coastal netting impacts on salmon and sea trout: a review of 
available evidence 
A5 
Annex 6 - North Coast netting (Minehead to Weston super Mare) A6 
Annex 7 - Netting Survey 2014 A7 
Annex 8 - Ecology and distribution of European sea bass in inshore and coastal 
waters in South West England 
A8 
Annex 9 - Review Process Flow Chart A9 
Annex 10 - Byelaw & Permitting Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes A10a 
Annex 10 - Byelaw & Permitting Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes A10b 
Annex 10 - Byelaw & Permitting Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes A10c 
Annex 11 - Estuary Netting - Options for management discussion paper A11 
Annex 12 - Part Estuary Netting Consultation Questionnaire A12 
Byelaw & Permitting Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes 3 November 2016 B&PM 3.11.16 
Response and Recommendations Report for Stakeholders RRRS 
Access of Netting within Estuaries & the Decision Making Process (Revised 
Report to IFCA Members) 
ANE-RR 
Impact Assessment (Final) IA Fin 
Supplement to support final Impact Assessment IA Fin(S) 









Sample of Familiarisation Notes 
 
PN11-FSH - Stresses the family tradition of fishing – father, grandfather, etc. 
Sees estuary netting set against this background as a traditional 
fishery that should be protected.  
- Refers to fishery as niche and little.  
- Talks of Plymouth netters and fixes them as the ‘bad guy’ – different 
from other netters as they abide by rules.  
- Refers many times to fishery in estuary being taken away from 
commercial fishermen and given to anglers – queries this in light of 
MACAA duty to produce a balance and varied, but sustainable, 
fishery. Feels fishery is not balanced – references help given to 
wrasse fishery and queries why not mullet fishery too? 
- Anger at what he sees as failures in consultation process and 
imbalance in byelaw subcommittee against commercial fishermen.   
- Sees downturn in stock as reason not to pile more regulation on 
fishermen, rather than need for something to be done to protect 
stock.  
- Describes care for local estuary.  
- Everybody has right to fish – this is behind his arguments against 
netting byelaw – it has privatised fishery for anglers.  
- Fish are common resource and we all have as much right to catch 
them as each other, but regulation changes this if it is not fairly 
balanced.  
- But we all need to maintain the sea also – much talk of love for the 
sea and what he does to look after it.  
- Money from exploiting sea resources (not just fish) should be shared 
out between public (eg improving roads etc), not just concentrated 
in hand of aggregate dredgers etc.  
 
PN12-MAN - Stresses importance of statutory balance required by s153 MACAA – 
balancing needs of industry against sustainability and balancing 
different uses.  
- Recognition of heritage/traditional fishery argument, but this 
cannot override stock concerns.  
- Importance of distinction between commercial and recreational 
fishing – those making money out of the fishery should be treated 
differently to those fishing recreationally.  
- Cultural identity and value in PRTF – similar to right to bear arms in 
USA.  
- PRTF is basis for management of fishery exploitation – provides 
burden of proof for IFCA to justify its decisions/ actions.  
- PRTF has often been perceived as unconstrained right, but it cannot 
be any longer, but starting point still needs to be you are free to fish 
unless evidence or the precautionary principle justifies restrictions.  
- PRTF applies equally to commercial and recreational sectors, but by 
necessity commercial sector is and will be regulated.  
- Doesn’t get hung up on who owns fish, but does think there is a 
public interest in a sustainable fish stock.  
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- Wants to see PRTF encoded in statute. References Magna Carta and 
view that there must be some value in this link otherwise people 
wouldn’t keep making it.  
- Acknowledges view that PRTF is an obstacle to sustainable 
management, but believes that it is lack of suitable management 
combining with PRTF that creates the obstacle. PRTF is important 
statement of law and cultural value that requires all sides in debate 
to justify their positions.  
- Sees problem in regulating on basis of science and evidence when 
fishermen/the public are basing arguments on emotion and cultural 
value/identity.  







Extract of Schedule of Coding 
Code 
Number 
Code Number of times 
used 
Repetition in same 
transcript 
Notes New or Variation?  
42 Government not strong enough to take 
decisions unpopular with commercial 
fishermen 
IIIII IIIII I PN03: III, PN10: II, PN15: II, 
PN17: II, PN18, PN21 
 V on 34 
43 Healthy sea as a public good IIIII 
 
I 




44 Fish are a public good that belong to no one III PN03: II, PN12  N 
45 IFCA good at involving public in decision 
making 
IIIII IIII PN03, PN05, PN06, PN09, 
PN10, PN15: II, PN19, PN21 
 N 




IIIII IIIII IIIII I 
PN03: II, PN04, PN05, PN09, 
PN10, PN12: II, PN15, PN17: 
II, PN21: IIIII  
 
IA Cons: IIIII I, A5, A10c, 
B&PM3.11.16: II, ANE-RR: 
III, IA Fin: II, RRRS 
 N 
47 Distinction between commercial and 
recreational fishing re PRTF 
IIIII IIIII  PN03, PN07: II, PN08, PN13, 
PN19, PN25: II, PN26, PN22 
 V on 28 
48 PRTF is a privilege not a right IIIII I PN03: IIII, PN19: II  N 
49 Right to fish commercially granted by society IIII PN03: II, PN05, PN07  N 
50 Right to fish is subject to inter/intra 
generational equity 
IIIII PN03: II, PN06: III  N 





PN03: III, PN11: II, PN12, 
PN14: II, PN19, PN21: II, 
PN23, PN26, PN17, PN25: II 
 












Extract of Research Journal 
 
PHASE FOUR 
STAGE ONE: Checking each sub-theme against the extracts coded to it to establish whether the sub-
theme matches the data.  
THEME 1: DIFFERENT CHARACTERISATIONS OF THE PRTF LEAD TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 
IT 
Sub-Theme Changes Made 
Asset of Society - Now includes code “fish available for everyone (1st come/1st 
served) 
Base of Management - Now includes code “PRTF applies to both commercial and 
recreational fishing” 
- Code “PRTF curtailed for certain species” doesn’t fit well in 
this sub-theme and has been moved to Limited Concept > 
Limitation 
- Codes “Problem is not with PRTF but with management of 
PRTF” AND “Problem is not with PRTF but with perception of 
it” have been moved to Limited Concept > Negative to 
provide an explanation of negative views.  
- Sub-theme Recreational Concept has been moved into this 
sub-theme.  
Recreational Concept - Moved into Base of Management sub-theme. 
Nature of PRTF DELETED 
Codes moved out of it as follows:  
- “PRTF applies to UK vessels/nationals only” – UNALLOCATED 
- “PRTF as leftover ability after all regulation (freedom)” –  
moved to PRTF as Cultural Identity > Importance 
- “Magna Carta as root of fishing for all” - moved to PRTF as 
Cultural Identity > Importance 
- “PRTF applies to both commercial and recreational 
fishermen” - moved to Base of Management > Practical 
- “Reference to right to go fishing commercially” - moved to 
PRTF as Cultural Identity > Importance 
- “Fish available for everyone (1st come/1st served) – moved to 
Asset of Society 
Limited Concept - Sub-theme Negative now included within this theme.  
- Codes “Problem is not with PRTF but with management of 
PRTF” AND “Problem is not with PRTF but with perception of 
it” have been moved to Limited Concept > Negative to 
provide an explanation of negative views.  
Negative Moved into Limited Concept 
Cultural Identity - Sub-theme Tradition – several references uncoded from 
“reference to traditional/artisanal fishing/history” as this sub-
theme should be about the importance of tradition and not 
about how to balance tradition with other considerations – 
that is for the BALANCE theme.  
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- Sub-theme Importance – now includes codes:  
“Magna Carta as root of fishing for all” 
“Reference to right to go fishing commercially” AND 
“PRTF as leftover ability after all regulation (freedom)” 
 






























PRTF lead to different 
Interpretations of it 
Fishing is our 
history/culture/tradition 
– it is who we are  
Identity 
Fishing is how we thrive – 
how we keep economy & 
coastal communities 
working + how we all have 
benefit of fish.  
Asset of Society 
Fishing is what we do – we 
see it as a practical thing and 
focus on how it works and 
how to manage it 
Base of Management 
Whatever the interpretation 
fishing needs limits – in order 





PRTF in different 
ways. 
How do people 
fit into these 
groups?  
 
